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This thesis has been a long time in the making, since I was first 
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commitments as a subject teacher in a secondary school did not seem likely 
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normal limits of a part-time doctoral thesis. However, shortly after that 
there began a succession of appointments to positions of increasing 
professional responsibility which engaged my spare time to a degree which 
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conclusion over the past eighteen months, even though the bulk of the 
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Professional commitments notwithstanding, I was most, reluctant to 
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not to be held responsible for any errors which may remain, nor is it to be 
assumed that he would concur with all the judgements and conclusions 
expressed in this thesis. My second personal debt is of a different nature, 
but of equal importance and sincerity: my wife, Sandra, has acted as an 
inestimable source of encouragement, comfort and support over this 
extended candidature; she has provided an ever-willing audience both to 
my ideas and to my frustrations in attempting to complete this study, 
whilst managing my professional duties; her determination that the thesis
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own. Nor should the tolerance and support of our children, James and 
Clare, pass unmentioned: they have grown from infants to be both in their 
teenage years whilst this study has been in preparation; whilst I would not 
suggest that the quality of our family relationship has been compromised 
by this research, it has been a fact that they have had to share in the 
inevitable limitations upon other family activities, particularly in vacation 
periods.
There are also several institutions whose contribution must be 
recorded with most sincere gratitude. First, I wish to express my deepest 
appreciation to Peterhouse, Cambridge, to its Master, Professor H. Chadwick, 
to its Senior Tutor, Dr. P. Pattenden, and to its Fellows, who most generously 
admitted me as a Fellow Commoner of the college for the Easter Term of 
I960, and who most graciously made available to me the splendid 
resources of both the college and the University of Cambridge. Similarly I 
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my former school, Canberra Grammar School; that invaluable extra time for 
drafting would not have been possible without the support and co­
operation of my former Headmaster, Mr. T. C. Murray. To both Peterhouse 
and to those concerned with the two Grammar Schools in Australia I am 
much indebted for the continuous spells of concentrated time made 
available tom e in 1955-1959; it has been those two periods which have 
especially provided the vital opportunity to manage the major drafting of 
the thesis into its ultimate form.
Finally it remains for me to express my thanks to those who have 
been responsible at The Australian National University, first for opening 
the candidature for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to part-time 
students, and then for being understanding and tolerant of the needs for 
extension of my candidacy due to professional demands upon my time 
which were certainly neither planned nor envisaged when I commenced 
my study of Isokrates. It has been a long, and sometimes exhausting, path 
from commencement to submission of this thesis, but it has always been 
intellectually stimulating; it has thus provided a great enrichment and 
stimulation to me, by enabling me to continue an academic interest in 
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engaged in full-time employment, even despite the economic and 
rationalist pragmatism of the current Federal Government. Not all the 
benefits of such study and research can be directly measured by 
association with currently perceived political and economic needs.
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Abstract
This thesis sets out to provide the first major study in English of the 
historical significance of the six political discourses of Isokrates 
(Panegyrikos. Plataikos. Archidamos. On the Peace, Areopagitikos and 
Philippos). Each discourse is discussed individually, and each is closely 
examined with respect to its content and its historical context. For each, 
Isokrates' perspectives, ideas and judgements, whether idiosyncratic or 
compatible with other contemporary viewpoints, are assessed against 
available historical data, for both their historical plausibility and validity.
Throughout the six chapters, which examine each of the political 
discourses in turn, it is argued that, despite the fact that these works are 
neither deliberate historical works nor genuine orations, designed for 
public delivery in the political contexts which constitute the settings, these 
discourses provide important historical evidence for the history of the 
times in which each was composed. Each work addresses at least one 
significant contemporary political issue; other related social, economic and 
military issues are also drawn into the discussion.
Isokrates' own statements about the serious nature of his advice are 
shown to afford a more persuasive interpretation of these works than do 
attempts by some scholars to detach the composition of individual works 
from their proclaimed historical contexts or to show the works as 
principally rhetorical display-pieces.
Isokrates eschewed a personal involvement in political life, either as 
rhetor or strategos. but his discourses reveal him as astute to contemporary 
issues of state and of inter-state relations. His commentary and advice 
upon current affairs was sometimes subtle, sometimes personal, but it 
cannot reasonably be portrayed as absurd, or even inept. Issues are not 
approached ideologically, but with a pragmatism not incompatible with a 
conservative and patriotic Athenian spirit. Isokrates cannot be 
characterized as a panhellenic visionary, pursuing persistently a single- 
minded policy: each discourse addresses its own peculiar situation, and, 
where apposite, policies are adapted to contemporary circumstances.
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Comparison with other evidence indicates that it is unlikely that 
Isokrates acted through these works as the mouthpiece of an active 
politician or of a political faction. Furthermore, his views and his advice, 
whether seen to be shared by others or whether perceived to be more 
idiosyncratic, can be perceived as a reasonable interpretation of the 
individual situations. Moreover, the advice appears to have been not 
entirely without influence, although two quite specific historical events 
have been mistakenly attributed to the direct influence of Isokrates' 
advice.
In short, historians of Greek history of the Fourth century B. C. 
neglect these discourses at their peril.
(iv)
Abbreviations
References to Greek authors and texts follow the abbreviations of LSJ, 
where they are not more fully indicated, although the orthography of 
abbreviations of Greek names, as in the thesis proper, is that of the Greek 
originals rather than Latinized spellings, except for some very familiar or 
distinctive names, such as Thucydides (abbrev. Thuc.). References to 
Isokrates' own works are usually indicated only by the number of the 
work, which are as follows:
1 = To Demonikos
2 = To Nikokles
3 = Nikokles
4 = Panegyrikos
5 = Philippos
6 = Archidamos
7 = Areopagitikos 
6 = On the Peace 
9 = Evagoras
10 = Helen
11 = Busiris
12 = Panathenaikos
13 = Against the Sophists
14 = Plataikos
15 = Antidosis
16 = Concerning the Team of Horses
17 = Trapezitikos
16 = Against Kallimachos
19 = Aiginetikos
20 = Against Lochites
2 1 = Against Euthunous 
Letters:
Ep. 1 ToDionysios 
Ep. 2 To Philip, I 
Ep. 3 To Philip, II 
Ep. 4 To Antipater 
Ep. 5 To Alexander 
Ep. 6 To Jason's Children 
Ep. 7 To Tirnotheos 
Ep. 6 To the Rulers of the 
Mytilenaians 
Ep. 9 To Archidamos
References to the text of Xenophon are to the Hellenika unless 
otherwise indicated, and are given simply in numerical form (e g. 3-5-6 = 
Xen. Hell. 3-5.6).
Titles of periodicals are abbreviated according to the abbreviations 
used in L’ Annee Philologique, again unless a fuller abbreviation is used.
( v )
Modern works, after their first citation, are abbreviated to the 
author's surname and to a short title. However, a num ber of frequently 
cited works, and standard works of reference, are more severely 
abbrevictted in their titles as follows:
Beloch, GG 
Bengston, SV 
Blass, AB
Bury & Meiggs, HG 
CAII
Cargill, SAL 
D-K
Davies, APF 
FGrH
GHI
Griffith, HM
Grote, HG 
Hammond, HG
HCT
IG, I I2 
Jebb, AO
Laistner, HGW
LS]
Meyer, GdA
RE
Ryder, KE 
Sealey, HGCS
= K. ]. Beloch, Griechische Geschichte 
= H. Bengston, Die Staatsverträge des Altertums 
= F. Blass, Die attische Beredsamkeit 
= J. B. Bury & R. Meiggs, A History of Greece to the 
Death of iMexander the Great 
= Cambridge Ancient History 
= J. Cargill, The Second Athenian League 
= Diels-Kranz, Die Fragm ente der Vorsokratiker 
= ]. K. Davies, Athenian Propertied Families 
= F. Jacoby, Die Fragm ente der griechischen 
Historiker
= M. N. Tod, A Selection of Greek Historical 
Inscriptions
= G. T. Griffith in N. G. L. Hammond & G. T. Griffith, 
A History of Macedonia. Vol. II 
= G. Grote, A History of Greece (in 10 vols.)
= N. G. L. Hammond, A History of Greece to 
^22 B.C.
= A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes Si K. J. Dover, A_ 
Historical Commentary on Thucydides 
= Inscriptiones Graecae II. editio minor 
= R. C. Jebb, The Attic Orators from Antiphon to 
Isaeus
= M. L. W. Laistner, A History of the Greek World 
from 470 to 7,27, B.C.
= Liddell-Scott-Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon. 
9th. ed.
= E. Meyer, Geschichte des Altertums 
= H. H. Scullard Si N. G. L. Hammond (edd.),
The Oxford Classical Dictionary. 2nd. ed.
= Realencvclopädie der classischen
Altertumswissenschaft, (ed. A. Pauly, 
G.Wissowa W. Kroll e ta l.), Stuttgart 1694- 
= T. T. B. Ryder, Koine Eirene 
= 1? A Wicfofv <">f thA Pitv-states
700-'S ^  B.C.
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1'Introduction
Born in 436/5, Isokrates lived until 336/7,1 so that his adult life 
spanned the later part of the Peloponnesian War and the greater part of the 
fourth century, until the victory of the Makedonian king Philip II at 
Chaironeia put an end to the aspirations and attempts of various city-states 
to preside over the affairs of the Greeks. Upon returning to Athens about 
the time of the restoration of the democracy in 403, Isokrates employed 
himself as a logographos for about a decade, then turned to the instruction 
of pupils in the art of rhetoric (probably about 392), establishing a school 
which earned him high reputation and commercial success.2 3 It was not 
until 361/0 that, as a mature man of about 55, he published Panegyrikos, 
his first essay into the world of the politics and policy of Athens and other 
Greek states. In the course of the next 35 years of his long life Isokrates 
published five more such political discourses, the last being Philippos (in 
346)3
Unlike his famous contemporary Demosthenes, and at least some of 
his own pupils (Timotheos and Androtion are the two who are weU-known 
as Athenian politicians), Isokrates himself did not engage in the political 
arena: he records that he lacked both the voice and the self-assurance 
required for a man in public life (5-61; 12.9-10; Ep.6.7; cf. Ep. 1.9). Despite 
even the dramatic setting of the Athenian Assembly before which Isokrates 
portrays himself delivering On the Peace and Areopagitikos. it is generally 
agreed among modern scholars that these discourses were not intended to
ipion. Hal. Isokr. ch.l; iPlut] Mor. 836 F, 837 F; Diog. Laert. III.3.
2For accounts of Isokrates’ life see R. C. Jebb, The Attic Orators from Antiphon 
to Isaeos, 2nd. ed.,Vol. II (London, 1893), PP-1-33, and E. Blass, Die Attische 
Beredsamkeit, 2nd. ed. (Leipzig, 1892), II, pp. 8-100. Isokrates' father had been a 
wealthy man, but the family had suffered misfortune at the time of the Peloponnesian 
Var (see 15-161), a situation vhich he repaired through his teaching, although he 
appears to seriously understate his property value in 353 (see 15-155-158): 
nevertheless, by 354/3 he and his adoptive son Aphareus had betveen them 
performed three trierarchies in addition to other unspecified liturgies (15-145): 
Isokrates' financial position and the commercial success of his teaching are discussed 
by J. K. Davies, Athenian Propertied Eamilies, 600-300 B. C. (Oxford, 1971), pp245-247.
3 In categorizing Panegyrikos, Plataikos, Archidamos, On the Peace, 
Areopagitikos and Philippos as political discourses I have, like Jebb (A0,II. pp. 78ff ), 
considered the content more important than the form.
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be delivered in their putative settings, but were designed to be read, and 
probably also to be read to an audience by others.1
English-speaking scholars in this century have not been sympathetic 
to Isokrates in their judgements of his political acumen as we find it 
expressed in the political discourses. The two most extensive studies of 
Isokrates and his political discourses this century have been the work of 
European scholars.2 *Nonetheless it is remarkable that no major study of 
these political discourses has been attempted in English to this date. One 
reviewer of Bringmann’s monograph summed up Isokrates as “a man of 
small originality of thought and negligible political influence, interesting as 
the representative of an attitude or group of attitudes“.3
Nor has Isokrates proved to be a writer whose works have produced 
ready agreement among modern scholars; as recently as 1967 it was 
remarked that “Opinions on Isocrates vary as widely as ever“, and 
subsequent publications concerned with the political discourses have done 
nothing to alter that judgement.4 Indeed, the monographs by Mathieu and
1See H. LI. Hudson-Williams, "Isocrates and Recitations”, CQ 43 (1949), 65-69. 
Philippes is clearly different, in  that it is composed as a  lengthy discourse addressed to 
the Macedonian king; its setting envisages it being read to Philip (see 5.1,25-27 (for 
the specialized sense in  these passages of (errv4 SeiKW^ ix (in passive forms) as “reading 
aloud to an audience" see Hudson-Villiams, p.67f.); cf. also G. Mathieu, Les I dees 
politiques d'lsocrate (Paris, 1925), p.66; E.G. Turner, Athenian Books in the 5th & 4th 
centuries B.C. (London, 1952), p. 19; A. Lesky, A History of Greek Literature, 2nd 
ed.,(1963), trans. J. Willis & C. de Heer (London, 1966), p.586 remarks that "Recently, 
however, serious doubts have been cast on the political actuality of Isocrates* 
speeches”; K. J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality: in  the time of Plato and Aristotle 
(Oxford, 1974), p.9 considers that all the works of Isokrates, excepting the forensic 
speeches (xvi-xxi), were intended to be read.
2G. Mathieu (see previous note) and K. Bringmann, Studien zu den politischen 
Ideen des Isokrates. Hypomnemeta 14 (Göttingen, 1965).
3r . Seager, CR n.s. 16 (1966), 405: Seager summarizes Isokrates* attitudes, 
which he agrees with Bringmann that Isokrates held fundamentally unchanged 
throughout his career, thus: “Isokrates vas always the advocate of peace, autonomy, 
and freedom among the Greeks and of the 'mixed constitution* at home, always hostile 
to Athenian imperialism and selfish p o m  politics between cities and to 'radical 
democracy* “.
4H. LI. Hudson-Williams, Eiftv Years (and Twelve) of Classical Scholarship 
(Oxford, 1968), p263; cf. S. Perlman, “Isocrates* *Philippus* - A Reinterpretation“, 
Historia6 (1957), 306 (reprinted in  Philip and Athens, ed. S. Perlman [Cambridge,
1973 i  p.104), vho says: “But there is still no great measure of agreement as to its 
(Philippos* ] aims. The attitude of modem scholars in this respect has varied as much 
as their attitude to Isocrates in general.“ For recent debate see the widely divergent 
judgements upon Isokrates’ intentions in the content and purpose of On the Peace 
offered by P. Harding, "The Purpose of Isokrates’ Archidamos and On the Peace“. CSCA
3
Bringmann demonstrate two quite different approaches to the study of 
these discourses, based upon somewhat different attitudes to Isokrates as a 
political adviser. Mathieu perceives Isokrates to be a political visionary 
who saw the need to move beyond the parameters of political structure 
which had prevailed in the world of the Greek poleis throughout the fifth 
and fourth centuries; he sees Isokrates consistently and persistently 
advancing solutions for the problems which confronted the Greeks, and he 
overlooks or seeks to explain occasions when Isokrates appears to depart 
from or fail to maintain this political vision. Thus the separate discourses 
are all related to, and explained in terms of what Mathieu considers to be 
Isokrates' political 'blueprint' for Athens and, more importantly, for the 
Greeks as a whole. Bringmann, on the other hand, although also finding an 
essential consistency in Isokrates' political thought and ideas, treats the 
discourses as separate responses to individual political situations;* 1 thus he 
takes account of individual attitudes in a way which shows their relevance 
in the particular circumstances which prevailed at the time when a 
particular discourse was written. With Bringmann, Isokrates appears more 
as a genuine political adviser than as Mathieu s political visionary.
Consistency has been an issue which has disturbed some students of 
Isokrates. For those, such as Mathieu, who would see him as a political 
theorist, this is undoubtedly important. Those scholars who have been, in 
essence, sympathetic to these discourses as genuine political tracts have 
often felt the need to account for, or to deny, what have been perceived as 
inconsistencies.2 On the other hand, those who have been inclined to an 
essentially rhetorical interpretation of the discourses have seized upon such
6 (1973), 137-149, and R.A. Moysey, "Isokrates* On the Peace: Rhetorical Exercise of 
Political Advice?", AJAH 7 (1982), 118-127 (see belov, pp. 148-150).
1P. Cloche (Isocrate et son temps [Paris, 19631 p 31) notes that, in contrast to 
Mathieu, T. A. Sinclair (A History of Greek Political Thought [London, 19511 pp. 134- 
136) held the v iev  that Isokrates vas concerned in these discourses, not ’with 
expressing broad political ideas, but v ith  offering ideas vh ich  ’were related to the 
immediate political situation at vh ich  the discourse vas directed.
2See, eg ., M. L. V. Laistner, Isocrates De Pace and Philippus (Nev York & 
London, 1927) pp.l8ff., vho argues for a general consistency in Isokrates’ political 
thought from Panegyrikos through to Philippos; cf. ¥ .  Jaeger, Paideia: the Ideals of 
Greek Culture, 2nd. ed., trans. G. Highet (Oxford, 1947-1954), Vol.III. p.129: “It is not so 
much that he has renounced allegiance to his old ideas, as that he is alvays ready to 
learn from experience". AUeged inconsistency has played an important part in  
interpretation of Panegyrikos (see belov, pp. 28-29,37-38), and formed the basis for 
Jaeger's proposed date for Areopagitikos (see belov, pp. 196-198).
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inconsistencies’ as evidence of their view that the works do not have 
genuine political intent.1
Scholarly opinion upon both the quality of Isokrates’ political 
judgment and upon the significance of these discourses for the history of 
the times at which they were published has been widely divergent. For 
much of the nineteenth century, German scholars were either trenchantly 
critical in their judgements of Isokrates’ political observations and 
proposals or, at best, they allowed him to be an impractical, ivory-towered 
idealist, remote from, and with little understanding of, the hurly-burly of 
practical Greek politics. However, about the turn of the century opinion 
changed, and some scholars placed a considerably higher importance upon 
the opinions and judgements expressed by Isokrates in his political 
discourses; particular interest and emphasis came to be put upon what 
were regarded as his Panhellenic views, and direct political consequences 
were alleged for some of his political publications, particularly Panegyrikos 
and Philippos: in short, Isokrates was regarded as a political publicist of 
some importance and effect.2 3Further study did much to discredit the view 
that Isokrates' works had specific, recognizable, consequences in major 
political events: neither the Second Athenian Confederacy (377) nor the 
terms of the League of Corinth (337) should be linked to publications by 
Isokrates.3 But if the implementation of Isokrates’ ideas and advice could 
not be demonstrated to have had such apparent public effect, the notion of 
him as a publicist remained, and some attention was given to defining the 
group whose views he was held to be publicizing; this view of Isokrates'
^ e  G. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (London, 1963), pp. 192,1%; 
and, esp., Harding, "Purpose", pp.143-147.
2For a summary of historical opinion concerning Isokrates’ political vie vs and 
their influence in the 19th and early 20th century see J. Kessler, Isokrates und die 
panhellenische Idee (Paderborn, 1911), pp.1-6, and Bringmann, Studien, pp. 13-18; see 
also CD. Adams, "Recent Views of the Political Influence of Isocrates", CPh 7 (1912), 
343-350 for a sympathetic view towards those vho had seen Isokrates' writings as 
influential upon his contemporaries, although Adams is prudently reserved about 
claims to find directly recognizable connections between the discourses and the 
actions of Philip II and his son Alexander. Adams is also troubled by what he regards 
as inconsistencies both within and between the discourses and by Isokrates' alleged 
political misjudgment in believing in 346 that there was any alternative to conquest 
for bringing the major Greek states into harmonious submission to Makedon. The 
view that Isokrates and his political discourses were largely influential in their time 
did not disappear quickly: see M. L. ¥ . Laistner. "The Influence of Isocrates' Political 
Doctrines on Some Fourth-century Men of Affairs", CV 23 (1930), 129-131.
3For the Second Athenian Confederacy see below, pp. 29-31; for the League of 
Corinth see below, p.310.
influence upon contemporary politics has been summed up by one critic as: 
"the writings of a petit-bourgeois schoolteacher, and [they] are propaganda 
for the views of the conservative opposition in fourth-century politics"1; 
according to this view Isokrates’ political discourses can be used to deduce 
the political views of the conservatives in Athenian politics in the fourth 
century.
By contrast other scholars in the latter half of the twentieth century 
have dismissed these discourses as having little or no historical importance; 
an extreme view has been to regard them as composed principally as 
examples of the rhetorician’s art, written by the master-craftsman to 
provide illustration and edification for his pupils: thus one critic has 
grudgingly assented that the discourses do contain some serious thoughts 
but “were composed in response to rhetorical rather than political 
challenges".2 There is a prima facie objection to this view: it is that the 
political discourses as a whole do not appear towards the earlier part of 
Isokrates’ teaching career; rather they are published at considerable 
intervals between 361/0  and 346, with three of the six being composed in 
the final two decades of Isokrates' life, when he was already an old man 
and when he was well-established as a teacher, who presumably had long
5
Warding. “Purpose", p.138. E. Barker, CAR. Vol.VI, pp.512-518, did not support 
the notion that Isokrates' publications had any political effect, but, noting vhat he 
sees as inconsistencies in Isokrates' expressed vie vs. Barker says that "like a 
journalist he [Isokrates ] reflected the contemporary vor Id in all its confusion", 
comparing him v ith  a  “real" orator, Demosthenes, vho seems consistent, precisely 
because he vas "one-sided" (p.513); cf. also P.G. Neserius, "Isocrates' Political and 
Social Ideas", International foumal of Ethics 43 (1932/3), 307-328. The v iev  of 
Isokrates as a  spokesman for the conservative opposition at Athens, designed to 
influence contemporary politics has been developed by Bringmann, Studien, see esp. 
PP-83-95,110-111, from the vork of Jaeger ("Date", pp. 442-447); cf. also the v iev  of F. 
Jacoby (Atthis: the Local Chronicles of Ancient Athens [Oxford, 19491 pp. 74-75,130) 
that Isokrates' political discourses should be regarded as propaganda for the 
conservatives.
Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion, p.199: Kennedy goes on to reach the 
damning conclusion that "his [Isokrates'] concern for the subject matter is largely 
incidental" (p.203). Other advocates of a rhetorical rather than political 
interpretation of the discourses include: NR. Baynes, Byzantine Studies and Other 
Essavs:ch.VIII Isocrates (London, 1960), pp.144-167; and esp. Harding, "Purpose", and 
“Laughing at Isokrates: humour in the Areopagitikos?", LCM 132 (1988), 18-23. This 
v iev  of Isokrates' discourses is by no means recent: see F. Koepp,"Isokrates als 
Politiker", Preußische Jahrbücher 70 (1892), 477,479. Not all of the more recent 
scholarship on Isokrates' political discourses has taken such a negative attitude; e g. 
in 1959 Ryder argued in a  paper delivered to the Classical Association that "Isocrates' 
pamphlets concerned v ith  Athenian foreign policy discussed the most important 
questions of his time and proposed solutions that vere  realistic and reasonably 
consistent" (“Isocrates and Athenian Policy", Proc. Class. Assoc. 56 [1959 1 30).
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ago made his views known on political matters as on other things to his 
pupils and friends and who could hardly have needed by that time to 
advertise himself or his teaching. On this view, then, the question remains 
unanswered why Isokrates chose to write at the particular times and on 
the particular themes that are exhibited in these discourses. Nor can it be 
objected that the six political discourses which we possess represent only a 
part of Isokrates' publication in this area; indeed, no-one has attempted to 
sustain such a case.1 *I Of course, most of Isokrates' other works were 
composed in the earlier half of his career, and may well have had a purpose 
of ‘advertising’ his teaching; however, this thesis confines itself to the 
political discourses, which share comparable themes and purposes as works 
and are aimed at changing opinion on Hellenic' matters.
A further aspect of these discourses seems not to support an 
understanding of them as straightforward rhetorical exempla of 
deliberative speeches: with the exception of Plataikos. and possibly 
Areopagitikos. they are all considerably lengthier than the examples of 
genuine deliberative orations which survive from Demosthenes. On the 
Peace, set as a speech to the x^thenian Assembly, is more than three times 
as long as the average Demosthenic deliberative oration, and twice as long 
as the longest of Demosthenes' deliberative speeches. Panegyrikos and 
Philippos. though neither is cast as an Assembly oration, are both longer 
still.2 Isokrates surely did not intend to teach his pupils to speak at such 
extraordinary length before public gatherings.
10ur surviving corpus of 21 discourses or speeches and 9 letters corresponds 
closely Tsith the figures given in later antiquity ([Plut. ] Mor.838D speaks of 60 vorks 
under Isokrates* name, but adds that Dionysios considered only 25 of these genuine 
and Caecilius 28; Photios [cod.159 ] also knev of only 21 logoi). To be sure Aristotle vas 
said to have claimed that copies of Isokrates' forensic speeches vere readily available 
in the bookshops at Athens (see Dion. Hal., Isokr. ch.18); the reference to Aristotle is 
made in the context, of a discussion as to vhether Isokrates vrote any forensic 
speeches (according to his son Aphoreus he vrote none, but one of his pupils, 
Kephisodoros. maintained that he vrote a small number [Dion. Hal.. Isokr. ch.18 ]). 
Certainly it is true that no citation from any lost vork of Isokrates has survived, and 
there is no reference in any of Isokrates* existing vritings vhich indicates a lost
’work. For discussion of the Isokratean corpus see Blass, AB, II2, pp. 101-107: the only 
suggestion of a lost ’work concerns a manual on rhetoric. Cf. R. Sealey, A History of 
the Greek City States ca. 700- 338 B. C. (Berkeley, 1976), p.6, vho speaks of Isokrates* 
"extant * speeches.
fysing the Teubner editions of Benseler for Isokrates (Lipsiae 1898) and 
Dindorf for Demosthenes (Vol.l: Lipsiae, 1885) page-totals are as follow: (a) for 
Isokrates: Panegyrikos 46, Plataikos 13. Archidamos 27. On the Peace 33. Areopagitikos 
19, Philippos 36; (b) for Demosthenes: Qlynthiakos 1 10, Olvnthiakos II8, Qlvnthiakos
III 9.5, Philippic 1 13 5, Philippic II 8.5, Philippic III 11.5, On the Chersonese 17.5-
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There are two other reasons for questioning the notion that 
Isokrates' political discourses belong essentially to the rhetorical and 
paedogogical side of Isokrates* life; both are based upon Isokrates* own 
statements. The first is that, from his initial political discourse through to 
the end of his life, Isokrates says explicitly that he has chosen to write 
upon topics which concern matters of the greatest political and public 
importance. Scorning the themes of mythology or history and the subject- 
matter of the professional writers of forensic speeches, he preferred to 
devote his attention to subjects on which he could give advice which he 
regarded as beneficial to his own city and to the rest of the Greeks, while 
not denying that he sought to dress his themes in a rich and profuse style 
which was designed to win the approbation of his audience. Thus he says 
at the beginning of Panegyrikos, "I have singled out as the highest kind of 
oratory that which deals with the greatest affairs and, while best displaying 
the ability of those who speak, brings most profit to those who hear; and 
this oration is of that character” (4.4), while in his final work Panathenaikos 
he reflects thus: “I .... devoted my own efforts to giving advice on the true 
interests of Athens and of the rest of the Hellenes” and “since I was barred 
from public life I took refuge in study and work and writing down my 
thoughts, choosing as my field, not petty matters nor private contracts, nor 
the things about which the other orators prate, but the affairs of Hellas and 
of kings and of states" (12.2, 11). In Philippos. with its extended epistolary 
form, Isokrates allows himself a degree of autobiographical comment: he 
professes to disappointment that the advice which he had given many 
years before, in Panegyrikos. had not been followed, but affirms that this 
will not deter him from offering similar advice to Philip, and he 
acknowledges that those who would “further some practical purpose and 
who think that they have hit upon some plan for the common good" must 
convince someone who is capable of putting the advice into effect (5 9- 13)- 
Still speaking in a ‘confidential* manner, he tells Philip of the initial shock 
felt among his friends when he announced that he proposed to send Philip 
a discourse whose aim was neither epideiktic nor enkomiastic, but related 
to practical policies (5-17): however, after they had been granted a 
‘preview’ of the work, he says that his friends* pessimism changed to 
acclamation, as they expressed their hope that not only Philip and Athens, 
but all Greece, would be grateful for what Isokrates had written (5 23)
This altered reaction is surely a reflection of the advice itself, not of the 
artistry of the prose in which the ideas had been expressed. Again, in 
Panegyrikos the point is made that the advice is relevant to contemporary
a
circumstances (see 4.5-6), but it is significant that many years later in 
Antidosis (353) Isokrates no longer claims any topicality of the advice 
given in his first political discourse; instead, he sees it as a work which 
glorifies the Athenians, their city and their ancestors (15.6 1-62), whereas 
he does cite the much more recent discourse On the Peace (355) as a work 
of topical relevance in which he criticizes current Athenian policy and 
counsels an alternative policy (15.63-65). It would be perverse to 
question, or to ignore, Isokrates' sincerity in all of this, and to dismiss as 
immaterial the internal evidence from Isokrates’ works which indicate that 
these discourses were written to offer serious political comment and advice. 
The historical settings of these discourses have been likened to those of the 
Platonic dialogues, and the emphasis of the works has been declared to be 
found in their ethical messages.i It is true that in antiquity Isokrates was 
remembered more for his style and artistry and for the moral benefit to be 
gained from reading his works than for the political advice contained in 
them;1 2 however, that does not preclude the possibility that the works were 
written with a serious political purpose and context; I have in fact just 
suggested that one can perceive a change in Isokrates’ own attitude to 
Panegyrikos between the time at which it was written and his reflections 
on the work almost 30 years later. To appeal again to Antidosis: Isokrates 
declares there a clear moralizing purpose in his publications (remembering 
that he is not here confining himself to the five political discourses so far 
published), when he speaks of having devoted his life to urging his fellow- 
Athenians to lead the Greeks in a morally better and juster manner (15 66); 
also, in introducing a passage from To Nikokles, he remarks that all his 
speeches (logoi) are directed towards virtue and justice (15.67). However, 
although he admits that eloquence is rightly used in praise of the virtue 
and achievements of one's ancestors, as he had shown in Panegyrikos. he 
also emphasizes that Panegyrikos was a political discourse relevant to the 
state (15-76-77: eneira t!$ [Xoyo$] av noXiTWWTepos rod paXAov npenccv t noXex ktA.), 
and so too in his other works he professes to discourse upon matters of 
advantage to Athens and to the rest of Greece (15.76-60).
1 Harding. "Purpose", pp.142,148 (for a v ie v  of Isokrates as a moralizing 
sophist in the Sokratic tradition Harding refers Ip.142, n 27 ] to a dissertation t>y A. 
Bloom The Political Philosophy of Isokrates [Univ. of Chicago, 19551 a ’vork to vh ich  I 
have not had access); see also E. Rummel, "Isocrates* Ideal of Rhetoric: Criteria of 
Evaluation“, CJ 75 (1979), 25-35; cf„ h ow ver, Baynes ("Isocrates", pp,160ff.), ’S'ho 
casts doubt upon even an ethical consistency in the discourses.
2See esp. Dion. Hal. Isokr. chs. 2,4-9.
The second observation to be drawn from Isokrates' own statements 
concerns the position of his political views and advice in his paedagogical 
instruction. Isokrates saw himself as training young men to be capable of 
taking an intelligent interest in the business of the state: in so doing he set 
his purpose against that of the sophists, contrasting the two:
I maintain also that if you compare me vith those vho profess to turn men to a 
life of temperance and justice, you ’fill find that my teaching is more true and 
more profitable than theirs. For they exhort their follo’vers to a kind of virtue 
and visdom vhich is ignored by the rest of the vorld and is disputed among 
themselves; I, to a kind vhich is recognized by all. They, again, are satisfied if 
through the prestige of their names they can drav a number of pupils into their 
society; I, you vill find, have never invited any person to foliov me, but 
endeavour to persuade the vhole state to pursue a policy from vhich the 
Athenians ’fill become prosperous themselves, and at the same time deliver the 
rest of the Hellenes from their present ills. (15.84-85)
It is also clear that the subject-matter which he regarded as suitable for his 
rhetorical talents was similarly appropriate for the attention of his pupils 
(see 15-276). However, it is not demonstrable from what he says in the 
defence of his teaching in either Antidosis or in the partially-extant Against 
the Sophists that he sought to advocate to his pupils a particular political 
ideology.1 Doubtless his pupils would have been aware of his political 
sympathies and of his views on particular policies of Athens and the other 
Greek states and it seems quite likely that Isokrates discussed such matters 
with his pupils; but the argument in Antidosis does not encourage a belief 
that he sought to indoctrinate his pupils in the particular solutions to 
contemporary political issues such as we find presented in his political 
discourses. Isokrates alleges that his critics expected his school to produce 
an identical succession of professional rhetors (15.200). However, his own 
claim was more modest; while he envisaged that a few among his pupils 
would become public figures, he expected the great majority to live as 
private citizens who had nevertheless acquired from his teaching greater 
sophistication in social discourse, an ability to judge arguments more 
acutely and more capable of giving counsel in public debate; in short, good, 
honourable and intelligent citizens (15 201-204, 220, 241, 253-257, 276,
JCf. P. Harding, “Androtion's Political Career'’, Historia 25 (1976), 188: “the idea 
that his [Isokrates* ] school vas a political training ground for the beliefs of one 
particular group is without substantiation.“
261-262).1 The message of Antidosis does not support a view of education 
as a means of political indoctrination: quite the contrary. Isokrates denies 
that men can achieve a form of knowledge which will invest their actions 
and words with the certainty of rightness; wisdom consists in the ability to 
arrive more often than not at the best conclusion on the basis of sound 
opinion (see 15-271; cf. 15-164).2
As we shall see, the observations, comments and advice enclosed in 
these six Isokratean discourses have been used by historians of the fourth 
century B. C. according as to what particular opinion each historian has held 
as to Isokrates* purpose in composing the works and also as to what value 
has been granted to Isokrates* political judgment; nor are these the only 
contentious issues involved in these discourses: the dates of composition, 
the intended audience, the very interpretation of the contents of the 
discourses are all matters which, in varying degrees, are controversial. The 
works have been used to deduce a line of political thought, either 
individual or representative, aimed at meeting some of the most pressing 
problems of the age;3 they have been treated as a series of individual 
statements - not always well-understood - directly related to the 
circumstances in which they are set; they have also been used as a general 
pool of evidence from which to collect data pertaining to the social and
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1 Isokrates regarded the ingredients for success in any field of endeavour, 
including the art of speaking, as three-fold: natural ability, the training to acquire 
appropriate knowledge, and the practice in exercising both talent and knowledge 
(15-187; cf. 13.14-15); of the three the first was for Isokrates the critical factor, while 
even those of lesser talent may achieve a level of success through experience and 
practice, so that the teacher, by supplementing these other two ingredients of talent 
and experience with theoretical knowledge and training, ranks quite modestly 
(15-185,189-192). Nor is it accurate to say that Isokrates' education wras aimed at the 
simple development of oratorical skills; his ultimate aims were to instil the basis of a 
moral goodness and a practical wisdom (DL. Clark [Rhetoric in Greco-Roman 
Education (New York, 1957), p.52 ] notes: “Isocrates preferred to call himself a 
philosopher rather than a sophist or rhetorician, and his school a school of 
philosophy“).
2Isokrates' portrait in Panathenaikos (12.30-32) of the educated person is 
consistent with this.
3Cf. J.R. Ellis and RD. Milns, The Spectre of Philip (Sydney, 1970), p.lf.: while 
the authors correctly point out that Isokrates’ Phüippos is of little value to us as 
evidence of Philip's thinking, they seek further to limit the historical importance of 
this discourse by their assertion that "whatever his own worth he [Isokrates ] does not 
seem to have represented any important stream of Athenian or Greek thought".
1 1
economic circumstances of the period.1 Cautionary notes have also been 
sounded: thus Wendland regarded Isokrates as one of the most important 
sources for the history of the fourth century B. C., but noted that the 
evidence was not easy to use;2 Sealey, in a general history of the classical 
Greek world, expresses a similar reservation^ but appears largely to 
disdain the discourses as evidence: for in Part III, which deals with the 
period from 3Ö7/6-33& Isokrates is omitted from the introductory list of 
Athenian orators, whose works are “a rich source for this period",4 and the 
only reference in the text itself to any of the six discourses involves 
Plataikos, where Isokrates’ testimony is invoked in a most tentative fashion 
to arbitrate in a chronological discrepancy between Xenophon and 
Diodoros.5
It is the intention of this thesis to re-examine each of these political 
discourses, and so to define and to explain the thrust of Isokrates' 
arguments in each; in seeking to explain Isokrates' arguments and 
proposals consideration will be given to the historical background against 
which Isokrates' views and advice are set. From this study it is hoped that 
sufficient evidence can be assembled to enable the question of Isokrates' 
political perspicacity to be adjudged, and thus a reappraisal of the historical 
worth of these discourses.
^ o r  this last see A. Fuks, "Isokrates and the Social-Economic Situation in 
Greece", Ancient Society 3 (1972), 17-44 (= A. Fuks, Social Conflict in Ancient Greece 
[Leiden, 19841 ,pp .52-79); cf. also A. Fuks, 'Patterns and Types of Social-Economic 
Revolution: in  Greece from the Fourth to the Second Century B.C.". Ancient Society 5 
(1974), 64-63 (also reprinted in  Social Conflict, pp22-23). For a  similar attempt to 
elucidate certain aspects of fourth century Athenian politics, using the evidence of 
Isokrates and other fourth century orators, see S. Perlman,'The Politicians in the 
Athenian Democracy of the Fourth Century", Athenaeum 41 (1963), 327-355-
. 2p. Vendland, Beiträge zu athenischen Politik und Publicistik des vierten 
lahrhunderts: I. König Philippos und Isokrates, Nachrichten von der königlichen 
Gesellschaft der Vissenschaften zu Göttingen, Philol.-hist. Klasse (Berlin, 1910), p.125.
3r . Sealey (HGCS, p.6 [on the sources available for the early period of Greek 
history, down to 479 ]) notes of Isokrates: "Several of his extant speeches were 
composed on a  current or recent event and 'were probably intended for circulation in 
writing. These speeches can be useful sources for the state of opinion at the time of 
composition, but some of them are difficult to interpret."
4 Ibid., p.402.
5 Ibid., pp.417-418. Nor are there many references even in the endnotes; for 
example. On the Peace is not listed among the sources for the Social Var (p.461, n .l).
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This study begins from the assumption that what Isokrates has to 
say, either in the discourses themselves or in other writings, about his 
purpose in these works is to be treated seriously. It also seeks to treat 
each discourse as a separate unity, recognizing the fact that there were 
substantial lapses of time between most of the compositions. It recognizes 
Isokrates' own admission that he took no active part in politics, in the sense 
that Demosthenes or Aischines did, but does not assume that, because 
Isokrates operated a school at Athens, he was thereby either a political 
theorist or that, whatever political views he may have held over a period of 
forty-two years, it was these which were necessarily paramount in what he 
had to say on the comparatively rare occasions when he committed his 
views to public scrutiny. Finally, it is not assumed that Isokrates can be 
treated as a straightforward historical source;1 although not an active 
politician, he could, and did, mingle with men of affairs, and, as a teacher of 
the politician's art of rhetoric, he could be selective in choosing his facts, 
and could alter the stance which he adopted towards some facts to suit the 
current political mood or his argument; similarly, like a practising 
politician, he would have needed to take into account the current opinions 
and public mood, so that it would be against that background that he would 
frame his arguments, if they were to possess any credibility.2
^The use of Isokrates* discourses as evidence for the history of events before 
the time at vhich each is set is outside the scope of this thesis; it is a subject vhich  
has received considerable attention; for a recent study of the subject, vith  
bibliography of the topic, see CD. Hamilton, “Greek Rhetoric and History: the Case of 
Isocrates“ in Arktouros; Hellenic Studies presented to Bernard M. ¥ . Knox on the 
occasion of his 65th birthday, ed. G. V. Boirersock et al.(Berlin, Nev York 1979), 
pp290-298. For historical events before his ovn lifetime Isokrates vould not rate 
very highly as a source, but for events vhich occurred during his adult lifetime he is 
considerably more reliable, although allotrance must still be made for rhetorical 
interpretation (see Laistner, Isocrates De Pace and Philippus, p24).
2See CD. ¥elles, “Isocrates' Viev of History" in L. Vallach (ed.). The Classical 
Tradition (Nev York, 1966), pp.>25.
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Chapter 1: Paaeqvirtuos
The Panegyrikos signifies the debut of Isokrates as an adviser on the 
political affairs of his time. The purpose of the work is explained in the 
prooimion: "I have come [before you]1 to give my counsels on the war 
against the barbarians and on concord among ourselves." (4.3). Isokrates 
himself admits at the beginning of the work that in urging a panhellenic 
war against Persia and the establishment of homonoia among the poleis. he 
is not advancing a novel theme (4.3: cf.4.15). The assumption that the 
barbarians, more particularly the Persians, were the natural enemy for all 
Greeks2 *had led other Greek orators to attempt to rally their compatriots 
against the common foe as a desirable alternative to the continual 
squabbling and intermittent warfare which preoccupied the city-states.
Two such appeals are known to us: in his Olympikos, a work of uncertain 
date,3 Gorgias brought together, before the panhellenic gathering which 
attended the Olympic festival, the composite themes of reconciliation 
among the Greeks and a united war against the barbarians; he also 
presented the latter theme to the Athenians at their Panathenaic festival, 
though there he tactfully omitted the advice about establishing harmonious 
relations among the Greeks, since the Athenians were enthusiastic for 
empire.4 The Athenian metic Lysias also addressed the Greeks assembled
11 have bracketed these Trords since they do not appear in the text. The use of 
the second person in translating this particular speech is misleading (see belov.p.18).
2See Gorg. fr. B 3b (D.-K); Plat. Menex. 242d; Rep. 470c. There ,vere 
occasionally dissenters, but this vas undoubtedly a popular Greek attitude tovards the 
Persians (cf. V.K.C. Guthrie, The Sophists [Cambridge 1971! p.162; also H. Diller, “Die 
Hellenen-Bar baren Antithese im Zeitalter der Perser kriege", in Grecs et Barbares. 
Entretiens sur l'antiquite classique, Tome VIII [Vandoeuvres-Geneve 19611 pp.37-82, 
and 0. Reverdin, "Crise spirituelle et evasion", pp.83-120 of the same volume). See also 
belov, pp. 55-70.
^392 B.C. according to Blass (AB, I2, p. 59), vho is folioved by Kessler (Isok.u.d. 
t>anh. Idee, p.7) and K. J. Beloch (Griechische Geschichte. 2nd. ed. [Leipzig and Berlin 
19221 III2. 1.521, n.3). Hovever, Ed. Meyer (Geschichte des Altertums, 4th. ed. 
[Stuttgart 19581 Vol. V, p.333) puts it in 408 B.C.
4Gorg. fr.82 A1 (D.-K) = Philostr., VitSooh. 493-494.
at Olympia: in his Olympiakos, probably delivered in 364,i he lamented the 
sorry state of current affairs amongst the Greeks and urged them to join 
together in seeking to cast off the yoke of oppression which had been put 
upon them by the Persian king and by Dionysios I, tyrant of Syracuse.
The title of the Panegyrikos. as well as its theme, indicates it to be a 
composition in the tradition of the public orations which were accustomed 
to be delivered by orators at the great panhellenic festivals (panegyreis) of 
the Greeks, as well as in the competitive presentations which took place as 
part of the Panathenaic festival.* 2 3The work was clearly known from the 
outset as the logos panegyrikos. for Isokrates himself referred to it by this 
name in several later works (cf. 5 9, 64; 12.172; Hp.3-6).3 Nevertheless, the 
choice of title has a certain indefiniteness about the supposed venue, which 
distinguishes it from the orations delivered at Olympia by Gorgias and 
Lysias, and, indeed, from the last of Isokrates own major works, the 
Panathenaikos.
An attempt was made to date the publication of Panegyrikos to a 
time quite soon after the King's Peace (early 366), probably in 365,4 but it
14
^rote's arguments (History of Greece, neved. [London 19071 Vol. VIII, p. 70) 
for 384, against Diodoros’ dating of 388 (cf.14.109.3), are convincing and have 
generally been accepted.
^Eor the appearance of the sophists at these festivals see Guthrie, The Sophists. 
p.42f., vhere the panhellenic mood of the national festivals is noted (for the duration 
of vhich a sacred truce vas proclaimed). At the Panathenaia the prepared speeches 
vere certainly agonistic (see Isok. 4.45), end despite Isokrates’ lamentations about the 
failure to recognize intellectual skill at the national festivals (4.1-2), a fragment of 
Gorgias may suggest that there too productions vere competitive, unless Gorgias' 
language is metaphorical (fr. B8 [D.-K I 6 yap toi Xoyoy icocSanep to idpyypa to 
’OXvpmaoi raAeL pev töv pwXopevov, ore^ ctvoT 8e tov Swapevov: cf. Plat. Hipp.Min .364a, 
and see Guthrie, The Sophists, pp.43, vho believes that the recitations by the Sophists 
at Olympia and else vhere vere agonistic).
3 It retained this title thereafter in antiquity (see Arist. Rhet. 1408b 16; Longin. 
de Sublim. 42).
4¥ . H. Engel, De tempore quo divulgatus sit Isocratis Panegyricus (Stargard 
1861). Engel's argument is tvo-fold, based upon a dating of the Kyprian Var to 394/3- 
385/4 (cf. belov, p.l5f ) and upon an interpretation of the speech in vhich he regards 
as anachronistic the vhole section in vhich Sparta is severely criticized (viz. 4.125-131: 
see Engel, pp,18ff.). He therefore has to postulate a later edition of the speech in 
vhich the criticism of Sparta, vith the references to events of the later 380s, vas 
added; cf. R. Rauchenstein, Ausgevählte Reden des Isokrates, 6th. ed. rev. K.
Münscher (Berlin 1908), pp29-31: Münscher rejects Engel's thesis, vhich had been 
accepted in earlier editions by Rauchenstein; cf. also Blass AB, Il2, pp. 252-255, vho 
follovs Engel but vho does not, hovever, believe that an earlier version vas 
published. Engel's dating of the Kyprian Var is not to be preferred (cf. belov, p.16, n.
2), and Drerup (“Epikritisches zum Tanegyrikus’ des Isokrates“, Philologus 54 (18951
is now generally agreed that the work, as we have it was published late in 
361 or sometime in 360.1 References within the speech to recent and 
contemporary events establish as much: the Spartans, it is said, have 
perpetrated the break-up (dioikismos) of Mantineia; they have seized and 
occupied the Kadmeia at Thebes, and the sieges of Olynthos and Phleious 
are in progress (4.126). The Spartan campaign against Olynthos probably 
began in the autumn of 362, while the siege of Phleious, which Xenophon 
tells us lasted twenty months (5-3-2 5), had begun in summer 361, shortly 
after the Spartan king Agesipolis had been sent to lead the operations 
against Olynthos (Xen. 5 3-6ff.; cf. D.S. 15.22.2ff.); Diodor os records the 
capitulation of the Olynthians under the year 360/379 (15-23-3), and 
Xenophon passes straight on in his narrative from the surrender of the 
Phleiasians to that of the Olynthians (5 3-25-26), and from that to an 
account of the liberation of Thebes (late in 379).2 On this basis the 
publication of Panegynkos belongs to some time between the latter part of 
361 and the beginning of 379.
Further definition seems to be offered by another contemporary 
reference: that which concerns events in the war between the Persians and 
the rebel Evagoras, ruler of Salamis on Cyprus. According to Isokrates, 
Evagoras is now ruler only of Salamis; he has been given up to the Persians 
by the terms of the treaty (i.e. the King's Peace); he has already suffered a 
naval defeat, and yet the attempts of the Persian king to subdue this rebel 
have so far lasted six years without being brought to a successful resolution 
for the King (4 141). The war between Evagoras and the King, which 
Isokrates and Diodoros agree to have lasted ten years (Isok. 9.64; D.S.
15.9 2) and whose outbreak is recorded by Diodoros in the year 391/390
15
643ff.; reprinted in Isokrates. ed. F. Seek (Darmstadt 19761 pp.1-18) has argued 
convincingly against a publication of Panegynkos before 381/380.
xSo, e g.: V. Tudeich, Kleinasiatische Studien: Untersuchungen zur griechisch- 
t>ersischen Geschichte des IV ,lhts. v. Chr. (Marburg 1892), 137-143; Drerup, 
"Epikritisches“, pp. 636ff.; Blass, AB,. II, p. 232; Mathieu, Idees. p.67; Jebb. AO, II, p.147; 
E. Buchner, Der Panegvrikos des Isokrates (Viesbaden 1938), p.132; Bringmann, 
Studien. t>.3Q; T.T.B. Ryder. Koine Eirene: General Peace and Local Independence in 
Ancient Greece (Oxford 1963), P-44, n.8.
^For the chronology given for these events see Beloch, GG., III^. 2 .233f.
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(14.96. Iff .),1 should thus have been concluded in 362/1 .2
Given the title, the literary tradition associated with the theme, and 
the contemporary references within the work, it has been suggested that 
we can date the publication of Panegyrikos even more precisely. 360 was 
an Olympic year, and it has therefore been tempting to assume that the 
publication of this discourse should be identified with the time of the 
Olympic festival of that year; 3 that is to say midsummer 360.4 If this 
assumption were true, then it might be that the reference to the Kyprian 
War as still being in progress was an anachronism; but, given our 
uncertainty as to when precisely that war ended, there may have been an 
alteration in the status quo which came about too late for the point to have 
been corrected, or news of Evagoras' final settlement with the King may not 
have reached Athens before the time when the work was published; 
certainly it seems unnecessary to resort to the ingenious explanation
^ h is  date for the commencement of this w a r  is generally accepted, see E.A. 
Costa, "Evagoras I and the Persians, ca.411 to 391 B.C.", Historia 23 (1974), 53.
^ h e re  is a contradiction in Diodoros' dating of this v a r . It is said to have 
begun in 391 /390 (14.98.Iff.); the sea-battle off Kition is narrated under the events of 
386 (15.2.Iff ), and the conclusion of the v a r is placed in 385 05-8.Iff.); hovever, the 
v a r is also said to have lasted almost 10 years (15-92). Judeich (Klein. Stud., pp.l 19ff.) 
argued against earlier attempts to date the v a r  either to 394-385 or to 386-377, and 
historians since have accepted the combined evidence of Isokrates and Diodoros for a 
date from 391 /390 to 381 or 380. Judeich himself dated the conclusion to 381 but 
others, not w h in g  to permit too great a gap between publication of Isokrates’ 
Panegyrikos (according to vh ich  the var has not yet been concluded) and the end of
the w ,  have opted for 380 (cf. Beloch, (HL III2- 1.98 & III2.2 .227f.; Grote, HG., VIII, 
p. 21, n.4); of course, this is contingent upon the time at vhich , during the sieges of 
Olynthos and Phleious Panegyrikos vas completed. The observation in  Panegyrikos 
that the Kyprian Var had been in  progress for 6 years (4.141) is comprehensible on 
the understanding that Artaxerxes’ attentions vere  not turned in  full force upon 
Evagoras until the establishment of the King’s Peace (cf. Judeich, Klein. Stud., p.122, 
n . l ). For recent argument in favour of dating the Kyprian Var from 390-381 /0, and 
use of Isokrates’ Panegyrikos in  doing this, see C.J. Tuplin, "Lysias XIX, The Cypriot 
Var and Thrasyboulos' Naval Expedition", Philol 127 (1983), 170-186.
Sphilostratos (VitSoph. 505) says the vork vas delivered at the Olympic 
Festival; cf. Menandros, p.391 (in L. Spengel led. I Rhetores Graeci [Lipsiae 1853- 
1856D. Among modems see Jebb, AO, II, p.150; Blass, AB, II. P.251; Grote, HG, VIII, 
pp. 41,73; Mathieu, Les Idees. t>.67: Jaeger, Paideia. Ill, p.74; Dobson. The Greek 
Orators (London 1919), p.144; Buchner, Panegyrikos. p.152.
4There is uncertainty about the precise date (or dates) for the Olympian 
festival: A I. Samuel (Greek and Roman Chronology: calendars and years in Classical 
anti<iuity [Munich 19721 pp.191-194) presents the limited and far from certain 
evidence, but concludes that, apart from the likelihood that it culminated v ith  the full 
moon, it is probably not possible to be more precise than midsummer (cf. Bickerman, 
Chronology of the Ancient Vorld. rev. ed. [London 19801 p.76).
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offered by Mathieu, who adopts 361/360 as the date for the end of that 
war: for Mathieu explained the alleged anachronism as a deliberate 
endeavour by Isokrates to signify that he did not regard Evagoras as truly 
beaten and to portray him, by implication, as a potential ally of any who 
would take up arms against the Persians.1 However, such subtlety was 
neither necessary nor appropriate to Isokrates' purpose; if he had truly 
wished that his audience should still see in Evagoras a potential ally, 
despite his recent surrender, he would surely have said so explicitly; it is 
' difficult to see what was to be gained by such a pretence. Alternatively, it 
has been suggested that the putative setting of the work is the Athenian 
Panathenaika.2 *Such attempted precision about the work's moment of 
publication is not justified by the evidence; furthermore, such precise 
definition is misleading.
In several respects Panegyrikos is notably unspecific. To start with 
the title itself: 'panegyrist was the word given to a national festival (cf. 
Isok. 6.95) and a logos panegyrikos could certainly refer to an oration 
intended for any of the major Greek festivals (cf. Isok. 4.1; 5.13; 15.147). 
However, to entitle a work Panegyrikos fails to associate it clearly with any 
specific festival; Panathenaikos would have linked the work to the 
Athenian festival or Olympikos or Qlympiakos to that of the panhellenic 
gathering due to be held once again in 360.3 it  could be argued that 
Isokrates sought a title which would distinguish his work from those of 
Gorgias and Lysias, and possibly others, which had preceded. However, 
given the tradition of such festival orations by this time, it is even possible 
that there were other orations with the title Olympikos (or Qlympiakos): 
such a concern of itself does not seem sufficient to justify the avoidance of 
the more specific title.4
Mathieu, Les I dees, p. 67f.: the explanation is based upon Diodoros' account of 
the desultory conclusion to the var, vhich had not ended in Evagoras' total 
humiliation (15-82-3,9.1-2).
2See L. Preller, Demeter und Persephone (Hamburg 1837), p.71, n.32; contra, 
see 0. Schneider, Isocrates ausgevahlte Reden, 3rd. ed. (Leipzig 1886), Bd.2, p2  & 
Mathieu, Les Idees. pp .65-66.
3Isokrates ’was to give his last major vork the title Panathenaikos.
4 A desire to appear as a part of, or to challenge, the tradition might veil have 
encouraged Isokrates to have adopted a specific title like Olympikos. cf. Lysias' choice 
of Qlympiakos; later Aelius Aristides vrote his Panathenaikos as an echo of Isokrates' 
vork of that title.
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Similarly the setting is vague.1 Isocrates' works were intended for 
publication, not for delivery,2 but we should compare the fictitious setting 
of an Athenian assembly, as used in On the Peace and Areopagitikos, with 
that of the Panegyrikos: instructive also in this respect is comparison with 
Gorgias' and Lysias* speeches which were composed for delivery at 
Olympic festivals. The audience' in On the Peace is addressed throughout 
the oration in the second person and a local evdaSa is used in the opening 
sentence (cf. also 6.2: fpconev yap ^XTimacovrec), while in Areopagitikos the 
second person is also used consistently and at the conclusion the ’audience' 
are invited to vote on "what is best for Athens" (7.64). In his Qlympikos 
Gorgias addressed his audience with the words rMvSpe$ (D.-K. Fr. B7). Lysias 
similarly apostrophizes his audience at Olympia and, in the same opening 
sentence, refers to the occasion with the demonstrative phrase TovSe tov 
dywva (Lys. 33-0; in the prooimion Lysias commends Herakles as the 
founder of this festival, and by use of the first person the orator identifies 
himself from the outset with his panhellenic audience.3 Isokrates, on the 
other hand, does not apostrophize his audience at the beginning of 
Panegyrikos, and nowhere in the oration does he speak to his 'audience' in 
the second person. In contrast to Lysias, Isokrates opens with a reflective 
statement, addressed to no-one in particular, and he does not use any 
phrase or statement which is directed at the apparent occasion (contrast 
the prooimion of On the Peace). Like Lysias, Isokrates refers to the 
founders of festivals, but the observation is a general one; the eulogistic 
reference by Lysias to the legendary founder of the Olympic festival is 
matched in Isokrates by a contemplative and critical remark, as he 
deplores the fact that these panhellenic occasions glorify athletic prowess 
but fail to honour intellectual talent and effort (4.1-2: note the use of the 
plural roc navTr/?)p€ic at 4.1). It is, indeed, a somewhat studied opening by 
Isokrates when compared with Lysias' treatment of the theme. In fact, the 
first explicit reference to an audience does not occur until after this opening 
reflection, and then the first-person plural is used in a slightly oblique way: 
ntoco c&#oyAewo.w (n.b. no indirect object v\iiv) nepl re ro£> noXeuoy row npoc rove
JSee H. Li. Hudson-¥illiams, "Isocrates end Recitations", pp. 68-69.
2See above, p. If.
^Lys. 332: “But he [Herakles ] ...established a contest...that v/e might meet 
together in this same place for all these enjoyments, some to see, others to listen to, 
because he judged that the gathering here T/ould be a beginning of mutual friendship 
among the Greeks.”
ßapßapcH^  wd r% opovoiac 1% npd$ <wtov<; (4.3). Isokrates continues 
throughout the work to use the first-person plural to refer either to the 
Athenians or to the Greeks as a whole (see below), but the use of the 
second-person plural to address his audience, as one would expect in a 
genuine deliberative speech, or even in one where the fiction was being 
fully maintained, is entirely neglected. Apart from the proem, the other 
place in a deliberative speech where explicit engagement between orator 
and audience would be expected is the exordium: but Isokrates offers little 
in terms of a setting, merely exhorting his audience, whom he designates as 
"listeners" (tapoaTcd: 4.166), to go away and seek either to exert influence 
upon men of political influence and power or to promulgate his ideas by 
making speeches themselves.1
If we are to envisage an Olympic festival audience, fictitious or 
otherwise, then we should ask how the use of the first-person plural 
operates throughout the speech; for it is employed in a dual capacity, 
either to refer to "we Athenians" or to "we Greeks". It has been observed 
that, on the whole, in the epideiktic earlier section of Panegyrikos the first- 
person plural refers to "we Athenians", whereas in the next section, where 
the campaign against Persia is advocated, "we" means "we Greeks“;2 *
however, such a distinction cannot be made absolutely, although the 
observation does possess general validity;3 often the context makes it clear 
when "we" is being confined to “we Athenians" (with rj itoXv? rjpo»' or fj T^ erepa 
ttoAis appearing at the start of a passage), but Isokrates does at times slide 
with almost bewildering ease from the one application of the first-person 
plural to the other.4 The use, then, of the first-person plural in Panegyrikos
translators may contribute more to the setting than the text warrants: e g. G. 
Norlin (Isocrates [Loeb ed., Vol. 11 translates the vords from 4.3 (quoted above) “I have 
come before you to give my counsels etc.“; in the exordium Norlin contributes an 
unjustified second-person to the text at 4.187, vhere he renders avroi>$ odv xpT} 
cwßiopav ooTft av eyßaipovtac rvxotpev as ’Therefore you must come my aid and try to 
picture to yourselves vhat vast prosperity ve should attain ...“; but i*pd$ cannot be 
understood vith avrovg: the pronoun vhich must be understood in this impersonal 
construction is given the 1st-person plurals vhich foliov in the subordinate 
clauses; the sentence should begin "Therefore ve  must examine together ...".
2Buchner, Panegyrikos, p.7.
3Ibid., pp.61, n.l & 63, n.5. (or the adj. T^ perepo^ ) does refer at times 
vithin the epideiktic section to all the Greeks (cf. 4.34-37,43-44,48 (e<$ypev ] and 
[probably 1 at 4.47,98); the converse is also true.
4As, e.£. at 426: oow 6e Töi$ oXXoi^  dyafitow canoi yevoyapev, o£tü)£ w  joxXXujt’ 
e^ erooGnpev, ei tov te ypovov an’ apx% ract rd$ npd£ei$ Ta$ t% noXemj SteXSotpev
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reflects not so much a fictitious audience as the fact that in the oration 
Isokrates is associating himself with his own city-state in making out a case 
for a renewal of her influence among the Greeks, but he is also embracing 
all the Greeks in his scheme for a war against the Persians.
There is another difficulty with any interpretation of Panegyrikos 
which seeks to regard the work as either a genuine panegyric oration or as 
a composition with this fictitious setting. At the start of the discourse 
Isokrates notes that others have treated the theme of a panhellenic war 
against the barbarians, but he proclaims that he is not daunted from 
essaying to write upon the subject, since, among other reasons: "I hope to 
rise so far superior to them that it will seem as if no word had ever been 
spoken by my rivals upon this subject" (4.4: cf. 4.10, 12-14). This is all to 
be expected, but what are we to make of the concluding remarks, where 
Isokrates admits that he has changed his mind about those early, self- 
confident statements, and where he now ’confesses*  to have failed to treat 
his theme in a worthy manner: he says that he has not risen to the 
magnitude of the theme, that he has omitted points which he had intended 
to make. He therefore invites his listeners to come to his aid: the men of 
action should act themselves to effect a reconciliation between Athens and 
Sparta, while the orators should cease wasting their efforts upon court- 
work or with compositions upon trivial themes and should “consider how 
better than me they will speak upon the same subject" (4.167-166). To 
profess modesty about one’s own achievement at the end of a speech was a 
rhetorical commonplace and need not in itself be regarded as incompatible 
with the assertions at the opening of this work.1 What is remarkable is 
that all the 'confession' is followed by an appeal to other orators to take up 
the theme. This ending could possibly be regarded as a piece of deliberate 
mock-humility and an extremely arrogant casting-down of the gauntlet to 
others to surpass him. The final words would then take on a particularly 
savage point; for the reference to other orators as "men who promise great
eypfjootiev yap ayrfjv ov jiovov to»' np6$ tov noXepov lav^vuv aAAa wd t% aXXTft 
K a ra ca cE i% , ev 5  raroucoSuev lad jjlc8 noXvreyojie0a lad 8i fjv  4f|v 8waue8a, oyeSov duaor  ^
avrxav 0&3OV (not on easy passage to translate due to the zeugma of avrtav with both tw  
iciv&nw and raTaoKR%: see J. E. Sandys. Isocrates. Ad Detnonicum et Panegvricus. 
new ed., [London 18971 ad loc.); in this passage the first-person as far as the 
semicolon must refer to the Athenians, but thereafter, if  Isokrates’ point (i.e. the 
Athenians’ contribution to "the rest of the ’world” [toi$ aXXoi$ D is to have meaning, 
the first-person must now mean “we Greeks".
*Cf. in Isokrates’ own ’works 5- M9 & 8.141 (but contrast 5-155 for a most 
confident statement). Isokrates did not always feel an obligation to conclude his 
political orations with mock-humility: see 7.84.
things” but who "waste their time on little things", and the suggestion that 
his rivals are impoverished (4.1691) would be particularly insulting, since 
Isokrates had initially proclaimed his intention to write definitively upon 
the subject. Such insincerity and such an aggressive provocation of his 
rivals seems to harmonize ill with the general theme and tone of the work.
It might also be noted that a similar exhortation to others to turn their 
attentions to the theme which he has just handled occurs at the end of On 
the Peace (6.14S) and in Philippos (565). In short, this conclusion does not 
ring true as being consistent with a genuine or properly fictitious panegyric 
oration, nor does it sit comfortably with the writer's earlier claims that he 
will provide a definitive treatment of the theme.
Hudson-Williams revealed the true audience for whom Panegyrikos 
was intended, when he concluded that the “listeners" mentioned at the end 
of the work were the real audience, and that these “listeners" were 
Athenian, although it may be supposed that a wider circulation was also 
intended.2 Such a view is supported by Isokrates' own testimony many 
years later, when in Philippos he says, in explanation of why he has turned 
to Philip rather than to the Athenians in his search for a leader who will 
conduct a war against the Persians: “In truth, (however) it will be found 
that I turned to Athens first of all and endeavoured to win her over to this 
cause with all the earnestness of which my nature is capable, but when I 
perceived that she cared less for what I said than for the ravings of the 
platform orators, I gave her up, although I did not abandon my efforts"
(5.129). But if Isokrates in Panegyrikos addressed himself to the Athenians 
we should ask: to which Athenians? and, what was he saying to them? and, 
why was he saying it?
Since in the Panegyrikos Isokrates did not elect to write a speech 
which adopts the form of a deliberative address before the Athenian 
assembly (as he was later to do in On the Peace and Areopagitikos) and 
since the work does not seem to be presented as a convincing imitation of 
an oration which is being delivered before a panhellenic festival gathering, 
we must conclude that the work, as it was published, was intended to be 
received by a reading public at Athens, and possibly by similarly well- 
educated men in other states. Certainly, the two groups which are detailed 
among the envisaged audience are politicians and advocates (4.166: tov$ pev
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1 Isokrates else vh  ere taunts his rhetorician-rivals as being impecunious: c f. 
11.1; 13-4,7.
2HL1. Hudson-Villiams, “Isocrates and Recitations", pp. 63,68-69.
npaTreiv 8wqievoi^.... toy$ Se r w  Xoyw (^4ac$T|ToyvTa^). But, if th e  work, does n o t 
seek  to carry  to ta l conviction as a  panegyric  o ration , w h e th er in ten d ed  for 
actual p re sen ta tio n  or not, is th e  co n ten t an y  m o re  to  be considered  as a 
piece of sincere  d e lib e ra tiv e  o ra to ry ?  Or, is Panegyrikos to be reg a rd ed  as 
no m ore th a n  Isokra tes, th e  teacher of rhe to ric , d isp laying  to pupils, and  to 
any  o th e rs  w ho care  to  a tte n d  to it, how  to  com pose w ith  a r t  and  s ty le  upon 
such a th e m e ? 1
As i t  s tands, Panegyrikos canno t sim ply  be  Iso k ra tes ' challenge, as a 
rheto ric ian , to  h is rhe to rica l p redecesso rs an d  con tem poraries .2 To do th is 
he w ould su re ly  h av e  so u g h t to convey a  convincing p an eg y ric  m ilieu; th e  
unexpected  challenge a t  th e  end  to  o th e r o ra to rs  to  tak e  u p  th e  sam e them e 
would, on th is in te rp re ta tio n , have  to be und ers to o d  as ironical. Nor is such 
an  in te rp re ta tio n  ad eq u a te  to  account for w h a t Iso k ra tes  h im self say s  of 
th e  p u rpose  of th e  w ork  e ith e r in P anegyrikos or in la te r w orks.
I t  is tru e  th a t  th e  w ork  is claim ed to be  a  dem onstra tion  of th e  
w rite r 's  rhe to rica l su p erio rity  over o th e rs  w ho h ave  tre a te d  th e  th em e 
before  h im  and  th a t  Iso k ra tes  says th a t  he  h as chosen a them e w hich offers 
a fine op p o rtu n ity  for an  o ra to r to  d isp lay  his sk ills (4.4.); a p rev io u sly - 
used  th em e need  be  no d iscouragem ent to  an  o ra to r, since th e re  a re  so 
m any  varia tions of p re sen ta tio n  available: "one m u s t n o t shun  th e  subjects 
upon w hich o th ers  h av e  spoken, b u t  m u s t t ry  to  sp eak  b e tte r  th an  they" 
(4.6); th e  deeds of th e  p a s t  a re  th e  ra w  m a te ria l availab le  to  all, b u t  i t  
belongs to  those w ith  w isdom  (oie£<tpovovvre$) to  perceive w h a t is 
ap p ro p ria te  a t  th e  tim e ab o u t p articu la r su b jec t-m a tte r and  to a rran g e  i t  
e loquently ; o ra to rs  to be  ad m ired  a re  n o t those  w ho broach a n ew  them e,
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Panegyrikos has attracted less attention than some of Isokrates' other 
political discourses in this respect. Most criticism has centred upon the sincerity of 
Isokrates' panhellenic views, and more particularly upon the question whether a 
joint hegemony is really what is being advocated. However, for a predominantly 
rhetorical interpretation of the speech see G. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion, pp. 188- 
190. Kennedy sees Panegyrikos as Isokrates' second attempt (after Helen) "to provide 
a material for rhetoric" (p.188); however, he does allow this discourse to be the one 
“most likely to have had some real political influence“ (p.190); by this he means 
(p. 190, n.96) that the speech may have helped prepare the way for the Second 
Athenian Confederacy, which was established two years later (see below, p. 29).
^ f. G. Cawkwell, Oxford CLassical Dictionary, s.v. Isokrates': “The Panegyricus, 
published in 380 after ten years of composition, was his version of a conventional 
subject celebrated by Gorgias and Lysias; its demand that the Greeks unite under the 
shared hegemony of Athens and Sparta was familiar, and the long period of 
composition suggests that it was intended to be an enduring masterpiece of its kind, 
not, as some have supposed, a topical plea for the establishment of the Second 
Athenian League." This is to neglect the very point of the individuality of Isokrates’ 
approach to his theme.
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but those who can take a familiar theme and speak upon it as no other 
could (4.9-10). This all sounds very much like Isokrates the teacher 
speaking. Such a view seems to be confirmed when he claims for his 
audience not petty-minded men, who applaud only the simple style 
appropriate to law-court speeches, but men who can recognize that great 
themes demand a grand style and manner, men who will not tolerate for 
such a theme words (apparently) chosen at random, but who will seek in 
Isokrates* words something which they will not encounter in the words of 
others (4.11-12). Isokrates arrogantly rejects the false, or diffident, 
professions which others provide, when they allege that their speech has 
been composed on the spur of the moment or that it is difficult to find 
words appropriate to the theme. He boldly states that he has laboured long 
over this speech and invites mockery and scorn if he fails to surpass others 
who have addressed this theme (4.13-14). All this would seem to lend 
weight to a distinctly rhetorical view of Panegyrikos. Then, near the end of 
his life, when he came to address Philip II of Makedonia«nthe same themes, 
he refers to the success which Panegyrikos has won: "(It] was so written 
that even my detractors imitate and admire it more than do those who 
praise it to excess" (5-11) }  this would seem to indicate a lasting reputation 
for Panegyrikos which rested upon its artistic qualities rather than its 
theme.* 2 A little later in Philippos Isokrates apologizes for any 
shortcomings in form and artistry which this later treatment of the themes 
may have: "I have not adorned it [Philippos] with the rhythmic flow and 
manifold graces of style which I myself employed when I was younger and 
taught by example to others as a means by which they might make their 
oratory more pleasing and at the same time more convincing“ (5-27).
While not wishing to deny that Isokrates sought in Panegyrikos to 
exhibit his skill in rhetorical composition, it must not be concluded that the 
work is a rhetorical exemplum and no more. This would be to accept only
iCare must be taken about putting too much credence in statements such as 
this. Isokrates' v iev  of an earlier York, like his vieYs of mythology or historical 
events, Yill be shaped to suit the present context and purpose; in this particular case 
Tre should compare his statement in another place (1561) that no-one any longer 
dares to speak upon the subject of Athens' greatness in the time of the Persian Vars, 
since his treatment of that theme in Panegyrikos: the tvo boasts are incompatible; if  
there is any truth in either, then that at 5.11 seems a priori the more plausible.
2The several references to Panegyrikos, some specifically by name, in 
Aristo ties' Ars Rhetorica demonstrates that this discourse of Isokrates had achieved a 
reputation vhich had ouüasted its immediate publication (1408bl5f.; 1409b33ff.; 
M llbllff; 1414b33ff.; 1418a31ff).
part of what Isokrates tells us about the purpose of the work: not only has 
he taken up a theme which provides him with an opportunity to display his 
rhetorical talent, but it is also a theme which "deals with the greatest 
affairs"; to be instructed upon such a theme will very greatly assist those 
who attend to the work (4.4).1 It is also worth noting how Isokrates ends 
the section in which he speaks about his personal ambition in writing a 
discourse upon this theme; for he concludes in a way which presents what 
has just been said as a tangential aside: “So much, by way of introduction, 
as to my personal claims" (4.14). Now he returns to his theme and again 
raises the issue of his purpose. He tells us that those who have previously 
treated this theme have not begun from a position which truly recognizes 
the reality of the situation (he has already stressed that the time is ripe for 
what he is going to recommend; were this not so, then it would not be 
appropriate to discourse upon the theme [4.5-6]). Therefore it must be 
realized that those who have proposed that the Greeks be reconciled and 
turn together upon the barbarian have made a fundamental error: for they 
have failed to acknowledge that only when Sparta and Athens, the two 
leading city-states, have been brought into some form of amity can the 
programme of a campaign against the barbarian and a general 
reconciliation among the Greeks hope to succeed (4.15-16). He continues, 
with significance to this discussion. “No, the man who does not aim merely 
to make an epideictic display [em8e\£v$], but desires to accomplish something 
as well, must seek out arguments as will persuade these two states" (4.17: 
trans. Norlin, slightly adapted). There is more than just originality in 
approach to the subject involved here; there is a sound appreciation of 
history and of the situation which prevailed a t that time when Sparta was 
besieging Olynthos and Phleious. Neither the Athenians nor the Spartans 
were likely to commit themselves to a war against the Persian king without 
the other being similarly committed. The King had given clear proof in 395 
(by supporting the Athenians and other Greeks against the Spartans [see 
Hell.Oxv. 7.2,5; Xen. 3 5 1-2; 4.3-10-12; 4.6.1-11]) and again in 366/367 
(by casting his support in favour of the Spartans against the Athenians [see 
Xen. 5 1 25, 26-291) of his ability to tilt the balance of power in Greece.
The Spartans may have felt confident enough of the King’s 
indifference to any actions they perpetrated against other European or 
island Greeks which seemed to infringe the right of autonomy proclaimed 
in the King’s Peace, but they were unlikely to repeat their error of 399
24
1A similar point is also made by Lysias at the start of his Qlvmpiakos (33.3).
when they confronted the Persians in Asia Minor while dissatisfaction and 
ambition existed in other mainland city-states. The Athenians could not 
have conceived of another liberation of the Greeks of Asia without 
substantial allies with land forces; that meant Sparta, for Thebes was in no 
position to help, with her democrats in exile and a Spartan garrison 
occupying the Eadmeia. Furthermore, any act of aggression against Persia 
which did not also involve Sparta would provide the Spartans with an 
undeniable right to interfere, in accordance with the provisions of the 
Peace, and with their alliance with the King (for the latter see 4.126; cf.
Xen. 5-1-29).
Thus Isokrates concludes the introduction to Panegyrikos by once 
again justifying himself for treating this theme: if he can focus his 
argument upon points about which agreement is not readily to be expected 
(viz. the reconciliation of Sparta and Athens to a joint leadership against the 
barbarians), he may point the way to action upon which, he maintains, 
there is general agreement (viz. the benefits to be gained for the Greeks 
from a general reconciliation and a war of plunder and territorial 
acquisition in Asia); failing this, he will have demonstrated who it is (i.e. 
the Spartans) that is preventing the prosperity of the Greeks (4.19-20).
With that he embarks upon the first of the two major arguments which 
constitute the main body of the speech.
At the end it is these deliberative purposes to which Isokrates 
returns. His artistic purpose is not mentioned; indeed, as has been noted, 
the purpose of achieving a discourse of unsurpassed artistry is actually 
contradicted by the appeal to other orators to rival and to surpass his 
treatment of this theme; this task, it is predicted, will achieve profit for the 
orators and great benefits for the rest of the Greeks (4.166-169).
There is one final point which might be argued to detract from a 
view of Panegyrikos as being a serious political discourse of a deliberative 
nature and having a precise focus upon the circumstances which obtained 
in the Greek world about 361/360. It was believed in antiquity that 
Isokrates spent ten, or even fifteen, years upon the composition of this 
speech (see Dionifal. de comp, verb. 206; Quint. 10.4.4; Plut. Mor. 350E; 
iPlut.] Mor. 637F; Timai., apud Longin. de Subl. 4.2). With surprisingly few 
exceptions, modern scholars have seen fit to accept this, in a general, if not 
precise, sense.1 There is little to commend such a belief. In the speech
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1See e.g. Blass, AB, Il2, p. 254f.; Sandys, Isocrates, Ad Demonicum et 
Panegyricus, pjcliii; CavkveU (see above, p.22, n2); even Judeich, vho argues that
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Isokrates makes reference to the fact that he has spent time upon its 
composition (4.14: "if I do not speak in a manner worthy of my subject and 
of my reputation and of the time which I have spent - not merely the hours 
which have been devoted to my speech but also all the years which I have 
lived - 1 bid you show me no indulgence“); this needs to be placed in 
context - Isokrates is here comparing himself with others who write upon 
such themes, but who preface their treatment by way of excuse with the 
disclaimer that their work has been prepared on the spur of the moment. 
Quite possibly prompted by this remark, and observing references in 
Panegyrikos to predecessors who had handled the theme, ancient critics 
took Gorgias' Olympikos to be the original inspiration for Isokrates. If it is 
correct that this work was delivered at the Olympic festival of 392 (see 
above, p. 13, n.3), this could account for the tradition that Panegyrikos took 
ten years to compose, its original motivation having been the intention to 
rival Gorgias*  speech.1
Whether Isokrates made any earlier attempt to write upon this 
theme cannot be demonstrated. What can be said is that Panegyrikos can 
be read as a work which belongs to the time at which it is set, without any 
appeal to there having been a protracted composition over a number of 
years. There is no internal inconsistency involving chronology, description 
of circumstances or mode of argument which would compel such a belief. 
Indeed, such infelicities are inherently improbable, given the 
understanding that Isokrates was seeking to achieve a work of consummate 
artistry. We cannot know whether the theme appealed to Isokrates well 
before 361/360 either as a subject upon which to lavish his rhetorical skill 
or as a solution to the problems of the Greeks; what we do know is that he 
judged that time to be an appropriate moment to publish Panegyrikos. It is
the specific circumstances of Sparta's outrages against Olynth os and Phleious vere 
responsible for the sudden completion and publication of the speech toirards the end 
of 381, is unable to discard the belief that a very lengthy period of gestation had 
preceded the act of publication (Klein. Studien, p.143). Howrer, for at least an 
expression of doubt about the tradition see 0. Schneider, Isokrates ausgevählte Reden. 
Bd2, p2f.
*For this v iev  see Koepp, “Isokrates als Politiker", pp. 477 & 479f.; cf. also 
Mathieu, Les Idees. 68-69; contra, E. Dr er up, "Epikritisches zum 'Panegynkus1 des 
Isokrates" Philol. 54 (1895), 639f. (reprinted in Isokrates, ed. F. Seek, Darmstadt 1976, 
p.4). The thesis cannot be demonstrated; the surviving testimonium and three 
fragments (D.-K. Frs. AI, B7-8a) tell us no more than that Gorgias advised the Greeks to 
establish homonoia and to turn their material energies from one another to a kar 
against the barbarians (see esp. Fr. A1 = Philostr. Vit. Sot>h. 493). Buchner 
(Panegyrikos, p. 11) concludes that such evidence as there is suggests that Isokrates' 
reflection in Panegyrikos of Gorgias' Olympikos vas slight.
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as a work of its immediate time that we must consider its purpose, 
whatever political acumen may be contained within it, and its contribution 
to our historical understanding.
Although there has been substantial agreement by scholars in this 
century about the time at which Panegyrikos was published, and although 
it is widely accepted that the work had a serious political purpose, there 
have been very different interpretations of just what it is that Isokrates is 
proposing, these interpretations often being advanced with seemingly scant 
regard for the question of to whom he was directing his advice. The speech 
has long been regarded as a meiktos logos.1 into a symbouleutikos logos. 
advising Sparta and Athens to accept a reconciliation and jointly to lead a 
campaign against the Persians (4.1-16, 133-169), has been incorporated a 
lengthy epideiktikos logos (4.19-126), in which Isokrates develops a series 
of arguments aimed at proving that it is Athens which is truly worthy 
among the Greeks of hegemony and in the last part of which is delivered a 
stinging rebuke of Sparta's leadership since the end of the Peloponnesian 
War (4. 110-126).
The length of this epideiktic section is considerable, more than half 
the total work.2 Its obvious prominence and significance for the work as a 
whole must be explained. More importantly, in it is found lavish praise of 
Athens and the Athenians, while it contains - with not too much concern 
where the bounds of historical verisimilitude are exceeded 3 - both an 
unrepentant defence of certain much-criticized aspects of Athens' fifth- 
century empire and also a hard-hitting indictment of Sparta's leadership
1See Blass, AB, II ,^ p. 256; also Buchner, Panegyrikos, pp.7-8 and recently D. 
Gillis. "Isocrates' Panegvricus: The Rhetorical Texture“, n.s. 5 (1971). 55. Nicolaus 
Sophista (Spengel, Rhetores Graeci [Lipsiae 18661 Vol. Ill, p.478) speaks of how an 
enkomion may t>e contained within another form or genre. <5v to v  pev nporepov 
napdfciypa 6 naviryvpuoo$ ’icoKpdro^ x6yo$, ö^ßoyXeuTucov jiev exwv to etfco$, 6ia Se 
eyw4iiacFTU% uXift KaracacEiM^ opevo^ .
^ h e  epideiktikos logos occupies 27 of the 46 pages in Ben sei er's Teubner 
edition.
SOülis ("Rhetorical Texture", p.55f ) notes that Isokrates’ political discourses 
were intended to be read, and thus absorbed at leisure, unlike a genuine deliberative 
speech delivered in the Athenian assembly; he asserts that, although both writer and 
audience appreciated that in the epideiktic genre facts of history could be "colored”, 
there was an understood limit to "interpreting and reconstructing history". However, 
’»here Gillis sees Isokrates operating within such limitations to the distortion of the 
past in his treatment of the Persian wars and of the Spartan role in them (ibid., 
p.66f ), I ’would offer a different explanation (see below, pp. 39-40). On either 
interpretation, the 'facts’ have been bathed with colour.
since 404/3; but, above all, the conclusion which is reached at the end of 
the eulogistic segment is that the people who most merit the leadership in a 
future campaign against the barbarians must be the Athenians. This 
passage is worth quoting in full:
Vho then should have the hegemony, v h en  a campaign against the 
barbarians is in  prospect? Should it not be they vho distinguished themselves 
above all others in  the former var? Should it not be they vho many times bore, 
alone, the brunt of battle, and in  the joint struggles of the Hellenes vere  avarded 
the prize of valour? Should it not be they vho abandoned their ovn country to 
save the rest of Hellas, vho in ancient times founded most of the HeUenic cities, and 
vho later delivered them from the greatest disasters? Vould it not be an outrage 
upon us, if, having taken the largest share in the evils of var, ve  should be 
adjudged vorthy  of a lesser share in its honours, and if, having at that time been 
placed in the lead in the cause of all the HeUenes, ve should nov  be compelled to 
folio v  the lead of others? (4.99)
All this has led to a popular school of interpretation according to 
which Panegyrikos is seen as an attempt by Isokrates to represent 
Athenian leadership of the Greeks to be historically right and proper.1
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1See Kessler, Isok. u. d. t>anh. Idee, pp. 9f., 24; Laistner, Isocrates De Pace and 
Philippus. p p .15-16: Ryder, K£, pp.49-50; Gillis, "Rhetorical Texture", pp. 52-73 (esp. 
56); C. Mosse, Athens in Decline, trs. J. Stevart (London 1973), pp 34-37; C.D. Hamilton, 
"Isocrates, IG ii^ 43, Greek Propaganda and Imperialism", Traditio 36 (1980), 91,95-97; 
S. Hornblover, The Greek Vorld 479-323 B.C. (London 1983), p.209.
Some of Gillis* conclusions illustrate clearly the problems to vh ich  such an 
interpretation can lead as veil as the lack of clarity vhich  often prevails as to just 
hov  this promotion of a policy for Athens vas to be effected. Gillis describes Isokrates 
as an acute critic of his times and a skilful rhetorician: he vas “no airy panegyrist 
out of touch v ith  the vorld, amid all his rhetorical devices and charms of style. He 
vas a cold-eyed politician vho knev  a good opportunity v h en  he sav  one“ 
(“Rhetorical Texture“, p.72). On the vhole ve  are supposed to envisage Isokrates* 
vork being addressed to a panhellenic audience at Olympia (pp 56-57,63-64,70), but 
at one point an Athenian audience is mentioned (p.69); on the other hand ve  should 
not really take it that oral publication is meant, for ve  are told that the vork  vas 
intended to be read (p.56). Hovever, another image is conjured up vhen  ve see 
Isokrates, apparently unvittingly  or at least unintentionally, angering the Spartans 
and their friends in  the audience (p.57) by his infelicitous criticisms of Sparta and by 
his markedly pro-Athenian boasts; all of vh ich  is to be seen as an attempt to assist his 
fellov-Athenians over their present "inferiority complex" and to inspire them v ith  
hope for the future (p.56f.: but cf. Isok. 4.18). Gillis concludes: “(But) Isocrates 
underestimated the damage vhich  he had done to Spartan sensibilities, vh ich  in 
effect rendered any real subordination to Athens in  a  crusade impossible. In this 
sense the speech vas a failure“ (p.?3). Gillis seems unable to decide vhether Isokrates 
vas or vas not trying to v in  over the Spartans: it is inconceivable that he vas ever 
thinking that he could persuade the Spartans to actually participate in the campaign 
and submit to Athenian leadership; yet this is presumably vhat Gillis has in  mind; 
for, at the start of the article, he judges that “it [Panegyrikos 1 had practical results 
v ith in  a reasonable period of time“ (p.53). Such an interpretation not only leaves the
According to this view the conclusion that it is the Athenians who merit the 
hegemony is incompatible with earlier, and subsequent, recommendations 
in the work for a joint hegemony, to be shared between Sparta and Athens; 
these references to a shared hegemony are explained as insincerity; they 
are said to have been provoked by an assumed cautiousness, necessitated 
by the dominant position which Sparta had among the Greeks (outside 
Asia) at this time. Isokrates, it is argued, is seeking to rekindle among the 
Athenians the interest in Athenian hegemony, even empire (arche), which 
had briefly been evidenced in the period 395-367. By some he is made out 
to be a spokesman for a whole group of leading men at Athens, among 
them Kallistratos and Timotheos, who were intent upon the revival of 
Athenian power. This interpretation is thought to be supported by 
Isokrates' words, many years later, when he says:
In it [Panegyrikos 11 summon the Hellenes to make an expedition against the 
barbarians, and I dispute the right of the Lacedaimonians to take the lead. 
Developing this theme, I shov that Athens has been author of all the advantages 
vh ich  the Hellenes no v  enjoy. Then, having concluded the account of these 
benefactions, and desiring to shov more convincingly that leadership in the 
expedition is the right of Athens, I further try  to prove that far greater honour is 
due to her for the perils she has faced in v a r than for her other benefactions." 
(1557-58)1
Some who have pursued this line of interpretation have carried it 
even further. Thus Panegyrikos is considered to be a propaganda-piece, 
designed to introduce an Athenian policy which was to reach fulfilment in 
the Second Athenian Confederacy.* 2 The Confederacy was established in 
376, but was not thrown open to all the Greeks (with the exception of those
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reader in  some uncertainty as to hov  Isokrates' message vas to be promulgated and to 
vhom it vas directed, but it shovs Isokrates to be not a "cold-eyed politician" but a 
bungling rhetor, vho did veil to keep avay from active engagement in politics at 
Athens. The Athenians, vho vere at this time trying to avoid a conflict v ith  Sparta 
(see belov, p. 32f.), vould not have thanked him for such a publication.
iSee Kessler, Isok. u  d. panh. Idee, pp. 8-10,24; Mosse, Athens in Decline, pp. 
35-36; cf. Hamilton, “Isocrates, IG ii2 43, Greek Propaganda and Imperialism“, p. 97 for 
a more cautious expression of this interpretation.
2This v iev  vas first proposed by U. von Vilamovitz-Moellendorff in Aristoteles 
und Athen (Berlin 1893), II. p. 387; see also Drerup, "Epikritisches", pp. 639f., 644; U. 
Yilcken, "Philip II von Makedonien und die panhellenische Idee“, Sitzungsberichte 
der Preussischen Akademie der Vissenschaften. philologisch-historische Klasse 1929, 
No. 18, p. 293f. (reprinted in  Philit> and Athens, ed. S. Perlman [Cambridge 19731 p. 
193f.); Mathieu, Les Idees, p.80; Jaeger, "Date", p.427; id., Paideia, III, p.82; Gillis,
Mosse and Hamilton (see above, p. 28, n . l ) are all attracted by this extension of their 
interpretation, but avoid openly subscribing to it.
who were subject to the Persian king) until February/March 377.1 
However, comparison of the objectives stated in Panegvnkos with the 
terms for the Confederacy, which are set forth in the decree of Aristoteles 
(IG, II2. 43: cf. Tod, GHI, 11.123; Bengston, SV, 257), reveals fundamental 
differences: the decree guaranteed freedom and autonomy to their allies: 
by this the Athenians were reasserting the basic provision of the King's 
Peace, and this they did in specific defiance of, and as a protection against, 
Sparta's abuse of her position of authority consequent upon the King's 
Peace (see IG, II2. 43,11.9-11: cf. D.S. 15-23.2). The newly-established 
Confederacy was also at pains not to antagonize the King, as is made clear 
by the express exclusion of those Greeks who came within the authority of 
the King under the King's Peace (IG, II2. 43,11. lb-19);2 finally, the 
Athenians in 3 7 7 were at pains to reassure their existing and prospective 
allies that the elements of the fifth-century arche which had caused so 
much resentment (viz. constitutional imposition, garrisons, tribute and 
Athenian ownership of property in allied territory) would not recur. It is 
hard, indeed impossible, to conceive how this decree could be regarded as 
the product, in part, of Isokratean 'propaganda’.3 The success of Athens' 
willingness from a time in 376 to uphold the right of the Greek states to 
freedom and independence did announce and provide recognition of 
Athens' claim to exercise hegemony; but it was not the exercise of the kind 
of hegemony which Isokrates had envisaged in Panegyrikos. The 
hegemony which Isokrates says that it is right that Athens should hold is 
specifically associated with the purpose of conducting a campaign against 
the barbarians (see 4.99: "Who then should have the hegemony, when a 
campaign against the barbarians is in prospect?“). The publication of 
Panegyrikos should not be seen as intended to pave the way for the
{See: Ryder. KE. p.55: G. L. Cawkwell. “The foundation of the Second Athenian 
Confederacy“, CQ n.s. 23 (1973), 47-60; J. Cargill, The Second Athenian Leag ue: Empire 
of Free Alliance? (London 1981), pp.7-13.
2An erasure in the wording of the decree at 11.12-14 was restored to provide an 
endorsement of the Peace of 387/6 with the King (see S. Accame, La lega Ateniese del 
secolo IV a. C. [Rome 19411 pp.31-52). Cargill (SAL, pp .28-32) adopts a very much more 
cautious approach to the restoration of the inscription at this point, but he 
nonetheless concludes that the King was mentioned here and believes that what was 
erased involved some reference to the King's Peace. For a rather different 
interpretation of the reference to the King in these lines cf. Cawkwell, “Foundation“ 
p. 60, n.l.
*The notion is firmly rejected by Buchner, Panegyrikos, pp.4-6,136-142, also 
Baynes, "Isocrates“, pp.145-146 and Cloche, Isocrate et son temps, p.45.
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Confederacy which was established two years later. Two events critical to 
the formation of that confederacy were yet to occur at the time when 
Panegyrikos appeared: first, the recovery of Thebes by the democratic 
faction, with the expulsion of the Spartan garrison (in winter 379/6), which 
led to the Spartan invasions of Boiotia in 376 and 377, and second, the 
abortive but highly provocative raid of Sphodrias upon the Peiraieus 
(sometime in 376).
The case of those who assert more nebulously that Panegyrikos is a 
statement in favour of the resuscitation of Athenian imperialism (the more 
cautious employ "hegemony”) is not more convincing. How is this arche or 
hegemonia to be manifested? Unless we are to regard not only the 
statements about sharing the hegemony with Sparta to be specious, but also 
the whole proposal for a campaign against the Persians, then it must be 
that Isokrates is proposing a campaign against the Persians which is to be 
led by Athens. Sparta presumably would have three options: she could 
accept Athenian leadership; she could simply stand aside (and watch 
Athens usurp her position as the dominant state among the Greeks); or she 
could oppose the plan for a panhellenic campaign. The first and second 
alternatives were inconceivable; Sparta was then at the height of her 
power (cf. Xen. 5.3.27; D.S. 15.23.3-4); to have expected either of these 
responses from the Spartans would make Isokrates out to be a political 
imbecile. The third policy is more Machievellian and was in fact 
anticipated as a possibility by Isokrates: for he says that if his plan is 
impossible to effect, it will be because the Spartans, not the Athenians, 
have stood in its way. His speech, by recounting past national beneficence 
on the part of the Athenians, will have reminded the Greeks, and the 
Spartans, that in Athens there was a state which was willing to lead the 
Greeks in an honourable and profitable manner, and had in the past proven 
herself capable of so doing (4.16-20). The statement that it is an easy 
matter to induce the Athenians to accept his proposals argues against a 
view that it was the Athenians whom Isokrates is seeking to persuade and 
in whom he is seeking to reinspire confidence; it is the Spartans who must 
be won over; for they are falsely inspired by a mistaken claim that they 
have an ancestral right to lead (4.16).
However, if it is inconceivable that the Spartans, in 361/0, could 
willingly have relinquished their authority among the Greeks to the 
Athenians, how could an Athenian-led campaign against Persia have hoped 
to win any support at Athens, let alone among other Greeks? The Thebans 
at the time were under the control of Leontiades and his pro-Spartan
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faction, backed by a garrison on the Kadmeia. The Spartans and their 
friends would have been given a legitimate cause for action against Athens 
the moment any move was made against Persia, and the King himself could 
hardly have remained impassive for long, whatever his difficulties 
elsewhere. It must be admitted that the Spartans traditionally were slow 
to act in affairs outside their own and adjacent territory, but Spartan 
behaviour since 336 would have made Isokrates' plan, if it were to be seen 
as a challenge to their own power, distinctly adventurous.
Nor is any weight afforded to the interpretation by postulating that 
Isokrates was publicizing the views of those who, before 337/6, had been 
enthusiastic for a revival of Athens’ fifth-century imperialism.1 It should 
be confessed that we know next to nothing of what individual leading 
political figures at Athens were saying or thinking in the years which 
followed the King's Peace. Two public policy decisions which occurred, one 
not long before, the other soon after, the publication of Panegyrikos make it 
clear that officially Athens was not anxious to confront Sparta or to 
antagonize the King: in 363 (or the earlier half of 362) the Athenians and 
Thebans sent ambassadors to Olynthos to negotiate an alliance (Xen. 5 2.15); 
the Thebans pursued the matter, clearly in the face of likely Spartan 
disapproval (ibid., 34); for the Spartans voted to raise an army against the 
Olynthians (ibid., 2Off.); Athens, however, seems to have retracted once 
Sparta's views became known.2 Not long after the publication of 
Panegyrikos (probably about the winter of 330/379), the Athenians 
received a protest from the King concerning Chabrias' role in assisting the 
rebel cause in Egypt. Chabrias, who was acting unofficially, was promptly 
recalled, and the Athenians sent Iphikrates to aid the King's army in 
seeking to suppress the revolt (D.S. 15 29-1-4) 3 These events do not 
encourage a belief that in 331/0 the Athenians could have been induced 
either to act against Sparta or to act against Persia; in the latter case they
iCf. Mosse, Athens in Decline, p.36: 'There can be no doubt that in writing 
thus Isokrates m s  expressing not only his ovn  opinion but that of a vhole group of 
men close to him, among vhom must be included Kallistratos and Timotheos, son of 
Konon. For these men the restoration of Athenian hegemony seemed an obvious 
necessity."
2See Cavkwell. "Foundation", p. 53. n.3.
^Diodoros puts these events under 377/6, but this is certainly  ^ srong; Chabrias 
m s  elected a strategos in 379 and defended the boundary of Attika shortly after the 
Theban democrates recovered the Kadmeia (Xen. 5-4.14: see Beloch, GG, III^. 2.229-230; 
also H. V. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers {Oxford 19331PP 59-62).
would have wanted first to assure themselves of Spartan agreement and, 
probably, co-operation.
The belief that hegemony for Athens was intended by Isokrates to 
involve a revival of the policy which Athens began to pursue openly from 
369, with the naval campaigns led by Thrasyboulos of Steiria, and which 
had been effectively ended by the King's Peace (see below, pp. 62-63), 
requires the word ‘hegemonia’ to be used in Panegyrikos as virtually 
synonymous with arche'.1 However, it has been demonstrated that there is 
a distinction in the speech between 'arche'. referring to the fifth-century 
empire of Athens, and the 'hegemonia' which Isokrates is advocating. 
Although the semantic distinction cannot be maintained with total 
consistency, there can be discerned a generally consistent conceptual 
distinction maintained between the use of 'arche' when it refers to the 
fifth-century Athenian empire, and 'hegemonia'. when it is used to refer to 
the leadership which is now advocated for Athens.2
^ o r  the emergence at Athens of a foreign policy directed toward a renewed 
hegemony or even empire see S. Perlman,"Athenian Democracy and the Revival of 
Imperialistic Expansion at the Beginning of the Fourth Century B.C.“, CPh 63 (1968), 
257-267; also G. T. Griffith, "Athens in the Fourth Century", pp. 127-144 in Imperialism 
in the Ancient ¥orld. edd. P.D.A. Garnsey & C.R. Vhittaker (Cambridge 1978). .
2See Buchner, Panes vrikos, pp. 39-41,150: in general terms Buchner 
distinguishes between the use of the two terms in Panegyrikos thus: "Der erste [i.e. 
arche ] bedeutet die Herrschaft über die Griechen, der zweite [hegemonia] eine von 
diesen freiwillig zugestandene Vorzugsstellung, im Panegyrikos vor allem die 
Führung der Griechen gegen die Barbaren" (p.150). H. LI. Hudson-Villiams agrees 
that the distinction is mostlyupheld. but observes: "The real difficulty comes in 103 
and 119 where riyepovia and T)yepove$ are undoubtedly applied to what is elsewhere 
called the dpxTj of Athens and Sparta respectively” (review of Buchner: CR n.s. 10 
[1960 1 32); he notes that these difficulties can reasonably be tolerated without 
recourse to Buchner's attempt (Panegyrikos, pp. 118f, 132) to explain them as direct 
imitation of similar passages in Lysias' Epitaphios: "One can hardly expect complete 
consistency from a writer like Isocrates in giving somewhat specialized meanings to 
common words". It may also be noted that stylistic grounds may be relevant in the 
latter case: for in the previous sentence 'arche' has been used twice in the play upon 
the different meanings of "empire" and "beginning" (4.119 apa yap rpeis re ttk apx% 
aneöTepoypeöa icod tov? EXAtjovv apytl tüjv icoaa2v eylyvero); then, in the next sentence, in 
which the Spartans are referred to after 404 as Tiyepoves, the main clause makes the 
point that there quickly followed a Persian rule over the sea (?jp£av 8e r%  eccAarn^ 
ktX.); apart from stylistic reasons for avoiding another use of apytl (or apx0VTe9)- 
there would be some conflict between the ‘arche’ of the Spartans and that of the 
Persians, the latter being the point Isokrates here seeks to make. 4.103 is more 
awkward, though, I would agree, hardly sufficient to undermine the validity of 
Buchner's distinction. Even then the context is worth noting: for in these words 
Isokrates idealizes the rule of Athens, and contrasts that ideal with the reality of 
arche which he is defending against criticism of events such as the punishment of 
the people of Skione. Here again, perhaps a little more than casual inadvertence lies 
behind the "inconsistency".
Let us for a moment consider the inconceivable. Let us imagine that 
Isokrates was picturing an hegemony of the Greeks with Athens as 
hegemon in place of Sparta and that, with Sparta hostile or at best 
grudgingly acquiescent, and with Thebes effectively under Spartan control, 
Athens was perceived as undertaking the leadership of a combined Greek 
force against the Persians. Such a scenario calls for some form of alliances 
between the Athenians and their envisioned allies. Yet neither ‘symmachia' 
nor its cognates are anywhere used in Panegvrikos in such a context.1 Nor 
will we find any consolation in thinking that, because the establishment of 
harmonious relations (homonoia) between the Greek states is part of 
Isokrates’ proposal, the achievement of such a reconciliation would pave 
the way for the campaign. It is true that when Isokrates returned, many 
years later (in 346), to argue to Philip II of Makedomathat he should 
undertake a campaign against the Persians, he declared the establishment 
of homonoia among the Greeks to be a necessary prerequisite (see below, 
pp. 273,3051.). Is that, then, perhaps also the case here?
There are three parts to Isokrates’ advice in Panegvrikos. The 
Greeks should wage a war against the Persians; they should effect a 
reconciliation among themselves; but before either of these can be 
effected, a reconciliation between Athens and Sparta should be sought. Of 
the two aspects of the plan which had been proposed before (by Gorgias 
and Lysias) it is not sufficient to say that the war against Persia is the 
principal theme of Isokrates' speech;2 nor is it sufficiently precise to say 
that these two main goals are inextricably interwoven.3 isokrates does not. 
always offer his proposals in detailed manner, but it does not help us to 
achieve a proper understanding of his capacity as a political observer and 
adviser, if we fail to attend to guidance in his work wThen it is available.
In the first statement of the counsel which is given in Panegyrikos 
we note that the campaign is mentioned first, and that is followed by the 
issue of concord among the Greeks (4.3), although a little later the two goals 
are mentioned in the reverse order (4.15). The relationship between these 
two goals is not elaborated or clarified until late in the work; in 4.167-174
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iThe point is noted by Bringmannn, Studien, p23; pace Kessler.. Isok u. d. 
panh. Idee, p.S.
2Cf. Buchner, Panegyrikos, p.142.
3Cf. Mathieu, Les Idees, p. 50; also Kessler, Isok. u. d. panh. Idee, p.19.
V. Oncken (Isocrates und Athens [Heidelberg 18621 pp. 53,56f.) criticizes Isokrates’ 
thought here as a vicious circle.
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Isokrates describes the situation among the Greeks which he seeks to 
address; he explains how his plan will achieve this: the problem 
confronting the Greeks is political. Although nature provides mankind with 
sufficient misfortunes, those which have recently beset the Greeks have 
been of their own making, namely wars and factional strife. The 
consequences of this self-made suffering have been lawless destruction of 
men in their own states, a nomadic life of exile for others with their 
families, or the need to become mercenaries and to turn against fellow- 
Greeks in the wake of the poverty which has been engendered by inter - 
Greek war and strife. Isokrates makes it clear that the root of all the 
consequent ill which besets the Greeks is this misdirected warfare. He 
contrasts the legendary calamities, over which the poets induce their 
audiences to weep, with “the real sufferings, the many terrible sufferings, 
which result from our state of war“ (4.166); these the audiences view dry­
eyed and willingly add to them whenever the chance is offered. Then, at 
4.172, Isokrates' audience is called upon to usurp the role of the ineffective 
leaders of the time and to "look to the means by which we shall deliver 
ourselves from our present discord“. Isokrates exemplifies his concern 
about the future of this self-destructive behaviour by citing areas of the 
Greek world where liberty and security of local independence have been 
lost, to wit: Italy, Sicily and Asia Minor (4.169). The means of redressing 
this crisis is clearly stated: “It is not possible for us to cement an enduring 
peace unless we join together in a war against the barbarians, nor for the 
Hellenes to attain to concord until we wrest our material advantages from 
one and the same source and wage our wars against one and the same 
enemy" (4.173). There can be no doubt from this that the goal of homonoia 
is contingent upon the success of a campaign against Persia. The war must 
come first; from it will come the restoration of true political independence 
for the Greeks (so 4.173: "We m ust.... pursue that course of action which 
will enable us to dwell in our several cities with greater security and to feel 
greater confidence in each other.”).
Indigence also, we saw, was perceived by Isokrates as a consequence 
of the unhappy state of political affairs among the Greeks: that too can be 
expected to be directly relieved as the result of a successful war against 
Persia (see 4.174); however, this is presented as secondary to the political 
effects to be enjoyed,1 just as it was treated as a consequence of, not a
*Cf. Mathieu (Les I dees, p.48), vho concentrates upon the themes vhich run 
through Isokrates* discourses and so emphasizes the material advantages of an anti­
barbarian campaign: “Isocrates ne fait pas de distinction entre les non-Hellenes; si
36
reason for, the present malaise in the Greek world. The war against Persia, 
with its anticipated political and economic liberation and resuscitation, will 
produce homonoia and eunoia ("goodwill") among the Greeks (so Isokrates 
continues at 4.174: “When these conditions have been realized, and when 
we have been freed from the poverty which afflicts our lives - a thing that 
breaks up friendships, perverts the affections of kindred into enmity, and 
plunges all men into war and strife - then surely we shall enjoy a spirit of 
concord and we shall feel a genuine good will towards each other" (trans. 
Norlin, slightly adapted).
Therefore, Isokrates concludes that the goals of the campaign against 
Persia and the establishment of homonoia among the Greeks are indeed 
interrelated, but there is no uncertainty as to the nature of the relationship: 
the war against Persia is the necessary means to the achievement of 
homonoia. and a consequent eunoia. among the Greeks. In contrast to the 
later proposal in Philippos, the advice in favour of homonoia is not in 
Panegyrikos associated with any general reconciliation of Greek states to be 
effected prior to a war against the Persians. The essentially political and 
limited notion of homonoia which is aimed at by Isokrates in Panegyrikos 
has been most satisfactorily summed up by Bringmann, who says that 
Isokrates encourages the Greeks to aim for "nicht anderes als die 
verträgliche Gesinnung, die einen dauernden und wahren Frieden unter 
Bürgern und Staaten ermöglicht".1 This corresponds very neatly with the 
evidence afforded at 4.167ff.: Isokrates would have for the Greeks a 
"secure peace" (4.173: ewtiv -  ßeßalccv), upheld by cities and states which 
are confident of their safety and trustful that their right to freedom and 
independence will be recognized; contributing to this state of affairs will be 
the augmentation of living space and wealth which will be gained from a 
war against the Persians. This relationship between campaign against the 
Persians and achievement of homonoia among the Greeks does not offer 
any comfort to the advocates of the view that Panegyrikos sought to 
promote a revived and independent Athenian hegemony.
generalement 1' expansion grecque doit se faire aux depens des Perses, T orateur n' 
exclut pas la colonisation d' une par tie de la Thrace, ou meme de la Macedoine, cedee 
aux Grecs de gre ou de force". Hovever, it must be stressed that there is no suggestion 
in Panegyrikos of the pursuit of economic relief and prosperity by any other means 
than through an attack upon the Persians.
bringmann, Studien, p.Z3. Kessler (Isok. u. d. panh. Idee, pp.18-19 [= Philip 
and Athens, p.184 D also recognized the true relationship in this speech between the 
campaign against Persia and homonoia among the city-states, and he specifically 
rebuts Oncken’s criticism (see above, p. 34, n.3); cf. also Vilcken, Philip II u. d. panh. 
Idee, p294, n.4.
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The essence of the case for those who maintain that Panegyrikos is 
an argument for Athenian hegemony is the prominence accorded to the 
praise of Athens and, especially, the allegedly contradictory conclusion 
reached (at 4.99) that the hegemony should be held by Athens, not shared 
with Sparta as originally proclaimed. To reject the clear and emphatic 
statement early in the work that a joint leadership of Athens and Sparta in 
a war against Persia is being proposed (4.17; cf. 19), and to throw the 
overriding emphasis upon the epideiktic section of the speech (and, in 
particular, upon the defence of the fifth-century Athenian empire) is 
perverse. It detracts too much from the deliberative nature of the work 
and from the whole second 'half of the work, in which a case is made for 
the appropriateness of present circumstances for a war against the 
Persians. It must also be noted that the speech concludes where it began: 
that is, with the project of a campaign against Persia which will be led by 
Sparta and Athens in conjunction (4.165- “For who, be he young or old, is 
so indolent that he will not desire to have a part in this expedition - an 
expedition led by the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians, gathered 
together in the cause of the liberty of our allies, dispatched by all Greece, 
and faring forth to wreak vengeance on the barbarians?“). The final picture 
with which we are left is the audience being urged to use their political or 
oratorical skills to bring out what Isokrates sees as the necessary first step 
towards the larger goals, namely to bring about a reconciliation of Sparta 
and Athens (4.167-169; esp. 166: "those who are men of action must exort 
one another to try to reconcile our city with that of the Spartans" (trans. 
Norlin, slightly adapted]).
Buchner has shown the way to an understanding of the Panegyrikos. 
which acknowledges and takes cognizance of the importance of the 
epideiktic section to the work as a whole and which recognizes and 
accounts for the criticism of Sparta in the centre of the work. From a 
careful analysis of Panegyrikos Buchner has argued that the purpose of the 
epideiktic section is not to apologize for Athens* fifth-century empire - 
either to prepare the way for a renascent fourth-century Athenian empire 
or to support a final conclusion that Athens, not Sparta, should occupy the 
position of hegemon amongst the Greeks; nor is it to pander to the desire of 
the Athenians to glorify themselves and their city’s past. Rather, Isokrates 
uses the epideiktic section to demonstrate Athens’ superior claim over 
Sparta to hegemony, so that the Spartans might be more willing to concede
to Athens a share in the hegemony for a campaign against the barbarian.1 
This interpretation is not only consonant with the expressed purpose of the 
work as stated at both beginning and end, but it also acknowledges the 
significance of Isokrates* statement that it is the Spartans rather than the 
Athenians who need to be persuaded to accept the advice which he and 
others before him have propounded (see 4.16). This not only accounts for 
the work as a unity, but it accepts the fact that Isokrates himself was quite 
aware that his 'conclusion', at the end of his arguments for Athens’ right to 
exercise hegemony, is apparently discordant with what he had initially 
proposed; so, at the end of his scathing attack upon the Spartans and their 
policies since the end of the Peloponnesian War, he acknowledges that this 
criticism may seem surprising in view of his professed intention of 
speaking for reconciliation between Athens and Sparta, but, as he says: “It 
is not with the intention of stigmatizing the city of the Lacedaemonians in 
the eyes of others that I have spoken as I have about them, but that I may 
induce the Lacedaemonians themselves, so far as it lies in the power of 
words to do so, to make an end of such a policy" (4.129).
Two further points may be emphasized about the 'conclusion' to the 
praise of Athens. First, Isokrates does not say at 4.99 that Athens should 
have the hegemony in place of the Spartans; he says that if a war against 
the barbarians is under consideration, then liistory' shows the Athenians' 
right to hegemony to be irrefutable; he then goes on to say rhetorically 
that, if in the previous conflict with the barbarians (in the time of Dareios 
and after him Xerxes) Athens had the largest share in the evils of war, it 
would have been improper for her to have been accorded a lesser share of 
the honours, then now it would be a disgrace to Athens if in a new war 
against the Persians "we [Athenians] should now be compelled to follow the 
lead of others" (4.99). That is, Isokrates is demanding a leading role, not 
the leadership. The second point is that the hegemonia with which we are 
concerned here, and throughout the work, is the leadership of the proposed 
campaign against the barbarians; there is nothing to persuade the reader 
that the hegemonia which is proposed in this work means anything beyond
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1 Buchner, Panegyrikos, p,136f.: "Zunächst muss noch einmal betont verden, 
dass die §§100-128 nicht das eigentliche Ziel des Isokrates enthalten. Isokrates 
verteidigt also die dpxil nicht, veil er sie hergestellt haben möchte, sondern veil er 
den ge^en diese erhobenen Vorvürfen gegenüber das höhere Recht Athens auf die 
Tryejiovia aufrechterhalten vill, vas, v ie  schon mehrmals hervorgehoben vurde, die 
Voraussetzung dafür bildet, dass die Spartaner sich mit den Athenern in die fjyeiiovm 
teilen"; end, (p.l39f.) "seine Anklagen [of Sparta]haben nur einen erzieherischen 
Zveck (§130: vovfereu'... err’ üfeXeuj.): Sie sollen Sparta dazu bevegen, dass es Athen 
als gleichberechtigen Partner neben sich duldet.“ (cf. also p.lbl).
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that. Here (at 4.99), as elsewhere, whenever the claim for Athenian 
hegemony is raised, it is always in the specific context of this campaign 
against Persia (with 4.99 cf. 4.17, 19-20, 66, 133-137, 165)1 If any 
broader notion of the style of leadership of which Isokrates approves is to 
be found in Panegyrikos. it is that given in an idealistic form when he is 
eulogizing the panhellenist altruism which he ascribes to the leaders in 
former times at Athens and (be it noted) at Sparta (see 4.75ff., esp. 60: 
They treated the Hellenes with consideration and not with insolence, 
regarding it as their duty to command them in the field but not to 
tyrannize over them, desiring rather to be addressed as leaders than as 
masters, and rather to be greeted as saviours than reviled as destroyers; 
they won the Hellenic cities to themselves by doing kindness instead of 
subverting them by force“).2
Even the criticism of Sparta is more cautious than is sometimes 
admitted. Sparta is certainly dealt with more subtly than by a mere 
mitigation of the criticism as being sympathetic and constructive (see 
4.129-130). If one is to point to a passage such as that where Isokrates 
notes as unseemly ingratitude the fact that the descendants of Herakles (i.e. 
the Spartan kings) have invaded Attika, the land which had earlier 
protected their ancestors (4.61-62),3 then one should also note the 
treatment of the theme of the Persian Wars of the fifth century, the 
Spartans and Athenians are portrayed as rivalling each other to display 
their courage and their hatred of the barbarian (4.71, 73, 65, 67, 91). A 
romantic and quite unhistorical account is given of the circumstances 
surrounding the battle of Marathon, with the Athenians and the Spartans 
virtually competing in a race to face and defeat the Persians (4.66-67: cf.
Buchner, Panegyrikos, pp.30,95f., 151,153, believes that the combined 
leadership of Athens and Sparta in a var against the Persians vould have conjured up 
the old Kimonian ideal of the fifth century of a dual-hegemony (for vh ich  see Plut. 
Kim. 16.9): this ideal he sees as particularly appealing to the politically conservative 
Isokrates (cf. Bringmann, Studien, pp. 33,110). In this chapter it has been suggested 
that by the end of the 380s Isokrates sav  the Spartans and their policy as the major 
threat to the other Greeks; although the Spartans are dealt v ith  in Panegyrikos v ith  
diplomatic circumspection, it vould be going too far to read into Isokrates’ attitude 
tovard them the degree of enthusiasm for the Spartans vh ich  tradition ascribed to 
Kimon.
^ h is  high-minded attitude to hegemony is particularly commended to the 
Athenians by Isokrates in his later vorks Plataikos and On the Peace (see belov, pp. 
101-102,109-111,152-153,169-170,174-175,187-188,190).
%ee Gillis, "Rhetorical Texture", p. 64.
Hdt. 6.105-106, 109ff-);1 glowing tribute is paid to the courage of Leonidas 
and his compatriots at Thermopylai (4.92). Then, when Isokrates passes to 
the great Athenian victory at Salamis, there is a certain coyness about the 
presentation of the ‘betrayal' of the Athenians by the Peloponnesian allies, 
for the Spartans are not individually mentioned: it was “the 
Peloponnesians“ or “the allies“ who selfishly deserted the Athenians and 
sought safety by a fortification of the Isthmos, and it was “the Greeks“ 
against whom the Athenians nobly refrained from expressing their anger, 
choosing instead to forgive (4.93-95) In referring to the period of Spartan 
rule from the end of the Peloponnesian War down to the King’s Peace, 
Isokrates very skilfully directs his attack not upon the Spartans for the 
injustices and abuses of that period, but upon the men in the subject-cities 
who used Spartan support to exercise an unjust power; thus, for Athens, it 
is in fact, by implication, the Athenian oligarchs who are saddled with the 
odium which was aroused by the despised dekarchies. it is these men who 
are said to be the critics of the Athenian fifth-century empire (4.110-114).2 
If one wants an example of how the Spartans could have been shown in a 
very unflattering light for their part in the Persian Wars, one might 
compare the account given in Panathenaikos (12.49-52X where Salamis is 
the only engagement mentioned; the Spartan role in that is specifically and 
critically described, and the consequent formation of the Delian League is 
aggressively mentioned (the other Greeks being said to have taken the 
hegemony away from the Spartans and to have transferred it to the 
Athenians: cf. the neutral description of this same event at 4.72). In fact, 
the only real attack upon the Spartans in Panegyrikos comes over the 
deplorable situation in Greece which is said to have resulted from the King’s 
Peace (4.115-126); even there the arch-villain is made out to be the King 
himself, although it must be acknowledged that the Spartans are clearly 
regarded as responsible for not altering the situation, even for contributing 
to it (4.125-126). Sparta receives some criticism in this matter, but it is the 
situation more than the Spartans which is deplored.
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1 Vith Isokrates' version of Spartan enthusiasm and haste to respond to Athens’ 
call cf. Hdt. 6.120: “After the full moon tsno thousand Lakedaimonians came to Athens, 
making so great haste to reach it that they vere in Attika on the third day from their 
leaving Sparta."
2This is, incidentally, a very clever presentation of this matter, since it not 
only avoids a direct criticism of the Spartans, but it also detracts from the authority of 
the criticism of the Athenian arche. vhich Isokrates seeks to defend.
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Finally, do remarks made by Isokrates in later works offer any 
guidance to our interpretation of Panegyrikos? In his prolix apologia the 
Antidosis Isokrates characterizes his major compositions as: Adyoi>$ ov nepl 
tw  iSm» ouußoXauüv, aAA’ 'EXXt]vucck>? icod noAiriKW^ lad nca^yypucc«^ (15-46). In 
response to a fictitious allegation of corrupting the Athenian youth by his 
teaching and writing ( 15-5&) Isokrates presents in 'evidence' selections 
from his published works. The first of three passages offered is taken from 
Panegyrikos. The temporal context of its publication is epitomized as "a 
time when the Lacedaemonians were the first power in Hellas, while our 
{Athenian] fortunes were at low ebb";1 he continues: "In it I summon the 
Hellenes to make an expedition against the barbarians, and I dispute with 
the Spartans the issue of the hegemony" (15-57: trans. Norlin, slightly 
adapted); then he elaborates, saying that he proved Athens to be the 
regular and historical benefactor of the Greeks, that he sought to prove that 
the leadership in his proposed expedition really belonged to Athens; to 
prove this further, he says, he argued that Athens is owed greater honour 
from the dangers which she has faced in war than for her other 
benefactions (15 56). To demonstrate this the 'clerk' is ordered to read to 
the court' an extensive extract from the epideiktic portion of Panegyrikos 
(viz. 4-51-99). Such a description of the subject matter of Panegyrikos and 
the consequent extract seem to indicate that the patriotic eulogy of Athens 
and her history was the principal object of the oration; this seems to afford 
encouragement to those who would focus attention upon the epideiktic 
section in order to account for the work as a whole. However, the context 
in Antidosis is important: Isokrates is professing to be demonstrating that 
his published writings neither "harm the city" nor “corrupt the young men" 
( 15.56); his concern here is with Athens and Athenians and not with the 
wider issue of the state of the Greek world. Therefore, he stresses the 
eloquence with which he presented the case for Athens' right to leadership 
among the Greeks, saying that thereby he was encouraging the younger 
men to display courage and to confront dangers on behalf of their city; this 
he did by eulogizing the city, their ancestors and the dangers which their 
ancestors had met and overcome; he says also that it is the continuing 
relevance of Panegyrikos which keeps it before men's eyes, deterring 
others from emulating him upon this theme (15- 60-61). It is probably 
true to say that whatever reputation Panegyrikos had in 353, when
^ his in itself is an interesting comment, suggesting that Isokrates veil 
appreciated the relative strengths of Sparta and Athens at that time.
Antidosis was composed, would have rested upon the work's artistic merit 
and a certain timelessness associated with the theme of Athens' past glory.1 
This is indeed implied when Isokrates professes to acknowledge that his 
first selected passage might be criticized as having been "fairly spoken", but 
lacking in usefulness, if it is compared with publications which criticize 
present mistakes and offer advice as to what ought to be done for the 
future 05-62); be procedes to respond to this criticism' with an extract 
from the recent, and still topical, On the Peace, which had been published in 
355 at the end of the Social War (see below, pp. 13$ff). Context and 
purpose must caution against a reliance upon these references in Antidosis 
to support an interpretation of Panegyrikos. Confirmation of this is given 
by the even later reference to the same work in Philippos. In 346 
Isokrates informs Philip II of Makedonia that the themes he presents, of 
ending the strife among the Greek states and of transferring their warring 
to Asia, is a course of action which he had recommended in his Xoyo$ 
TTavTiyypucoc (5.9). The treatment and emphases of the two themes between 
the two works is not identical (see below, p. 3Oof ), but the reference is a 
useful endorsement of what is said in Panegyrikos itself about the purpose 
of that work; it should caution us against accepting the statements in 
Antidosis as evidence of the Panegyrikos' purpose. The reference in 
Philippos. unlike those in Antidosis, encourages an acceptance of an 
interpretation of Panegyrikos which satisfies the text as a whole; this is to 
be preferred to interpretations which are encouraged by historical 
hindsight and which give undue emphasis to one extended passage, while 
demanding that other statements of passages be regarded as insincere or as 
the work of a man of prodigious political, artistic and intellectual 
obtuseness.
The closing words of Isokrates' 'conciliatory* remarks, after he has 
lambasted the Spartans for accepting, and even contributing to, the present 
unhappy state of affairs, offer a key to their author's purpose: "I have 
spoken as I have about them [the Spartans!....that. I may induce the 
Lacedaemonians themselves, so far as it lies in the power of words to do so, 
to make an end of such a policy" (4.129).
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isokrates cannot mean literally at 15.61 that orators had ceased to speak upon 
the subject of Athens' glorious ancestors and the wars of earlier times: the funeral 
orations which were delivered in honour of war-dead were a regular event at Athens 
(see A.Y. Somme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides [Oxford 1945-1981L 
Voi. 2.iQ2f'.); more generally, the theme was a commonplace among the fourth 
century orators.
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In 361/0 Isokrates knew well enough the currently invincible 
position held by the Spartans in Greece. Like many other Greeks, he 
disapproved of the manner in which the Spartans had gone about 
upholding the King's Peace; possibly he feared that even worse would 
follow. The vital issue in Greek politics at this time for those outside the 
Spartan 'camp' was whether Sparta could be dissuaded from further 
seeking to extend her influence in the internal affairs of other poleis and 
from her readiness to employ force to ensure that her wishes were met. 
Opposition by force seemed a forlorn hope. Was there another way?
Revival of the panhellenic crusade which the Spartans, and in 
particular their king Agesilaos, had waged in Asia Minor from 399 until 
395 (with a brief, later, inconclusive revival iXen. 4.6.17-22]) would 
provide a saving diversion and also a fruitful operation for the Greeks as a 
whole. However, Sparta had learnt a lesson in 395- she could not safely 
devote her energies to a war against the barbarians of Asia without first 
ensuring that her position in Greece would not be endangered.1 Athens had 
played a leading role in the opposition to Sparta, and this opposition had 
effectively ended Agesilaos' panhellenic plans and pretensions in Asia. 
However, if the Spartans could be persuaded that Athens would commit 
herself alongside Sparta to a panhellenic crusade, there might be some hope 
of redirecting Spartan policy and energy. Panegyrikos should be seen as 
offering the Spartans both promise and threat: promise, that acceptance of 
a panhellenic crusade could, by means of a shared hegemony in the 
campaign, nullify the risk of an opposition to Sparta arising again among 
the Greeks while Sparta occupied herself in the East (Thebes was secure for 
Sparta at this time with the garrison installed on the Kadmeia); threat, that 
Sparta was not the only polis with claims to, or experience of, leadership 
among the Greeks. With the threat went the unstated implication that only 
one slip would be required by Sparta for the Greeks to unite their strength 
under Athens for self-protection against Spartan high-handed behaviour.2
This then was Isokrates' alternative to the policies currently being 
pursued by Athens and Sparta as the decade of the 300s drew to a close. 
Were Isokrates' proposals little more than the impractical dr earnings of a
1 Isokrates openly recognized this point many years later in Philit>t>os (see 
5.86-88; cf. Ep.9.13-14).
2The threat, together vith Athens' historic' role as self-perceived champion 
of the veak, lies behind the examples from the past vhich Isokrates invokes as 
evidence of Athens' right to hegemony (cf. 4.52ff.: note esp. 52-53).
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teacher of rhetoric who comprehended inadequately the world of affairs 
about him and its workings? The remainder of this chapter will be devoted 
to a consideration of the quality of Isokrates’ perception of the situation of 
the Greek world when he wrote Panegvrikos and the relevance of his 
advice to the current state of affairs.
The picture drawn by Isokrates in Panegvrikos of the present 
situation among the Greeks is unequivocally depressing. At the start his 
advice is said to be aimed at resolving the inter-state warfare, the existing 
confusion and the greatest ills (4.6). The general image of inter-state strife 
with its consequent economic, political and personal ills remains consistent 
throughout the discourse, and is finally encapsulated in a sustained and 
emotional passage:
It rare  rail to make the expedition in the present generation, in order that those 
who have shared in our misfortunes may also benefit by our advantages and not 
continue all their days in wretchedness. For sufficient is the time that is past, 
filled as it has been with every form of horror; for many as are the ills which 
are incident to the nature of man, r a  have ourselves invented more than those 
which necessity lays upon us, by engendering wars and factions among 
ourselves; and, in consequence, some are being put to death contrary to law in 
their own countries, others are wandering with their women and children in 
strange lands, and many, compelled through lack of the necessities of life to 
enlist in foreign armies, are being slain, fighting for their foes against their 
friends.
Against these ills no one has ever protested; and people are not ashamed to 
weep over the calamities which have been fabricated by the poets, while they 
view complacently the real sufferings, the many terrible sufferings, which 
result from our state of war; and they are so far from feeling pity that they even 
rejoice more in each other's sorrows than in their own blessings. But perhaps 
many might even laugh at my simplicity if I should lament the misfortunes of 
individual men, in times like these, when Italy has been laid waste, when Sicily 
has been enslaved, when such mighty cities have been given over to the 
barbarians, and when the remaining portions of the Hellenic race are in the 
gravest peril. (4.167-169; cf. also 4.174)
Another elaborate depiction of the sorry state of the Greek world occurs in 
the centre of the discourse, where the King’s Peace is specifically said to 
have failed to obviate such misfortunes: pirates control the sea, 
mercenaries occupy the city-states, civil war is rife among the Greek poleis, 
political exiles abound, and for some 'freedom' and 'autonomy' means
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subjection to tyrants or to harmosts or to barbarians, or even the 
destruction and dissolution of cities (4.115-117). This catalogue of ills is 
also expressly linked to the King’s Peace a moment later, when the prime 
responsibility for the situation is attributed to the present subservience of 
the Greeks to the Great King (4.120). It is a very gloomy picture for the 
Greek world. Would other Greeks of the time have recognized its validity, 
in part or in entirety?
Lysias in his Olympiakos paints a similar scene:
...but I think it behoves a  man of principle and civic worth to be giving his 
counsel on the 'weightiest questions, when I see Greece in this shameful plight, 
with many parts of her held subject by the foreigner, and many of her cities 
ravaged by despots. Nov if these afflictions vere  due to veakness, it would be 
necessary to acquiesce in  our fate: but since they are due to faction and mutual 
rivalry, surely we ought to desist from the one and arrest the o th e r,... (33 3-4).1
However, it is unlikely that. Isokrates presents a consensus-view of 
the situation: not all Greeks may have regretted the curtailment of the 
imperialistic activities of Athens and, to some extent, Sparta. Just as there 
were a number of Greek states who welcomed the intrusion of Philip 11 of 
Makedon into the city-state world (see Poly bios 16.14), so there may well 
have been some who preferred the settlement by the Great King in 367/6  
to the rapacious and destructive policies of the major city-states. Isokrates 
admits as much, when he seeks to anticipate an argument that some Greeks 
may be reluctant about his proposed expedition because they feel that they 
owe their freedom and independence to the King, while others (those in
1 It may also be noted that, in  the absence of a strong hegemonial power, 
subsequent Common Peaces in the 370s did not resolve the difficulties which 
confronted the Greeks, but in fact led to new instabilities: thus Diodoros reports that 
the Peace of late 375 was encouraged by a weariness among the Greeks of a succession 
of conflicts (15.38.2; cf. 15-50.4 for the situation in 371, when the Greeks were again 
said to be in  a state of turmoil), but that the outcome of that Peace proved to be "great 
disturbances and internal strife" (15 40.1: rapaxas peyaAa$ Kaicrraoe\^), including the 
exiling of many citizens from their towns, particularly in the Peloponnese (see 
15.40.1-5). For argument that Diodoros' dating of the five Peloponnesian revolutions 
after the Peace of 375 should be accepted and should not be transferred to after the 
Peace at Athens in  371 see J. Roy, “Diodoros Siculus XV. 40- The Peloponnesian 
Revolutions of 374 B.C.", Klio 55 (1973), 135-139.
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Asia) regard the Spartans and other mainland Greeks as having betrayed 
them to the Persians (4.175).
Nevertheless, Isokrates' criticism of the King's Peace must be 
permitted some credibility, since Sparta’s abuse of her position under the 
Peace and the growth of her power in the six years which had preceded the 
publication of Panegyrikos were widely recognized by contemporaries. 
Spartan aggression and interference at Mantineia, Thebes, Phleious and 
Olynthos in the years between 365 and 379 are familiar and undisputed 
violations of the Peace in Sparta's interests.1 Was this all? Was this 
sufficient to justify Isokrates' general remarks and laments about loss of 
liberty and independence?
Xenophon concludes that as a consequence of her predominant role in 
bringing about the King's Peace Sparta now appeared much more 
distinguished (5-1-3&); yet he admits no time-lapse before he says that the 
Spartans set about a vindictive policy aimed at punishing those of her allies 
who in the (Corinthian) war had been against them or well-disposed to 
their enemies (5-2.1). He proceeds to narrate the events surrounding 
Sparta's breaking-up of Mantineia and her support for the Phliasian exiles. 
Are these two instances all that lies behind Xenophon's general 
introductory statement? Diodor os, too, before relating the events 
concerning Mantineia, Phleious, Thebes and Olynthos, makes general 
remark that the Spartans were not prepared to abide by the Peace, but that 
they took advantage, at least in some instances, of pro-Spartan exiles, who 
had been driven out of their cities in consequence of the restoration of 
autonomy guaranteed by the Peace; they incited these exiles to stir up 
their cities and to create unrest through the agency of those who were 
friendly toward them; thus the Spartans at first enslaved the weaker cities, 
but later they made war upon, and forced into subjection, cities of greater 
account ( 155.1-3; cf. 15.19.1).
For mainland Greece Isokrates cannot cite any instance of Spartan 
abuse of her position and power other than those mentioned by Xenophon 
and Diodoros (see 4.126). However, he does make two references to 
Spartan 'activity' in the Aegean which might be taken as pertaining to the 
contemporary situation: for he criticizes the Spartans for subjecting the
^ or Mantineia see Xen. 52.1-7; VS.  15.12.1-2; ror Phleious: Xen. 3-3-10-17,21- 
25; for Thebes: Xen. 5-229-31,3^36; VS. 15-20.1-2; for Olynthos: Xen. 5220-24,37-43; 
3.1-9, iS-iy, 26. Cavinreii (~rne Jüng's Peace", Cy n.s. 31 U98i i  78) suggests that 
Sparta may have had a defensible case for her action against Mantineia. For the 
dating of these events see Beloch, GG, III2. 2.230-234.
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Greek islanders to tribute (4.132), and he speaks of a dispute (between 
Sparta and Athens?) over the Kyklades islands (4.136). It is certainly 
difficult to know what to make of these references, for which there is no 
confirmatory evidence, apart from the possibility that at some time in the 
years after 366 Athens withdrew temporarily from Delos.1 The former 
passage which refers to the Greek island states paying tribute could 
conceivably be taken to mean that the Spartans, by acquiescing in the 
terms of the King's Peace, abandoned the Eastern Greeks to the demesne of 
the Great King, who exacted tribute from them; the relatively rare verb 
SaqioXoyeu» is only otherwise used in Panegyrikos a short while before, in 
reference to the eastern Greeks who had been left by the Spartans to pay 
tribute to the barbarians, to see their citadels occupied by their enemies, 
and to suffer even greater personal indignities (4.123). Thus, at 4.132, 
Isokrates could be saying that the Spartans have indirectly been 
responsible for the islanders paying tribute by their agreement to 
surrender these Greeks to the Great King's control. A moment before 
Isokrates had criticized Sparta on the ground that she is at present aiding 
and abetting the advance of absolute monarchs and tyrants at the expense 
of the Greeks, and he instances the Makedonian king Amyntas III, the 
Syrakusan tyrant Dionysios I and the Great King; these absolute rulers, he 
says, are being assisted by the Spartans "in order that they shall have the 
greatest possible realm" (4.126). The objection to this interpretation is that 
it was only the Greek cities of mainland Asia, together with the islands of 
Klazomenai and Kypros, which were to belong to the Great King (Xen.
5-1.31), so that, unless Persia had been extending her rights among the 
island Greeks beyond what had been initially specified by the Peace,
1See RJC. Sinclair, “The King's Peace and the Employment of Military and Naval 
Forces 387-378", Chiron 8 (1978), 43-44: Sinclair rejects the possibility that Sparta vas 
directly exerting her influence in the Aegean islands and perhaps levying tribute on 
some islanders; he suggests that at best Isokrates' testimony might be matched vith  
epigraphic evidence from the accounts of the Amphiktyons and from the lists of gold 
crovns dedicated by the Athenians to Delian ApoUo to infer that some pressure, more 
probably diplomatic than military, had been exerted by the Spartans to force the 
Athenians to vithdrav from Delos in recognition of the Peace-terms; cf. G. Glotz &
R. Cohen, Histoire grecaue. 3 vols (Paris 1923-1936), III, p. 106, vho accept Isokrates' 
testimony as proof of Spartan tribute-gathering among island-states. Sinclair also 
contends that, although Athens maintained some interest in the Aegean through the 
presence of a small naval force, there vas little ship-building in the years vhich  
followed the Peace (pp.47ff.); it has been estimated that Athens retained a force of 
about 50 ships at the conclusion of the Peace (see M. Amit, Athens and the Sea: A Study 
in Athenian Sea-Povrer. Collection Latomus, Vol 74 [Brussels 19651 p25), and that 6 
n ev  ships vere built each year between 386/5 to 380/79 (C.H. Vilson," Athenian 
Military Finances, 378/7 to the Peace of 375“, Athenaeum n.s.48 [19701 p.310).
Isokrates would be stretching the truth considerably by this interpretation. 
Another possibility would be that Isokrates uses the expression “much 
rather than subjecting the islanders to tribute" as a logically antithetical 
extreme to his preferred alternative for the Spartans to endeavour to 
reduce the Persians to become the subjects of the Greeks (4.13 If )- This 
logical, and undesirable, alternative would remind his audience of the 
earlier regime promoted by Lysander on behalf of the Spartans among the 
islanders and Asian Greeks after the Peloponnesian War.
The alleged dispute over the Kyklades is also obscure, but it may 
make more sense if we interpret the "dispute" as being between, not Sparta 
and Athens, but between “we (Greeks)" and the Great King; for the 
sentence points to the irony of "disputing over the Kyklades", when "we" 
gratuitously betrayed to the King so many large and powerful cities (in Asia 
itself). Such an ironical contrast fits well into this entire passage, which is 
concerned with the question of the relationship between the Greeks, 
Spartans and Athenians and others, and the Persians rather than with the 
relationship between the Spartans and the Athenians themselves, although 
admittedly the passage does begin with this latter relationship (4.133)- 
Such an interpetation finds further support from the sentence which 
follows that in question: Therefore some territories he has in his grasp, 
others he will have, while others he forms designs upon, and justly has he 
come to despise us all" (4.136). It is all vague and allusive, but it may 
nonetheless reflect a feeling that the King was seeking to extend his active 
influence beyond the originally agreed boundaries of the Peace; if such 
were the case contemporaries would have appreciated the point and would 
have recognized that, apart from Kypros, where the King was openly active, 
no exact instance could at present be cited.1 A later passage complements 
this argument: at 4.163 Isokrates says: "If the barbarian strengthens his 
hold on the cities of the coast by stationing in them larger garrisons than he 
has there now, perhaps those of the islands which lie near the mainland, as 
for example, Rhodes and Samos and Chios, might incline to his side". This is 
an hypothesis, not a fact, but it is based upon an assumption of the 
credibility in the eyes of the Greeks that the Great King may not remain 
content with the limitations which he had set for himself by the Peace.
Before these hints and allusions at 4.132 and 4 . 1 3 6  are discarded as 
no more than rhetorical fabrication, two points must be made which might
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That the passage relates to present circumstances is made clear at the outset of 
the section: 4.133 ^  ru>€$ aXXo8ev eneXSovre^  Bearal yevowro ray tt« o 6 v t q b > n p a w a r w .
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incline us to give them some credence: first, it is not easy to conceive of the 
purpose of such a dissemblance; Isokrates' general argument at this point 
can stand without the need to concoct some spurious dispute concerning the 
Kyklades; moreover, it is difficult to see what profit there would be in 
introducing such a detail, if it were a manifest invention. Second, some 
motivation is required for the enthusiastic response among island cities to 
the Athenian appeal in 3 77 for membership in the newly-founded Second 
Athenian Confederacy. It is true that the Confederacy was established with 
the motive of protecting the members from Spartan abuses, but unless 
those references in Panegyrikos which have just been discussed do indicate 
an active re-emergence of Spartan power in the Aegean, then there seems 
little about Sparta's behaviour on the mainland which would drive island 
Greeks into the Confederacy, whereas hints or threats of Persian 
interference could provide a forceful impetus to join. The fact that the 
Confederacy was careful to maintain a correct attitude to the King in terms 
of the Peace does not contradict such a suggestion: Athens and her new 
allies could not sensibly declare a breach with Persia so long as the 
possibility existed that Sparta might side in such a situation with the King; 
the Confederacy sought to reaffirm the Peace, rather than to openly begin a 
conflict with either Persia or Sparta.
As far as Sparta's conduct after the Peace is concerned, it has been 
observed that the military insistance with which she effected her foreign 
policy in these years meant that “the spirit of the old League must give way 
before a harsher and more ruthlessly efficient organization".1 Not all the 
evidence which can be adduced for this more autocratic style of leadership 
among her own allies relates to the period from 366-360; some comes 
from the increasingly precarious period of Spartan leadership between 
379-371.2 On the other hand, it seems unlikely that Autokles, an Athenian 
ambassador to Sparta in 371, was thinking of a situation which pertained 
only after the time of Panegyrikos' publication, when he criticized the 
Spartans for their hypocritical attitude to the independence of the Greek 
cities, saying: The first clause you put into any treaty with your allied 
cities is this, that they must follow you wherever you lead" (Xen. 6.3.7), and 
later in the same speech: “It often happens that these so-called 
’independent' states are forced to march against people who want to be on
Smith, “The Opposition to Agesilaus’ Foreign Policy". Historia 2 (1953/4), 
275.
2 Ibid., pp275-277.
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the best possible terms with them“ (6.3-6). Such , for example, were the 
terms imposed upon the Olynthians when they surrendered in 379; as 
Xenophon tells us: Their ambassadors .... concluded an agreement to have 
the same foreign policy as Sparta, to join any expedition led by Sparta and 
to become an ally“ (5.3.26). The demands of military service must have 
been burdensome for Sparta's allies,1 and the Spartans were not slow to 
chastize their allies (see Xen. 4.4.17). The arrangements decided at the 
meeting of Sparta and her allies in 362, when it was agreed to send a force 
against Olynthos, are suggestive of discontent among the allies at the 
demands of campaigning in Sparta's interests: for it was agreed that states 
could send money in lieu of men; moreover, the need for a clause which 
stipulated a fine for any state which failed to contribute suggests that 
willing acquiescence could not be assumed (Xen. 5-2.21-22).2
To recapitulate, Xenophon and Diodor os both speak as though one 
could deduce a more widespread oppression of the Greeks on the part of 
Sparta after the King's Peace than they specifically document. In 
suggesting this, they concur with Isokrates' willingness to generalize about 
the failure of the King's Peace as far as the Greeks, other than the Spartans, 
were concerned. Perhaps in other, unrecorded situations, threats from 
Sparta, or from the King, had sufficed to produce compliance, and so such 
issues were not recorded in detail or at all by historians of the time, or at 
least are not reflected in extant sources.
Isokrates was not alone in his criticism of Sparta's conduct. With 
hindsight moralizing historians eagerly attributed Sparta’s demise a decade 
after the appearance of Panegyrikos to her policy in the period prior to the 
publication of the discourse; in particular, the Spartans’ opportunism in 
seizing Thebes and in garrisoning the Kadmeia with Spartan troops in 362 
seemed to fuel this view, but other sources also reveal that Phoibidas’ 
action here, compounded by the official endorsement of it at Sparta, led to 
widespread disapprobation of Spartan conduct among the other Greeks 
(Xen. 5.4.1; D.S. 15-20.2; Plut. Pelop. 6.1; cf. Polybios 4.27.4). It also led to 
Athens' first recorded act of defiance to Sparta since the Peace, when the 
Athenians accepted the Theban refugees (Xen. 5 2.3 D- If the seizure of the
1Ibid.,p276&n.ll.
2An anecdote in Plutarch (Ages. 26.3-5) concerning allied grumbling about 
their part in Sparta’s military activities a fev  years later, after Thebes' recovery of 
independence, has the air of a discontent vhich vas not limited to the immediate 
campaigns against Thebes.
Kadmeia was seen by the Greeks as an infringement of the Peace, it must 
be added that the events at Thebes, which led to the offer of betrayal by 
Leonüades and his followers, included a disagreement among the Thebans 
as to whether or not they should support the Spartan intervention in the 
Chalkidike which was aimed at suppressing the Olynthian Confederacy; for 
the Thebans, presumably inspired by the rival faction led by Ismenias, had 
rejected the Spartans' call for mobilization, with a proclamation forbidding 
Thebans to join the expedition against the Olynthians, with whom the 
Thebans had attempted to negotiate an alliance (Xen.5-2.15, 27). Thus, by 
the time that Panegyrikos appeared there can be little doubt that many 
Greeks were indeed cynical about the benefits which the King's Peace had 
seemed to promise. Isokrates' criticisms of the Peace would not have fallen 
upon deaf ears, even if there were also other Greeks, apart from the 
Spartans, who had welcomed the consequences.1
It is evident that, insofar as the King's Peace had failed to live up to 
its promise for some Greeks, that failure was largely and manifestly to be 
attributed to Spartan policy and action; little, if any, support had been 
needed from the Great King, who, with his satraps, seems to have confined 
his attentions to his own kingdom and to those Greeks who lived within its 
boundaries,2 *although I have suggested that Isokrates in this speech may 
afford just a fragmentary glimpse of a Persian interest which extended, or 
was starting to extend, beyond the limits laid down in the Peace. Modern 
historians of this period generally acknowledge that Artaxerxes had sought 
from the Peace protection against a re-emergence of hostile Athenian 
activity in the Aegean and along the Asiatic coast, so that he could deal 
unimpeded with rebellions on Kypros and in Egypt; 3 he also aimed to 
redirect the energy of the Spartans away from Asia Minor, where they had 
proven excessively untrustworthy and troublesome ever since the 
beginning of the century.4 The specific responsibility for permitting the 
Persian king to achieve this position of dominance over Greek affairs is
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^Dne thinks, for example, of the Pla.taia.ns, who must have been restored to 
their city at some time after the Peace (see belov, p. 99f), and who surely felt a debt of 
gratitude to the Spartans for making this possible.
2See Ca’vkvell, "The King’s Peace“, p.77.
3See e.g. N. G. L. Hammond, A History of Greece to 322 B. C., 2nd. ed. (Oxford 
1967), p.464; cf.also Ryder. KE. t>.41.
4See D.M. L e w , Sparta and Persia (Leiden 1977), p.146.
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allocated by Isokrates to the Spartans, but he is careful immediately 
afterward to moderate that criticism; for he excuses his harsh words by a 
very rhetorically-phrased distinction between "accusation“ and 
"admonition” (4.130: XPJ} &e KttTTiyopeiv pev fiyeioöca roy$ ewt pAdft) roioyra Aeyovrac, 
voyteretv 8e tov$ eV (DfcXeiq, XoiSopowra )^. Reconciliation, not confrontation, 
between Athens and Sparta is Isokrates’ professed aim, and so he wishes 
ultimately to direct Greek odium onto the barbarians, although he seeks to 
make clear to the Spartans that their conduct since the Peace is not 
acceptable to many other Greeks.
If admonition was a necessary prelude to reconciliation for one party 
which had offended the Greeks through its failure to respect the provisions 
of the King's Peace, there was no mitigation of the censure which was 
directed at him who had imposed the Peace. The Peace and the role of the 
King in Greek affairs are roundly condemned. The battle of Knidos (394) 
had signalled a beginning of misfortunes for the Greeks as the Persians 
extended their power throughout the Aegean, even occupying Kythera and 
landing on Lakonian soil (4.119; cf .Xen.4.6.7-3); but with the Peace of 
337/6 the Great King is said to have established himself as the manager 
and instructor of the affairs of the Greeks:
"Nowadays it is the Great King who manages the affairs of the Greeks, and 
prescribes what each should do, and has all but set up satraps in the poleis. For, 
except for this, what else is lacking? Vas he not the decisive influence in the 
war? Did he not regulate the Peace? Has he not set himself up as leader of the 
present state of affairs?1 (My translation)
There appears to be a tone of irony revealed by the choice of language in 
this passage: the verb enpyravevoe, not attested elsewhere in Isokrates, had a 
particular technical sense at Athens to refer to the tribe which held the 
monthly presidency in the Boule: the word emorarT ,^ used in the next 
clause, also had a technical sense in the same context, since it was the word 
used for the chairman of the prytanis, who presided over the meetings of 
Boule or Assembly (cf. Arist. AthPol. 44.1); emcn-aTTK’ is used elsewhere by 
Isokrates, but generally in a context where the role of the person so 
described is approved: in particular, it is the word used to describe the role 
recommended for Philip II in his relations with the Greeks (cf. 5 7 0; that 
Isokrates has chosen to use this verb and this noun in his description of the
^4.120-121: vvv eraivos eorw 6 öioucüä» rd tojv'EXAfjvmy, rat npoOTaTTGuy a xpfj 
TTCievy sat [icvcv «keTTicrdSiici  ^ev rcaj Tro^oiraSicrdj. irXfjy yap icyroy n
rd»» aXXajv ynoXourov ecrrw; oy rat roy noXepoy icypioc eyevero, rai tt)v eipTjv^ v 
eTTpirr dveyoE, rat tw  napovray npayparcuv emcrraTT^ raÖCOTTyoEV;
recent part played by the King in the affairs of the Greeks suggests that he 
intends to make an ironical allusion to the King's role by employing 
vocabulary which evokes for Athenians at least thoughts of their own 
democratic institutions and method of government. The irony in these 
words is reinforced by two indignant questions:
"Do ve  not sail off to him as to a master, vhen v e  have complaints against each 
other? Do \re not address him as The Great King' as though ve  rare the captives 
of his spear?“*
That Isokrates views as ironical the Great King's position in the Greek world 
as the result of the Peace is made very clear near the end of the speech, 
where he condemns those Greeks who believe that “the barbarian cares 
tenderly for Hellas, and stands guard over her peace, while among 
ourselves are to be found those who outrage her and do her harm“ (4.175: 
trans. Norlin, slightly adapted). Isokrates suggests in these sentences of 
4.121 the difference, as he sees it, between appearance and reality with 
respect to the King's imposition of the Peace.
The responsibility for this situation is laid at the door of the Spartans, 
who are acutely reminded of the propagandist-cry of liberation for the 
Greeks which had been invoked at the outset of the Peloponnesian War in 
431 (4.122; cf. Thuc. 2.8.4; 4.85-1); for instead, they have surrendered to 
the barbarian the Greeks of Asia. The current condition of these Greeks in 
Asia is forcefully described:
...these peoples are reduced to such abject servitude that it is not enough that 
they should be forced to pay tribute and see their citadels occupied by their foes, 
but, in addition to these public calamities, must also in their ovn persons submit 
to greater indignities than those vhich are suffered in our ’»arid by purchased 
slaves; for none of us is so cruel to his slaves as are the barbarians in punishing 
free men. But the crovning misery is that they are compelled to take the field 
’vith the enemy in the very cause of slavery and to fight against men vho assert 
their right to freedom, and to submit to hazards of war on such terms that in case 
of defeat they will be destroyed at once, and in case of victory they vill 
strengthen the chains of their bondage for all time to come. (4.123-124: trans. 
Norlin, slightly adapted)
The King's policy toward the Greeks is said to have two aspects: first, 
he aims to promote a continual state of division among the Greeks, and 
second, he uses Greeks soldiers to secure and to enhance his own kingdom
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14.121: o^x 0 CEVVOV nXeopev axmep npo$ Seanon^ oXXt^Xw  w^TV/opTpovres, ov 
ßaaiAea rov jieytxv ayrov npooayopeyqiev, armep caxpaXtoroi yeyovores;
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(4.134). Two arguments are advanced in response to those who would 
counsel against a rupture of the Peace. The first is simply stated and needs 
no development: those who are fearful now of incurring the King's wrath 
will have much more to fear when once the King has succeeded in 
controlling and extinguishing the areas of dissidence in his present kingdom 
(4.136). This argument is based upon the assumption of an aggressive and 
expansionist policy on the part of the King toward the Greeks; I have 
already referred to hints by Isokrates designed to corroborate such a policy 
(see above, p. 46-49). The second argument points out that the King’s 
ability to exercise an influence over the affairs of the Greeks has depended 
upon his capacity to tilt the balance of power in Greek affairs by siding 
either with Athens or with Sparta; this capacity, it is argued, would be 
irrelevant in the event of a united Greek assault upon the King's domain, 
when he would have to rely upon his own, unaided resources (4.139-140). 
This second argument is amply developed. A survey of recent Persian 
'failures’ is provided: the revolt of Egypt has not been checked, despite a 
major effort to suppress it; the long-running war against the rebel Kypriot 
prince Evagoras continues; the Persian successes, in the first decade of the 
century, in promoting the liberation of Rhodes, and then the rest of the 
Aegean, from the tyrannous Spartans, is said to have been due more to 
Greek support and leadership than to Persian endeavours, where the King’s 
early lack of zeal about providing pay and support had almost caused the 
resistance to Spartan authority in the Eastern Aegean to wither and perish; 
the Spartan campaigns of the early 390s are said to have exposed the 
limitations of the Persian control of Asia Minor; and, finally, the 
memorable expedition of Kyros and the even more renowned retreat of the 
Greek mercenary army after the battle of Kwnaxa are said to have cruelly 
revealed the lack of manliness of those soldiers in the King’s own army and 
to have demonstrated the infidelity and the treachery of barbarians 
(4.140-149).
All this adds up to a conclusive demonstration of the degeneracy 
(iiaAoKia) of the barbarians. This tale of weakness and failure is explained 
by the description of the Persians which follows: they are portrayed as 
undisciplined, wealthy and committed to luxurious living; hence, they are 
pampered and soft, faithless and cowardly, sacrilegious, while their social 
structure displays at one extreme qualities of arrogance and tyranny and at 
the other servility and obsequiousness (4.150-156).
Finally, Isokrates enumerates areas from within the territories over 
which the King claims dominion which might be expected to support a
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Greek attack upon the Persians: Egypt and Kypros are still in revolt; 
Phoinikia and Syria have been devastated in that war; Tyre is in the hands 
of enemies of the King, and the cities of Kilikia are either already in similar 
situation or are readily available to be brought over; Lykia has never 
fallen fully under Persian control; Hekatomnos, satrap of Karia, has long 
been disaffected; and, of course, one can expect nothing but enthusiasm 
from the Greeks along the Asiatic coast (4.161-162).1 In short, the Eastern 
fringe of the Persian kingdom is claimed to be either actively hostile to the 
Persians or ready to seize the chance to revolt.
Isokrates' observations and assessments as to the state of affairs in 
the Persian empire, the national characteristics and military capacities of 
the barbarians, and the possibility of a successful war against the King's 
territories have not been accepted without criticism.2 There are two issues 
involved: there is the question of Isokrates’ knowledge of these matters, 
and thus of his judgment with regard to his advocacy of a panhellenic war 
against the Persians; then there is the question of the extent to which 
Isokrates’ opinions on these matters were representative of opinion among 
the Greeks.
Isokrates’ view of the Persians as degenerate, effeminate barbarians 
must be seen as the continuation of a view presented by a succession of 
Greek writers which can be traced back as far as Herodotos. In the 
Histories Aristagoras of Miletos places before the Spartans the twin 
enticements of a Persian foe who is easily vincible and of Persian wealth 
such as could hardly be imagined by the impoverished mainland Greeks: 
he concludes: "If you wished passionately for these things, they would be 
yours" (Hdt. 549; cf. 5-97). There is nothing known about Isokrates’ life to 
suggest that he spoke of the Persians as a race from experience among
^or a summary of the various positions of the Asiatic Greek cities and towns 
under Persian rule at this time see Glotz-Cohen, Histoire greccue, Ill, p.102: the 
scenario described by Isokrates in Panegyrikos is accepted as essentially accurate.
or criticism of the general picture of Persia conveyed by Isokrates and other 
contemporary Greeks see CG. Starr,“Greeks and Persians in the Fourth Century B.C.“, 
Iranica Antiqua 11 (1975), 39-99; for the unrealism at this time of an attempt to march 
into the King’s territory and seize control of Asia see Cawkwell, “Agesilaus and 
Sparta“, CQ n.s. 26 (1976), 71; cf. Cl. Mosse, “Les Rapports entre la Grece et la Perse au
IVeme siecle avant Jesus-Christ“, in La Persia e il mondo greco-romano (Rome 1966), 
pp.177-182, for support of the conventional Greek view of Persia as ’wealthy and 
feeble; cf. A.R. Burn, “Persia and the Greeks”, Ch. 6 in Cambridge History of Iran,
Vol 2 (Cambridge 1985), p.355 for acceptance of the military weakness of Persia, 
which was nevertheless counterbalanced in this period by Persia's use of gold and 
diplomacy.
them; also his views of their fighting capabilities were derived from others. 
It is beyond the scope of this study to present a detailed exploration of 
contemporary views of Persia and its people, but one or two examples will 
show that Isokrates* views on the subject were not peculiarly those of their 
author. Xenophon was one who had had first-hand experience of the 
Persians as opponents; he had witnessed their treachery and saw fit to 
exhort his fellow-mercenaries to return to Greece, there to pass on to their 
compatriots a message which echoed that attributed to Aristagoras; so he 
encouraged his colleagues: “I think it just and reasonable that first we 
should go to Greece and attempt to reach our families, and that we should 
point out to the Greeks that it is their own choice that they live poorly, 
when it is possible for them to convey here those who now live there in 
austerity and to see them wealthy“ (Anab. 3-2.26). Another contemporary, 
Plato, criticized the Persian kingdom as an example of a pure monarchic 
system, professing that a harem-system of education was responsible for 
princes becoming kings "swollen with pride and indiscipline" and that the 
enslavement of the people, together with the autocratic nature of their 
rulers, led one to the conclusion that "the present maladministration of 
Persia is due to an excess of servitude and autocracy" (Laws 694a-696a: 
trans. A£ .  Taylor).
While it must be admitted that this uncomplimentary and 
unsympathetic portrait of the Persians cannot be given balance from a 
Persian viewpoint due to the lack of historical evidence,1 it would be 
perverse to claim that our literary Greek sources present no more than a 
mythological view of the Persians or that this view was not shared by 
many, perhaps most, other Greeks.2 Since the time of the legend-making 
victories over the Persians first at Marathon and then against the army and 
fleet of Xerxes, the Greeks of the mainland had experienced no occasion to
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iOn the one-sided nature of the evidence for relations between the Greeks and 
the Persians see Starr, “Greeks and Persians", pp. 44-48; also P. Cartledge, Agesilaos 
and the Crisis of St>arta (London 1987), p. 184.
2For just such an assertion see S V. Hirsch, The Friendship of the Barbarians; 
Xenonhon and the Persian Empire {Hanover & London 1985), p.3f.; Hirsch alleges that 
even Isokrates himself, let alone other Greeks, did not really believe the views about 
the Persians which are expressed in his works; the failure of Isokrates to arouse 
active support for his plan to attack the Persians leads Hirsch to conclude that most 
Greeks did not subscribe to Isokrates’ portrayal of the Persians and of their 
vulnerability. Hirsch's argument on this matter is imprecise and is not substantiated: 
nor in his conclusion does he distinguish whether the Greeks rejected Isokrates’ 
general characterization of the Persians or more particularly the plan for an 
expedition against the barbarian, or both.
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cause them to revise their confident belief that Greek, hoplites were 
superior to Persian infantry; such influence and success as the Persians 
had experienced in Greek affairs since their active interference had been 
revived in 412 had been, as Isokrates truly claimed, the result of a policy 
of supporting Greeks against other Greeks. That support had been 
demonstrated through the undoubted power of Persian gold and of the 
ships which that money could provide.
The conventional Greek view of Persia in the fourth century, as a 
wealthy but 'soff nation of unprincipled barbarians has been accepted by 
some modern historians, although others have interpreted the Greek 
portrait more sympathetically.1 The lifestyle favoured by wealthy Persians 
and the attitude of the mass of the people to the autocratic rule of the 
Akhaimenidaeand those who governed on their behalf may not have been 
well understood by Isokrates or by other Greeks, but there can be no doubt 
about the unimaginable wealth contained within the kingdom; as recently 
as the first half of the 390s Greek troops with the Spartan commanders 
operating in Asia Minor received a foretaste of the vast fortune in booty 
which was later to come into the hands of Alexander and his army as they 
traversed the Persian Empire.2 The Greeks had also witnessed how, since 
412, the King and his satraps had sought by strategic disbursements of this 
wealth to influence the balance of power among the Greeks.
Nor is the superiority of Greek to Persian infantry a matter of 
dispute. The reputation of the Greek mercenaries who had accompanied 
Kyros into Asia and who had returned to the sea-board, where they had 
proved troublesome to Greeks as well as to barbarians, had been enough to 
discourage Tissaphernes in 397 from engaging Derkylidas’ army in which 
some of these veterans now served (Xen. 3-2 6-7, 17-16). At least until the 
Persian king responded in earnest, the Spartan campaigns in Asia Minor in 
the first half of the 390s had revealed that there were rich pickings to be 
had for a Greek army which did not stray too far into the hinterland of 
Anatolia. The recognition of this among the Greeks is surely attested by the
1See Mosse, “Les Rapports“, pp.177-182. For a more sympathetic interpretation 
see Starr, “Greeks and Persians", pp.41ff. and J.M. Cook, The Persian Empire (London 
19831 pp. 229-231.
2 In 399 the Spartan commander Derkylidas compelled Meidias to hand over the 
treasure of Mania, former queen of Aeolis, a treasure vhich , he said, irould almost 
suffice to pay his 8,(XX)-strong army for a year (Xen. 3127-28); on his return to 
Greece Agesilaos iras able to make a handsome dedication at Delphi of ten talents, as a 
tenth part of his spoils from Asia (Plut. Ages. 19.3); c f . also Xen. 322,4.12,24; DS .  
14.38.3; 79.3; 802,4; Plut. Ages. 10.4-5; 11.1.
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enthusiasm said to have been generated among the Greeks by the 
announcement of Agesilaos' expedition (Xen. Ages. 1.13) and subsequently 
by the reluctance of his troops to depart from Asia (Xen. 4.2.5).
Isokrates' description of the Great King's policy towards the Greeks, 
as one of promoting division among them and of capitalizing upon their 
indigence to obtain mercenaries to aid in the suppression of rebellious 
members of his own empire, is not wide of the mark, although the claim 
that the King sought to promote continual warfare among the Greeks more 
accurately represents Persian policy for the period from 395 to 366 than 
that revealed at and after the King's Peace, by which Persia demanded that 
all Greeks outside Asia Minor acknowledge each others' autonomy. 
Artaxerxes' inclination from 395 to favour the Athenians at Sparta's 
expense had had to be revised when Thrasyboulos and the Athenian fleet 
began to encroach upon the eastern Aegean and when the Athenians 
treacherously repaid the King's beneficence by lending support to the rebel 
Evagoras on Kypros. Cieariy the King wished to free himseif from the 
perpetual wranglings of the Greeks so that he could direct his attention to 
the escalating rebelliousness spreading within the western part of his 
empire from Kypros to Egypt.1
More contentious, in the view of some scholars, was Isokrates’ belief 
that the Greeks of * s^ia were unwilling sufferers under the Persian yoke.2 
It has been claimed that, contrary to Isokrates' portrayal and judgement, 
the Greeks of Asia were less than dismayed to have been surrendered to 
the control of the Great King, and that the period which followed the King's 
Peace inaugurated for them an era of stability and prosperity which would 
not have encouraged their support for those who wished to promote their 
independence from the Persians.3 Pointing to evidence of developing 
economic prosperity among the Greek cities of Asia, revealed in part by
iDiodoros associates the King’s purpose in imposing peace upon the Greeks 
vith immediate preparations aimed at overpowering the rebel Evagoras (14.110.5).
2See esp. Starr, “Greeks and Persians", pp.72ff.; cf. A. T. Olmstead, History of the 
Persian Empire (Chicago 1948), p.396, & Cook, The Persian Empire, p.215.
^Olmstead (History of the Persian Empire, p.3%) believes that freedom from 
the costs of the wrars of liberation wrould have compensated the Asiatic Greeks for the 
reimposed tribute owred to Persia; cf. Cook, The Persian Empire, t>215. Such hard- 
headed economic rationalization is not characteristic of the Greek city-states, vhich, 
although ready at times to disengage from costly vars, rarely abandoned at the same 
time their fundamental faith in independence and autonomy. The history of the 
Greek cities of Asia wras no exception in this respect.
building activity and migration of mainland Greeks to Asia, Starr concludes 
that satisfaction among Asiatic Greeks with Persian rule is demonstrated by 
the absence both of appeals to the mainland for liberation and of support 
for anti-Persian activity, such as revolts by satraps.1 This thesis has not 
gone unchallenged; it has not unreasonably been suggested that this 
evidence for prosperity should more properly be seen as reflective of the 
wealth of a minority and as overlooking the oppression of the ‘many’ under 
the Persian despotism.2
Although direct evidence is lacking, it seems likely that after the 
King’s Peace the Asiatic Greek towns were required to return to paying the 
tribute which they had paid in the past, as Tithraustes had proposed to 
Agesilaos after the execution of the fickle Tissaphernes in 395 (see Xen. 
3-4.25) 3 Further, the evidence for a slightly later period reveals that in 
most of the Greek cities which were under the influence of the Karian ruler 
Mausolos there existed oligarchic governments sponsored by Mausolos 4 5
Whether or not prosperity was foreseen in 386 by the Greeks of Asia 
and whether or not the improved economic circumstances which later 
occurred were widely shared by Greeks of all levels of society, the more 
powerful off-shore islands (including Rhodes, Chios, Samos and Tenedos) 
must have forfeited their mainland holdings (peraiai) as a consequence of 
the King's Peace,5 and they may well have been apprehensive of further 
Persian interference, once Persia had dealt with Evagoras. Some such fear 
or concern may explain the alliance which was struck in 364 between Chios 
and Athens (Tod, GH111.118). Still more significant is a recently- 
discovered inscription from Erythrai which seems to refer to internal stasis 
at Erythrai and which records a (lost) resolution from the demos at Athens 
concerning a fear on the part of the Erythraians that they will be
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1 Starr,“Greeks and Persians“, pp .72-84.
2See Cartledge, Agesilaos, p.198.
^Glotz-Cohen (Histoire grecque. III, p. 102) accept that one group of these cities 
and towns paid tribute and provided military service to the King.
4See S. Hornblower, Mausolus (Oxford 1982), pp.lOTff; Hornblower stresses and 
carefully documents the fact that Persian policy for Anatolia in the fourth century 
was not uniform: each city or town must be considered as a separate case (ibid., p.l 14, 
n.64).
5 Ibid., p.l28f.
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surrendered to the barbarians.1 If this Athenian decree is correctly 
referred to the time of the King's Peace and the abandonment of the Greeks 
in Asia to the Persians and their agents, then it is clear that at least one 
Greek town in Asia did not go willingly into its status of subjection to the 
King. The Athenians cannot have offered much hope to the Erythraians 
about 366, and at some time afterwards, but perhaps before 365, Erythrai 
passed from democracy to oligarchy.2 Nor did universal acceptance come 
with the years and the alleged prosperity: the Greek town of Iasos appears 
to have been permitted to retain its democratic constitution; it also 
provides evidence of acceptance of the local ruler Mausolos, but an 
inscription from Iasos (Syll.3 169) reveals that some people in the town 
resented the interference of the Karian satrap and plotted against him. The 
Erythrai decree mentioned above is proof that the Athenians were not 
uninformed of the apprehension of at least some of the Asiatic Greeks at 
the time of the King's Peace about their abandonment to the control of the 
Great King. This in itself affords some vindication for Isokrates' view that 
the Asiatic Greeks had not welcomed their ‘betrayal’. The fact that there 
was not an appeal to the mainland Greeks for liberation after the King's 
Peace is in itself no argument for rejecting the testimony of Isokrates. It 
would have been provocative folly to have made such an appeal without a 
real prospect of a combined response from either the leading Greek states 
or from a major Greek state.3 The King's Peace had deprived Athens of her 
power to act independently in such a situation, where action would 
inevitably provoke reaction from Persia and Sparta, and the Spartans were 
otherwise engaged in their pursuit of an aggressive policy in Greece itself. 
Nor is it an inevitable conclusion that prosperity, to whatever extent it 
existed, would compensate for less tangible losses, including independence 
and autonomy: the Athenian empire of the fifth century had demonstrated 
that no amount of security on sea or land, and consequent commercial 
benefits, could prove acceptable to Greeks whose liberties had been 
assailed.
1SEG 26.1282; cf. Hornblcrffer, Mausolos. No. MM; trans. in P. Harding, From 
the End of the Peloponnesian Var to the Battle of Ipsus (Cambridge 1983), No.28A.
2Homblo,ver. Mausolus. pp.108-110.
%c, tsdth Sparta in control of the seas in 400 they appealed for help against the 
demands of Tissaphernes (Xen. 313) ,  and in 397 they urged Derkylidas,the Spartan 
commander in the field, to exert direct pressure upon Tissaphernes (Xen. 3-2.12).
It is not easy to document a case either for willing acceptance or for 
resigned reluctance on the part of the Asiatic Greeks to their return to 
Persian control in 367/6. However, there is evidence to suggest that the 
attitudes among some of the Asiatic Greeks would make plausible 
Isokrates' claim that the Hellenes of Asia would readily respond to a 
prospect of revolt; also, there is evidence that such an attitude was 
generally known at Athens, if nowhere else in mainland Greece. As 
Hornblower shows in his carefully-documented study of the Hekatomnid 
dynasty, the policy of the Great King and his agents towards the Greeks of 
Asia was not limited to an interest in tribute, nor in a number of instances 
did it stop short of political interference or even of the imposition of 
garrisons. Later, in the reign of Mausolos, Isokrates' fear that the 
barbarians would seek to extend their control to the important off-shore 
islands was proved to be justified, as Chios, Kos and Rhodes came under 
Mausolos' control and had garrisons placed in their territories.1 Admittedly 
such interference with off-shore independent states was to come after 
Athens had made her bid to reimpose her control upon the Aegean through 
the Second Athenian Confederacy, and could be apologized for in barbarian 
eyes on that account. Was Isokrates no more than scare-mongering in 360 
when he suggested that the consolidation of the Persian kingdom and the 
strengthening of Persian military control along the coast of Asia Minor 
could threaten the larger off-shore islands or compel them in self-interest 
and self -protection to accept Persian over lordship?
The case of Samos affords some reason to believe that Isokrates was 
alert to the true goals of Persian policy, even if that policy could not be 
fully pursued at the time of the composition of Panegyrikos. Samos had 
changed allegiance from the Spartans to the Athenians after the battle of 
Knidos in 394 (Paus. 6.3.16); presumably there was a democratic 
government thereafter. Some time before 366, the year in which 
Timotheos besieged the island and won it for Athens (though not for the 
Second Athenian Confederacy), a Persian-backed government had been 
restored to power on the island and a garrison installed on the instruction 
of the Persian Tigranes (Dem. 15-9; cf. Isok. 15- 111). The date of these 
changes at Samos cannot be precisely located within the broad period 
367/6 - 366;2 but if Isokrates is to be believed Samos had not yet fallen
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^ornblover, Mausolus. p.136.
2Ibid„ p.135, n247. G. Shipley (A History of Samos 800-188 B. C, [Oxford 1987 D 
gives a brief historical outline (pp.133-143) of Samian history for the period from
into Persian hands at the time when Panegyrikos was written (see 4.163).
On the other hand the Samians are an interesting omission from the list of 
members inscribed on the decree of Aristoteles (Tod, GHI II. 123), which 
recorded early in 377 the formal establishment of the Second Athenian 
Confederacy, and which included among its earliest members the large 
eastern Aegean states of Chios, Mytilene and Rhodes. It is surprising that 
the Samian democrats, if they still held power in 377, should have stood 
aloof from this alliance; island-states around them were joining, and the 
Samian democrats had a special place in Athenian hearts, as had been 
demonstrated by the decree passed in their honour by the Athenians after 
the restoration of the democracy at Athens in 403 (Tod, GHI 1.96). It may 
be then, that the transfer of power at Samos in Persia's favour should be 
placed after 360, but before or not much later than the formal 
announcement of the Second Athenian Confederacy early in 377. If this 
argument is correct, then Isokrates' concern in 360 for the future 
independence of these large islands which lay close to the Persian- 
controlled coastline, was not altogether misplaced.
It was one thing to reflect a state of affairs in relation to Greece and 
Persia which would strike chords of response among other Greeks, but it 
was another to arouse them to action aimed at relieving their misfortunes 
at the expense of the Persians. To do this Isokrates' plan called for an 
initial rapprochement between Sparta and Athens and an agreement by 
these two states to champion a panhellenic campaign against the barbarians 
of Asia. Was Isokrates 'whistling in the wind' when he appealed to his 
fellow-countrymen and to the Spartans for leadership, or was his proposal 
based upon an appreciation that there were some at Athens, and perhaps 
also some at Sparta, who might have been receptive to such a plan? Let us 
consider first the Athenians.
The military activities of the Athenians in 369-366, led by 
Thrasyboulos and after him Iphikrates, indicate a revival of imperial 
interest in the eastern Aegean and in the Hellespontine region.* 1 In
Knidos (394) to 365, noting that “There is no precisely datable evidence for specific 
events berveen 391 and 366“ (p.135): Shipley believes it likely that there vas a strong 
Persian influence on the island as early as the time of Panegyrikos. but thinks that 
the garrison set up under Kyprothemis vas probably only installed a fe v  years prior 
to 365 (pp-135-137).
1See esp. R. Seager, “Thfasybulus, Con on and Athenian Imperialism, 396-386 
B.C.“, JHS 87 (1967), 95-115; it is Seager’s contention that Athenian policy from the 
time of the alliance vith Thebes in 395 until the King’s Peace vas directed at the 
regaining of a fifth-century style arc he; see also Perlman, "Athenian Democracy",
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367 the success of the Spartan admiral Antalkidas in depriving the 
Athenians of their control of the Hellespont, with the consequent threat to 
Athens’ food supplies, was probably the critical factor which impelled the 
Athenians to accept the Peace.1 It is generally acknowledged that Athens 
was not as severely affected by the terms of the Peace as were her major 
allies of the recent Corinthian War, Corinth, Thebes and Argos.2 * Whatever 
the Athenians may have thought about the Peace in respect of their recent 
imperial aspirations, they, along with the Thebans and some others among 
the Greeks, appear to have consented of necessity rather than willingly to 
the surrender of the Asiatic Greeks to Persian control (see D.S. 14.110.4; cf. 
Plat. Menex.245b-c for a more parochial account of this surrender, which 
exonerates only Athens).3
Athenian foreign policy in the years which followed the Peace has 
been characterized as "cautious” and “correct", a description which implies 
something less than enthusiasm for the situation.4 On a number of 
occasions the Athenians avoided, or withdrew from, action which might be 
construed as provocative by either Sparta or the Great King: when 
Mantineia was besieged by the Spartans, the Athenians declined to respond
pp. 257-267. Hovever, for some cautionary remarks, advising that ambitions and 
realities as perceived among the Greeks and perhaps even at Athens vere  not 
necessarily coincidental see Griffith, "Athens in the Fourth Century", pp.127-144; for 
further discussion and bibliography see Cargill, SAL, p.8 & n 2.
iCf. Xen. 5-128-29: Xenophon mentions also the fear of the Athenians of future 
co-operation at their expense between the Spartans and their allies the Persians, and 
he further refers to the hostile activities of raiders based upon Aigina.
^ o r  Athens' relatively favourable position after the King's Peace see Beloch, 
GG. III.l .95: her imperial aspirations vere  thvarted, but her Long Vails and her fleet 
vere  left unimpaired and her links to the north (the islands of Skyros, Lemnos and 
Imbros) vere  recognized as her territory. Hovever, for more limiting terms, vh ich  
embraced disbandment of Athens' military forces, and those of other states, and the 
removal of the gates of the Peiraieus see Cavkvell, "Foundation", pp. 52-54; a 
difficulty v ith  Cavkveil's hypothesis vould be to explain vhat Athens could have 
offered through alliance to the Chians in 384 (Tod, GHIII. 118), if she had no 
varships; cf. Sinclair, "The King's Peace", pp.29-54.
^Cargill, SAL, p.9, says that the terms vere  such that “the Athenians rightly  
lamented their condition".
4See Ryder, KE, p.49 & R. Seager,“The King's Peace and the Balance of Pover in 
Greece, 386-362 B.C.“, Athenaeum 52 (1974), 44f.; P. Cloche (La Politique etrangere d' 
Athen es d’ 404 a 338 avant I.-C. (Paris 19341 pp.38ff.) stresses that the Peace brought 
an abrupt and resented end to the revival of Athenian prestige and fortunes vh ich  
had occurred in  the years immediately preceding; the trials of some of the 
proponents of Athens' revivalist policy seems indicative of dissent v ith in  the 
Athenian community (ibid., pp.41-44).
to a request for help from a Mantineian embassy (D.S. 15-5-5); the treaty of 
alliance which was struck in 364 between the Athenians and the Chians is 
worded carefully so that no-one should consider that this alliance was at 
odds with the King's Peace (Tod., GHI 11.116,11.6-241); in 362, when 
ambassadors from Akanthos and Apollonia appealed to Sparta for aid 
against Olynthos, the Athenians were contemplating an alliance with the 
Olynthians (Xen. 5-2.15)-' nothing further seems to have come of this 
Athenian intention, quite possibly due to Sparta's decision to support the 
Akanthian (and Makedonian) appeal by marching against Olynthos.2 This 
attitude of formal correctness of Athenian foreign policy,both with respect 
to the King and to the executors of his Peace, the Spartans, can be traced 
after the publication of Panegyrikos. When, early in 377, the Athenians 
declared themselves publicly against Spartan abuse of her role as enforcer 
of the King's Peace, the decree which established the Second Athenian 
Confederacy revealed that the Athenians had no intention of repudiating 
the King's Peace or of encroaching upon the King's claim to control the 
Greeks of Asia: "If anyone wishes, of the Greeks or of the barbarians living 
on the mainland, or of the islanders, whoever do not belong to the King, to 
be an ally of the Athenians and of their allies, it shall be permitted to 
him ".3 Even with Sparta there are signs that up until only a short time 
before the formation of the Second Athenian Confederacy the Athenians 
attempted to maintain an official propriety: in winter 379/6 a party of 
Theban democrats, who had been afforded refuge at Athens, regained 
possession of Thebes and expelled the Spartan garrison from the Kadrneia; 
some assistance came from a group of Athenian troops, led by two generals, 
who had been summoned from across the border by horsemen sent from
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‘Esp. 11.14-16: um fjtooimv (sc. the Athenians) dyaftx enaytyfeAXopelvmToodlv 84m  
tüji ^Uhivalaw belli dudujqi rfji' E^ AiiSi taxi ßaoiAei, etjfri^ ujöcci rail 8fyi|üjfL This certainly 
bears the mark of a desire on the part of the signatories to preclude misinterpretation 
by the King, and understandably so, if the Kings strong interest in the Peace wras 
governed by his concern to avoid a naval resurgence of any Greek state in the 
Aegean.
2For an interpretation of the politics involved, ^rhich explains the change in 
Athenian policy by a desire to conform to the King's Peace, see CavkveU, 
"Foundation", p.53, n.3.
$Tod, GHI, II. 123,11.15-20: eav tvc ßoiA|lium rw  'EaI Ativojv rj t w  ßapßdpüw i w  ev| 
Iiineipcoi evl oucowtoiv rj' tojv viqaianw, oa)lot jjirj ßcccnJ Xeojj eiciv, ’AQrivodoav c i^ijjiax|bc etvai 
Klxi tgjv oi^ axw , e$eivaioc$ t][co(i . There vas also some reference to the King's Peace 
earlier in the decree (11.12-14), but the reference ™as later erased, v/ith the result that 
the content and significance of these lines has generated considerable scholarly 
discussion (see Cargill, SAL, pp .28-32).
the returned Theban exiles; another Athenian force of peltasts, headed by 
the general Chabrias, was guarding the road north from the Peloponnese 
which passes through Eleutherai, and their presence caused the Spartan 
king Kleombrotos, at the head of a relief force, to enter Boiotia by an 
alternative route via Plataia (for this account of events see Xen. 54.1-16). 
The Athenians, we are told, became alarmed by the intrusion of a Spartan 
army into central Greece, close to their own boundaries, and they tried the 
two generals who had co-operated with the Thebans; one was executed, the 
other fled and was exiled (Xen. 5.4.19). This account of events reveals an 
unofficial Athenian sympathy for the victims of Spartan aggression (in this 
case the Theban democrats), but it also demonstrates that at an official 
level the Athenians were not prepared to risk an open defiance of the 
Spartans.1 If such was the official policy, or the policy when a rupture with 
Sparta seemed to threaten, there are nonetheless sufficient glimpses 
available for us to see that there were some Athenians who would willingly 
have seen Athens occupying a more prominent position in foreign affairs.
We have seen that the Athenians, and other Greeks, were less than 
happy about the abandonment of the Greeks of Asia under the terms of the 
King’s Peace, but that necessity prevailed (see above, p. 63). According to 
Philochoros it was for just this reason that the Athenians had rejected the 
previous attempt (in 392 /1) by Antalkidas to bring about a Peace involving 
the King.2 Nor did the Athenians accept philosophically the immediate 
circumstances which led to their compliance with the King's demands in 
367/6. From the concluding portion of an Athenian decree we learn that 
the Assembly had honoured a certain Phanokritos of Parion with the title 
“benefactor" (‘euergetes’); not content with this the politician Kephalos
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1 It must be noted that Diodoros provides a different version of the matter: in 
this the Thebans make an official appeal to the Athenians for assistance in dislodging 
the Spartan garrison stationed on the Kadmeia. and their call is met by a vote of the 
Athenian assembly to dispatch “as large a force as possible"; this vas achieved vhen  
the general Demophon led forth a force of 5,000 hoplites and 500 cavalrymen in a race 
to arrive at Thebes before Spartan relief should get there (15-25.4-26.4). Diodoros* 
version has not, in general, been preferred, but even a recent advocate of his account 
of the matter has conceded that up to this time it vas not the tsish of either the 
Athenians or the Spartans to rupture the King’s Peace and thereby initiate a major 
military conflict in Central Greece (see Cavkvell, "Foundation“, pp. 56-58; Cavkvell 
gives a bibliography of scholars vho have accepted Xenophon’s version of Athenian 
involvement in the liberation of Thebes [ibid., p.56, n.21
2FGrH 328 F 149: wri n}v eipfjvi^ v rfjv en’ ’Avt aJudSon KaTenein|*Ev 6 ßaon e^t ,^ ffv 
’AÖTjvcnoi ofc)id eSe a^vro, Sum eyeypanro iv ayrrii roylg rfjv ’Abxav ouoo5vTfex^ ]vEXXrivc^  ev 
ßaoiAea)? oudüj, ttI dvra$ e W  ouw€V€pT|ievou$.
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added a rider detailing the further honour of 'proxenia' and specifying 
Phanokritos' benefaction: it seems that he had warned some Athenian 
generals about a passage of ships, and the rider caustically adds the 
observation that, if the generals had heeded the advice, the enemy 
warships would have been taken (Tod, GHI 11.116). This incident has been 
generally accepted to refer to the situation which is described by Xenophon 
as occurring at Abydos in spring 35V: x^ntalkidas had succeeded by a ruse 
in deceiving the Athenian generals into believing that the Spartan fleet 
besieged in Abydos had sailed for the Propontis; the Spartans waited in 
Perkote until the Athenians sailed past, before returning to Abydos, where 
they were reinforced with ships from Syracuse, Ionia and elsewhere, and 
subsequently they gained control of the Hellespont (5-1.25-26). We do not 
know what punishment, if any, was exacted upon the four Athenian 
generals who are named by Xenophon in this incident. Nevertheless, the 
decree, and Kephalos' rider, reveal that their disbelief of Phanokritos and 
their loss of control of this vital strategic location was not received kindly 
by the Athenians. It has been suggested that Iphikrates, who was also
w ix ilx id iiv .iixxg , xxi L i i r x  aw.Uj.Io, vvdo w ilot^ M  u.U Iiu . y  u io v /i a l-1  l U i c u o  i v i
a time.1 Another honorific decree belongs to this period soon after the 
Peace: in 366/5 the Athenians commended the Odrysian king Hebryzelmis 
for his loyalty and granted to him all the honours which they had granted 
to his ancestors (Tod, GHI 11.117); three xAxthenians are also to tell the king 
about, "the ships” (“presumably an Athenian squadron lying somewhere off 
the Thracian coast”: Tod, GHI II. p.49). These two decrees, like that which 
recorded the alliance with Chios two years later (see above, p. 64), indicate 
that, despite her caution, Athens was still prepared to engage in diplomatic 
activities, so long as they were not provocative or concerned with parts of 
the world which would arouse the concern of either Sparta or the King.2 
Another literary source casts some light on popular Athenian thinking at 
this time about foreign policy and xMhens* international status.
iR. Sealey, "CaUistratus of Aphidnaand his Contemporaries“, Historia 5 (1956), 
p. 186 (= Essays in Greek Politics [New York 19651 p.MOf.).
2Cf. Hornblower, Mausolus, p.186: "Athens behaved well [in these years from 
386 to 3?9 ] - but arguably this was only because she had no option, the King’s Peace
having clipped her w ings....Since she can no longer fight openly, Athens seeks to
combat Spartan expansion in subtler ways [e.g. by alliances like that with 
Hebryzelmis T.
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Probably in 366, after the Peace,1 Plato composed his Mene­
xenos which many modern scholars believe to be a parody of an Athenian 
state funeral oration.2 3 Whatever the truth as to the purpose of this 
curiously un-Platonic work, this oration, spoken by Sokrates’ and taught to 
him by 'Aspasia', reveals the jingoist, uncritical description and 
interpretation of their city's past which the Athenian audience would have 
applauded on such a patriotic occasion.^ So, the Athenian 'panegyrist', 
looking back upon Athens' recent involvement in the Corinthian War, 
portrays his compatriots as the noble champions of liberty, willing to show 
generosity and compassion to their former enemies, Argos, Thebes and 
Corinth, and even - extraordinary thing - to come to the aid, albeit 
discreetly, of the Great King himself, although this help is made less 
deplorable by the assertion that the Athenians, unable to forget the past, 
had provided their assistance to the barbarian through exiles and 
volunteers; the Athenians are praised for their lone stance among the 
Greek states in 392 in refusing to agree to the King's demands that he have 
control over the Greeks in Asia; the subsequent desertion of that noble 
position in 367/6 is only mentioned in a very oblique way and does not 
refer to Athenian involvement, when the orator says that in the Corinthian 
War the Athenians had succeeded in liberating their Greek allies, who 
remained free until they afterwards enslaved themselves (i.e. through the 
King's Peace) (Menex. 2 44b-2 46a). This distorted description of Athenian 
relations with the Persians in the Corinthian War confirms Diodor os' remark 
that the Athenians had only reluctantly and of necessity accepted in 367/6 
the King's terms with respect to the Greeks of Asia. Parody or not, the 
Menexenos shows that at a formal occasion among their own citizens the
^or the date see M.M. Henderson, "Plato's Menexenus and the Distortion of 
History", Acta Classics 18 (1975), 25.
2See e.g. Lesky, History of Greek Literature, p.522; for a recent reaffirmation 
of this interpretation see Henderson, "Plato's Menexenus", pp25-46; P. Huby ("The 
Menexenus Reconsidered". Phronesis 2 [19571 104-114) argues against a satirical 
interpretation, taking the vork as a serious attempt by Plato to advertise himself and 
his nevly-established school; in so doing, Huby likens Plato’s purpose to that vhich  
she sees in Isokrates' political discourses.
3This patriotic and noble interpretation of Athenian history, especially that 
vhich embraced the time of the Persian Wars and aftervards under the Empire, is to 
be found frequently in fourth-century Athenian oratory (see A.H.M. Jones. Athenian 
Democracy [Oxford 19571 p.66; Jones observes that, if Thucydides' speeches are to be 
believed, it represents a distinct change in Athenian expression of foreign policy 
from the blunt statements of self-interest recorded from the time of the Empire itself; 
see also Henderson, “Plato’s Menexenos", p.45).
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Athenians preferred, despite the King’s Peace, to see themselves as the 
noble champions of liberty for the Greeks from the barbarian Persians.
It was not only among the Athenians that the Persian king continued 
to be viewed as the enemy and oppressor of the Greeks. Lysias' 
Olympiakos, delivered at the Olympic Festival of 364 has already been 
referred to (see above, p. 13f.): Lysias deplored the humiliating, 
oppressive, and potentially dangerous situation in which the Greeks found 
themselves at that time; because of faction and mutual rivalry they now 
had become subservient to the wealthy King of Persia, some states being 
subject to the King, while others were being destroyed by tyrants (Lys.
33 3, 5)- The latter reference was specifically directed at Dionysios, tyrant 
of Syracuse, whose delegation was present at the festival: in a part of the 
speech which has not been preserved, it appears that the orator urged the 
assembled Greeks to begin hostilities against the despot from the west 
there and then by pillaging the Syracousan tents, a tempting target with 
their costly adornments (see Dion. Hal. De Lysia 29-30; cf. D.S. 14.109).1 
Lysias calls upon the Greeks to lay aside their interstate rivalries and 
instead to emulate their ancestors in depriving the barbarian of his lands, 
in driving out tyrants and in establishing a common freedom for all Greeks 
(33-6). Only the first part of the speech is preserved, together with a 
summary by Dionysios of Halikarnassos,2 and nothing is said about the 
Athenians. Thus it is not as demonstrable as it is in the case of Menexenos, 
with its distinctly Athenian setting, that Lysias' words would have found a 
sympathetic reception among the Athenians. However, the speech does 
indicate that the King’s Peace had not wrought any fundamental change to
^ h e  Athenians themselves had little cause to love Dionysios, since it had been, 
in part, a fleet of twenty Syrakusan ships which had brought about the naval 
blockade of the Hellespont and had forced Athens to capitulate to the King’s demands 
(Xen. 5-1.28). Isokrates also reflects Athenian hostility towards Dionysios in this 
period (4.126; cf. 4.117).
2The completeness of Dionysios' summary is open to question, since that ’would 
lead us to believe that the work was confined to an attack upon Dionysios; nothing is 
said of the Persian king. Yet the opening of the speech, which Dionysios quotes, 
makes it clear that the menace to the Greeks is two-fold, from the East as well as from 
the West. We do not know whether action against the Persian king was proposed by 
Lysias, although it may be a plausible assumption if Olympiakos was one of the 
orations which Isokrates had in mind when he acknowledged in Panegyrikos that his 
theme is a familiar one among the sophists and those who have addressed public 
gatherings on matters of common interest (4.3,15). Certainly, like Isokrates, Lysias 
was invoking friendship among the Greeks and unity in redirecting their enmity and 
energy against those foreigners who sought to interfere with Greeks’ liberty; it is 
also clear that the Persian king and Dionysios were seen together by Lysias as the 
proper targets for the opprobrium of the Greeks.
the readiness of the Greeks to espouse the cause of liberty for themselves 
and to regard the Persian king and other tyrants as objects fit for public 
criticism because of their policies towards the Greeks. As for the 
Athenians, we may surmise that Lysias, who earned his living from his 
reputation at Athens as a logographer, was not going to enunciate at the 
most important of Greek public festivals a policy which would earn him 
either mockery or even condemnation by the Athenians for the manner in 
which he had 'represented' them before the assembled Greeks.1
There is evidence, then, that in Panegyrikos Isokrates presents a 
public image of themselves which the Athenians still wished to offer to the 
rest of the Greek world, since the Persian invasions of the early fifth 
century they had gloried in their role as liberators and champions of the 
Greeks in the face of Persian attempts at oppression; the King's Peace, 
despite its regrettable necessity, had not altered the Athenians' readiness 
to cast themselves in this role. Furthermore, Panegyrikos reinforces the 
implication of Lysias' Olympiakos of a few years before: not only could 
Athenian writers and orators portray the Athenians as wishing to continue 
after 366 to present themselves as champions of the Greeks against the 
barbarians, but the Greeks at large were not so in awe of the Great King, 
whose will had been imposed upon them, that they would be unlikely to 
give a hearing to an orator or pamphleteer who advocated the rejection of 
the King’s authority as expressed through the King's Peace and who even 
called for a panhellenic endeavour to liberate the Greeks of Asia and to 
plunder at the King’s expense.
Panegyrikos supports the evidence of Plato, Lysias and certain 
Assembly decisions (made with due caution), that the Athenians did not 
regard the King's Peace as permanently or appropriately redefining either 
Athens' role in the wider Greek world or her long-term attitudes to other 
states and powers. They continued to see themselves as defenders of 
liberty and the Great King as a traditional enemy, and they remained 
convinced of the appropriateness of a leading role for Athens in interstate 
affairs. The other Greeks, whether they had especial reason to welcome the 
practical consequences of the King's Peace or not, did not extend their
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1 Reference to the Spartans is not as censorious as the attitude to Yards them 
Yhich is revealed in Panegyrikos: for the Spartans had not, in 384, proceded far upon 
the course of interference and suppression vhich vas soon to earn them the odium of 
many of their fellov-Greeks. There is, hoYever, express criticism at 33 .7, and there 
may be irony intended vhen Lysias says in this passage: “having become the 
saviours of Greece in past dangers they [the Spartans 1 are taking forethought for 
those of the future".
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charity to a new and 'unhellenic' friendliness towards the Persian king.
They may not have felt as closely responsible as the Athenians for the fate 
of the Greeks of Ionia, but it is doubtful that they would have 
acknowledged that they were truly satisfied with a situation which made 
the subservience of the Greeks of Asia to the Great King the price of their 
independence and peace: that was a political price to be rejected. The 
works of Lysias and Isokrates demonstrate that the abandonment of their 
Asian brethren could be publicly deplored among the mainland Greeks. 
Then, of course, the Persian satrapies of Asia Minor offerred an enticing 
prospect to impecunious European Greeks. The condottieri and their 
mercenaries knew that; so, too, did the Spartans and their allies who had 
campaigned there a decade before. Isokrates knew his Athenian 
compatriots, knew their dreams about the past, sensed their ambition for 
the future; he appreciated their attitude, and that of many other Greeks, to 
the King's Peace, and in particular to the Great King, who had given peace 
and independence the unwanted subscript of humiliation.
On the other hand, the events of the years which followed the Peace 
indicate that the Athenians were not so politically inept as to confuse the 
manner in which they wished to be portrayed among themselves, and 
before other Greeks, with the political reality which had been forced upon 
them by the King. The clearly-attested caution and correctness in Athenian 
foreign policy during the decade from 367/6 indicates that it was 
recognized by those who guided Athenian policy at this time that, whatever 
the role the Athenians would have preferred to play in interstate affairs, 
there could be no question of any action which might result in the 
combination of Persian and Spartan power to Athens' disadvantage. 
Isokrates was realist enough to understand and to appreciate the 
cautiousness of the Athenians' public policy at this time. This 
understanding, as he himself correctly remarks, distinguishes his oration 
from those of others before him on this theme (he must surely have been 
thinking particularly of Lysias' Olympiakos). For the second time in her 
recent history Athens had, by the end of 367, been taught the lesson that 
she could not successfully confront Sparta and Persia simultaneously. By 
Isokrates’ own argument (4.139), and by the history of the Greeks in their 
relations with the Persians, the Great King was not in himself a conclusive 
force, but he had been very successful in tilting the balance in Greek 
affairs. Thus the fundamental proposition in Isokrates' plan: Persia, the 
traditional and appropriate enemy for the Greeks, cannot be engaged 
before Athens and Sparta have been reconciled. The glimpses which we
have of Athenian foreign policy between 367/6  and the foundation of the 
Second Athenian Confederacy make it clear that the policy-leaders at 
Athens in this period were not unwilling to envisage a hegemonial role for 
Athens, were even prepared to move discreetly in this direction when 
opportunities offered; but they were not foolhardy; everything we know 
of Athenian foreign policy in this decade shows that, until the raid of 
Sphodrias exposed the untrustworthiness of Sparta in her attitude to 
Athens, avoidance of conflict between Athens and Sparta was a basic 
determinant of the limits of Athenian foreign policy.1 If the picture which 
I have given of Athenian foreign policy between 366-360 is correct, then 
Isokrates was not being misleading when he claimed that his own city 
would readily accept his advice (4.16).2 What, then, of the Spartans? For, 
according to Isokrates, they are the ones who need to be persuaded.
The Eurypontid king Agesilaos dominated and directed Spartan 
policy in the years which followed the King's Peace until the catastrophic 
defeat at Leuktra in 371.3 Led by Agesilaos, Sparta sought to consolidate or 
to reimpose her control over other Greek cities and states under cover of
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^ e e  e g Sinclair, The King’s Peace", p.52. Modern historical opinion places 
the raid of Sphodrias before the foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy (e.g. 
Hammond, H&, p.483-485), as Xenophon records events (5.420ff.); Diodoros' 
chronology, vhich  places the raid after the formation of the Confederacy (15 29.5-7; 
cf. 15.28.1-4), has been defended by Cawkvell ("Foundation", pp.51-56).
2The Spartan seizure of the Kadmeiaat Thebes in  382 may have been an 
influential action in the minds of many Athenians. Vhile Athens declined to give 
public support to the Theban democrats and refrained, so far as we know, from 
official criticism of Sparta’s action, the Athenians did provide hospitality to 300 
Theban exiles (Xen.52.31; Plut. Pel. 6.2-4; Mor. 576A; IG 11 .^37); further alliances 
after that ’with Chios (384) followed; with Byzantion, Mytilene and Methymna. 
Isokrates claims (1428) that Byzantion and Mytilene, like the Chians, remained loyal 
to Athens after the King's Peace; inscriptions! evidence of the en try  of Byzantion and 
Methymna to the Second Athenian Confederacy, or what was very soon to become 
that, is available and dated to 378 and 377 respectively (Tod, GHI, II. 121 & 122); the 
inscription for Methymna records that Methymna was already in  alliance with 
Athens at the time of this decree in 377 (GHI, II. 122,11.5-6): that must have occurred 
after the Peace, since Methymna was still in Spartan hands shortly before the Peace 
(see Xen. 4.829).
3See G2M. de Ste Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian ¥ a r  (London 1972), 
p.160; P. Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History 1300-362 B.C. (London 
1979), p289; id., Agesilaos. p.399. For discussion of Sparta’s foreign policy between 
386-371 see Smith, “Opposition", pp. 274-288; D.G. Rice, Vhv Sparta Failed: A Study of 
Politics and Policy from the Peace of Antalcidas to the Battle of Leuctra. 387-371 B.C. 
(Diss. Yale 1971); id., “Agesilaus, Agesipolis, and Spartan Politics, 386-379 B.C ",
Historia 23 (1974), 164-182.
her position as arbiter of the King's Peace.1 Agesilaos seems to have been 
intent upon land power, pursuing an implacable, even obsessive, hatred of 
Thebes, but indifferent towards Athens, whose interest lay in naval power 
and whose attention was focussed upon the Aegean and the Hellespontine 
region.2 3However, Agesilaos' concerns and policy had followed a different 
path during his first years as king.
In 396 Agesilaos had taken over the Spartan campaign against the 
satraps of Asia Minor. Xenophon says that Lysander persuaded Agesilaos 
to accept the command (3 4.2), but it has been plausibly suggested that the 
king was favourably inclined from the beginning toward the anti-Persian 
policy which Sparta had been pursuing in Asia Minor since 400 and that he 
may have had personal reasons which made him more than ready to accept 
the command itself when this was proposed.3 There is no doubt that 
Agesilaos' preparations for departure and, indeed, the entire campaign 
itself were dressed up as a panhellenic crusade: the grandiose conception 
the king had of his mission is made clear by the attempt to sacrifice at 
Aulis before the expedition crossed to Asia, the attempt to re-enact 
Agamemnon's famed departure for Troy ended in a fiasco, thanks to 
Theban interruption of the rites, but the intended analogy was evident to 
all, and the expedition's arrival in Asia was marked by Agesilaos' 
declaration to Tissaphernes that the king had come to liberate the Greeks in 
Asia, a sentiment reminiscent of Spartan proclamations at the outset of the 
Archidamian War.4 The panhellenic theme of revenge for Xerxes' invasion 
of Greece in 460 was also probably invoked. In his dealings with the 
Persians Agesilaos may have begun "in a moderate fashion", but when 
diplomacy failed - and when Agesilaos came to believe more clearly in the
72
1 It matters not to this discussion vhether the Spartan role as arbiter and 
upholder of the Peace in mainland Greece had been defined formally or not: the fe  
facto situation vas that Sparta acted thus; for discussion of the issue see Cavkvell, 
"The King's Peace“, pp. 77-78.
2Smith, "Opposition", p.275; de Ste.Croix, Origins, p.160.
3See Cartledge, Agesilaos, p.l91f.
4Aulis: Xen. 34 3-4; Plut. Ages. 6.4-6; liberation of the Asiatic Greeks: Xen. 
3.4.5; Spartan propaganda in 432/1: Thuc. 2.8.4; cf. 4.85.1; revenge for Xerxes' 
invasion: Xen. Ages. 1.8.
inadequacy of the Persian opposition1 - then, “larger designs emergeld]".2 *
By 394 plans were entertained for an assault upon the Great King's empire; 
these plans extended well beyond the liberation of the Greeks of Asia.3 The 
recall of the king and his army in 394 came as a bitter disappointment to 
Agesilaos, but he departed with promises to his friends and allies that he 
would return just as soon as matters in Greece had been settled (Xen. 4.2.3; 
4.3.2). Thus Agesilaos* anti-Persian attitude and his willingness to employ 
panhellenic propaganda in support of this policy is clear as far as the time 
of the king's return to mainland Greece. However, not until the end of his 
life did he return to the territories claimed by the King, when in 3 6 1 he 
went to Egypt in command of a group of mercenaries to serve the rebel 
Tachos (Plut. Ages. 36-40; cf. Nepos, Ages. 6.2; D.S. 15.92.2-93-6). His 
friend, apologist and eulogist, Xenophon, portrayed him shortly after his 
death in strongly panhellenist and anti-Persian terms: thus, in an age of 
Medizing Greeks, Agesilaos stands out as a “Persian-hater“ (pioonepcrrft: Ages. 
7.7). However, scholars have argued that throughout the 360s and 370s 
Agesilaos, dominant in Spartan policy-making, was himself dominated by 
his hatred of Thebes, and acquiesced in, or even welcomed, the 
rapprochement with the Persians which Sparta began to court in 392, when 
Antalkidas visited Sardis, a rapprochement which was finally achieved with 
the Peace in 367/6.4 Agesilaos is believed to have supported the Peace in 
367/6.5 On the other hand, it has been argued more recently that Agesilaos 
was throughout his career “consistently Panhellenist"; Cawkwell's 
argument that Plutarch's account of a bitter enmity between Agesilaos and
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iSee Xen. 3-4.19; Plut. Ages. 9.5; cf. Xen. 3.5.1
2Cavk,veU, “Agesilaus and Sparta", p. 67; cf. R. Seager, "Agesilaus in Asia: 
propaganda and objectives“, LCM 2 (1977), 183-184: Seager concludes that Agesilaos’ 
practical aim vas "the creation of a buffer zone of rebel satraps and tribes between 
the territory stiU controlled by the King and that of the Greek cities of the seaboard".
3See Xen. 3-5-1; 4.1.41; Ages. 1.36; cf. Hell.Oxv. 22.4; Plut. Ages. 15-1-
4See Smith, "Opposition", pp274ff, esp274-276; also de Ste.Croix, Origins, p.162.
5de Ste Croix (Origins, pp. 161-162) notes that the sources represent Spartan 
policy on this issue as undivided. The possibility of either the young and 
inexperienced Agiad king Agesipolis or Antalkidas sponsoring a peace proposal vith  
Persia in 392 and then in 387/6 carrying it through in the face of opposition from 
Agesilaos has been dismissed as implausible (see Cartledge, Agesilaos, p.195). The 
antagonism between Agesilaos and Antalkidas. vhich is recorded by Plutarch (Agrc. 
23 3; Mor213B) and clearly linked to the Peace, has been questioned (see de Ste .Croix, 
Origins, p.162; Cartledge, Agesilaos, p.195).
Antalkidas, based upon opposing attitudes to the Persian king, was reliably 
informed should be regarded as cautionary rather than conclusive.1 
However two other pieces of evidence appear to suggest that Agesilaos' 
attitude to Sparta’s favourable relationship with the Great King in 367/6 
and in the years which followed was influenced by necessity and does not 
represent a change of heart: first, during the Corinthian War news of heavy 
losses by his Greek enemies was said to have prompted from the king not 
exultation but regret, which he expressed in panhellenic terms: "Alas for 
you, Greece, when those who are now dead were sufficient, if they had 
lived, to defeat in battle all the barbarians" (Xen. Ages. 7.5); in addition, his 
reluctance to prosecute an attack on the walls of Corinth is explained by his 
saying: "If we destroy those among ourselves who are in error, we should 
see that we shall have none with whom we shall conquer the barbarians“ 
(Ibid., 7.6).2 The other occasion was the trial of Ismenias, after the seizure 
of the Kadmeia in 362; the Spartans were anxious to deflect angry 
criticism, even from within Sparta itself, at Phoibidas' action and from their 
subsequent opportunism, which Agesilaos had openly condoned, even if he 
had not issued instruction or encouragement (Xen.5-2.32; cf. D.S. 15-20.2; 
Plut. Ages. 23- i-% 7); they accused Ismenias "of having worked in the 
interests of foreigners, of having made friends with the Persian satrap 
against the interests of Greece, of having taken money from the king, and of 
being chiefly responsible, with Androkleidas, for all the disorders which 
had taken place in Greece" (Xen. 5-2-35)- Agesilaos’ attitude to the affair
^w kw ell/'Agesilaus and Sparta", pp.68-71. Caw!;veil's most persuasive point 
is the fact that the rebel Persian admiral Glos could, at the end of the Kyprian revolt, 
entertain an expectation of a sympathetic response to an appeal for help to Sparta 
(Theopomp. FGrH 115 Er 103; B.S. 15-9.3-4; cf. Isok.4.135- further, see below, pp. 78-79); 
also interesting, though difficult to date, is the story of Agesilaos' rebuff of an 
overture from the Great King which off erred the Spartan king "friendship and the 
rights of hospitality" (£evia re ic o d  Xen. Ages. 8.3f .; Plut. Ages. 23.6): Plutarch 
locates this incident at or soon after a peace, and, although it has been argued that the 
episode belongs to a later date, possibly 362 or 361IJ. Hatzfeld, “Agesilas et Artaxerxes 
II", BCH 70 (1946), 238-246; cf. Cartledge, Agesilaos, p201 i  the possibility remains that 
the incident occurred just after the establishment of the King's Peace, and that 
Agesilaos' reply indicates that expediency governed his attitude to the Peace rather 
than that he had come to embarce an unholy alliance with the enemy against whom 
he had sought to lead a panhellenic war a decade or so earlier.
2These alleged remarks, written long after the event, in a work in which 
Xenophon was concerned to emphasize his hero's panhellenism and hostility toward 
the barbarians, may be apocryphal, and they could be a deliberate attempt to gloss 
over an embarrassing period in the career of the "panhellenist" king, but then it is 
surprising that the more obvious "sin" of the Peace itself is not more vigorously 
exculpated.
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makes likely his further connivance in the travesty of this trial and 
suggests either that he was prepared to endure further odium for his 
obvious hypocrisy or that he could expect that public opinion, at Sparta and 
more importantly among the Greeks, still connected him sufficiently with 
his earlier hostility to the barbarian that such a set of charges could be laid 
without exposing himself to the ironical scorn which would be due if he 
himself were popularly believed now to be a Persian sycophant.
Consideration must therefore be given to the possibility that, 
although Agesilaos may have suppressed his panhellenic posturings of the 
390s for the next decade, or even longer, he did not treat the agreement 
with the Great King as anything more than an expediency for Sparta;
“Sparta first and Sparta last“ was the motto manifested by his deeds. His 
panhellenic campaign had been interrupted by the treacherous behaviour 
of certain mainland Greeks, especially the hateful Thebans. He must surely 
have recognized that the King's Peace offerred Sparta the chance to regain 
her power and authority among the Greeks outside Asia, and there can be 
no dispute that, led on by his detestation of Thebes, he seized opportunities 
for Sparta without scruple. However, it cannot be asserted with any 
certainty that, once mainland Greece had been subjugated to Spartan will, 
Agesilaos would not have proved receptive once again to a summons to 
arms against the barbarians in the East.1
Sparta's position in Greece must have seemed to be approaching one 
which would have satisfied Agesilaos when the Spartan garrison had been 
safely installed upon the Kadmeia, and with factions in other Boiotian towns 
willing to accept Spartan support in order to guarantee their independence 
from Thebes (cf. Xen.5.4.10):2 certainly someone at Sparta saw fit to risk 
ridicule by referring to traditional anti-Persian feelings among the Greeks 
in the charges levelled against Ismenias. Less than three years later the 
apogee of Spartan power had been reached, with the surrender of Olynthos
iCartledge, vho seems at least sympathetic to Xenophon's portrait of Agesilaos 
as “the *Panhellenist' par excellence", presents the king in 387 as a political realist, 
cynically prepared to exploit a Peace T/ith the Great King in his pursuit of more 
urgent interstate rivalries; Cartledge sensibly sees Agesilaos' use of panhellenist 
propaganda as also a means to an end, that end being Spartan empire or hegemony 
(Agesilaos, pp.180,195f).
2After the liberation of Thebes the Spartans decided to bolster their friends in 
some of the Boiotian tovns, and so they installed Spartan garrisons in Plataia, 
Thespiai, Orchomenos and Tanagra (see J. Buckler, The Theban Hegemony, 371-362 
B-C. [Cambridge (Mass.) 19801 p.19); apparentiy they had not thought this necessary 
vhile their garrison occupied the Kadmeia itself.
and the capitulation of the Phleiasians. As Sparta approached this pinnacle 
the question for other Greeks must have been what Sparta would do next? 
Was her goal the restoration of the odious rule which she had exercised 
after the Peloponnesian War? Could Agesilaos be persuaded to resume the 
mantle of Agamemnon, which he had attempted to don in the 390s? Or, if 
he had truly forsaken personal and public glory as a panhellenist, in 
preference for a more contentious and shabby policy of harsh expediency, 
was there any other public, or leading opinion at Sparta which might, by 
the end of the 360s, have favoured a policy which might be more welcome 
among the other Greeks?
Agesilaos' policy of intervention and of force, where threat proved 
inadequate, demonstrated for the period between 366-360 against 
Mantineia, Phleious, Argos, Corinth, Achaia, Thebes and Olynthos, aroused 
resentment, anger and fear outside Sparta. It also created some dissension 
within Sparta, even at the highest level. The two kings of these years, 
Agesilaos and Agesipolis, even if personal friends, held different views 
about Sparta's foreign policy and about the question of respect for the 
King's Peace, especially for its proclamation of autonomy as the right of the 
mainland and island Greeks.1 Agesipolis appears to have been held in 
special regard by the allies and by some of the "outsiders" of Spartan 
society, when he was appointed in 361/0 to the command against 
Olynthos, many perioikoi and 'fringe'-members of Spartan society (iood£evo\ 
t w  Tpo4>4JUjüv loaAoi.'pivajv, iaod voöoi tüjv ZnapTiarcw), together With allies, 
volunteered to serve with him on this expedition (Xen. 5 3 6-9). Certainly, 
the two kings adopted very different attitudes towards Phleious:
Agesipolis commended the Phleiasians for their prompt and generous 
financial support for his expedition against Olynthos (Xen. 5-3-10), whereas 
soon after this Agesilaos supported the ephors' decision to declare war on 
Phleious (Xen. 5-3- 13f^ -); not all at Sparta were happy about this aggression 
towards Phleious, and Xenophon reports that "there were a number of 
Spartans who complained that for the sake of a few individuals they were 
making themselves hated by a city of more than 5,000 men" (5 3-16). The 
seizure of the Kadmeia at Thebes by Phoibidas in 362 also evoked mixed 
feelings among Spartans (Xen. 5-2.32, 35; Pint. Ages. 23 3-4; cf. D.S. 
15-20.2). Disagreements at Sparta over foreign policy and over actions by 
Spartan commanders outside Spartan territory continued throughout the
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ifor the friendship see Xen. 5-3-20 (though Xenophon also admits their 
rivarly); for their different vie vs upon Sparta's foreign policy see DS. 15-19.4 .
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370s.1 So Spartan foreign policy after the King's Peace was neither 
monolithic nor unambiguous. We may ask whether either Agesilaos' own 
deeper feelings about the barbarians or the opposition of some Spartans, 
including, it would seem, Agesipolis, to the state's aggressive exploitation of 
the King's Peace offer any encouragement to Isokrates' proposals?
The proposals expressed in Panegyrikos would require several 
alterations to Agesilaos' policy. First, and most importantly, Sparta would 
have to repudiate her relationship with Persia, and thereby would have to 
abandon the ultimate authority upon which she was able to exert her 
influence and power among the Greeks. Was this an impossible 
expectation? Second, Sparta was being advised to moderate her position of 
sole authority among the Greeks outside Asia, and to accept Athens as her 
partner in leadership, at least in the context of the proposed war against 
Persia. Third, she was being urged to abandon her aggressive policy of 
interfering in the affairs of the other Greek states and to uphold truly the 
principles of independence and freedom as expressed by the King's Peace. 
The blunt contrast drawn by Diodoros between Agesilaos and Agesipolis 
shows quite clearly the latter's belief that the Spartans should not abuse 
the independence of the other Greeks in contravention of the King's Peace; 
Agesipolis is also said to have ascribed Sparta's current unpopularity to her 
betrayal of the Greeks of Asia and to her self -interested arrangements of 
the affairs of the cities in Greece, in contravention of the autonomy 
guaranteed by the terms of the Peace.2 Diodoros' assertion of the rivalry 
between the two Spartan kings is confirmed by Xenophon's remark about 
Agesilaos' reaction to the news of Agesipolis' death: "One might have 
expected that Agesilaos, when he heard this news, would have been 
pleased, as one is at the death of a rival, but in fact he wept and mourned 
for the loss of a comrade” (5.3.2 0); Xenophon goes on to say that the two 
men were able to live together harmoniously, with Agesipolis showing the
1See Smith, "Opposition", pp280ff.
^  5.1519.4. See Ryder, KE, pp .47-48, for a discussion of the evidence vhich  
suggests that the Spartans (or some of them) sought publicly to justify their 
aggressive actions in these years; cf. Cavkvell, “The King's Peace", pp.77-79, vho  
argues a case for a sanctions-clause in the King's Peace vhich gave the Spartans the 
task of dealing vith breaches of the Peace: on this hypothesis there vould have been 
much less for the other Greeks to have been displeased vith or critical about; but, 
even if  Cavkvell is correct in suggesting that Sparta vas not the transgressor in the 
action vith Mantineia (p.78), there must have been some criticism to ansver, if  
Polybios is right in saying that the Spartans denied that their action vas unjust 
(427.6).
respect due to a senior partner. It seems that the differences between the 
two were genuinely over policy, and were not due simply to personal 
rivalry.1 It seems that the Spartans were not unanimously in favour of an 
aggressive, selfish policy which flouted the spirit, even the terms, of the 
Peace; the Spartans made some attempts to justify to the other Greeks at 
least some of their actions after 366, and the widespread discredit which 
resulted from the seizure of the Kadmeia may have influenced what one 
scholar has described as the “comparative clemency“ in the arrangements 
which followed the surrender of Phleious and Olynthos.2 3
Some, perhaps much, of this disagreement over foreign policy among 
the Spartans must have been recognized among other Greeks, and must 
thus have been available for Isokrates to play upon. For example, the safe 
conduct, exercised by Agesipolis on his father's persuasion, under which the 
pro-Argives and democratic leaders among the Mantineians were allowed 
to leave the city after the surrender of Mantineia must have been common 
knowledge (see Xen. 5-2.6); again, the very purpose of the fine against 
Phoibidas for his action in seizing the Kadmeia and of the trial by the 
Spartans and their allies of the Theban leader Ismenias was to seek to 
lessen the discredit in the eyes of the other Greeks which had accrued to 
Sparta from this action.3 The charges brought against Ismenias (see above, 
p. 74) suggest that the Spartans were not in this case portraying 
themselves in their actions at the time as the agents of the King; nor is 
there any evidence to indicate that they ever did so; on the contrary, these 
charges may offer a hint that the public image which the Spartans wished 
to present involved a tactful distancing of themselves from the Persians.
One further incident may be related to this picture of Spartan foreign 
policy, although it is not likely to have directly affected Isokrates in his 
composition of Panegyrikos. Ephoros, upon whom Diodoros relies for this 
period of Greek history, believed that repentance, stemming from what was 
seen as the betrayal of the Greeks of Asia by the Peace, was in part 
responsible for Sparta's agreement to strike an alliance with the rebel
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*See Ryder, KE, p.45f.; cf. Rice, ¥ h y  Sparta Failed, p.65.
2Ryder, KE, p.52: for discussion of the evidence regarding Sparta's treatment 
of those vhom she opposed between 386-379, and for the conclusions which I have 
summarized see Ryder, pp.45ff.
3For the fine, not mentioned by Xenophon: D.S. 1520.2 and Plut. Pel. 6.1; for 
the trial. Xen. 5-2.35-36; for the reaction of other Greeks to the seizure and to 
subsequent events at Sparta: DS. 15202; Plut. Pel.6.1: Ages23.3.
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Persian admiral Glos at Kypros^The alliance, if it was ever confirmed,2 
seems never to have been acted upon; for the assassination of Glos and the 
death of his successor Tachos put an end to this rebellion, and the Spartans 
are said to have thereby abandoned their activities directed at Asia (D.S.
15.16.1; 19.1). The loss of Thebes in winter 379/6 and the events in Greece 
which followed would readily account for Spartan retraction from a 
situation which promised to reopen war between herself and Persia. 
Iso la tes  cannot have known of these overtures: he would surely not 
have overlooked so auspicious a sign for his proposal as the prospect that 
Sparta might respond, might even have responded, favourably to an 
alliance offered by a Persian rebel, and, in fact, he believed the war 
between Evagoras and the Persians to be still in progress. The point for 
this discussion is that soon after Panegyrikos, Sparta was, or could be 
thought by other Greeks to be, approachable in circumstances which could 
have led her into conflict with the Great King.
It does, then, seem possible that by the end of the 360s, despite her 
practical success in extending her position of authority among the Greeks, 
Sparta, or at least some Spartans, had developed a degree of sensitivity 
about the methods by which control was being increased and the betrayal 
of national spirit upon which her position of authority ultimately rested. 
Thus, two of the three expectations demanded of Sparta by Isokrates’ 
proposals seemed capable of fulfilment. There remains the question of the 
possibility of a combined Spartan-Athenian leadership in a war against 
Persia.
We have very little direct evidence of relations between Sparta and 
Athens for the years 366-360. As we have seen, the Athenian policy was 
largely influenced by a desire to maintain a proper respect for the Peace, 
doubtless as the means to security and prosperity, given the circumstances 
at the time. The Mantineians’ appeal for help was rejected (D.S. 15 5-5); 
the Athenians may have been tempted to form an alliance with the
^ D S .  15-9.3-5; T.TB .  Ryder (“Spartan Relations vith Persia after the King's 
Peace: a Strange Story in Diodorus 15.9“. QQ n .s. 13 119631 105-109) accepts Ephoros' 
attribution of motive; cf. Beloch (GG, III2. 1.99), vho attributes the acceptance of Glos' 
overtures to Spartan self-confidence in 379 after the success of her sieges at Phleious 
and Qlynthos. Beloch places Glos' rebellion from the King soon after the end of the 
Kyprian Var (GG, III2. 1.98-99), vhich he dates to about the end of summer 380 (GG, 
III2. 2.226-229).
2Cavk’ffeU (“Agesilaus and Sparta", p.70) declares that it is "impossible" that 
Diodoros can be right vhen he says that the Spartans accepted Glos' offer of alliance.
Olynthians, but they withdrew when Sparta decided to intervene against 
Olynthos (Xen. 5-2.15)- Refuge was given at Athens to Theban exiles after 
the Spartan occupation of the Kadmeia (Xen. 5-2.31), but that is all. There is 
nothing in all this to make the Spartans fearful of a revival of Athenian 
power or to make them feel that any attack upon Persia would require also 
the sharing of leadership between Sparta and Athens. It was doubtless a 
reflection of the relative strength of the two states in these years which 
caused Isokrates to expend so large a part of his Panegyrikos upon the case 
for Athens’ claim to leadership. Would this aspect of Isokrates’ proposal 
thus have evoked no more than derisive contempt at Sparta?
Perhaps not. Athens had been tactful in her relationship with Sparta 
in these years, allowing the hatred which her imperial past had excited to 
devolve onto the Spartans. She had permitted the Spartans to reap the 
odious outcomes of their aggressive actions, and was careful neither to 
interfere nor to excite resistance. With Thebes in Spartan hands and with 
opposition to Sparta simmering from the Peloponnese to Makedonia,
Athens offered the one possible champion for disaffected Greeks. So far 
she had not sought or threatened to adopt that role. On the other hand, 
Athenian policy had been correct, but not altogether submissive. The 
confidence was there in 364 to make an alliance with Chios, and also with 
Olynthos (the latter, however, being aborted because of Spartan interest); 
the Theban exiles had been afforded sanctuary, and when, in 379, these 
exiles staged their bold repossession of Thebes, the plot was not revealed to 
Sparta, and some active assistance was provided, even if the coup was not 
given official recognition by Athens. Isokrates' cryptic remark about 
disputes concerning the Kyklades may also reveal a certain independence 
which the Spartans needed to acknowledge. Athens may not have 
provoked fear at Sparta, yet neither did she merit contempt. Military and 
strategic factors would be relevant, if the Spartans were indeed concerned 
by the hostility which their actions against other Greek cities had 
engendered and if they were also sufficiently embarrassed by the 
resentment felt concerning the plight of the Greeks of Asia to an extent that 
a war against Persian territories would again hold appeal. Two strategic 
facts had been made clear in the recent Corinthian War: Sparta could not 
undertake a war in the east, unless the situation in Greece itself held no 
threat, and a war in Asia required naval control of the Aegean. A joint 
military hegemony would virtually guarantee both these strategic 
prerequisites. Sparta may have missed the point in 360; Philip II of
ei
Makedon was to display greater astuteness several decades later, when he 
ultimately turned his attention toward the East.
To return at last to the question of the publication of Panegyrikos’ 
date and audience. Isokrates did not deliver his works himself.
Panegyrikos cannot be obviously associated with any one of the great 
public festivals of Greece. The fictitious setting is not maintained in this 
work, as it is in some of his later political orations. For whom was it meant, 
and how was it to achieve any serious effect? A theory which would seem 
to account for the chronological indications within the work, for its failure 
to display itself as a convincing example of its genre and for such clues as 
are given at the conclusion about the audience for whom it was initially 
intended, is as follows: for personal reasons Isokrates had no prospect of 
emulating Lysias and delivering an oration at a panhellenic festival; 
furthermore, the crucial novelty, if such it should be termed, of his 
treatment of the theme of a panhellenic campaign against the Persians, 
leading to a consequent state of homonoia among the Greeks was his 
proposal that Sparta and Athens must first be reconciled, so that Sparta 
would accept Athens as co-leader of the panhellenic crusade against Persia. 
The fundamental factor here was to persuade Sparta to alter her foreign 
policy and to accept Athens as a partner in leadership. This could be seen 
as an adjustment to the current official Athenian policy of avoidance of any 
provocation of Sparta; it certainly involved a repudiation of the Great King 
as the arbiter of Greek affairs. I would suggest that Panegyrikos should be 
seen as the proposal at Athens of a plan and a policy: the plan being to 
instigate a panhellenic war against the Persians, and the policy being to 
seek to reject the Persian king as the arbiter of Greek affairs, to redirect 
Spartan military energy towards the barbarians, who were the natural 
enemies of all Greeks, and to pressure Sparta not only to change her foreign 
policy but also to pressure her into accepting Athens as joint leader in the 
panhellenic campaign. Such a proposal would need the agreement and 
support of the political leaders at Athens. It is these men, the educated 
public spokesmen, to whom Panegyrikos was addressed. At the end of the 
work Isokrates’ challenge to them is to accept and to implement his 
proposal.
That could be done in several ways: but most effectively by official 
endorsement in the Athenian assembly and by the sending of diplomatic 
missions, and by Athenian orators seizing the opportunity, as Lysias had 
done in 364, of a panhellenic gathering to deliver an oration for which 
Panegyrikos was offered as a model. The work can be dated to a time in
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361/0, perhaps not long after the Kyprian War had ended.1 In summer 
360 an Olympian festival was due to be held. What better occasion for a 
skilled Athenian speaker to present Isokrates' theme? The arguments and 
the method for treating the subject had been prepared by this publication. 
All that was required was to turn a proposal into reality.
That the work did not achieve the political or policy goal which its 
author had intended is undeniable. Isokrates himself acknowledged as 
much: in an Epistle which he directed to Dionysios I of Syracuse, probably 
about 366/7  (for the date, see below, p. 302), he declares that public 
festivals are not a fitting place to offer political advice, if one wishes to see 
some serious matter effected (Ep. 1.6); the same point was to be made, 
when he returned to the theme in his epistle of 346 to Philip II of Makedon 
(5-12).2 However, its failure to convince may be less to do with Greek 
response to the idea of a Persian expedition than to the failure of the 
Spartan leadership to respond; it may be that the course of events, 
particularly those at Thebes in the winter of 379/76, created new concerns 
for the Spartans and for those who were apprehensive of her ruthless 
pursuit of power and control.
This chapter has argued that the emphasis in Panegyrikos fell first 
and foremost on that dominant role which Sparta had been exercising, and 
increasingly abusing, since the Peace.3 Isokrates was right to be concerned, 
and so were others: morever, a response to the threat was found, albeit in
iCf. Tuplin, “Lysias XIX“, pp.180-182: Tuplin sensibly observes that "Nothing 
whatsoever in Panegyrikos ties it to Olympia (the contrast with Lys. xxiii is 
particularly telling", and he concludes about the discourse "It is a panegyrikos logos 
solely because it deals with a panhellenic theme which had been treated by others at 
panegyreis. In all substantial respects it is a political pamphlet (and a very 
Athenocentric one at that), and there is no objection to giving it a date in e.g. 381 /0 if 
that is what the internal evidence requires".
2Cf. Buchner (Panegyrikos, p.140), who notes that the silence of Isokrates in 
Antidosis on the political, as opposed to the literary, reputation of the work also 
indicates its failure to persuade or to see its proposals effected.
3Cf. Ryder, “Isocrates and Athenian Policy“, pp. 30-31: Ryder perceives 
Panegyrikos as designed to restore Athenian leadership in the Greek world at Sparta’s 
expense; he considers that it failed because opinion in Greece was becoming anti- 
Spartan rather than anti-Persian, and thus instead the Second Athenian Confederacy 
was formed. I would suggest that for Isokrates too the Spartans were recognized as the 
real threat. However, the response among the Greeks which occurred early in 377 
was not a case of choosing between alternatives which had been the same two to three 
years before; in 378 Sparta was now openly hostile to a number of other Greek states, 
especially to the Thebans and to the Athenians, who had given sanctuary to the 
Theban exiles prior to their expulsion of the Spartan garrison from the Kadmeia, and 
it would have been extreme folly to have antagonized Persia simultaneously.
different circumstances and so in a way different from that envisaged by 
Isokrates, a couple of years later, when the Second Athenian Confederacy 
was formed.
Chapter 2: Ptataifeos
The next discourse in which Isokrates addresses a political situation 
among the Greeks is Plataikos. This time the dramatic setting is precise. 
However, Isokrates does not present himself as the speaker. The work 
purports to be a speech by a Plataian who addresses the Athenian 
Assembly in search of support for the wrongs that he and his fellow- 
Plataians have suffered at the hands of the Thebans. The form of an 
assembly-speech is maintained throughout, from the opening words (14.1 
EiSorec yp.%, <5avSpec ’AOtjvcroi, ... [cf. 14.6, 54, 5b1]) to the final call for the 
Athenians to vote on the issue in favour of the Plataian cause (14.63 
4r#ioo^od Ti TTepi ^ [icov Smiov: cf. 14.4 2). The assembly -scene is further 
suggested in that we are told that some of the most capable of the Athenian 
politicians have been engaged to speak on behalf of the Thebans: bribery is 
clearly imputed (14.3: "we have reached such a state of misfortune that we 
must struggle, not only against them, but also against the ablest of the 
orators, men whom they have suborned from our resources to be advocates 
for them" Itrans. Norlin, adapted]: cf. 14.33); it is not made explicit that 
these rhetores are Athenians, but it seems most likely: the point at 14.3 
cannot simply be that the speaker has to combat eloquence, but that there 
are Athenian politicians who are willing to defend the Thebans' action 
against Plataia. However, the rhetorician's imputation of bribery as the 
motivation for leading Athenian political figures to have been prepared to 
speak at this time on behalf of Thebes need not be taken seriously; 
Aischines records a list of pro-Theban politicians at Athens from a time 
before his own: these include men who were politically active in the 370s.2
If the setting is precise, the issue is also specific. Despite the fact that 
peace exists (14.1, 5, 23, 43) and that there are treaties to guarantee the
*Mathieu (Isocrate Discours, [Bude ed. L adloc.) notes that the categorisation of 
the audience into the older men and the younger men is typical of' judicial oratory 
and has been transferred here to fictional political oratory.
2Aischin.3.138-139: they are listed as Thrasyboulos of Kollytos, Thrason of 
Erchia, Leodamas of Acharnai, Archedemos of Pelekes, Aristophon of Azenia and 
Pyrrhandros of Anaphlystos; Deinarchos (1.38-39) adds Kephalos, and Xenophon 
(5.4.34) speaks of oi ßoimriaCovrec at Athens, vho complained at the lack of justice 
dispensed at Sparta to Sphodrias (on these pro-Thebans at Athens at this period see A. 
Schäfer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit. 2nd. ed., Leipzig 1885, I^ . pp. 142-147).
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autonomy and independence of the Greek cities (14.5, 10, 12, 17, 39, 44,
63), the Thebans, who remain as members of the Second x^thenian 
Confederacy (14.11, 2 1), have offended both justice and right by rendering 
the Plataians stateless, destroying their town and dividing up their land 
(14.1, 7, 22, 46, 57, 61) and compelling them as refugees to seek homes 
elsewhere, including x^thens (14.46-50). The Thebans are now seeking 
endorsement for their action from the Athenians and from the allies of the 
Second Athenian Confederacy (14.3); their claim is said to be that they 
have acted in the interests of their allies (14.2 1-22, 25). The Plataian 
spokesman wishes to dissuade the xAxthenians from a decision which, he 
says, would link them with the moral infamy of Thebes' action, if they were 
to condone it and were to decide for the Thebans (14.22, 62); he appeals to 
his Athenian audience to restore to the Plataians their land and city 
(14.56), and , although he is none too precise about the means by which 
this could be accomplished, he seems to believe that this could be achieved 
by diplomatic pressure; for, although he says that a vote cast against the 
Thebans would show that Athens, as leader of the Confederacy, was 
prepared to go to war "in defence of the treaties",1 he is at pains to 
convince the Athenians that a diplomatic threat to Thebes would not expose 
Athens to danger (14.2, 33-36). A precedent which the Plataian quotes 
concerns some kind of protest by Thebes to Athens over the town of Oropos 
which, it seems, had recently found its way back into Athenian hands; the 
Athenians, we are told, responded to the Thebans by threatening to vote to
114.42: i'nep rtov c^ v8r|kxov; whether this refers to the terms of the Second 
Athenian Confederacy or to those of the Peace of 375 is not clear, but it is not greatly 
important since the principles of each were essentially the same (see Ryder, KE, 
pp.53,124-126).
make them etoonovSoi, and this was sufficient to cause the Thebans to retract 
their claims or objections (14.37; cf. 14.20).1
The Athenians must surely have discussed the destruction of Plataia; 
indeed, if Plataikos’ setting is to be trusted, the Theban action was 
defended in the Athenian assembly, probably by Athenian politicians, and 
the Thebans themselves may also have sought to justify their case in the 
Allied synhedrion (for this last see 14.21). It is commonly supposed that 
the views of those who defended the Theban action prevailed. Certainly 
Plataia was not restored again until Philip II of Makedon saw to it. We do 
hear that the Plataians were granted isopoliteia by the Athenians (D.S. 
15-46.6). It may be more cautious to say that, while the silence of our 
sources may be taken to indicate that the Athenians were not prepared to 
convoke a war against their Theban allies, we do not know whether the 
Athenians were disposed to call the bluff of the Thebans by threatening 
diplomatic sanctions, as it seems that they had done over Oropos; the two 
situations were not exactly alike: in the case of Plataia it was the Thebans 
who were in position to bluff, whereas the Oropos-incident preceded the 
compulsory enlistment of Thespiai and Tanagra into the Boiotian 
Confederacy, and it was unlikely that Thebes was yet ready to break away 
from the Athenian Confederacy.
1 Oropos, which had been incorporated into the Boiotian League sometime after 
402 (D.S. 14.17.1-3), had regained its independence at the time of the King's Peace, 
when the Boiotian League w^ as dissolved (Xen. 3.1.32-33). Theban expansion of power 
in Boiotia after 376 and before the Peace of 375 seems a plausible time for the Oropians 
to have "given” their land to Athens; the incident referred to by Isokrates at 14.37 is 
probably to be dated to a time close to the Peace of 375 (just after, according to Sealey, 
"Cailistratos of Aphidna”, Historia5 [1956] 191 (= Essays, p.145); Beloch, however, 
placed the incident in 375. prior to the Peace [GO, III. 1.155; cf. Glotz-Cohen, Histoire 
grecque, III, p.137]
Buckler [The Theban Hegemony, p .19] suggests that Sparta had detached Oropos and 
had given it to Athens at some time after 386: the action is conceivable at that earlier 
time, but does not square with such details as Isokrates provides. The placing of the 
Oropos-incident after the Peace of 375 offers an explanation of Diodoros' mistaken 
belief that the Thebans were excluded from this Peace, as they wrere later to be in the 
first Peace of 371 [cf. Ryder, KE, p.124: for the issue of a Diodoran doublet in his 
account of the Peace of 375 see A.G. Roos. "The Peace of Sparta of 374 B.C.“. Mnem. n.s. 2 
[1949 L 265-285 and S.Lauffer, “Die Diodordublette XV 38 = 50 über die Friedenschlüsse 
zu Sparta 374 und 371 v.Chr." Historia 8 [1959 L 315-348).
It might also be noted that Isokrates speaks of this confrontation between Athens 
and Thebes over Oropos in a way which suggests there was a significant interval 
between the Oropos-incident and the composition of Plataikos. It is further 
interesting to note the detail offered by Diodoros (15-46.4) that the Plataians provoked 
the Thebans into action by planning to hand over their city to the Athenians, an 
intention reminiscent of the action of the Oropians.
The destruction of Plataia is generally accepted to have occurred in 
the archonship of Asteios (i.e. 373/2: Paus. 9-1.6);1 a more precise date 
within that archon-year is dependent upon the testimony afforded by 
Plataikos. However, before looking at a more precise date for the event, it 
is necessary first to take note of the views of some scholars who have 
proposed a date for Plataikos which is significantly later than the event 
which is its subject.
Without offering any positive reason for the implausibility of a date 
of composition soon after the destruction of Plataia, Mathieu argued that 
Plataikos was, in fact, composed several years later; he saw in Plataikos a 
striking similarity to the views expressed by Kallistratos as an ambassador 
at the peace-conference at Sparta in 371 (see Xen. 6.3.10-17).2 3Mathieu 
regarded Plataikos as propaganda written in support of the Second 
Athenian Confederacy, 3 and he concluded that the discourse was produced 
in order to influence the peace congress which was held at Sparta early in 
371: the work being designed "ä attirer lattention des arnbassadeurs 
atheniens (et aussi celle des representants des autres Etats) sur le danger 
que Thebes faisait courir ä la paix de la Groce.“4 Influenced by his thesis 
that all Isokrates* political comment was ultimately governed by a desire to 
see the Greeks united in a war against the barbarian, Mathieu claimed that 
Isokrates had now come to see the Thebans as having replaced the 
Spartans as those who were standing in the way of the achievement of 
eudairnonia among the Greeks (cf. Isok. 4.20), furthermore, in seeking to 
account for Isokrates* reversal of attitude toward a peace mediated by the 
Persian king,5 he calculated that Isokrates must now have been reckoning 
on promoting a period of tranquillity in which the Greeks could come to 
appreciate their common interests, and so would thereafter unite in a
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iSee G.L. Cav/k^rell, "Notes on the Peace of 375/4“, Historia 12 (1963), 85; 
Diodoros dates the event to 374/3 (15 46.6).
2Mathieu, Les Idees. p.92; Mathieu's v ie v  vac supported by Cloche (Politique 
Etrangere, pp.81-85).
3 Ibid., p.87.
4 Ibid., p.94.
^I.e. the Peace of 375: for the actual initiative of' the Great King in this Peace 
see D.S. 15-38.1; also Didymos, In Demosthenem. 7.62-71 (= Philoch. FGrH 328 E151) (cit. 
P. Harding, From the End of the Pel. wTar to the Battle of Ipsus (Cambridge, 1985),p.61 ] 
(cf. Ryder, KE, pp 58,61,124-5).
panhellenic crusade.1 All this is purely speculative; there is no hint of any 
such intention in the discourse. It has been argued effectively against 
Mathieu's theory that Plataikos cannot be demonstrated to link up with the 
situation which pertained just prior to the peace-conference at Sparta in 
371 and that the work does not anticipate or reflect the policy or 
arguments which were proposed at that conference by Kallistratos: in 
Plataikos Isokrates does not adopt any attitude to Athenian-Sparta.n 
relations and does not show any expectation of a true rapprochement with 
Sparta; on the contrary, the speaker is at pains to refute the argument 
which might be offered by Theban apologists, that Thebes now fights on 
behalf of Athens and could be a danger should she transfer her allegiance 
to Sparta (14.33-34).2 To these objections it may be added that if Isokrates 
had wanted in 371 to produce a work of propaganda in favour of 
Kallistratos* policy, he could, and surely would, have strengthened his case 
by the inclusion of reference to the added threats, or even injury, which 
Thespiai had then recently sustained at Theban hands.3
The further one goes bevond the time of the incident itself, the less •—* * *
convincing Plataikos becomes, if it was to have been a serious attempt to
influence opinion against the Thebans; also, the more difficult it is to
explain why, by fixing his discourse so precisely in an historical context and
by hiding behind the mask of a Plataian refugee, Isokrates would have
limited the opportunities which events subsequent to Plataia's destruction
gave to one who would influence opinion against the Thebans. The only
alternative for those who would detach the composition of Plataikos from
the date of its putative setting is to regard the discourse as no more than a
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1 Mathieu, Idees, {>.91.
2A. Momigliano, "Un Momenta di storia grece: la pace -lei 373 A. C. e il Plataico 
di Isocrate", Athenaeum N.S. 14 (1936), 27-28; cf. ¥ .  Jaeger, Demosthenes: the Origin  
and Grovth of his PolicyXambridge 1938, pp. 199-203: Jaeger rejects Mathieu's dating 
of Plataikos to 371, but. does see Isokrates' vork as being designed, in  373, to prepare 
the v a y  for Kallistratos* policy, as expressed in  the first peace conference in  371.
3In Plataikos (14.9) Thespiai is said to have been forced, ^dth Tanagra, to join 
the Boiotian Confederacy; Diodoros (13.46.6) claims that the Thebans "pillaged" 
(e^ TTOpÖrjöKXv) Thespiai at they same time as they razed Plataia, against this, Xenophon 
reports, as preface to the conference at Sparta in  371, that the Athenians took thought 
of the Platedans' plight and that “the Thespians too vere  begging Athens not to a llov  
them to be left xmhout a city" (6.3.1: cf. 6.3.5; 4.10; also D.S. 15 51.3); Pausanias, on the 
other hand, says that the Thespians ’»are at Leuktra but v ith d rev  before the battle 
(9.13.3: also Polyainos 2.3 3; cf. Beloch, GO. III^. 1.160, n.3), and that after Leuktra 
they left their city  and sought refuge at Keressos, from vh ere  they ^ r e  taken by  
Epaminondas (9.14.2-4).
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rhetorical display-piece, in which the rhetor has taken particular care to 
avoid anachronisms.
Indeed the suggestion has been made that the work may have been 
composed some years after the dramatic date, with the implication that it is 
no more than a rhetorical exhibition. This judgment is based upon an 
uncertainty as to the trustworthiness of the historical and contemporary 
details to be found in the work; thus it has been concluded that "it is not 
clear whether he [Isokrates] remembered the circumstances of 373/2 
correctly or chose to represent them correctly".1 This question of historical 
accuracy in Plataikos will have to be considered, but first it must be said 
that there is nothing in the speech itself, nor in Isokrates* known practice of 
composition or of his professed attitude to subject-matter, which demands 
the postulation of a compositional date significantly removed from the 
dramatic date. The onus of proof for a later date of composition rests 
entirely with those who would seek to establish such a fact. It is not even 
sufficient to be able to demonstrate that contemporary events or 
circumstances referred to in the speech are inaccurate, unless it can also be 
established that it would be impossible, or beyond the bounds of credibility 
for an orator so to misreport matters. That said, let us consider the alleged 
inaccuracies of fact in Plataikos.
The first criticism concerns the description of Theban conduct in the 
more recent past. In an attempt to demonstrate Theban perfidy, as 
opposed to Plataian loyalty, it is alleged that, when the Corinthian War was 
brought to an end, the Thebans were not content to remain neutral but 
formed an alliance with the Spartans; by this alliance, it is said, they swore 
to follow the Spartans against those very Athenians who had but lately 
saved them from the Spartans; divine retribution followed, with the 
capture of the Kadrneia and refuge for some Thebans in Athens; 'saved* 
once again by Athens, the Theban exiles had no sooner re-entered their city 
than they sent ambassadors to Sparta "showing themselves ready to be 
slaves and to alter in no respect their former agreements with Sparta"
Healey, HGCS. p.418; of. Horn blower. The Greek ¥orld. p .211. Earlier E. von 
Stern (Geschichte der spartanischen und thebanischen Hegemonie von 
Königsfrieden bis zur Schlacht bei Mantineia Dorpat 1884, p.71, n .l [cf. p.lGG]) agreed 
in general with Busolt’s judgment ("Per zveüe athenische Seebundn, Supplementband 
7, Weite Jahrbücher für Phil, u. Paedog. [Leipzig 1872-18751 p.677) that Plataikos was
historically worthless, although he had to confess that the evidence of IG 11^  .34/35 (= 
Tod, GHI, II. 118) confirmed Isokrates' claim (14.28) about Chios' loyalty after 387/6 
and therefore lent probability to the alleged loyalty also of Mytilene and Byzantion.
(14.27-29). The language is colourful, ‘truth’ is 'stretched';1 but was there 
an alliance struck between Thebes and Sparta after the King's Peace, and 
did the Thebans attempt to establish diplomatic relations, even an alliance, 
after the democrats recovered Thebes in 379?
Isokrates' statement that the Thebans had formed an alliance with 
the Spartans in 366, after the imposition of the King's Peace, receives 
support from Plutarch, who records that Thebes sent a contingent to assist 
the Spartans against Mantineia and adds that at that time the Thebans 
were still the friends and allies of the Spartans (Pelop. 4.4-5). Although it 
may seem at least a little surprising that Thebes should form an alliance 
with Sparta just after she had been compelled by the Spartans, through the 
terms of the King's Peace, to acknowledge the independence of the Boiotian 
cities (cf. Xen. 5-1-32-33X and despite the attempts by some historians to 
deny this alliance,2 *there is no good reason to do so, and the majority of 
historians have rightly accepted the alliance, and thus Isokrates' evidence.3
Isokrates' further claim that when the Thebans regained control of 
their city in winter 379/6 they once again were prepared to be slaves and 
to make no change from their former agreements with the Spartans (14.29) 
obviously uses the verb "to be enslaved" (SoyAemv) figuratively,4 but there 
is no reason to doubt that the Thebans made overtures to the Spartans at 
that time:5 the Athenians maintained a very cautious public attitude in
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114.29: öüjöevTtv yap naAiv Sra. nie yiiereoac Suvauetoc (of Athens' reception of 
democratic exiles in 382) and eroipoi SouAe&iv ovrec (the latter referring to the 
alleged readiness of the Thebans democrats, even after regaining their city, to 
attempt some continuation of relations ’with the Spartans). As for the -description of 
the Spartan occupation of the Kadmeia as an act evidencing the ’working of divine 
justice, compare the very different v iev  portrayed in Panegryikos (4.126).
2Most recently the alliance has been denied by J. Buckler,“The Alleged 
Theban-Spartan Alliance of 386 B.C.", Eranos 78 (1980), 179-185; Buckler’s argument 
from Xenophon’s silence, especially vhen he is ’writing of the events surrounding the 
Spartan seizure of the Kadmeia, is not persuasive, since, despite the historian's 
general pro-Spartan and anti-Theban sympathies, he remains critical of the Spartans 
over this incident, despite his protection of Agesilaos in the affair (see 5-2.25ff.; esp. 
5.2.32 & cf. 5 4.1); in this Xenophon reflects the general condemnation among the 
Greeks of the Spartans' action (see above, pp. 50,78).
Sfor a recent defence of the alliance see H. M. Hack, “Thebes and the Spartan 
Hegemony, 386-382 B.C.”, AJPh 99 (1978), 210-227 (T/ith a bibliography on the subject 
at p.217, n.21).
4Cf. Thuc. 1.98.4.
5j. Buckler (“The Re-establishment of the Boiotarchia“, A IAH 4 (1979), 53), also 
rejects Isokrates’ evidence on this matter; cf. D. G. Rice (“Xenophon, Diodorus and the
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relation to the coup in which the Theban exiles recovered their city, 
Athenian forces were at hand but took no active part in the fighting, and 
the Athenians merely watched as spectators the consequent Spartan 
invasion of Boiotia; indeed, the Athenians were sufficiently alarmed by the 
course of events that they put on trial the two generals who had 
collaborated with the Theban democrats: one was executed, the other 
escaped into exile (Xen. 5.4.10-19). Given this distant public response at 
Athens, it is not surprising that the Thebans made overtures to the 
Spartans in an attempt to avoid further Spartan attacks. Whether or not 
the Thebans already had plans for reestablishing their control over the 
Boiotian cities, their position would be precarious, or at best, limited in 
terms of their capacity seriously to pursue more ambitious goals, until they 
had secured alliance with one or other of Sparta or Athens, uf the two, 
Sparta would be the more obvious to approach. However, the installation 
by Sparta of a garrison in Thespiai (Xen. 5 4.15), and then or soon after in 
other Boiotian cities,1 made clear to the Thebans that the Spartans were not 
prepared to acquiesce in the newT situation in Boiotia, and the Athenians too 
must have been given pause. The Athenians were left in no doubt as to 
which way their interests lay, when the rashly ambitious Sphodrias made 
his abortive attempt to seize Athens (Xen. 5-4.20-2 .3). Alliance was struck 
with the Thebans (IG, ii2 .40), and the Thebans subsequently entered the 
Second Athenian Confederacy (Tod, GHI 11.123-1-79).
Rhetorical hyperbole is perhaps exploited when Isokrates writes that 
the Thebans wTere no better than the Spartans in forcibly extending their 
control over the Boiotian towns, “razing the walls of some and entirely 
destroying others” (14.19). The picture of the whole of Boiotia being 
unwillingly coerced into a federated state may be exaggerated, 2 but. it 
cannot be denied that Plataia, Thespiai, urchornenos and Tanagra were 
under pressure to co-operate and ultimely were coerced or destroyed; it is 
also surely the case that. Isokrates' view of Boiotian affairs in the years 
from 3?6 to 37.3 was shared by many at Athens: we need only remind 
ourselves of Xenophon's statement that one of the things which influenced
year 379/378 B. C.. Reconstruction and Appraisal“, YCS 24 (1975), 104), for acceptance 
of the alleged embassy, although P.ice thinks that a. return to the old alliance was 
unlikely to have been desired on the part of the Thebans, and he says that Isokrates 
“is certainly distorting the events" (at 14.29).
^ ee  Hack, “Thebes and The Spartan Hegemony", p216, n.3 for refs, and for a
biblio.
2See Buckler, The Theban Hegem ony, t>p21-22.
the Athenians to make peace in 375 was the growing power of Thebes 
(6.2.1). This growth had, it seems, been checked, even cut back, by the 
Peace, bu t with the seizure and destruction of Plataia, and a rapid revival of 
Theban power in Boiotia, Athenian concern m ust again have been aroused.1
The most im portant issue of historical accuracy regarding events 
recorded in Plataikos is whether Isokrates is correct in asserting tha t peace 
still held a t the time that Plataia was destroyed; the point is made 
repeatedly in the speech (14.1, 5, 43; cf. also 17, 23). Difficulty arises when 
one considers the narrative of Xenophon, and to some degree also that of 
Biodoros. For, probably in the latter half of 375.. after the Spartans and the 
Athenians and their respective allies, encouraged or even prompted by the 
Great King., had reaffirmed the conditions formally established in the King's 
Peace, Xenophon recounts how Timotheos, who had been operating in 
western waters, was recalled to Athens; on his way he pu t ashore on 
Zakynthos some Zakynthian exiles; this action led to a protest to Sparta by 
those already in control on Zakynthos, and as a result "the Spartans 
immediately came to the conclusion that the Athenians had committed a 
hostile act and once more began to fit out a fleet" (6.2.2-3). Xenophon 
immediately continues on to describe how a Peloponnesian fleet was raised 
with Mnasippos as nauarch and how this force began operations designed 
to bring Kerkyra under Spartan control (6.2.4ffj. The Kerkyraians 
appealed to Athens, and the Athenians sent out Ktesikles by land with a 
force of peltasts, and voted a force of sixty ships with Timotheos in 
command. Timotheos, however, had difficulty in manning his ships and 
sailed into the Aigaian to recruit crews; the Athenians were dissatisfied 
with this delay, Timotheos was deposed; Iphikrates assumed the command 
and speedily made ready the ships and sailed in haste for Kerkyra (Xen.
6.2.2ff.).
Diodoros records tha t the Spartans and the Athenians managed to 
maintain the peace for a short time (15-45-2: a^repaiyap alnoXeu; aSmi xpovov 
dxlyov SitTfjpriaav rdc cmovSac); Diodoros narrates the restoration by Timotheos 
of a group of Zakynthian exiles (15-45-2-3); however, his narrative 
thereafter concerning events associated with Zakynthos and Kerkyra differs 
significantly from the narrative of Xenophon. Diodoros' account, which 
relates all these events under the ar chon-year 374/3, is not itself without 
difficulties and contains some m anifest errors, but it is clear from his
iSee Gray, "The Years 375-371 B.C.: A Case Study in the Reliability of Diodorus 
Siculus and Xenophon", CQ ns. 30 (1980), 310-311.
account that Xenophon's version has telescoped events, so that the Spartan 
naval appointments of Aristokraten (to Zakynthos) and Alkidas (to 
Kerkyra), which preceded that of Mnasippos, have been entirely omitted 
(cf. D.S. 15.45.4ff.).1 Diodoros also seems to regard the action of Mnasippos 
at Kerkyra as signifying the resumption of war between Athens and Sparta, 
with the previous activities at Zakynthos and Kerkyra being preliminaries 
to a resumption2 *According to Diodoros, and in conflict with Xenophon, the 
appointment of Timotheos, in response to appeal from Kerkyra, precedes 
Mnasippos' attack (D.S. 15 47.1-2; cf. Xen. 6.2.4-11).
The chronology of events in the years which immediately followed 
the Peace of 375 are difficult to determine, and have long been the subject 
of scholarly discussion.3 However, in two more recent attempts to clarify 
the issue both Cawkwell and Gray have accepted Pausanias* dating of the 
seizure of Plataia in 373/2 and have also agreed that Isokrates did not 
distort the truth when he wrote in Plataikos that a state of peace still 
existed among the Greeks, including Athens and Sparta. Cawkwell argues 
from an acceptance of the evidence of the Plataikos that a condition of 
peace still existed sometime into 37.3/2 and proceeds from there to 
examine the accounts of Xenophon and Diodoros, opting for the account of 
the latter and deferring the attack of Mnasippos upon Kerkyra until 
autumn 37.3, at a time after the composition of Plataikos.4
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^his telescoping by Xenophon is agreed by both Cavkvell (“Notes on the 
Peace of 375/4", pp. 85-88) and Gray ("The Years 375-371 B.C.“, p.308f.), vho 
nevertheless produce some vhat different chronologies of events in these years 
which directly folio w-ed the Peace of 375-
2&ray ("The Years 375-371 B. C.", p.317f.) notes: "There is sure evidence that 
peace lasted up until then, since the Spartans negotiate at Athens over Timotheus' 
alleged breaking of the peace, and the Spartan fleet expects to be received in friendly 
fashion at Corcyra, an expectation that vould be quite ridiculous if the peace had then 
been broken."
3&ray, at the outset of her article “The Years 375 to 371 B.C.", remarks: "Neither 
the chronology nor the interpretation of the history of the years 375 to 371 BC is yet 
settled" (p.306); she provides a bibliography of the various issues in the introduction 
to the article.
4CavkTrell, "Notes on the Peace of 375/4", pp.84-88; in dating Mnasippos' 
departure to autumn 373 Cavkvell follows Beloch, &&. III .^ 2 .235f. & Die Attische 
Politik seit Perikies, Leipzig 1884, p.359f; Cavkvell notes that on this chronological 
issue "most scholars have felt themselves obliged to accept him [Diodoros 3 in one form 
or another" (p.87, & n.34 for bibliography).
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Gray has more recently attempted convincingly to restore the 
reputation of Xenophon in these chronological issues;1 while not denying 
that Xenophon's account of events subsequent to the Peace is defective,
Gray argues that what is written is nonetheless consistent and plausible. 
Gray dates Mnasippos' nauarchy to 374/3 and places his departure before 
that of Timotheos - an event which is independently dated to Mounychion 
373 (cf. [Dem.] 49.60). The issue therefore arises of whether Isokrates 
could still have referred to a state of peace existing when he wrote 
Plataikos (see 14.2: cf. 14.43): Gray contends that "the definition of the time 
at which a war begins is not a straightforward matter", saying that there 
was no actual conflict on Kerkyra between Spartan and Athenian forces 
until autumn 373, and then only between the Spartans and the peltasts 
under Ktesikles, who were very likely foreign mercenaries; Gray concludes 
that “The Plataeans might have referred to peace in Greece right up to the 
time at which Iphicrates carried out his planned raids on Laconia the 
following year, since that would be the first time that Spartan and Athenian 
forces had clashed in battle" and adds that "likelihood of war seems to be 
what the Plataeans are playing on when they use the threat of war with 
Sparta to make Athens accept their appeal and revenge their injustices."2
Modern historical scholarship thus has found no reason to dispute 
the accuracy of Isokrates' statements in Plataikos that a condition of peace 
still obtained when the work was written, and the date for the work which 
is accepted by such scholarship is a time in the earlier part of 373/2, not 
long after the seizure itself of Plataia. It also gives point to the great 
celebrations with which the Peace of 375 was greeted by the Athenians, 
who established an altar and a cult of Eirene, celebrating the event in 
conjunction with the Festival of the Synoikia and erecting a statue to 
Timotheos in honour of his achievement in regaining recognition from 
Sparta of Athens' sea-power and the leadership of her Confederacy.3 The 
facts in Plataikos may be stretched or coloured in support of the Plataian
i&ray, "The Years 375-371 B.C.“, pp.306-326.
2Gra.y, “The Years 375-371 B.C.”, p.319.
3for these ttra Athenian responses to the Peace see CawkirelL "Notes on the 
Peace of 375/4", p. 87f. For the celebration at Athens of the Peace see: Isok. 15-109-110; 
Philoch. FGrH 328 F 151; Nepos, Timoth. 2.2; for the statue of Timotheos see Nepos, 
Timoth. 2.3. On the establishment of the public cult of Eirene at this time see F. Jacoby, 
FGrH Illb. 1.523-526: the statue of Timotheos and the cult-image of Eirene, v ith  the 
child Ploutos cradled in her arms, vh ich  ttss fashioned by Kephisodotos, tsrere quite 
possibly commissioned at the time of the Peace itself.
cause, but there is no reason to regard the discourse as a rhetorical fiction. 
One can point to opportunities to prejudice the case against the Thebans 
which have been resisted: so, we are told, the Thebans have proven 
themselves no better than the Spartans by imposing their will upon others, 
by force if necessary, although, unlike the Spartans, they have not inflicted 
garrisons (14.19): the statement is ironical, since Thebes' methods of 
control are more drastic, as Isokrates goes on at once to point out.
Isokrates may have felt that the irony m s  more impressive than any claim 
that Thebes had stationed garrisons in Boiotian towns, but it also worth 
recalling that the Peace of 3?5,in essence a reiteration of the King's Peace, 
included a specific clause which forbade garrisons.1 Isokrates implicitly 
acknowledges the clause from the Peace and resists any temptation to 
suggest that the Thebans had violated it. Then again, pressure had been 
exerted by Thebes upon both Thespiai and Tanagra, and they had been 
forced to submit to Theban control; here too no attempt is made to 
exaggerate; Thespiai, at least, may even have suffered some physical 
attack (cf. D.S. 15-46.6), but survived to face further intimidation in 371; 
ultimately the Thespians were dispossessed by the Thebans after Leuktra 
(see Xen. 6.3 1; Paus. 9.14.2).
Even though most scholars have accepted for Plataikos a date of 
composition which is contemporary, or near contemporary, to its purported 
historical setting, there has been little agreement as to its purpose. It has 
been claimed that it m s  genuinely written for delivery on the actual 
occasion of the Plataian appeal at Athens;2 it has more cautiously been 
described as a commissioned work, with the added suggestion that 
Timotheos may have been responsible for the commission.3 It. has been 
seen as a contribution to a surge of anti-Theban feeling which swept
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iSee D.S. 13.38.2; cf. Ryder, KE. pp. 38-39. Gray (T he Years 373*371 B. C.“, 
pp. 309-311) believes that the Thebans had mastered all Boiotia before the Peace in 373, 
that they had placed garrisons in some tovns, and that the clause concerning 
garrisons vas designed to remove Theban, not Spartan, garrisons from Boiotian 
tovns. There is no evidence for this v ie v  beyond Xenophon's remark that, vh ile  the 
Spartans and Athenians vere engaged in events vh ich  culminated in the battle of 
Alyseia. the Thebans "had subdued the Boiotian cities and next vere moving into 
Phokis" (6.1.1). If Gray's hypothesis vere true, it vould seem most unlikely that 
Isokrates vould have failed to make the point in Plataikos. vhereas in fact he 
disregards it.
2jet>b, AO, II, p.176; Grote, ffiL VIII, p.153. 
3 Jaeger, Demosthenes, pp.199-203.
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Athens at the time of Plataia's destruction,1 or as reflective of a redirection 
of xAxthenian policy, generally associated with Kallistratos, which was to 
reach fulfilment in the peace congress at Sparta in 371.2 * It has been 
described as propaganda, either for the Second Athenian Confederacy^ or 
against the Thebans and their development of a Boiotian Confederacy.4 * It 
has been thought to be an attempt to divert the attention of the Athenian 
public from the prosecution of Timotheos for his failure to protect Kerkyra 
by focusing upon this aggressive act of the Thebans.5 it  has been given a 
more reflective tone as a wTork which seeks to discuss the question of 
purpose for x^thens and her allies should Sparta cease to be the common 
threat, asking what kind of leadership would Athens then offer.6 We must 
examine the Plataikos more closely, but let us begin by considering a 
question which few critics have raised: why is the discourse spoken’ by a 
Plataian?
Was the Plataikos actually written for presentation in the Athenian 
Assembly? The possibility cannot be altogether excluded: Ryder has, 
indeed, said, quite fairly: "Its arguments are, on the whole the statement of 
the Plataeans' case as it. could best be stated", although he does not 
subscribe to the view that the speech was actually written for a Plataean to 
present.7 Mathieu has denied the possibility of Isokrates, at this stage in 
his career, writing a commissioned piece for public delivery;8 but 
Isokrates' clear rejection of the composition of speeches for private lawsuits 
or works on petty themes (see 4.11) cannot be permitted to rule out the 
possibility that he saw in the Plataian appeal a subject worthy of his 
attention; nor can one understand Mathieu’s further point that Isokrates 
would have been too jealous of his art to allow another to present a work of
buckler, "The Re-establishment of the Boiotarchia", p. 52.
2 Jaeger, Demosthenes, p.202.
^Mathieu, Les Idees, pp.87 & 94.
4J. Buckler, “Dating the Peace of 375/4 B.C.", ORBS 12 (1971), 359.
^Momigliano, “Un Momenta", pp. 30-31.
6Bringmann, Studien, pp. 5!-53.
?KL P-61f.
8Les Idees, p.92f.
his before the Athenian assembly:1 if that had been a concern, then so long 
as it was not concealed that he had written the work, there seems little 
difference between a Plataian delivering the speech before the assembly 
and a slave or a friend or pupil reading the work to a gathering in a 
manner familiar at Athens since the fifth century. It may be that at this 
time in his public writings Isokrates was attracted to the presentation of 
his ideas through the form of dramatic personae: for Plataikos was 
followed in the next decade by Nikokles and Archidamos. both works which 
are cast in the form of addresses delivered by those after whom they are 
entitled; thereafter he resumes his own 'voice' in his discourses. Yet to 
note this is not to exp-lain why with Plataikos such a plan was adopted; the 
notion of a literary experiment which extends over almost ten years and is 
then discontinued does not seem sufficient or even convincing as an 
explanation.
The length of Plataikos makes it the only one of Isokrates' political 
discourses which bears any real comparison with other known deliberative 
speeches designed for delivery in the Athenian assembly in the fourth 
century, although even then by comparison it is quite a lengthy speech.2 It 
does not, therefore, seem to be beyond the bounds of credibility that 
Isokrates felt strongly enough about the destruction of Plataia, and about 
the wider ramifications of the growth of Theban power and the threat to 
Athens' hegemony, to have agreed to write a speech for the Plataian 
spokesman to use, after all, the Plataians were up against a formidable 
opposition in that the Thebans were to have their case represented by 
experienced advocates. This fact itself is perhaps suggestive: historically, it 
would be predictable that Plataians would find a more receptive audience 
at Athens than would Thebans, so in terms of forensic strategy, it would be 
more emotional for the Plataians, as the wronged party, to put their own 
case, whereas, for the Thebans, who would have had to rely on arguments 
of reason and expediency, and who could hardly appeal in their case to 
emotions, it would be more tactful for their case to be represented by 
others.
In addition, there may be represented in this some reflection of the 
assembly's feelings toward foreign policy at this time: that is to say, among 
those who spoke in the assembly with any regularity there may have been
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^ ee  Mathieu, Les Ideas, p.93; also, Jaeger, Demosthenes, p.199.
2See above, p. 6,n.2.
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at this time a stronger inclination to excuse the Thebans' violation of the 
Peace in preference to supporting the Plataians by public action on the part 
of the state (for example, by threatening to expel Thebes from the 
Confederacy and thereby risking even war itself). Certainly, it is a fact that 
the Plataian appeal did not produce at this time any manifest alteration to 
Athenian policy toward Thebes: no threat of expulsion from the 
Confederacy, nor any suggestion of sanctions under the terms of the 
renewed Peace of 375; at the time the Athenians did no more than grant 
{ooTToXlreiato the Plataians (D.S. 15.46.6), although later, when (in 371) the 
Athenians sent an embassy to Sparta, we are told that they had by then 
ceased to be favourably disposed toward the Thebans and that in this they 
had been influenced by the action of the Thebans against the Plataians and 
by the appeals from the people of Thespiai (Xen. 6.3.1,5).
If such was the general balance of political assessment at Athens at 
this time, despite the violation of the rights of the Plataians, and if Plataikos 
was not a work intended for actual delivery in the assembly, then the use 
of a Plataian as a dramatis persona may have been a cautious piece of 
personal diplomacy on the part of Isokrates, designed to avoid too close an 
association with a policy which he realistically recognized would not win 
popular favour: it was one thing to express sympathy for the homeless 
Plataians and to offer them refuge at Athens, but it was quite another to 
permit that sympathy to affect Athens' foreign relations with a major city- 
state such as Thebes. We shall consider what evidence there is for 
Athenian political opinion at this time in order to see whether such an 
interpretation of the use of a Plataian speaker is explicable as a recognition 
of political reality, but first it will be helpful to focus attention upon the 
content and arguments of the speech.
By placing his views in the mouth of a Plataian, Isokrates avoids any 
obligation to discuss ways and means for executing the policy which is 
proposed in Plataikos. It was not the task of an ambassador to argue ways 
and means, so much as to convince his audience that his appeal should be 
heeded.1 Thus, although Plataikos does finally call upon the Athenians to 
give back to the Plataians their land and city (14.56), the emphasis in the 
speech is upon arguments aimed at persuading the Athenians to respond
1 In this respect Plataikos may be compared T?ith diplomatic speeches such as 
that of the envoys from Akanthia and Apollonia to Sparta in 382 (see Xen. 3-2-11-19) 
rather than to a policy-speech by an Athenian in the assembly, such as Demosthenes' 
First Philippic. Howver, even ambassadors could sometimes make general reference 
to the nature of the military aid vhich they ’were seeking (see Xen. 6.1,14f.).
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favourably and to tbe rebuttal of points which the opposition might 
introduce, and there is only the one direct reference in the speech to the 
restoration of Plataia. As for the method by which such restoration might 
be accomplished, the only hint given is the implication that the diplomatic 
th reat of expulsion from the Athenian Confederacy, which had proved 
effective when Thebes raised a challenge (whether diplomatic or military is 
not specified) to Athens' control of Oropos (14.20.37), might again be 
effective. Certainly the expectation of a physical conflict over the dispute is 
something which is carefully denied a t the outset (14.2).
As for the arguments which could be called upon to urge or to 
discourage Athenian acceptance of the Plataian appeal, Plataikos does not 
provide quite the same same analytical opportunity as would a pair of 
speeches in an historian like Thucydides. However, it is not uncommon for 
a real speech to anticipate and to seek to rebu t in advance an opponent's 
arguments, and so in Plataikos this debating technique is employed, 
enabling some perception of the opposition viewpoint to be formed.
The essence of the Plataians' case is that the Thebans, by the 
destruction of Plataia, have violated the oaths and treaties. This issue of 
legal injustice is introduced in the opening sentence: "Since we Plataeans 
know, Athenians, that it is your custom not only zealously to come to the 
rescue of victims of injustice ....“ (14.1); the accusation is levelled 
repeatedly (14.2, S. 10, 25, 44: and cf. 12, 23, 39, 42, 63)- The "oaths and 
treaties" (oi oproi icod cd c^veijkm) to which the Plataians appeal are those of the 
Peace of 375, itself essentially a reaffirmation of the King's Peace;1 only the 
reference a t 14.17 m ust be understood as a specific reference to the initial 
Peace of 367/6 .2 The King's Peace had asserted autonomy for all Greek 
cities outside Asia, great or small (see Xen. 5.1.31: cf. Ryder, KE. p. If.), and 
this provision can safely be assumed to have been reaffirmed in 375 (see 
B.S. 15 36 2),3 so tha t Plataia, reestablished subsequent to the Peace of
^.ee Ryder.. KE, p.124.
2H.17: “Remember also that you [Athenians ] undertook your most recent tvar 
[378-375 B.C. ], not to secure the freedom of either yourselves or your allies (for you 
all enjoyed that already), but on behalf of those vho were being deprived of their 
autonomy in violation of the oaths and covenants.“
^The details of taking the oaths for the Peace of 375 are not known. It has been 
suggested that after Sparta and Athens agreed to renew the Peace, each undertook to 
persuade their allies to accept it (see V. Judeich, “Athen und Theben vom 
Königsfrieden bis zur Schlacht bei Leuktra", RhM N F. 76 (1927), 181-185: cf. Sealey, 
“Cailistraios of Aphidna", p. 189 [= Essays, p.H3D. Diodoros says mat the King's 
proposal for peace met with approval from all the Greeks and that agents were
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367/6, was from then also party to the guarantee. Despite her possible 
anxieties about the growth of Theban power, which, among other things, 
are said to have influenced the Athenians to conclude peace in 375 (see 
Xen. 6.2.1), the Thebans certainly remained as members of the Athenian 
Confederacy after that Peace.1
To claim restoration of their city under the guarantee of the Peace 
was one thing: it was quite another to find a power which would uphold 
the Peace. Sparta and Athens had both found their recent war burdensome 
and at Athens the Peace had certainly been welcomed with great 
enthusiasm.2 It is significant that there is no mention in Plataikos of any 
possibility of co-operation between Sparta and Athens in order to exert 
pressure on the Thebans under the terms of the Peace so as to bring about 
the re-establishment of Plataia. Isokrates must have seen that the Peace 
had far from healed the rift between the two leading states in Greece and
appointed who went to all the cities to supervise the clause which directed that, 
garrisons be removed; the Thebens objected to the Peace being made "city by city" 
(ranunoXu') (15.38.2-3). Quite possibly the procedure was the same as later occurred at 
the first Peace in 371, when the Spartans took the oaths for themselves and for their 
allies., w’hile the Athenians and their allies swore to it individually (Xen. 6.3.19) This 
might seem to imply that the Peace of 371, and possibly also that of 375, w*as a bilateral 
arrangem ent between Sparta (speaking on behalf of its allies) on the one hand and 
the Athenians and their allies on the other, and thus that the status of a town like 
Plataia could have been a matter for dispute. But Xenophon goes on to say. “The 
Thebans also signed with the other cities which ware tailing the oath” (ibid.; my 
underlining); these "other cities" could possibly have included the towns of Boiotia. 
for which on the following day Thebes wished to speak; some of these towns may 
have been aligned neither to Sparta nor to Athens, and so clearly the Peace in 371 was 
truly a Common Peace, and so too, it would seem, was that of 375. Plataia must have 
been involved in the process of the removal of garrisons, for by her own admission a 
Spartan garrison had been stationed there (Isok. 14.13); for Plataia not to have sought 
the guarantee of h e r independence would have been to expose herself to unnecessary 
risk in the face of Thebes, her eternal enemy.
iThis is confirmed not only by the testimony of Plataikos (see esp. 14.21-22), 
but also by the facts that the Thebans continued to provide naval support to the 
Athenian fleet in 373 (IG II2.1607.11.49,155; [Dem]49.14-16,21,48-54) and that a 
Theban served as chairman of the Allies' Synhedrion for 373/2 (see J. H. Oliver, 
"Inscriptions from Athens". A JA 40 (1936). 461-463); the Athenian invitation to the 
Thebans to attend the peace congress at Sparta in 371 (see Xen. 6.3.2) further seems to 
imply continued membership by Thebes. Diodoros' statement (15.38 3) that the 
Thebans were rendered cicottovSoi of the Peace of 375, together with his account of a 
dispute between Kallistratos and Epaminondas over the matter of Thebes' claim to 
speak for all Boiotia should be discounted as a confusion with the famous conflict in 
371 over the same issue, but between Agesilaos and Epaminondas, when Thebes was 
indeed excluded from the Peace (see D.S. 15-50.4; the argument between Agesilaos and 
Epaminondas is not in fast recorded by Diodoros, but appears in Plutarch [Ages. 27.4- 
28.2: cf. Xen. 6.3.19]).
^For war-weariness in 375 see Xen. 6.2.1; cf. D.S. 15 38.2. For Athenian delight 
in the Peace see above, p. 94 & 94, n.3.
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that events in the West were not auspicious for the continuation of the 
Peace. Protest had already been made by the Spartans over alleged 
Athenian interference at Zakynthos (D.S. 15 45-4) and appeal had come to 
Athens from Kerkyra expressing suspicion about Spartan intentions toward 
that state (D.S. 15-46.3). The absence in Plataikos of insistence upon any 
legal obligation of states to come to the aid of a city whose independence 
had been infringed is a decisive argument against any suggestion of such a 
clause in the Peace of 375.1 2Hence in Plataikos the suggestion appears to be 
that diplomatic pressure should be the means by which redress is to be 
sought. This had worked, we are reminded, in the case of Oropos.
The real argument in Plataikos relies not simply upon legal justice, 
but upon the moral consequences for Athens as leader of her confederacy, 
if she fails to recognize the justice of the Plataian case. It is not just a 
question of the moral integrity of upholding the independence and 
autonomy for the Greek cities as had been proclaimed in the Peaces of 
3Ö7/6 and 3 75;2 the Athenians have the matter brought home to them 
when they are reminded that the basic purpose upon which their 
confederacy was founded and for which they fought the recent war against 
the Spartans was to protect the freedom of others and to restore liberty 
and autonomy to those who had been wrongly deprived of it (14.17); it is 
argued that, even if the Thebans were to fail to respond to diplomatic 
pressure, the Athenians should take heart from the 'fact' that “victory in 
wars does not go to those who overthrow cities by violent means, but to 
those who govern Greece with greater decency and moderation" (14.39); if 
they continue to champion independence and autonomy, then it is likely 
that more cities will come to join their Confederacy (14.42), but if they 
show themselves selective, in protecting some but neglecting others who 
are wronged, then some may look back again towards Sparta for leadership 
and will certainly question any call which Athens may make upon their 
assistance (14.15 -16, 43). This last point (at 14.43) is surely topical, when 
Isokrates says: "But if you are not so minded, what reason will you give, if 
war breaks out again, to justify your demand that the Greeks should join 
you, if you hold out. to them independence and then grant to the Thebans to
1See Ryder, KE, p.125.
2For this see e.g. H.23: ’Tor I presume that it is clear to ail that it is incumbent 
upon the v/ise, in time of var to strive in every vay to get the better of the enemy, but 
vhen peace is made, to regard nothing as of greater importance than their oaths and 
their covenants.“
destroy any city they please?”. The storm-clouds of war again with Sparta 
were observable at this time. Thus the issue of the destruction of Plataia 
has been translated from a single case of violation of the Peace, which 
Athens as head of her Confederacy is pledged to honour, to a deeper moral 
issue which is fundamental to the position of leadership which Athens has 
achieved in the few years since the very successful foundation of the 
Second Athenian Confederacy. This takes us, I believe, to the heart of 
Isokrates' purpose in Plataikos. Bringmann was correct in seeing this issue 
of the role of Athens' leadership as the key to Plataikos: however, the 
question which is raised is not as theoretical as Bringmann suggests when 
he says:
¥as sollte aus der Symmachie von JH ^rerden, v>*enn Sparta ayrovonia und eXei'Ötpiui 
als Prinzipien ansah, die nicht nur andere Staaten, sondern auch es selbst zu 
respektieren hatten? Oder Trenn seine Macht gebrochen var? Sollte der Seebund 
sich dann auflösen oder väirde Athen vde im fünften Jahrhundert den Austritt 
eines Staates aus der Symmachie mit Gewalt verhindern und den ¥eg zur apxfj 
einschlagen?1
102
Isokrates is not confronting the Athenians with a question for the 
future: namely, what would Athens' purpose be as leader of her 
Confederacy should Spartan abuse of the principles of freedom and 
autonomy, against which the Confederacy had been founded, cease. He is 
posing an issue of moral hypocrisy right then, in 373, to which the 
Athenians seemed likely to succumb. The nub of the matter is contained in 
the sentence at 14.39 (quoted above): it is the moralist rather than the 
historian who will arrive at a conclusion that victories in wars go not to the 
physically strong, but to those who are morally upright; however, in the 
two examples which follow (at 14.40-41), revealing the downfall first of 
imperialist Athens and then of imperialist Sparta, Isokrates claims that the 
abuse of power and of an initially-trusted position of leadership has led to 
the formation of a coalition of opposition which ultimately defeated the 
ruling state: that coalition was in each ca.se formed with the express 
purpose of impeding or destroying the abuse of hegemony. The critical 
question for Athens' leadership posed by Isokrates in Plataikos is not 
hypothetical, with a view to some future time; it is presented as being 
before Athens in the form of the decision to be made about Plataia.
bringmann, Studien, p.51.
The dilemma between expediency and justice is also revealed where 
Isokrates presents an argument of those who would condone Thebes' 
action. In short, the Thebans may threaten to break away from their 
alliance with Athens, and this, it is claimed, would not be in the interest of 
Athens' other allies, especially if the Thebans were to side with Sparta 
(14-33)- Of the two arguments which are offered by Isokrates in response 
(see 14-34) the second is to the point: namely, that the Thebans would not 
dare to entrust themselves to the Spartans;1 whatever the likelihood of 
this argument, it is the argument which precedes it which reveals the 
deeper significance of the whole incident in Isokrates' mind; for he says: 
"My opinion is, however, that it is neither profitable to the allies that the 
weaker should be in servitude to the stronger (in past times, in fact, we 
went to war to protect the weak)'' (14.34). This is an unexpected 
argument. It is not immediately relevant to the alleged threat of Theban 
betrayal, as is the argument which follows; it is not even directly relevant 
to the Plataians, for they were not allies of the Athenians at this time. It 
does, however, reveal how Isokrates perceived the issue of the Athenian 
response to the destruction of Plataia, as implying a much larger issue 
involving the stature of Athens’ leadership in the eyes of the other Greeks. 
The implication of the point made here is spelled out later in the speech (at 
14.43-44). This fundamental issue for Athenian leadership of her 
Confederacy, which emerges in Plataikos in what was as yet an isolated 
situation, was to become the central thesis of the later discourse On the 
Peace.2
What then of those interpretations which see Plataikos as intended to 
swing Athenian policy away from the alliance with Thebes and to portray 
Thebes rather than Sparta as the threat to Athens? First, it must be 
observed that this comparative point is nowhere as much as hinted at in 
the speech. To be sure, Theban injustice, arrogance, hypocrisy, 
peremptoriness, disloyalty and treachery are all emphasized;3 what is 
missing is a vigorous presentation of the threat which Thebes posed to 
Athens; the attack upon Thebes is made largely in terms of the critical 
portrayal of alleged Theban faults, exemplified mostly through historical
iNote that this point is in contradiction to the point made earlier (14.26ff.) that 
the Thebans ere notoriously disloyal.
2Cf. Bringmann, Studien, p51.
3Injustice: Plat, passim; arrogance: 14.3,30,37; hypocrisy: 14.19,24f., 30-32; 
peremptoriness: 14.2If.; disloyalty: 14.26-29; treachery: 1458-62.
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(or in one case mythical) examples; the criticism of Thebes' present 
behaviour focuses largely upon her treatment of the Plataians, although 
recent action or threats towards Thespiai, Tanagra and Oropos are also 
mentioned. Only at one point is Theban ambition described, and there it is 
more a case of the form of that ambition, likened to that of Sparta in 
trampling underfoot the rights of others, an attitude which Athens and her 
allies had recently opposed in the case of Sparta (see 14.16-20); there is no 
attempt to suggest that Theban ambition extended beyond the boundaries 
of Boiotia (see 14.16: those who are endangered are those who live near 
the Thebans).
With Plataikos in this respect we might compare an ambassador's 
speech, where the ambition of a foreign power is described in an attempt to 
win support for a people who are threatened: only a short time previously 
(in 375) Polydamas of Pharsalos in Thessaly had come before the Spartan 
assembly to ask for protection for his city against the aggressively 
expansionist ambitions of Jason, tyrant of Pherai; the speech which 
Xenophon narrates, in its presentation of the active and immediate threat 
posed by Jason to other cities and states, makes a striking contrast to the 
muted description of the Theban threat to Athens or to others outside 
Boiotia which we have in Plataikos (see Xen. 6.1.4-16; cf. esp. the alleged 
quotation of Jason's own account of his ambitions in SSB-12). In Plataikos 
Isokrates has not even attempted to play up the future threats to to w s  
such as Thespiai. Although he says in a rhetorical hyperbole that of those 
who live about Thebes some are no better than slaves while others will 
eventually suffer the same fate as the Plataians (14.16), he had earlier 
admitted that both the Thespians and tlie Tanagraians had, however 
reluctantly, accepted the demand to submit to Theban control, and so had 
not suffered the fate which had befallen the stubborn Plataians (14.6-9).
If Isokrates' principal purpose in Plataikos had been to convince the 
Athenians of the danger of Thebes and to persuade them to swing from an 
anti-Spartan to an anti-Theban policy, then it should be admitted that he 
did not make the most of the case available. Apart from the fact that what 
we do have is far from a vitriolic attack upon the Thebans, it seems strange 
that there is no mention of Theban encroachments (in 3?S) upon Phokian 
territory (see Xen. 6.1.1, cf. 6.2.1); nor is anything said about the activities 
concerning Zakynthos or Kerkyra, where, if redirection of Athenian policy 
had been Isokrates' purpose, it might have been expected that he would 
have advised the settlement of these points of dispute and urged a 
combined effort by Athens and Sparta to suppress once again the ambitions
of Thebes, as was indeed to be attempted in 371. The argument and the 
substantiation of the case against Thebes is inept, if it was Isokrates' 
purpose to point out to Athenians the danger of Theban aggrandizement, 
nor does it afford a convincing explanation for the use of the Plataian 
persona.
The idea that Plataikos was intended to divert Athenian attention 
towards Thebes and away from a forthcoming prosecution of Timotheos1 is 
not a compelling conclusion to be drawn from the fact that events in the 
west are not mentioned in the speech: it has been pointed out that 
Isokrates' silence might just as well indicate condemnation of Timotheos' 
action in provoking war again with Sparta.2 It is hard to see how 
Timotheos' cause would have been helped by this speech, which urges upon 
the Athenians a foreign policy which made action by Timotheos against 
Sparta in the West a dangerous distraction. It is certainly a very oblique 
method for Isokrates to have used to defend his former pupil; the 
Athenians had accepted the Plataian refugees and there would have been 
little need for a speech such as we have in Plataikos to attract the attention 
of the Athenians to the plight of the Plataians; nor does this explanation 
account for the significant emphasis in the speech upon the moral issue 
involved for the Athenians in their decision on this matter. The theory is a 
good example of the danger of pressing with inadequate evidence too much 
consistency out of a known pupil-teacher relationship and a subsequent 
biographical detail (namely, that Isokrates accompanied Timotheos on his 
voyages in the mid-3 60s and was well-rewarded by his pupil for 
composing reports of the general's activities which were sent back to the 
Athenian assembly (cf. [Plut.j Mor. 6.37c)).
The Plataikos calls for a firmness of purpose in confronting Theban 
highhanded behaviour; this behaviour is alleged to have violated the 
principles of freedom and autonomy upheld in the Second Athenian 
Confederacy. Many Athenians were moved by the suffering of the
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iSee above, p. 96.
2See Bringmann, Studien, p.49. Bringmann points out (p.49, n2) that not all 
scholars have laid the blame at Timotheos' feet (cf. E. Meyer, GdA. V, p.388, n.2; see 
also Cawkwell, "Peace of 375/4“, pp .94-95). For him to have deliberately provoked the 
Spartans at Zakynthos after he had been ordered to return to Athens, not to mention 
the welcome with vhich the Peace was received by the Athenians and the personal 
glory which Timotheos himself was accorded, should at least raise some scepticism 
about those who believe in the deliberate provocation of Sparta by Timotheos and 
should cause one to wonder whether Bringmann is right to conclude that the Peace 
was “ungelegen" to Timotheos.
Plataians and were angered at the Thebans. Were they prepared to stand 
up for the principles of their Confederacy?
Jaeger believes that some of the political leaders at Athens were now 
ready to review the affiliations of their state with their allies, if not their 
relationship with their foes: he maintains that it was the destruction of 
Plataia which first gave shape to the policy of Kallistratos which acquired 
its fully developed form in 371, although "at first [it] amounted to nothing 
more than a firm resolve to countenance no arbitrary special action on the 
part of Thebes"; Plataikos is thus written "in order to smooth the way for 
this, both in Athens and in Confederacy circles"; Jaeger further speculates 
that the "commission" for this task was obtained for Isokrates by his friend 
and former pupil Timotheos.1 All this is pure surmise, and much of it is not 
very convincing; for it contradicts what, evidence we have for Athenian 
policy between 375 and 37.3; there is certainly no evidence to link 
Plataikos either with Kallistratos or Timotheos. In the first place, the 
Athenians did not stand up to the Thebans over the destruction of Plataia. 
Then again, Kallistratos had presumably been supportive of the anti- 
Spartan stance taken by the Second Athenian Confederacy; for he had been 
elected a strategos for 376/7 (D.S. 15.29.7), and he appears to have helped 
to organize the Confederacy's finances in the following years (Theopompos, 
FGrH, 115 F 96), but we have no more knowledge about him until he seizes 
the opportunity to prosecute Timotheos in 373, unless we are willing to 
believe Diodor os ‘ account of a dispute between him and Eparninondas at the 
time of the Peace negotiations in 375;2 even then, it would not be 
necessary to assume from that a beginning of the policy-change which he 
m s  to promote in 371:3 his prosecution of Timotheos can be explained in 
straightforward terms as a chance to put down a rival and recently 
successful leader; he sailed for Kerkyra as a strategos in company with 
Chabrias and Iphikrates to fulfil the ta.sk in which Timotheos had failed.4
jaeger, Demosthenes,. pp. 202-203.
2See above, p. 100, n.l.
3Cf. Sealey, "Callistratos of Aphidna”, p. 191f. (= Essays,, p.146).
4D.G. Rice (Why Sparta railed: A Study of Politics and Policy from the Peace of 
Antalcidas to the Battle of Leuctra. 367-371 B.C., Diss. Yale 1971, p. 156) suggests that 
Kallistratos may have deliberately hampered Timotheos’ fleet in 373 by playing upon 
the Athenians' reluctance to pay taxes, but there is no evidence for this. Rice builds 
up a veb of surmise about Athenian politics at this time: so, the peace-initiative at 
Athens in 375 spells the return to influence of the pro-Spartan faction of Kallistratos
Only when they reached Kerkyra, to discover that the situation there had 
been largely resolved, did Kallistratos return to Athens with the purpose 
either of collecting more money for the fleet or to make peace (Xen. 6 .3-3); 
there he found the demos receptive to peace, and he was elected as one of 
the ambassadors to go to Sparta.
To see Kallistratos’ prosecution of Timotheos as motivated by a desire 
to alter Athenian policy with respect to Sparta and Thebes or to assume 
that Kallistratos went to Kerkyra with the underlying conviction that the 
real foe should be Thebes not Sparta and that he returned to Athens with 
every intention of making peace and none of acquiring funds to pursue 
further successes with the fleet cannot be proven and usurps an alternative 
and more obvious interpretation. Apart from Isokrates' evidence that 
there were prominent and influential politicians at Athens in 373 who 
would speak on Thebes’ behalf (14.3), there is other evidence that the 
Athenians were not ready to abandon their alliance with Thebes just yet, 
however much concern there may have been about expansion of Theban 
power in Boiotia. The Athenians had met their obligations to their Theban 
allies on land as well as by sea during the war with Sparta from 377-375 
(Xen.54.34, 59, 62-63; 6.2.1, D.S. 15-32.2-5; 33-4;34-3-35-2;36.5;) The 
Peace of 375 reveals, by the inclusion of the clause which insisted upon the 
withdrawal of garrisons, that Athenian loyalty to Thebes held good: thus 
any remaining (see above, p.95, n. 1) Spartan garrisons in Boiotia were 
removed (this was not, it would seem, the action of a state which was over­
whelmed with mistrust and anxiety about Theban expansion). When 
Timotheos put to sea with his fleet in 3 7 3, bound ultimately for Kerkyra, he 
had with him a Theban contingent which he was anxious to keep with him; 
the Boiotian trierarchs were threatening to depart unless pay was forth­
coming (not, be it noted, because of any political estrangement between the 
two states); presumably Timotheos was concerned about the strength of 
his force, but he may also have been unwilling to incur the assembly’s 
displeasure if the Boiotians were to depart (see [Bern.] 49.15, 21, 45-50).
What, one wonders, did Kallistratos say, if he spoke at all, in the 
assembly at the time of the Plataian appeal? WTere there voices raised on 
Plataia's behalf in favour of making a stand, as Isokrates would advise?
(ibid., p. 147); of the destruction of Plataia “it v-as no doubt this event that triggered 
the removal of the pro-Theban faction from po^-er in Athens" (ibid., p.160) - 
Timotheos being, in Rice’s v iev  a leader of the pro-Theban faction (ibid., pp. 159, 
185f., n.73: cf. Cavk’vell ["Notes on the Peace of 375/4", p. 94 ] for the viev  that 
Timotheos was merely an agent of the pro-Thebans at Athens, although not himself a
Boujüto^üw )-
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I sokrates himself provides a few hints that the case in support of the 
Plataians was not indisputable. The first of the three arguments which, it is 
said, the advocates of the Thebans would advance was that the Plataians 
had, in fact, sided with the Spartans in the recent war and were thus 
legitimately the enemy of Thebes and her allies; the Plataians of course 
could claim compulsion so long as a Spartan garrison was in their town and 
a larger one was stationed at nearby Thespiai. More invidious perhaps was 
the Plataians' refusal, in contrast to the peoples of Thespiai and Tanagra, 
after the Peace of 375 to accept the inevitability of submission to a Theban- 
led state of Boiotia. Peace with Sparta in 375 had not involved a 
reconciliation between Athens and Sparta: both were finding war 
burdensome, and Athens was delighted to seize the chance provided by two 
naval successes to win from Sparta the recognition of her position as leader 
of her Confederacy. The Spartans were unlikely to have been overjoyed at 
the outcome of the three years of conflict; already by 373/2, when Thebes 
seized and destroyed Plataia, a resumption of war between Athens and 
Sparta threatened. Should that erupt, howT pleased would Athens have 
been if Sparta had reintroduced a garrison at Plataia, even perhaps in other 
Boiotian towns? More wearying and hazardous land campaigns in Central 
Greece, more garrison duty on Athens' borders (cf. Xen. 6.2.1)? One cannot 
help wondering why the argument in Plataikos runs thus: it would not 
have been entirely unacceptable, if only the Thebans had treated the 
Plataians no worse than the people of Thespiai or Tanagra, instead of 
destroying the city of Plataia entirely. Why, if Theban expansion was 
unpalatable to the Athenians, not say that the treatment of the peoples of 
Thespiai and Tanagra also amounted to infringement of the Peace? Why 
make the point that a similar fate to Plataia may later befall other Boiotian 
towns (14.16), when what has already occurred provides a case for 
claiming that the Peace has been abused? The answer, I would submit, is 
that the Athenians were not yet convinced that Thebes rather than Sparta 
should be their enemy. The Peace of 375 had not entirely removed the 
threat from Sparta, and while that existed Thebes' growth of power in 
Boiotia would have to be tolerated, even if with reluctance. I sokrates' 
Plataikos does not herald a new line of policy for Athens with respect to 
Thebes, and certainly not with respect to Sparta; nor is it evident that it 
represents the opinion of either Kallistratos or Timotheos at that time.
I sokrates' arguments against the threat that unless Thebes’ action is 
approved the Thebans may realign themselves with the Spartans are not 
altogether fanciful. Although the allies would have preferred a Thebes that
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respected the autonomy of the Boiotian cities to one that did not, they had 
no way of enforcing this, and the claim (14.34) that a Theban appeal to 
Sparta would bring the Thebans little joy - for they would either have to 
submit to Spartan demands for the Boiotian cities to be independent or 
they would be forced to fight for their Boiotian state - has something to it. 
Agesilaos was, throughout the 370s the dominant influence in Spartan 
policy-making, and, just as Sparta spurned Theban overtures in 376 (as she 
was to do again in 371), it does not seem unlikely that, if Thebes were to 
detach herself from Athens, Sparta would be prepared again to demand 
that Thebes surrender her claims to Boiotia. That was a more urgent force 
in Agesilaos' policy than any dispute with the Athenians. Where Isokrates 
may have miscalculated is in the picture which he paints of a Boiotia which 
was widely dissatisfied with Theban leadership and which was suffering 
under the yoke of Theban tyranny (14.35-.30): the evidence of events two 
years later, prior to and at Leuktra, does not support that picture; Buckler 
is probably correct when he accuses Isokrates and the other Athenian 
orators of wrongly describing the Boiotian cities as, by and large,the 
reluctant victims of Theban domination.1
Would Thebes have submitted to Athens' demand if it had been 
demanded thatPlataia be rebuilt and resettled (cf. 14.37, 56)? The 
circumstances in summer 373 were not what they had been before about 
the time of the Peace of 375, at which time almost certainly Thebes had 
retreated from a confrontation with Athens over Oropos. The Spartan 
garrisons in Boiotia were gone. When in 371 the decisive moment did 
arrive, Thebes had achieved the confidence to assert her claim to speak for 
Boiotia against Sparta and Athens. We must admit that for summer 37.3 
the position is not clear, either in respect of what Theban reaction would 
have been to an Athenian ultimatum or with regard to the foreign policy of 
the more influential Athenians: as Isokrates rightly perceived, at Athens 
honour and expediency were tugging against one another.
Isokrates perceives in the destruction of Plataia a clear violation of 
the principles of freedom and autonomy which in 377 Athens had pledged 
herself to uphold: it was as champion of these principles that she had won 
herself a new opportunity to lead the Greeks. For Isokrates the incident 
did not so much raise a spectre of a Theban state which might destroy 
Athens by direct means, as a member-state of the Second Athenian Confed­
eracy whose methods of conduct contradicted the principles in which
1 Buckler, The Theben Hegemony, pp.21-23.
Athens had professed publicly to believe: the challenge exemplified by this 
incident, dramatic but (by inter-state standards) small, was not physical 
but moral. If Athens were to accept that allies could flaunt these principles 
with impunity, then her days of leadership were likely to be limited. That 
is the message Isokrates wished to convey to his countryment m an appeal 
which he knew might well go unheeded in the interest of expediency.
When the Second Athenian Confederacy was established, the express 
purpose of Athens and her allies was to protect their freedom and 
autonomy in the face of Spartan pressure and aggression and to preserve 
the guarantees which had been afforded to the Greeks by the King's Peace 
(see Tod, GHI 11. 123, 11.9- 15): it is clear from this that a time of testing for 
Athens and her Confederacy would come when the Spartan menace had 
teen allayed.1 Plataikos is a recognition that the test did not need to await 
the removal of one particular threat to the principles upon which the Con­
federacy had been founded: there could come a challenge to those prin­
ciples from other than Sparta, and the real test was not whether Athens 
could provide a purpose in her leadership, if and when peace was estab­
lished, but whether she could remain true to these principles, no matter 
who was to challenge them. In short, were justice and expediency to be 
regarded as compatible or not? - or, in Isokrates' own words: "But. even if 
they [the Thebans! were likely to act altogether otherwise [i.e. and join with 
Sparta], not even then, in my opinion, does it. become you to have greater 
regard for the city of the Thebans than for your oaths and treaties" ( 14.39).
Isokrates did not. speak for any politicians when he wrote Plataikos.2 
He saw the way the wind blew at the time of the Plataian appeal, and he 
made the moral issue clear. He did not. speak as a practical politician, or he 
would also have taken account of the relationship with Sparta, and he 
would surely have prosecuted more vigorously a case against the Thebans. 
Although Xenophon (6.3 1,5) may tell us that by 3? 1 the Athenians were 
projecting their renewed enmity against the Thebans back to the time of 
Plataia's destruction, Plataikos warns us that at the time when the 
destruction occurred Athenians were not yet. ready to be led toward 
reconciliation with Sparta and a breach with Thebes. Nor need wTe attempt
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toee J. B. Bury & R. Meiggs, A History of Greece to the death of Alexander the 
Great, 4 th. ed„ London 1975, p.351f.
2Cf. Jaeger, Demosthenes, p.2Q2: "for this (his [Isokrates1 ]n ev  role, as 
spokesman for Kallistratos' policy) brought him, for the very first time, into contact 
with the actual politics of the Athenian state."
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to read Plataikos as a speech made on behalf of others more immediately 
involved in the hurly-burly of politics at Athens; the arbitrariness of such 
interpretations is revealed when the work is treated on the one hand as a 
statement in support of Timotheos and on the other as a treatise designed 
to promulgate the opinions of Kallistratos, the latter at that very time 
having sought to destroy politically the former through prosecution in the 
courts.
Nor was Isokrates a dreamer devising far-reaching plans for a 
panhellenic crusade. He was not an advocate for fifth-century Athenian 
imperialism. He was not a political idealogue: things had changed since he 
had offered his advice to his fellow-Athenians in Panegyrikos; in 
particular, the Great King's support for the Peace, an endorsement which 
Isokrates had spurned with contempt in his earlier work, he now 
recognizes as a politically necessary, if no more palatable, fact.
What Isokrates sought to do in this speech was to alert his fellow- 
countrymen to the moral responsibilities which their city as hegemon of a 
Greek league had pledged to honour. If they could reconcile principles with 
expediency, or, failing that, if they could subordinate the latter to the 
former, then, he believed, the future would be prosperous for Athens.
Athens was to adopt a pusillanimous attitude in 371, when she 
allowed Sparta to proceed without her aid in calling the Thebans to the 
reckoning. The way for this detachment had been carefully prepared by 
the clause of the Peace of 3?1 which read: "... in any case of violation of 
these terms, any state which so desired should be free to go to the help of 
the injured party, but that, if a state did not desire to do this, there should 
be no legal obligation for it to do so" (Xen. 6.3.16). Is this perhaps not the 
true legacy of Plataikos: a cynical response to its message by politicians 
like Kallistratos at Athens, who thereby did little to preserve Athens' 
integrity as a leader, but permitted Sparta to be removed forever from a 
position of power?
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Chapter 3: ^rchittamos
Archidamos purports to be a speech by Agesilaos' son Archidamos, 
the heir apparent to the Agiad branch of Sparta’s kings. Archidamos had 
commanded Spartan forces at least from 37 1, when he led the relief forces 
northwards, only to meet the remnants of Kleombrotos’ army at Aigos- 
thena, whence the entire force returned to Corinth and disbanded (Xen.
6.4.16-26); his task then was to ensure the safety of those who had sur­
vived Leuktra. Three years later, in 366, he is commanding a force of 
Spartans and their allies, including a contingent sent from Dionysios of 
Syrakuse, against the Arkadians; on this occasion the Arkadians, already 
eager to establish their independence, were without their Theban allies.
The time came when the troops sent by Dionysios had to depart; however, 
they ran foul of a force of Messenians, and Archidamos brought his troops 
to their aid; in the meantime the Arkadians had moved to bar Archidamos’ 
route back to Sparta. After a brief but patriotic exhortation to his men, the 
armies joined in battle. The result was a comprehensive victory for 
Archidamos and his men in which not a single Spartan was slain, while the 
losses of the enemy were severe. This battle brought great rejoicing among 
the Spartans, who had had little enough to cheer about in the recent past 
(Xen.7.1.26-32: cf.D.S. 15-72.3; Plut. Ages. 33• 3ft-)• This victory can safely 
be assumed to have won for Archidamos great glory.1 His father Agesilaos 
was now an old man and troubled by illness,2 while the Agiad kings
1 In 365 Archidamos was to suffer a defeat at the hands of the Arkadians when 
he was defending the interests of Sparta's Eleian allies, but Xenophon is careful to 
protect the reputation of the wounded Archidamos by attributing the call for a truce 
to "one of the older men" (cf. 7.4.20-25). Just prior to the battle of Mantineia (362) 
Archidamos led another courageous and successful counter-attack against the mighty 
Thebans themselves, who were within the very perimeter of Sparta (Xen. 7.5.11-13).
“Agesilaos had been unable to lead the Spartan forces into Boiotia in 376 (see 
Xen. 5-4.58f.) and he was still not fit in 371 (ibid. 6.4.18), although he had recovered 
sufficiently by the following year to lead a force against the independent-minded 
Mantineians (ibid. 6.5.1 Iff.). Of the Eurypontids, Agesipolis had not acquired much 
military fame, preferring to pursue policies by diplomatic means and dying at 
Olynthos before the capitulation of that town (see Xen. 5 3.19; D.S. 15.19.4; 23 2; his 
successor, Kleombrotos, had conducted a puzzingiy innocuous expedition into Boiotia 
in 379, after the Spartan garrison had been expelled from Thebes (Xen. 5.4.14-18); 
then, in 371 Kleombrotos was to lose his life, and bear the blame among the Spartans, 
for the humiliating and disastrous defeat at Leuktra (for this last point see Isok. 6.9): 
even before the battle Xenophon implies a mistrust of Kleombrotos' attitude to the
had done little to uphold the noble Spartan military image for many years. 
From the little we know of him Archidamos would seem an appropriate 
choice for the patriotic speech which Isokrates named after him: a young, 
brave and energetic future king of Sparta, the kind of leader Sparta would 
need if she was ever to recover her security and standing among the 
Greeks, which had been dealt such a stunning blow by the Thebans, first at 
Leuktra, afterwards by the creation of an independent Arkadian federal 
state (backed at first by Thebes), and then, most vital of all, by the lib­
eration of the helots and the refoundation of Messene (in winter 370/69).
The setting for xAxrchidamos is a debate in the Spartan assembly.1 
The subject for discussion is the Theban conditions for a Common Peace 
which in late 366 or early 365 several of Sparta’s allies were urging her to 
accept. As Archidamos is made to describe the situation, there is hesitancy 
amongst the Spartan elders about confronting the issue: some are said 
even to be willing to accept the proposals, while those who disagree have 
done so in a spiritless manner; others have said nothing at all. Archidamos 
declares that the Theban demands are unacceptable, in particular, the
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Thebans (6.4.5). Kleombrotos' successor. Agesipolis III., died after only one year as 
king and was succeeded by the very young Kleomenes (D.S. 15-60.4).
^ h e  question of whether such a setting for a. debate at Sparta would be 
historically valid is a. subject of dispute among historians of the Spartan politeia. 
Aristotle's view of the Spartan Assembly (Pol. 1272 av 11.11-12; 1275 a  11.10-15), es no 
more then a. rubber stamp for decisions which had already t  een taken in the 
gerousia would not seem to allow of such a situation as Isokrates presents in 
Archidamos; Aristotle's view has been recently defended by Cartledge (Agesilaos, 
pp.129-151: cf. also de Ste Croix, Origins, pp.348-349). However, this view has been 
challenged, in favour of an Assembly which had, at least at times, a more important 
role in formulating policy, even if the open debate (isegoria) practised in the 
Athenian Assembly should not be envisaged (see A. Andrewes, "The Government of 
Classical Sparta”, pp.1-20 in E. Badian (ed.). Ancient Society and Institutions: Studies 
presented to Victor Ehrenberg on his 75th birthday. Oxford. 1966,); possibly only 
kings, gerontes and ephors were permitted to speak (see A.H.M. Jones, Sparta, Oxford, 
1968, pp.20-25). Cartledge (Agesilaos, p.129) is harsh in his judgement of Isokrates, 
when he labels Isokrates' view of the Spartan Assembly in this work as the result of a 
"perverse imagination"; if Aristotle’s view is literally true, then certainly Isokrates 
has employed a setting for his discourse which was historically inaccurate; but we 
must at least allow that at the beginning of the speech Archidamos is made to 
apologise for his presumption in departing from the customs of his state by coming 
forward, although still a younger man, to present his view; the basic assumption 
behind Archidamos' opening remarks is that in Sparta.it is normally only the older 
men (vis. the gerontes?) who speak on questions of policy, but that the present crisis 
is extraordinary and merits an extraordinary response (see esp. 6.1-7); clearly 
Isokrates was not totally ignorant of the traditional practice of Spartan policy­
making; even if Aristotle's view is right, this means no more than that Isokrates 
cannot have intended Archidamos to deliver the speech or to argue the case before 
the Assembly at Sparta he could, of course, have delivered it, or rendered its 
•arguments in  his own words in  some other gathering.
clause which would specify that Messene's independence be acknowledge-:!. 
Archidamos calls upon the Spartans to reject this demand, even though 
Sparta's allies threaten to proceed independently to make a separate peace 
( see 6.1-15: the willingness of some Spartans to capitulate over Messene - 
or at least to avoid war - is reinforced throughout the speech, cf. 6.5 I f 55, 
57-6, 72).
Xenophon confirms much of this and adds to our knowledge (7.4.1- 
10). The Corinthians, who had remained loyal to Sparta after Leuktra, 
found themselves in 366 not only under pressure from Sparta's enemies 
but also unable any longer to trust the Athenians; for the Athenians had 
recently reacted to the loss of Oropos by concluding an alliance with the 
Arkadians, when no assistance had come to them from either the Spartans 
themselves or their other Peloponnesian allies; furthermore, it had been 
advised in the Athenian assembly that "the generals should be instructed to 
see to it that Corinth also should be kept in a position where she could not 
be a threat to Athens"(7.4.4). The Corinthians heard of this and acted to 
preempt any dangerous move on the part of the Athenians; they obtained 
the services of a mercenary force and preceded to act against their 
neighbours, and, it would seem, to engage in some internal strife.1 They 
also opened discussions with the Thebans in pursuit of a peace. This 
approach met with a favourable response from the Thebans, who agreed 
also to the Corinthians' proposal that they should encourage others of their 
allies to participate. As a consequence the Corinthians went to Sparta to 
invite the Spartans to join in a peace and to put forward their case for 
making a peace with the Thebans, even if Sparta did not wish to agree to 
the offer. The Spartans accepted that the Corinthians and any other of their 
allies who so wished should make peace with Thebes, but for themselves 
they were determined to fight on, since they refused to accept the loss of 
Messene. The Thebans then pressed the Corinthians for an alliance, but this 
was politely refused; so peace was granted "to the Corinthians, the 
Phliasians and those who had come with them to Thebes" (7.4.10).2
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^or this latter point cf. Nepos, Timoleon 1.3-4; Pint. Timoleon 4.2-5; PS. 
16.65.3-4; and see G. Cavk^-ell, Xenot-hon: A History of My Times (Penguin 1979), note 
on p.384.
2>To the Corinthians and the Phliasians add the Epidaurians (cf. Isok. 6.91). 
Diodoros, in a very brief notice of this Theban peace, calls it a Common Peace (15-76.3), 
but if  Ryder (“The supposed Common Peace of 366/5“, CQ n.s. 7 (1957), 202, and KE, 
Pp.83, 137-139) is correct in believing that not only the Spartans but also the 
Athenians and the Arkadians did not participate in this peace, then it can hardly be
This Peace, over which Thebes presided, had been struggling to reach 
the light of day since Persia had renewed interest in mainland Greek affairs 
in 3^6. In that year Philiskos of Abydos had come to Greece, sent either by 
the Great King or by the satrap Ariobarzanes, and he had summoned a 
peace conference at Delphi. The Persians were once again seeking to settle 
matters in Greece, aided by their gold; presumably Greek mercenaries 
were the Persian objective. Philiskos’ proposals for a peace foundered 
when the Persians preferred the Spartan view of things: Xenophon records 
that the Thebans refused to accept that Messene be subject to Sparta;
Diodor os, who says that Artaxerxes himself had sent Philiskos, tells a 
different story: he says that the Thebans were excluded because they had 
brought the whole of Boiotia under their personal control;* 1 Diodor os also 
records that Philiskos’ purpose was to bring about a Common Peace ( Xen.
7.1.27; D.S. 15-70.2).2 Athenian participation in the conference is not 
mentioned.3 Nothing is said in the sources to imply that this initiative was 
inspired by any among the Greeks, although it has been suggested that the
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classified truly as a. Common Peace: contra... see G.L. Ca’wk'well, "The Common Peace of 
366/365 B.C.”, CQ n.s. 11 (1961), 80-86.
1 It is possible that Philiskos’ proposals included both the return  of Messene to 
the Spartans and the independence of the Boiotian tovns and cities: that vould 
depend upon hov' much the Persians then understood of Greek affairs since Leuktra. 
A demand that Thebes should relinquish her control of Boiotia wos certainly 
unrealistic., and it seems that even the Spartans., whom Philiskos certainly favoured 
(since he left them a m ercenary force of 2,000 men ’when the negotiations failed)., 
’would have been so foolishly ambitious as to prejudice their chance of agreement to 
the nearer - and vital - objective by urging a stipulation 'which they must have 
kno’wn that the Thebans would spurn. Xenophon's explanation for the failure of the 
negotiations is preferred by Ryder (KE, pp.134-135). What is most interesting to our 
study of Archidamos is the fact that Isokrates was not the only one outside Sparta to 
have displayed publicly a support for the return  of Messene as a step towards 
reconciliation among the city-states of Greece.
2 If the conference was billed, as E'iodoros claims, as a Common Peace, it seems 
likely that the King himself would again be treated as a sponsor, as he had been in 
387/6 and in 375; a satrap does not seem likely to have commanded by himself the 
authority which ’would produce a Common Pease. In the following year the King 
himself was the recipient, of the Greek embassies, so that it is perhaps premature to 
see here in  368 a preparatory and independent bid by the satrap Ariobarzanes to wm  
Greek mercenaries for his revolt of rvo years later (cf. Schäfer, Dem, u. s. Zeit. I“, 
pp .89-90,97-98). The intermediary role of Ariobarzanes may find some confirmation 
in Isokrates’ statement that. Sparta, in her claim to Messene, might look for support to 
the king of the Egyptians and to others of the rulers in Asia (6.63), but the fact that 
the Greek ambassadors did attend and saw Philiskos as important lends support to the 
view that he acted as the agent of the King.
^However, Ryder (KE, P-134) suggests that some Athenian representation ’was
likely.
Spartans were behind Philiskos' mission from the beginning.1 However, if 
the Spartans had already tried, and failed, in this year to manipulate or to 
capitalize on Persian interests, as they had done with success in 367, it 
seems surprising to find them in the following year (367) as the leaders in 
a rush of Greek diplomatic missions to Asia to court the King's favour (Xen. 
7.1.33; Plut. Pelop.30.1).
Of the Greek states which sent envoys to the King in 367 it was not 
the Spartans who won the King's support but the Thebans, led by Pelopidas. 
The Theban leader was also able to persuade the King to sanction some 
specific clauses for a Common Peace directed against Sparta and Athens: 
the independence of Messene was to be recognized, and the Athenians were 
to lay up their fleet, which was then waging war in the north in pursuit of 
the recovery of Amphipolis.2 The proposed Peace had little chance of 
success: the Athenians were furious with Timagoras, one of their envoys, 
who had somewhat surprisingly supported Pelopidas in his arguments to 
attract the King's favour towards Thebes, and he was put to death; the 
Spartans were not going to concede their demand to rule Messenia; and the 
Arkadians were nettled because they considered their rivals, the Eleians, to 
have been given preferential treatment. An irascible congress occurred at 
Thebes; when the document from the King was read, the Arkadians 
departed in protest. Undaunted, Theban ambassadors set out around the 
cities to administer the oaths to the Peace, only to be rebuffed at Corinth, 
the first city to which they came; other cities followed the Corinthian 
example, and the peace-attempt collapsed (Xen. 7.1.33-40; cf. D.S. 15-61-3; 
Plut. Pelop. 30-31 1). Unable to succeed by diplomatic means in their 
ambition to win recognition among the Greeks as the leading power, the 
Thebans resumed their policy of military aggression, invading Achaia (367), 
where they achieved temporary success (Xen.7.1.41-3), and in the following 
year Oropos was passed into their hands (Xen.7.4.1; D.S. 15.76.1); this latter 
event precipitated tire chain of events which resulted in the invitation to 
the Spartans from the Corinthians and other allies to join them in a peace 
with Thebes.
Archidamos is the most difficult of Isokrates' political discourses to 
define as to its purpose. From antiquity opinion has been divided upon 
whether it is a work with a political as well as a rhetorical purpose, or
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1£. von Stern, Gescfa.d.spart.u.theb.Hegemonie, pp.i 91-192.
2 It is possible that the independence of Amphipolis was to be specif ically 
acknowledged (see Dem. 19.137; cf. Ryder, KE, 0.136).
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whether it is simply a rhetorical exercise or demonstration. The 
anonymous hypothesis to the work says:
. . .  i c o d  oi uev Xeyouoiv on  neu^ ocs ’ApyiSauoc ev ’Alveus rov Xoyov nap’ ’Iorapdrovs 
eSefoLTO* aXXoi Se 4«xca y 141 vaciav etvai rov Xoyov 'Icoqpdrouc, rivac av euroi Xoyouc 
Apx\Saiio$ cypipoyXeyojy AaKeSoapiovioic.
Two modern scholars have wished to detach this discourse from its 
dramatic date, though for quite different reasons. Blass argued that 
Archidamos must have been composed after the Letter to Archidamos. 
written in Isokrates' eighty-first year (i.e. in35b: see Ep. 9.16); Blass 
believed that the opening to the Letter, where Isokrates says that he has 
chosen not to write an enkomion of Archidamos but will leave that to 
others could not have been written if Archidamos had already been 
produced: thus Blass proposed a date of composition for Archidamos 
between 356 and 3511 The silence of the Letter is not a convincing 
argument: Archidamos cannot be classified as an enkomion of the work's 
namesake; it does not praise Archidamos' virtues or his deeds, nor does it. 
applaud his father Agesilaos or his family;2 *it is a speech on a matter of 
foreign policy in which Archidamos appears, incidentally, as a brave and 
patriotic young Spartan. Blass' appeal to Panathenaikos is no more 
persuasive for his case:3 in that discourse Isokrates' interlocutor merely 
observes that Isokrates "had praised the government of the Spartans more 
than any other man” (12.239); but Archidamos is no more an eulogy of the 
Spartan constitution than an enkomion of Archidamos; the passage in 
Panathenaikos does not refer to Archidamos by title and proves nothing for 
Blass' hypothesis.
Philip Harding has treated Archidamos and On the Peace as a pair of 
rhetorical speeches (antilogiai): the treatment of various themes in 
Archidamos (e g. Thebes, tyranny, one s ancestors, mercenaries, arche) is 
seen by Harding as consciously opposed to the use of the same themes in 
On the Peace, and he concludes that the two discourses were composed not 
far apart,4 as the terminus post quern for On the Peace must be the
1 Blass, AB, II2, pp .288-293.
2Cf. Isok. Ep. 9.1-2: "Since I know-, Archidamus, that, many persons are eager to 
sing the praises of you, your father, and your family, I have chosen to leave to them 
that topic.....; to praise your virtues I should have found an easy task."
mass.. AB. II2, p.289.
4P. Harding, "Purpose”, pp. 137-149.
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beginning of the Social War in 35?, Archidarnos should be regarded as 
having also been composed about that time. Harding's explanation for the 
historical detail of Archidarnos (which contains no known anachronism for 
its purported context of 366), as merely a window-dressing intended to 
provide an appearance of authenticity, shows, when compared with 
Sealey's explanation of alleged historical inaccuracies in Plataikos as being 
due to a deficient memory on Isokrates' part, the capriciousness with which 
critics have been prepared to justify proposed compositional dates for some 
of Isokrates' discourses which are quite divorced from the dates at which 
the works are set.1 Harding's hypothesis, with which I disagree, will be 
discussed below (pp. 146-150) in rny consideration of On the Peace, since 
recent criticism of the hypothesis, and Harding's riposte, have concentrated 
upon the topicality of On the Peace rather than upon Archidarnos.2 Suffice 
it to say now that not only are there no historical inaccuracies to which one 
may point in order to claim a date for Archidarnos in the 350s, but neither 
is there any evidence from within the text of the work which points to a 
date significantly later than the events upon which the discourse focusses. 
On the contrary, from 362 the independence of Messene ceased to be an 
issue for the Greek world for all but the Spartans, whereas this was clearly 
not the case prior to the battle of Mantineia in 362, and especially during 
the attempts between 366-366 to establish a Common Peace.
Convincing reasons for a date of composition later than the time at 
which the work is set have not been adduced, and once again one has to 
add that to regard this work as having been composed at least, a decade 
after the events with which it is concerned must deprive the discourse of 
any topicality; this contradicts Isokrates' own claims for the topical 
relevance and importance of the political themes upon which he expressed 
himself.3
There is one further point which can be made in support of a 
compositional date close to the events; described, or at least before 362. In 
that year the battle of Mantineia, if it did not restore Spartan supremacy, or 
even recover for that state the control of Messene and the helots, did
1 Harding, "Purpose", p.148; Seeley, HOPS. p.418 (see above, p. 89).
2See Moysey, ‘‘On the Peace", pp. 118-127; cf. Harding, "Laughing at Isokrates",
pp. 18-20.
3See above, pp. 7-3; cf. E. Drerup, Isocratis opera omnia, Lipsius 1906,1, p.clii; 
also Mathieu, Les Idees, p.106.
severely curtail the power of the Thebans to use their military strength to 
determine the situation within the Peloponnese; Pelopidas was already 
dead and Epaminondas fell at Mantineia. If Isokrates had written 
Archidamos after 356 he must have known that the Thebans had detached 
themselves from events in the Peloponnese and that there was little real 
threat to the security of Sparta itself ;1 further, he would have known that 
Sparta had, to some extent, fought back in a conventional manner. All of 
this renders the plan to evacuate Sparta and to wage a guerilla-war, with 
her warriors alone remaining in the Peloponnese (6.72ff) both 
unnecessarily daring and extremely innovative as advice to put into 
Archidamos' mouth. This plan seems better suited to the topicality of the 
situation as it existed in 366, when Sparta had in the last four years 
suffered three Theban invasions of the Peloponnese. Of course it is advice 
which has its Athenian inspiration stamped upon it, as an obvious imitation 
of the famed evacuation of Athens in 460, but it is bold advice, and 
certainly uncharacteristic of Spartan history. Admittedly, it could be 
argued that not only the silence about the battle of Mantineia but the whole 
plan for an evacuation on the model of Salamis is all part of the window- 
dressing.2 Yet it is not easy to believe that Archidamos himself would 
actually have conceived such a plan, and if Isokrates had composed the 
oration a decade after 366, is it not more plausible that he would have 
given his work greater ’authenticity' by constructing arguments for Archi­
damos which were more conventional, but which would anticipate, or at 
least be consistent with, the true course of history in the decade after 366?
Blass and Harding have regarded Archidamos as a rhetorical show­
piece; Blass was led to this position by his view of the compositional date, 
whereas Harding arrived at the date as a consequence of his belief that the 
work was a display, arguing the -ca.se for war in a state which was at peace 
(a counterpoint to On the Peace, which is contrasted by Harding as a
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^ h e Thebans did not entirely neglect the Peloponnese after 362: for 362/1 
Diodoros records that a Theban force, led by Pammenes, intervened in response to an 
appeal from the Megalopolitans, although this did not involve the Spartans (15.94.2- 
3); again, in 352/1, at the time of the Third Sacred War, a Theban army entered the 
Peloponnese and engaged Peloponnesian forces, including the Spartans (16.39.1-7).
“The avoidance of any reference to the battle of Mantineia, the reference to 
the power of Dionysios II, and the characterization of Archidamos as relatively young 
and still awaiting his royal inheritance are specified by Harding ("Purpose", p.148) as 
instances of the historical faithfulness of Archidamos as a speech set in 366; Harding 
does not consider the plausibility of the evacuation plan for a speech which he would 
envisage as having been composed some time after 357.
presentation of a case for peace to a state which was at war).1 Baynes has 
also declared that Archidamos is no more than a rhetorical demonstration.2 *
Jebb too hypothesized that it was written originally as an "exercise", 
although he accepts a date of composition closely contemporary to the 
debate at Sparta, and he speculates further by suggesting that it was 
probably sent to Archidamos, not for delivery, but as an expression of 
sympathy with the Spartan policy; 3 jebb sees Archidamos as a true 
reflection of the reaction by the majority of Spartans to the reestablishment 
of an independent Messenia.4 *However, if most Spartans agreed with the 
sentiments attributed to Archidamos in this discourse, what was Isokrates' 
purpose in portraying a significant opposition among the Spartans 
themselves?
From antiquity Archidamos had been admired for its ethical content 
and its uplifting moral advice, 5 and Mathieu has also praised it for this, as 
well as for its literary power;6 however, although he dees not regard the 
advice given as indicative of much practical wisdom, Mathieu is consistent 
in also describing this discourse as propaganda: he adopts an 
interpretation, which had previously been expressed by Brerup, that sees 
Archidamos as written not to intervene in the actual deliberations at 
Sparta, but to influence in the first place Athenian, and then, more broadly, 
Greek opinion, against the further particularization of the communities in 
the Greek world.7 Bringmann finds in the oration an expression of what is 
said to have been Kallistratos' policy at this period, of seeking to reduce 
Thebes under the authority of a Common Peace through the combined
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1 Harding, "Purpose", p.144.
2Baynes, “Isocrates“., pp.160-161; cf. Cargill, SAL, p.176, n.29 (Moysey ["On the 
Peace", p.l 19 ] is wrong to cite Cargill as one vho regards Archidamos as a serious 
political oration).
3Jebb, AO, II, p,194f.
4Ibid„ p201.
5Pion. Hal. Isok., ch.9; cf. Harding, "Purpose”, p .l37.
^Mathieu, Les Idees, p.lGj.
7Ibid., p .l06; cf. Drerup (Isocratis opera omnia. I, p.cliii), vho says specifically 
that Isokrates vas trying to voo public opinion avay from Thebes and to direct it 
tovards Sparta, cf. also Cloche, Politique etrangere, p.l 19.
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efforts of Sparta, x^thens and Dionysios I and his son.1
All of these interpretations of Archidamos and explanations of its 
purpose are unsatisfactory to greater or less extent. The problem lies in 
the setting; this distinguishes the work from any other of Isokrates’ 
political discourses. For it is not "spoken" by Isokrates himself, as are all 
the other orations, with the exception of Plataikos: nor is it addressed to an 
Athenian audience, as is Plataikos. However, the dramatic setting in this 
case is faithfully maintained throughout, unlike in Panegyrikos.
Prima facie Archidamos is what it professes to be: a speech by the 
prince xAxrchidamos which is aimed at persuading the Spartans not to be 
seduced by their allies’ encouragement to join a Common Peace which 
would be presided over by the Thebans, but to resist forcefully, and to the 
last conceivable resort, the refoundation of an independent Messene. The 
speech purports to set forth Archidamos' views on the subject of "the 
demands of the enemy" (6.2); these "demands" are later specified as the 
recognition of the independent state of Messenia (which Epaminondas had 
helped to establish in 370/69 in the first Theban invasion of the 
Peloponnese) (6.6,13,66), and "the enemy" are the Thebans (e.g. 6.6). For 
x^rchidamos the Spartan response to the peace offer will amount either to a 
commitment to fight, if they reject the peace, or to acceptance of a peace 
which will involve humiliation and the admission of impotence for Sparta 
(for the alternatives see 6.6-10; for the disgrace of accepting the terms see 
esp. the peroration, 6.66ff... but also 6.6-10,12,36,62,55,66,64,67). At the 
beginning it is said that this issue is of fundamental importance to Sparta’s 
future: "For never since we have dwelt in Sparta has any war or any peril 
come upon us in which so much has been at stake as in this question which 
we are now assembled to discuss" (6.7). The whole Greek world is focused 
upon what Sparta will decide in this matter (6.106). The Spartans are 
advised of the danger of trusting in diplomacy when one is weaker than 
one's enemies or rivals (6.51), and they are warned that concession of what 
is demanded will surely lead to further demands (6.39; cf.6.67; 107).2
Throughout the speech Archidamos is adamant in his call for the 
Spartans to reject the Theban demands and to fight to regain the territory 
of the Messenians. The arguments of the discourse are all devoted to 
confirming this decision: first comes a series of 'proofs’ of the justice of
1 Dmj jt. j- . at. *r. C* i  ^ 4 ^ L
* u i  iiigmcuiii, tinmen, y . j u .
2 A familiar argument: ef. Perikles' use of it just before the commencement of 
■^■ar in 4'31 (see Thuc. 1.140.5).
Sparta's claim to Messenian territory (6.16-33: lor a summary see 32-33); 
the next argument is a refutation of the claim that justice should be 
accommodated to the requirements of expediency (6.34-39):1 here 
Archidamos adopts an intransigent position: "No man could ever persuade 
me that one should ever deem anything to be of greater consequence than 
justice" (6.35) From there he demonstrates that history reveals many 
occasions when a state has been defeated, but has subsequently revived its 
fortunes (6.40-46). This argument reveals Isokrates' perception of the 
relative importance for Sparta's future of her defeat at Leuktra and her 
subsequent loss of control of Messene and the helots: the latter is rightly 
perceived as the critical factor in the long-term prospect for Sparta as a 
leading city-state.
From there the speech goes on to consider some arguments which 
might be advanced by those who would accept the Theban terms. First, 
there is the claim that war is a risky business: to this it is replied that the 
risk is there for those who have prosperity to lose, but for those who are in 
difficulties war offers the chance of a quick change of fortune and the 
chance to come to terms with one's adversaries on a basis of mutual respect 
for each other's power; it would, indeed, be shameful if the Spartans, for 
long successful champions of others in need, failed now to respond to their 
own state's hour of crisis (6.46-57). Second, it is asked where a Sparta 
committed to war could now expect allies: in the first place it is suggested 
that Spartan virtues are of themselves their best allies, namely 'just 
dealing', 'good government', 'sober habits of life', 'a willingness to battle to 
the death against the enemy' and 'the conviction that nothing is so much to 
be dreaded as the reproaches of our fellow-citizens'; however, outside help 
may also be looked to from the Athenians, Dionysios of Syracuse,2 the
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^ h e assertion that history reveals that wars have been -decided in accordance 
with justice rather than by superior pow'er (6.36) had already been advanced by 
Isokrates in Plataikos (14.39); in On the Peace (8.31-35) it is argued that justice is 
compatible with advantage for a state, despite an alleged popular and cynical belief to 
the contrary.
2This must be Dionysios II, who had succeeded his father in 367 (D.S. 15.735: 
however, Diodoros' linking of the tyrant’s death to immoderate celebration of his 
victory at the Lenaia Festival of 367 must be tempered by the inscription«! evidence of 
an alliance between Dionysios I and the Athenians which was passed in the Assembly 
in March of that year, some two months after the Festival: see Tod, CHIII. 136). 
Xenophon records that about the time of the peace between the Thebans and the 
Corinthians and other Peloponnesians the younger Dionysios had sent twelve ships 
and a contingent of men, who helped the Spartans to capture Sellasia, a short distance 
north of Sparta itself (7.4.12).
Egyptian king, other rulers in Asia, the oligarchs in the Greek cities, even 
the common people in some Peloponnesian cities (6.56-69).
Even if no external assistance is available, Archidamos rejects 
acceptance of the peace terms, and he outlines a plan for the evacuation of 
the women and children and older people to refuges overseas, while the 
men of fighting age pursue a guerilla war against their enemies (6.70-66).
It should be emphasized that this plan is conceived as a last resort, only to 
be employed if even the present state of affairs cannot be maintained. This 
is made clear both at the beginning and at the conclusion of the proposal 
(6.72,66); the plan is introduced almost as a symbol of Archidamos’ 
determination not to agree to the recognition of Messenes independence.
Its real purpose is the value of it as an indication to the other Greeks that 
Sparta would never capitulate on this issue, and thus, hopefully, dissuade 
the Thebans and their friends from continuing to insist upon their demand. 
So, at 6.77, Archidamos says: “For my part., I believe that if this proposal 
were merely put in words and scattered broadcast among the Hellenes, our 
enemies would be thrown into utter confusion; and still more would this be 
so if we were put to the necessity of carrying it into effect."
The speech concludes with a repetition of the demand that the 
Spartans must, under no circumstances, accede to these peace terms. This 
is coupled with a rousing exhortation to live up to their noble and proud 
ancestors (6.67 -111).
The purpose attributed to Archidamos is to reject the demand for 
Sparta to acknowledge Messenes independence and, instead, to battle to 
recover control of Messene and its territory (for the latter point: 6.13, 36, 
36.. 70-71, 66-69, 101). His appeal is not made in pursuit of a renewal of 
Spartan empire:1 references to Spartan empire are to a past situation 
which is several times called upon as a contrast to the present invidious 
position in which Sparta finds herself (cf. 6.7, 55, 94, 97), but nowhere is 
empire spoken of as a future prospect. On the contrary, Archidamos early 
in the speech is made to applaud the freedom which is signified by not 
being at the behest of another state, and this is approved of not only for 
Sparta but for any state which is worthy of respect (6.7). The discourse 
does not unequivocally commend war,2 nor, for that, matter, peace: there
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xCf. Harding, for whom Archidamos’ ambition is "naked imperialism" 
("Purpose", p.14?).
2Cf. Baynes, ::Isocratesu, p.ibi: ::Couid the apostie of ouovom in all seriousness 
have composed this bellicose exhortation to var?" It is this, and the alleged disparity
are circumstances in which one rather than the other is appropriate (6.50). 
The expressed aim in Archidamos is for the Spartans, having recovered 
what is “theirs" (cf. 6.10, 13, 57-56, 66-69), to achieve a peace in which 
they can participate on equal and honourable terms; for Archidamos says:
“I should not so earnestly exhort you to carry on the war if I did not see 
that the peace resulting from my proposals will be honourable and 
enduring, while that which would result from the counsel of certain men 
among you will not only be disgraceful, but will last no time at ail" (6.67: 
cf.6.51). Admittedly there are suggestions that Sparta should hope to 
regain a position of eminence among the city-states, but the ambition is 
couched in moral terms of “honours and distinctions" (em^aveiai mi 
XauTTpoTTjTec: see 6.104f.) and conveys no threat of a future authoritarian 
rule; however, some voluntary association of alliances is not ruled out, if 
Sparta can earn the respect needed to attract other cities, most likely those 
in the Peloponnese, as they grow weary of stasis within their own 
communities (6.69).
If Archidamos should not be regarded as an enkomion of the Spartan 
prince, it should also not be regarded as a eulogy of Sparta. In support of 
his arguments Archidamos is made to appeal to certain Spartan virtues and 
qualities which he would have the contemporary Spartans display, although 
it is his very point that many of them are not at present exhibiting those 
characteristics: thus Archidamos claims that experience in war and 
attention to good government are bases upon which the Spartans can hope 
to reverse their fortunes (6.46; cf .6.61); to these, as "allies", can be added 
"just dealing”, sober habits of life“, a readiness to fight to the death and a 
fierce concern for their reputations in the eyes of their fellow-citizens 
(6.59). These points of civic pride belong in the context of the argument 
and do not amount to an extrinsic eulogy on Isokrates’ behalf of the 
Spartan constitution or way of life: for example, no effort is made to 
describe the peculiar features or merits of "good goverment". Furthermore, 
the work is certainly not complimentary of Spartan policy in the more 
recent past or of the attitude of many Spartans at present: for both in the 
recent past and in the present the Spartans are represented as having 
wrongly identified the appropriate occasion to pursue peace or war (6.50- 
51), and the present generation of Spartans are characterized as
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between Panegyrikos (in vhich Baynes believes that Isokrates rejects Sparta’s right 
to leadership) and Archidamos (where Baynes seizes upon a phrase such as " ve must 
either be first among the Greeks or perish [6.89; cf. 6.85,94, but both referring to past 
claims to leadership, or even arche D that lead Baynes to his conclusion that 
Archidamos is "a pure emSeucnjcoc Xoyo$".
undeserving of their heritage, revelling in luxury and ease, and taking a 
dishonourable attitude to the pressures from other cities and states (see 
esp. 6.55).1
Toward the Thebans, the enemy, the speech is less aggressive than 
might have been expected, especially in a speech which professes a Spartan 
viewpoint that is hostile to the peace proposals. It is really not an attack 
upon Thebes at all. It is true that the Thebans are criticized implicitly for 
being willing to recognize Persia’s control of Asia; they are also said to 
have acted "contrary to the oaths and covenants" both in their destruction 
of Thespiai and Plataia, and now, it is claimed, in their resettlement of 
Messene (6.27-26); it is suggested that capitulation to the present demands 
would soon lead to further demands, but the point is made generally, with 
no specific reference to the Thebans (6.39); the disputes which had already 
begun to appear by 366 between the Thebans and their allies within the 
Peloponnese are referred to, but once again without specific mention of 
Thebes and without any clear imputation of criticism or blame of Theban 
policy or behaviour (6.61); Thebes is even used as an example of reversal 
of fortune of a city, with current Theban dominance being referred to 
uncritically, though rather ungraciously, by describing Thebes as "a greater 
state than anyone ever expected she would be" (6.104). The familiar topoi 
of anti-Theban diatribe are conspicuous by their absence: no branding of 
the Thebans as Medizers, not introduction of the frequently-used tale of the 
story of the Theban impiety concerning the Argive dead. Whatever else it 
may be taken as, Archidamos cannot be regarded as a general attack upon 
the Thebans and their attempt at this time to sponsor a Common Peace, 
although it is, of course, an adamant repudiation of their peace demand 
inasmuch as it required the Spartans to accept the independent existence of 
Messene.2
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*For a useful discussion of Isokrat.es' attitude to Sparta see P. Cloche, "Isocrate 
et la politique lacedemonienne", REA 35 (1933), 129-143. Cloche regards Isokrates’ 
attitude to the Spartan constitution and vay of life as considerably more consistent, 
and favourable, than his attitude to Sparta's foreign policy (for vhich see esp. 12.109, 
although even then the theory rather than the practice is vhat wins Isokrates' 
approval: cf. 11.17-20). Cloche explains the variation of Isokrates' attitude ’with 
respect to foreign policy as due to its measurement against other constants of 
Isokrates' thought (as, for example, his hatred of Persia or his dislike of popular 
•agitation); an alternative, and I v/ould suggest preferable, explanation may be found 
in Isokrates' view  of that policy in the broader context of the general state of affairs 
among the Greek states at a particular time.
2Hovever Bringmann (Studien, p.36) regards it as an attack upon the Thebans 
(cf. also Mathieu, Les Idees. p.106, and Cloche, Isocrate et son temps, p.67). As vith
The attitude adopted in Archidamos to the Athenians is cautiously 
friendly. Athens’ role in the war against the Persians in 460-479 is 
introduced in complimentary fashion as an example of what advantage may 
he gained by those who would dare to stand up against their enemies; for, 
as a consequence of their courageous action to preserve freedom, the 
Athenians entered upon a lengthy period of control over others (6.41-43); 
however, the example is not without a cautionary point, for it is prefaced 
by the observation that when the Athenians proceeded to lord it over 
others, they suffered loss of respect among the other Greeks (6.42). Later, 
when Archidamos advocates evacuation of the Spartan community as a 
final recourse, the Athenian example which was set in 460 is evoked, and 
the motivation for the Athenians' action is ascribed to their determination 
to uphold the freedom of the Greeks (6.63)- Athens’ position as leader of 
the Greeks in her Second Athenian Confederacy is cited as an example of 
the reversal of fortune which a state may achieve if it is prepared to 
struggle to regain its glory (6.104). Thus, Athens' heroic role in the Persian 
War is utilized as an inspiration for Archidamos’ arguments, but without 
dwelling at any length upon those deeds or events, and Athens’ more 
recent reputation as leader of the Second Athenian Confederacy is recalled 
without rancour.
More immediate to the contemporary circumstances which surround 
the oration are two other references to Athenian policy. First, in order to 
demonstrate Sparta's reputation for coming to the rescue of others, three 
examples are chosen, all drawn from the Peloponnesian War.
Contemporary Athenians, one might think, would hardly have been 
enamoured of these reminiscences to their failures at Amphipolis, Syrakuse 
and Chios, the reference to the loss of Amphilopis was at least a little 
galling at a time when Athens had chosen to revive efforts to recover her 
control of this city.* 1 However, the most overt statement about the
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Isokrates' attitude to Sparta, so too in his attitude to Thebes.. P. Cloche ('Tsocrate et 
Thebes", RK 193 [1942-31277-296) demonstrates that it developed and altered, rather 
than remained a. simple, fixed view (for which, cf. Mathieu, Les I dees, pp .45,192). In 
Archidamos Cloche (op. cit.. p.283) finds Theban perjury and violence to be 
vehemently denounced, but he also notes a confession of the substantial power of 
Thebes, a fact which Isokrates had not been prepared to acknowledge in earlier 
works. I would submit that Cloche exaggerates the animosity which the Spartan 
prince Archidamos is made to direct at the Thebans in Isokrates’ discourse.
1 If Aischines (2.32) is to be trusted, the Athenians appear to have resuscitated 
their claim to Amphipolis prior to the death of Amyntas III (itself before midsummer 
of 369: DS. 15.60.3). Ryder (KE, pp.123-130) thinks the conference in winter 370/369, 
which led to the alliance between the Athenians and the Spartans and their allies, to 
be the most probable occasion. Iphikrates was sent to the region in  368 (Aisch. 2.27-
contemporary relationship between the Spartans and their Athenian allies 
occurs when Archidamos claims that, in the end, the Athenians will not 
permit Sparta to be destroyed by her enemies: "For I know, in the first 
place, that the Athenians, although they may not hold with us in 
everything, yet if our existence wTere at stake would go to any length to 
save us" (6.62). This statement sums up well the Spartan-Athenian 
relationship as it is presented in Archidamos. Archidamos is made to speak 
appreciatively of the Athenians, particularly for their devotion to the cause 
of freedom, but famous incidents of Athenian history are not eulogistically 
elaborated. The relationship portrayed would seem to attribute to the 
Spartan speaker what we know from other sources to have been a common 
Athenian viewpoint: thus the Athenians did not respond unhesitatingly 
when the Thebans attacked Sparta itself in 3TO, although after all the 
arguments had been put and the speeches made the Athenians were 
persuaded and set out enthusiastically under the command of Iphikrates 
(Xen. 6.5.33-49); but again, when an alliance between Athens and Sparta 
wTas being thrashed out in 369, Kephisodotos challenged, and persuaded the 
Athenians to alter, the Spartan proposal regarding the form of leadership in 
joint military undertakings (Xen. 7.1.12-13), and, although the Athenians 
were meeting their obligations to the Spartans and their other allies in the 
Peloponnese throughout 369-367, they were not pleased at the failure to 
receive reciprocal help when Thebes seized Oropos (Xen. 7.4.1-2). In 
Archidamos the attitude to the Athenians seems consistent with Xenophon's 
account of Athenian reactions to a relationship with Sparta in the years 
immediately after Leuktra; encouragement is not given for any belief that 
the work was seeking to promote a closer or warmer relationship. On the 
other hand, although the Athenians by 366 show signs of dissatisfaction 
with Sparta and her Peloponnesian allies and although they strike an 
alliance with Sparta's enemies within the Peloponnese, the Arkadians, the 
claim attributed to Archidamos that the Athenians would not be prepared 
to stand by while Sparta vras destroyed carries conviction and receives 
support, from the Athenian presence on the Spartan side at Mantineia at 
362. This is not to see in Archidamos any attempt by Isokrates to give a 
last expression to a now-discredited policy of Kallistratos of seeking to limit 
Thebes' power by a Common Peace backed by an opposition comprising
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29), although his task may have been more to do with the succession to the 
Makedonien throne after the death of Amyntas (see Ryder, KE, pp .76-77).
Sparta, Athens and any other powerful support which could be mustered,1 
one does not feel that Archidarnos' references to the Athenians are in any 
way designed to mollify the Athenians or to woo them back to some 
common policy directed against Thebes; Archidarnos is made to present an 
attitude that is respectful to Athens but is neither ingratiating nor 
importunate. The speech cannot be regarded as an appeal to Athenian 
pride or vanity. It does not address itself to the relationship between 
Athens and Sparta, at this time probably more fragile than at any time 
since Leuktra. It does not make an attack upon the Thebans. It is, as has 
been said, a speech in which the Spartan heir to the Agiad crown states in 
the clearest possible terms his absolute opposition to any abandonment by 
Sparta of her control of Messene.
There is nothing in Archidarnos to convince us of Mathieu’s view that 
the recognition of an independent state of Messene is opposed in this 
speech because Isokrates beloved that it. would take the Greeks further 
away from his vision of a unification of Greek states and cities into some 
kind of panhellenic federation.2 3 Why then was the work composed?
It is very unlikely that the discourse was meant to influence the 
debate at Sparta which forms the setting for the work. As a former 
logographos Isokrates must have been capable of producing a speech 
hastily; certainly, he cannot have taken very long over the composition of 
Phillipos.3 There was little time available on this occasion; soon after the 
Corinthians were informed that the Thebans were willing to accept the 
Corinthians’ allies into a peace, they went to Sparta to urge the Spartans to 
join them (Xen. 7.4.7); they may have sent envoys first to their other allies, 
although Xenophon is not explicit on this point and, in fact, could be taken 
to imply that the Corinthians came to Sparta alone (7.4.9). Isokrates, 
however, seems to picture a group of allied representatives present at 
Sparta (6.11; cf .6.91, where Epidaurians and Phliasians are also 
mentioned). Whether the Corinthians consulted the Athenians is not 
known: that alliance was perhaps not yet broken, although the Corinthians
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*Cf. Bringmann, Studien. p56: cf. above, p,120f.
2Mathieu, Les Idees. p.106: this is one of three purposes which Mathieu 
recognizes in Archidarnos; he sees the discourse es further evidence of Isokrates' 
unremitting opposition to Thebes, and he follow Drerup in finding in the work an 
attempt to arouse Greek, and especially Athenian, opinion in  order that they should 
intervene in the Spartan counsel.
3See belov, p.255.
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now regarded the Athenians as "unfriendly" to them (Xen. 7.4.6). Even 
allowing that the news of the Corinthian purpose had reached Athens in 
time to allow Isokrates to compose Archidamos as a contribution to the 
debate and send it to the Spartan kings son, there are problems: the 
discourse is considerably longer than Plataikos. although not as long as 
another "assembly-speech" un the Peace:1 it is not easy to envisage 
Isokrates, who is careful to portray Archidamos as a typical Spartan, not 
given to speech-making (6.6,15), presenting him for use with a long speech 
which would be quite contrary to the Spartan preference for brevity. Then, 
too, the surprisingly moderate manner in which the work makes mention of 
the Thebans does not seem appropriate for a genuine speech on this 
occasion and for a speech which adopts the intransigent line which it does; 
the diplomatic attitude to the Thebans would seern more the voice of 
Isokrates than that of Archidamos. Then, how could Isokrates be sure that 
Archidamos was a suitable person to make the speaker of his work? He 
himself acknowledges that it would not be customary for Archidamos to 
have addressed the Spartan assembly at his age (6.1 ft.).2 Finally, what are 
we to make of the alleged attitude of the Spartans in this debate? For 
Archidamos is based upon a scene in which the young prince is standing 
out in his advice against a strong feeling in the Spartan assembly that the 
Theban terms should be agreed to, or, at best, a feeling of uncommitted 
despondency (see esp. 6.2).
If there were any historical accuracy in this portrait and if 
Archidamos were written to influence the debate, then that attitude toward 
Messene of resigned submission among the older Spartans must have been 
known to Isokrates and no doubt to others before the debate took place. 
Xenophon admits no hint of Spartan disunity in their response to the 
Corinthian invitation: he reports that the Spartans accepted that the 
Corinthians and any other allies who wished should make a separate peace
^ ee above, p. 6, n.2.
2Archidamos may have been about 34 years of age in 366. He is first mentioned 
in our sources at the time of the scandal surrounding Sphodrias' acquittal after his 
abortive raid on Athens in 378, vhere he appears as the lover of Sphodrias' son 
Kleonymos (Xen. 3.4.25-33; Plut. Ages. 25.1-4). Cartledge (Agesilaos. p.14?) puts 
Archidamos' birth somewhere between 408-400, noting: "for Archidamos vas almost 
certainly under thirty in 378 and still relatively young in about 366 (Isok. 6.1)"; 
Cartledge also says that Archidamos vas “certainly over tv^enty in 378". Thirty ’vas 
the age from vhich Spartiates might attend the Assembly (W.G. Forrest, A History of 
Sparta. 950-192 B.C.. 2nd. ed. (London 19801 p.52); Plutarch informs us that young 
Spartan men under thirty did not frequent the agora at all (Lyk. 351).
with the Thebans, but says that the Spartans were determined to continue 
to fight to uphold their claim to what they saw as their ancestral right with 
regard to Messene (7.4.9). Yet in Xenophon’s account there is a politeness 
and uniformity about the Spartan response which is less convincing than 
what we have in Archidarnos.1 First, it is difficult to imagine the Spartans 
listening kindly to the Corinthian proposal; with the recent alliance made 
between the Arkadians and the Athenians this further crumbling of 
Spartan support must have both irritated the Spartans and caused them 
anxiety. In Isokrates' discourse the attitude of Archidarnos to the allies is a 
mixture of anger at betrayal (6.11 -13) and patronizing condescension 
( 6 . 91 ) .
Although we have only Isokrates’ speech testifying to any division of 
opinion at Sparta over the question of the Theban demand in 366, we learn 
from Diodor os of at least one other quite recent occasion on which more 
temperate counsel was issued at Sparta and prevailed: when in 370 
Epaminondas and his army were ravaging Lakonian territory, the Spartan 
warriors were all for rushing forth to confront the enemy, but they were 
restrained from precipitate, and possibly disastrous, action by their elders 
(15.65.1).;2 In 366 the Persian envoy Philiskos had accepted Sparta's claim 
to Messene (Xen. 7.1.27), but in the following year Pelopidas was able to 
alter the King’s view about this claim and to have him agree to the Theban 
demand that Messene’s independence should be recognized (ibid. 36); 
presumably the Spartans repudiated this peace initiative, when the 
Thebans summoned the Greeks to Thebes, but there is no evidence of 
whether Sparta attended the conference at Thebes or not, nor whether 
Theban ambassadors travelled to Sparta among the cities which they 
visited without success after their preliminary rebuff at Corinth (ibid. 39- 
40).
Many, if not all, Spartans were determined from the moment of its 
refoundation to regain their control over the Messenians, but it should be 
admitted that Sparta's position was never weaker or more isolated than at 
the moment when the Athenians had allied themselves with the Arkadians, 
and when the Corinthians and other allies had announced their intention to
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Plutarch's account (Ages. 33-3w)of the reaction at Sparta to the “tearless 
battle" (of 368) indicates the extent to vhich Spartan phlegmatism had given vay to 
despondency.
Plutarch also describes (Ages. 32.3-7) hov Agesilaos suppressed a conspiracy 
by 200 of the mutineers and dissidents during the attack on Sparta in 370/69; cf. Nep. 
Ages. 6.2; Polyainos 2.1.14.
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adopt a position which amounted to neutrality. The portrait of divided 
council at Sparta which we have in Archidamos cannot be discounted as a 
rhetorical fabrication. However, the magnitude of the indecisiveness or 
even the readiness to capitulate over the issue of Messene does seem 
exaggerated by the discourse, the better to isolate and to highlight 
Archidamos as the advocate of traditional Spartan courage and 
determination.
The probable exaggeration of the strength of those intent upon 
accepting the terms, or at least prepared to sit in silence, would seem to 
argue further against Archidamos as being designed to meet a truly antic­
ipated situation. It also seems to tell against the notion of the speech as a 
work addressed to a Spartan audience; the image of the Spartan elders 
which it provides is hardly flattering. Then, if the speech were an ex­
pression of sympathy or support for the Spartan decision, it is difficult to 
understand why Archidamos is the speaker and the setting is the debate 
which resulted from the Corinthian appeal to Sparta to join the peace; for it 
does not offer new advice or an alternative policy; it merely produces, 
possibly in a more eloquent and elaborately-argued form, a case for a 
decision which the Spartans had already made; it does not profess to make 
explicit Athenian support for Sparta or for her decision about Messene.
The precise extent of the accuracy of the historical setting provided 
in Archidamos cannot be ascertained. Some fundamental facts we know to 
be correct: the Corinthians did approach the Spartans in 3b6 with a request 
to be permitted to make a peace with the Thebans and with an offer for the 
Spartans also to participate; the Spartans declined the offer on the ground 
that they would not recognize an independent Messene, but they did accept 
the decision of the Corinthians and others of their allies to join a peace with 
the Thebans. This much is sure. I have argued that the picture conveyed 
in Archidamos of Spartan elders who were prepared to accept, the Theban 
demands, whether by open agreement or by tacit acceptance, is also 
credible, although it is not confirmed by independent evidence. Whether 
Archidamos spoke at the meeting which discussed the Corinthian proposals, 
and whether all, or any, of the arguments and counsel found in Isokrates' 
speech were drawn from the author's knowledge of that meeting we do not 
know. If probability may be invoked again, Isokrates' work would carry 
conviction if, at least, Archidamos were known to be an ardent proponent 
of tlie recovery of Messene into Sparta's control.
Why did Isokrates compose Archidamos? The answer lies in the fact 
that the speech is far more than a series of proofs or arguments in support
of Sparta's claim to control Messene: proofs of the justice of Sparta's cause 
are presented in the earlier part of the speech, but once these have been 
dealt with the speech becomes a patriotic exhortation by Archidamos to the 
Spartans not to shrink from any and every effort to recover what he sees 
as theirs. Isokrates perceives this decision by the Spartans to pursue their 
claim to Messene no matter how isolated they may be as not only the single 
compelling issue of Sparta's foreign policy, but also as the one demand 
which has already kept, and will continue to keep, Sparta out of any 
Common Peace. In the speech Isokrates reveals, and seeks to convey to 
others, his appreciation of the unassailable determination of those who 
dominate Spartan opinion not to concede their claim to control Messene.
For the Spartans it is far more than a question of justice; the loss of 
Messene was to Sparta irreparable and could never be accepted. To the 
modern student of this period of history it is obvious that the re­
establishment of Messene and the liberation of the Messenian people from 
the Spartan yoke was destructive at a single blow of Sparta's former way of 
life;1 hindsight also reveals Sparta's intransigence and single-mindedness 
about the matter.2
Was it so clearly recognized in 366 that no peace could succeed in 
including the Spartans unless her claim to control Messene was admitted? 
The Corinthians did not regard it as a sine non qua: they were surely 
aware of the Theban demand when they came to Sparta with the proposal 
that she join them in making peace with Thebes. Not until the Theban 
peace-negotiations of 367 does Xenophon even mention the refoundation of 
Messene (7.1.27), although this may be because he was all too sensitive and 
appreciative of its significance for the Spartans; however, the only 
recognition he gives to its importance for Spartan policy is his paraphrase 
of the Spartan response to the Corinthians in 366, when the Spartans are 
said to declare that they would never accept the loss of Messene (7.4.9).
The Thebans, too, obviously believed that Sparta, could ultimately be 
brought to accept their demand, since they had persisted in it despite their 
failure to bring about a Common Peace a year before.
Archidamos reveals the unalter ability of Sparta's position on this 
matter. It also shows that the limit of Sparta's present ambition was
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!See Bury & Meiggs, HG, p.37'3; Beloch GG III .^ i. p.178; Hammond, H&, p.497; 
Sealey, HGCS, pp.424,428.
2E.g. Sparta alone refused to join the Peace agreed by the Greeks after the 
battle of Mantineia in 362 (D.S. 13.89.1-2; Plut. Ages. 35.3; Polyb. 4.33 8-9).
concerned only with the recovery of Messene; that achieved, peace could 
follow. Archidamos himself is depicted as a personification of Sparta's 
unquashable will to fight for this goal. If there is any historical truth in 
Isokrates' characterization of the young Archidamos, and it is not 
unreasonable to assume that there is, then it is conceivable that Isokrates 
was fascinated by the leadership of this man at a time when Sparta's 
position looked particularly bleak: perhaps Isokrates saw in Archidamos a 
classic instance of the persuasive great man who uses the skills and the art 
of rhetoric to hold his country together. Xenophon tells us nothing of the 
internal stresses within Sparta at this time; his narrative focusses upon the 
''big" actions. Isokrates' Archidamos. on the contrary, suggests that for the 
Spartans of this period unresolved difficulties abounded: to the outside 
Greek world the Spartan policy may have appeared intransigent and 
monolithic, but the scenario portrayed by Isokrates also indicates that 
within Sparta that policy had to be forged in the face of some wavering. 
Such a picture is not incompatible with that given for Sparta at this time by 
Plutarch in his Life of Agesilaos.1
The purpose of Isokrates' oration is contained in the remark that the 
mere promulgation of Sparta's determination to fight to the last drop of her 
warriors' blood will most probably be enough to dissuade their enemies 
from a futile demand that Sparta should recognize Messene's independence 
(6.77). Isokrates realized, perhaps more clearly than some others at the 
time, that Sparta's rejection of Theban demands for the continued 
independence of Messene was not. negotiable: it would mean continuing 
warfare and misery among the Greeks, and it meant that, whatever hope 
there was for a stable and enduring state of peace among the Greeks, 
whether the initiative were to come from Thebes or from elsewhere, that 
hope had no prospect of realization so long as the Thebans persisted in 
their demand concerning Messene.
One final point should be noted: it is possible that Isokrates' 
Archidamos was part of a broader debate at Athens over the question of 
Sparta's policy towards the reconstituted state of Messenia. Alkidarnas, a 
rhetorician-rival of Isokrates2 published a work entitled Messeruakos. in
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'^ Eor the period after Leuktrasee esp. Plut. Ages.32.3-6, on vh ich  see E. David. 
"Revolutionary Activity in Sparta after Leuktra", Athenaeum 38 (1980), 299-308.
2For the antipathy between Isokrates and Alkidarnas see Blass, AB IIA p.47. 
Alkidarnas, On the Sophists 29ff., attacks those vrtio published artificial speeches, 
v h ich  plainly refers to Isokrates: cf. Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, p.173.
which he urged the Spartans not to enslave the Messenians; Aristotle 
quotes a sentence from this work, where Alkidamas says: "If the war is 
responsible for the present misfortunes, it is necessary to repair the 
situation with the aid of peace“.1 Without more evidence it is not possible 
to say more about the timing of this work, its purpose or any possible 
relationship which it may have had with Isokrates’ discourse, or vice 
versa.2 The Athenians had a long-standing sympathy for the Messenians, 
some of whom they had settled at Naupaktos, after the Spartans had 
rebuffed their Athenian allies at the time of the Helot revolt (Thuc.1.103 3: 
the revolt ended in 456/5 and the Messenians were settled at Naupaktos 
some time after that: see Gomme, HCT. I, p. 304). The Messenians were 
expelled from Naupaktos in 401 (D.S. 14. 34. 2-5). Some were later (c.396- 
5) serving with Konon as mercenaries (Hell. Oxy. 17.3X and presumably the 
Messenians displaced from Naupaktos could have found refuge in Athens, 
once Sparta’s grip on Athens was loosened. Diodor os (loc. cit.) mentions 
Messenians in mercenary service in Sicily and Greece. This sympathy may 
also be a factor in the temperateness of the case which Isokrates presents 
in Archidamos.
1 Arist. Rhet. 1397 a 11-12: e i yap 6 ttoa€|j.o$ oano$ rdtv napovTajv kwl>v, nerd t% 
tiprjvrft 6eienavop6iüooö6ai; the scholium (ad loc.) notes: ovpßovAevei 6 JAAioSdpac tovj 
AaKeSai^ ioviors Uh w ria S o v A a b o a  to?)$ ev  M taofjvr), enixeipajv ere to# evavnoy (cf. schol. ad 
Arist. Rhet. 1373 b 18).
2See Blass, AB Il2 p.350.
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Chapter 4: On The Peace
The next time that Isokrates expressed himself in a deliberative 
discourse it was not Sparta, but Athens, which was experiencing difficulties 
in her foreign relations. On the Peace 1 is the first oration in which Isokrates 
introduces himself in the role of a speaker in the Athenian Assembly .2 The 
setting is a meeting of the Assembly at which the question of war or peace 
is under debate (6.2). According to the evidence of the discourse itself the 
prytaneis have brought before the Assembly a proposal to make peace with 
the Chians, the Rhodians and the Byzantines, and this seems likely to be 
agreed, although not without some opposition (6.15-16, cf.6.25: for the 
opposition to peace see 6 5,12). The events of the Social War form the 
background to this Assembly debate.
In 35? the Chians and the Rhodians, two of Athens' major allies in 
the Second Athenian Confederacy, had revolted against the A thenians;3 the
*The title of the vork in the best MSS is IIEPIEIPHNHZ. Dionysios of 
Halikamassos entitles it ITEPI THZ EIPHNHZ (isok. ch.7). Although Isokrates quotes a 
passage from this oration in Antidosis, he does not refer to the ’work by a title, but 
merely speaks of it, after Panegyrikos, as "another oration“, and identifies it by 
beginning to speak of it thus: eort 8e r d  pev iv dpxfj Xeyopeva nepi i %  eipT iv ift t %  TTpo$ 
Xloy$ KaTPoSioys urn Bu^avtioys, ictX.( 15-63) Aristotle refers to it as the (Xöyo$) 
ouppaxtKDS (Rhet.1418a.32-3). and the vulgate MSS give the dual titie nEPI EIPHNHZ H 
ZYMMAXIKOZ. Aristotle, vho is interested in the speech as an attack upon Chares, 
may have dravn th e  adjective from a passage in On the Peace vhere
commentators believe that Isokrates had Chares in mind as one of the generals vho is 
being criticized: c f.8.134 epytp Se to% crrpaT^yo% ckJtovs (sc. ovppaxo^s) o n d v  
ßoyXoüvroa noieiv «SiSupev, pr}5e 5€öttotijc%  dXXa at^paxurös ayrduv emoraTwpev. The 
broader title recorded by Dionysios and the major MSS seems to reflect more 
appropriately Isokrates' concern in the speech.
^ e  reason for this is novhere explained by the author, but it may indicate 
the seriousness v ith  vh ich  he viewed the current situation and his concern that 
those vho normaUy took the lead in matters of state policy vere  not coming to grips 
v ith  the real issues, as Isokrates sav  them.
^Dionysios of Halikamassos (Lys.12) puts the outbreak of this v a r in the 
archonship of Agathokles (357/6), vhereas Diodoros records its beginning in the 
previous year (358/7: cf.16.7.3); most historians have accepted that the v a r broke out 
in the later half of 357 and that the battle of Chios took place in  356 (see G. L. 
Cavkvell, “Notes on the Social Var", Class & Med 23 (1962), 34-40; Cavkvell supports
the dating of these events given by Beloch ( GG III2.2 .258f.): contra Schveigert, 
“Greek Inscriptions“, Hesperia8 (1939),14f.; D. M. Levis, “Notes on Attic Inscriptions",
Byzantines, who had broken away from the Confederacy some years earlier 
(probably in 364), also lent support to the rebellion. These states may have 
been joined by the Koans, whom many historians have regarded as
members of Athens' Confederacy, but who were in fact probably 
independent. 1
Whether other allied states or cities participated in the revolt is 
uncertain;* 2 that it was not a general revolt is revealed both by the fact 
that, subsequent to the battle of Chios, the rebels attacked Athenian 
possessions on Lemnos, Imbros and Samos, as well as ravaging other 
islands allied to Athens in order to raise funds for their revolt (D. S.
16.21.2) and also by the fact that the Second Athenian Confederacy 
continued to exist and to operate, admittedly in a much-reduced form, after 
the departure from the Confederacy of the rebel states at the end of the 
Social War. 3 However, other allies may have taken advantage of the
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ABSA 49 (1954), 44; R. Sealey, "Dionysius of Halicarnassus and some Demosthenic 
dates". REG 68 (1955). 112.
*Cf. Cargill, SAC p.37f., who regards Koan membership as "virtually certain". 
The case against Kos as a member of the Confederacy has been set out by S. M. 
Sherw in-¥hite (Ancient Cos: an historical study from the Dorian settlement to the 
Imperial period. Hypomnemata51. Gottingen 1978. pp. 41-43 (cf.also pp. 65-66; 
Sherwin-¥hite's view is adopted by Hornblower, Mausolus. p .l3 3 f)- see also G. E. Bean 
and J. M. Cook, The Carian Coast, III", ABSA 52 (1957), p.142.
Most MSS of Isokrates at 8.16 list only the Chians, the Rhodians and the 
Byzantines (cf. 15.63) as those with vhom the Athenians should make peace; 
however, Diodoros (16.7.3; 21.1) includes the Koans among Athens' revolted allies 
(although the Koans are not included with the other three states in  the allied fleet 
mentioned by Diodoros at 16.212). Laistner (Tsocratea", CQ 15 [1921178-79) sought to 
include the Koans at 8.16, by emending a variant, but obviously corrupt, papyrus text 
of the passage with an appeal to Dion. Hal. (Isok. ch.16). who quotes this passage and 
includes Kos, along with the other three states; Mathieu, in the Bude edition, does not 
accept Laistner's emendation and follow the MSS; cf. also Sherw in-¥hite, Ancient 
Co£, p.42, n.73, and Hornblower, Mausolus. p.133, n228 (the latter noting, however, 
that "Dion. Hal. and the papyrus between them suggest that something has gone 
’wrong with Isok.’s text [at 8.16]“).
2See esp. the scholion to Dem. 3-28, which claims that “During the Social Var 
Chios, Rhodes, Byzantion, and certain others (icoci eiepol rtve$) revolted" (cf. D.S. 16.22.2 
& Theopomp. FGrH 115 F 164). E. H. Marshall, The Second Athenian Confederacy. 
Cambridge, 1905, p .109, adds Perinthos and Selymbria to the list of rebels, but in the 
case of Selymbria, at least, defection from the Confederacy may have been enforced 
by the Byzantines (for Selymbria see Dem. 1526, and for Perinthos see Plut., Pern., 
172: cf. Cargill. SAL. P.18QD.
3In 336 an Athenian garrison was stationed on Andros, to protect the interests 
of both the Athenians and the Andrians against Athens’ enemies of the Social ¥ar: 
see Tod, GHL II. 156.
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Athenians’ preoccupation with those who had revolted to weaken their 
own ties.1
The Athenians reacted by sending Chares, who was at the time 
campaigning in the Thracian region for the Athenians, against Chios with 
sixty ships. In an attack upon Chios (probably in spring 356) the Athenian 
fleet was repulsed and the former general Chabrias, serving this time as a 
private citizen, died in the engagement. A sizeable allied fleet of one 
hundred ships proceeded to take the offensive, attacking Athenian 
possessions in the northern Aegean and laying siege to Samos.2 The defeat 
at Chios stirred the Athenians to respond further to the rapidly-developing 
threat within their Confederacy; a fleet of sixty ships was sent out under 
the command of Timotheos, Iphikrates and Menestheos (Iphikrates* son) to 
join forces with Chares. The opposing fleets met that autumn (356) off 
Embata, in the waters between Chios and the Asian mainland. However, 
stormy weather, no doubt reviving memories of Arginusae, dissuaded the 
Athenian generals, except for Chares, from engaging. Chares pressed on 
regardless and suffered a defeat; he then vented his spleen against his 
colleagues by lodging suit against them on the ground that they had been 
bribed by the enemy. At the trial which followed, in the winter 356/5 or 
soon after,3 the prosecution case was managed by Chares’ political ally 
Aristophon; Iphikrates and Menestheos were acquitted but were not 
renewed in their command, while the haughty Timotheos was found guilty, 
was fined the crippling sum of one hundred talents, and withdrew into 
exile in Euboia, where he died not long afterwards. In the following year 
(355) Chares, now in sole command, prepared to renew the war against the 
allies, but lack of funds saw him and his men having to hire their services 
out to the rebel satrap Artabazos. This mercenary digression proved 
successful: a victory over an army of the King earned the general and his 
men grateful reward and caused Chares himself to boast that he had won a 
second Marathon. At first the Athenians were pleased by Chares' success,
^or the departure from the Confederacy nov or soon after of cities on Lesbos 
and of Kerkyra see Beloch, GG. lift .  1.244-5, and for the cities of the Chalkidike, led by 
Olynth os, see Cargill, SAL, p.180.
2This island had been brought under Athenian control in 365 by Timotheos 
and a hated cleruchy had been established there soon after; however, this act had not 
violated the letter of the agreement vhich Athens had made ’vith her allies in 377, 
since Samos had not been admitted as a member of the Confederacy.
3for the date see Beloch, Attische Politik, pp 363-364, cf. Pickard-Cambridge 
(CAH VI. p211), vho puts it either in 355 or possibly even in 354.
but their enthusiasm was shortlived: Artaxerxes Ochos was a more vigorous 
ruler than his predecessor, and he sent ambassadors to Athens to protest 
against Chares' involvement in Persian affairs, while rumours spread that 
the King threatened to throw Persian resources (a force of three hundred 
ships was specifically mentioned) behind the rebellious allies and other 
enemies of Athens. This prospect of Persian forces and resources being 
employed once again to humble Athens had a rapidly-sobering effect: not 
only was Chares' adventuring in Asia terminated on instructions from the 
Athenians, but they resolved to cut their losses in the war against their 
allies; peace negotiations were initiated, and the allies were found to be 
ready to accept terms; Chios and Rhodes followed Byzantium in 
withdrawing from the Confederacy, and the independence of these and of 
the other states and cities involved was recognized.1
A majority of scholars has accepted the explicit internal evidence of 
On the Peace which sets the work at a point late in the Social War, thus 
attributing to it a contextual and compositional date somewhere between 
the battle of Embata and the conclusion of peace in 355; some would 
nevertheless allow a period for composition and would thus separate the 
dates of the setting of the work and of its publication, putting the latter 
date shortly after the conclusion of the peace.2 This view has certainly won 
wider acceptance than an alternative theory that the discourse should be 
dated earlier in the time of the Social War: those who have subscribed to an 
earlier date for the work have offered approximate timings which range
1The sources for these events of the Social Var are listed by Meyer, GdA, V, 
pp.480 nn.l & 2,481 n 2; the only narrative source is that of Diodoros (16.7.3-121.1- 
722 ) .
^ l o c h  (Attische Politik, p.365) puts the speech before Areot>agitikos, vh ich  
he dates to summer 355, and either early in 355 or also in summer 355, but before the 
Athenians had fallen out v ith  the Great King; cf. Jebb, AO, II, p.182; Judeich, Klein. 
Studien.t>29Q. n.l (Judeich notes that he accepts the dating of the vork to the time 
immediately after the peace v ith  the allies as proposed by K. Euler (Ueber die 
Abfassungszeit der isokrateischen Eriedensrede. Progr. Cor bach 1883] vhose vork I 
have been unable to consult); Blass, AB, i R  p299; Meyer, GdA, V, p.494; Drerup, 
Isocratis opera omnia. I, p.cliii; Laistner, Isocrates De Pace and Philippus, p.17;
A. Momigliano, “Per la storia della pubblicistica sulla KOINH EIPHNH nel IV secolo 
A.C.", in  Terzo Contributo alia storia degli studi classici e del mondo antico (Rome, 
1966), p.472 (originally published in Annali della R. Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. 
Serie II, Vol.V, fasc2 [1936]); jaeger. D ate“, p.425, n .l; Jacoby, FGrH, Illb (II), p.85; 
Ryder, KE, p.91; Bringmann, Studien, p.59, n2 ; D. Gillis,“The Structure of Arguments 
in Isocrates' De Pace“, Philol. 114 (1970), 196.
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from early in the War to a date about autumn 356 1 The advocates of these 
earlier datings have depended upon arguments ex silentio: the two 
silences in On the Peace which have been especially noticed concern the 
allegedly disastrous Athenian defeat at Embata and the perplexing absence 
of any reference to the Persian king's part in bringing the war to a 
conclusion.
Oncken's suggestion (see note below) that On the Peace was written 
soon after the first Athenian attack on Chios is contradicted by the speech 
itself, in which it is implied that the war had already been in progress for 
some time (6. 19-21). Failure to mention the defeat of Embata is not a 
compelling indication of the work's date: to say that Embata was a defeat 
of great magnitude, which could therefore not have been overlooked, is a 
conclusion based solely upon a single, rather imprecise reference in Nepos; 
for only Cornelius Nepos actually says that a sea-battle occurred at Embata, 
adding that 'quite a number of ships were lost' (Timoth. 3 3“4- cf.3A hinc 
male re gesta, compluribus amissis navibus). Diodor os' account is less than 
precise concerning the battle itself and could even be read to mean that no 
engagement actually took place; for he says:
But just at the time when the naval battle was about to take place a great wind fell 
upon them and thwarted their undertaking. Vhen Chares, however, wished to fight 
despite the condition of the leather, but those with Iphikrates and Timotheos 
opposed the idea on account of the heavy sea. Chares called upon his soldiers to bear 
him witness and accused his fellow-commanders of treason; he wrote to the demos 
about them, charging them with having abandoned the sea-battle without cause. 
(16.21.3-4: trans. Sherman (Loeb ed.l slightly adapted; my under linings)
Both the underlined expressions could be read as meaning that no battle 
actually occurred. However, despite the vagueness of Diodoros' testimony it 
would be perverse to maintain that no engagement at all occurred. 
Undoubtedly a trial of the three more prudent generals took place at 
Athens, but the acquittal of two of those men is perhaps itself suggestive 
that the actual result of the engagement at Embata was not disastrous. 
According to Polyainos (3-9.29) the charge against IpWikrates was that,
lOncken, Isokrates und Athen, pp. 111-151; Mathieu, Idees, pp.116-118; P. 
Cloche, Politique Etrangere, pp. 156,163; & Isocrate et son temps, pp.76,109;
P. 0rsini,"La Date du Discours sur laPaix d'Isocrate“, Pallas 12 (1964), 11-17; according 
to Jaeger ("Date“, p.425 n .l) and Bringmann (Studien, p.59 n 2 ) F. Kleine-Piening also 
argues for a date early in the war, in a dissertation which I have been unable to 
consult (Quo tempore Isocratis orationes quae neot eionvfk et ’Aoeonayvruooc 
inscribuntur compositae sint [Diss. Münster, 1930]).
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when he might have defeated the enemy at Embata, he declined battle: 
this points to the fact that what angered the demos was not a disastrous 
defeat, but the failure to snatch a victory. Whatever the magnitude of the 
defeat at Embata, it does not follow that a subsequent composition of Qn 
the Peace would inevitably have included reference to that event. In the 
first place it may not have been politic for Isokrates to have rubbed salt 
into such a fresh wound;1 he may also have had a personal reason for 
avoiding recollection of that event, since he could have had no wish to 
exacerbate the public hostility towards his former pupil, Timotheos, of 
whom he was particularly proud (see 15.101-139), and whose career was 
ended over this incident.
The theory that the speech was composed prior to the battle of 
Embata may appear to account for the work's failure to mention certain 
historical events associated with the Social War, but it faces a serious 
difficulty in explaining the setting which is described. Before Embata the 
Athenians clearly intended to use force to suppress their rebellious allies 
and other enemies; so much is evident from the despatch, prior to Embata, 
of a second force to bolster that already active under Chares' command. 
There is no reason to expect a serious proposal for peace to originate from 
within the Council at Athens until after Embata and the dispiriting political 
feuding which ensued among the generals and their political allies at home. 
Those who would argue for a compositional date for On the Peace which 
precedes Embata must be prepared to treat the entire setting of the work 
as fictional, and it would be a fiction whose purpose is as obscure as its 
likelihood is implausible. Far better, then, to accept that the failure to 
mention Embata imposes no terminus ante quern, and to take the setting as 
reflecting historical events.
For some, who have accepted that On the Peace was composed at 
some time after the Athenians had begun to look toward a conceded peace 
to end the Social War, there is still the embarrassment of Isokrates' failure 
to acknowledge the influence of Persian pressure for Athens to terminate 
the war. Thus, some scholars would place the setting, and presumably the 
composition, of the speech at a time after Embata but before Chares had 
evoked the formal protest of the Persian king by his mercenary activities 
on behalf of the rebel satrap Artabazos; thus a date of around winter
1 Interestingly a similar point has been made by R. Sealey ("Athens after the 
Social ¥ a r“, JHS 75 [19551 74) about the omission of any mention of the battle of Chios, 
earlier in the var, in Demosthenes' speech Against Androtion vhich vas delivered 
shortly after the var.
356/5 or early in the following spring is advanced.1 However, the majority 
of scholars have preferred to postulate a setting for the work near the end 
of the Social War and a compositional date either close to the end of the 
war or shortly thereafter; these scholars have been prepared simply to 
accept that Isokrates could write upon the subject of the conclusion of the 
Social War without making reference to whatever part Persia played in 
inducing the Athenians to conclude a peace with their rebellious allies. In 
one sense this omission need not evince surprise, since Isokrates' purpose, 
as we shall see (below, pp. 14%, I67f., & esp. 17 Iff ), is forward-looking 
rather than retrospective;2 the speech is not about whether the Social War 
should be concluded or not - peace has already been acknowledged as 
agreed (though not unanimously) among the Athenians; rather, the issue 
which concerns Isokrates is the nature of the peace which is to be pursued.
In another sense we should not necessarily be over-concerned by 
what may seem to some to be a glaring omission; for Embata and the 
Persian influence in the ending of the Social War are not the only recent 
events which might be expected to have been mentioned in this speech. 
Neither the events of the Sacred War, primarily between the Phokians and 
their Lokrian and Theban enemies, nor the activities of the Makedonian 
king, Philip II, expanding his influence and control in the north of Greece, 
undoubtedly at Athens' expense, have been granted any precise historical 
record in On the Peace. This is so, despite the fact that Athens was an ally 
of Phokis and despite the fact that over the two years 357-356 Philip had 
already dispossessed Athens of Pydna and Potidaia, had formed an alliance 
with the Chalkidian League and, most crushing of all, had seized control of 
Amphipolis. Isokrates does refer to the long-standing Athenian objection 
to the Thebans' claim to speak on behalf of all Boiotia, and more 
particularly to the Athenians' anger at the Thebans' control of Plataia and 
Thespiai (6.17), but the resurgence of Theban attempts to expand their 
control to the territory of their persistent rivals, the Phokians, is not 
mentioned; yet, in the same year as Athens conceded peace to her 
rebellious allies, that conflict in Central Greece opened out into a formal
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*So Blass and Drerup (above, p. 138, n. 2).
2Modern scholarship has tended to v iev  the discourse as a negative statement 
by its author (relatively recenUy see Ellis & Milns, The Spectre of Philip, p.17 n.8: ”0n 
the Peace is a reflection of Athenian disillusionment after the var"); the 
interpretation provided in the course of this chapter emphasizes a positive v iev  of, 
and approach to, the situation on the part of Isokrates, vhich distinguishes it from 
interpretations found in earlier scholarship.
Amphictyonic War. Similarly, Athenian interest in Makedonia and Thrace 
is mentioned (6-22-24), but one would learn nothing from Isokrates’ vague 
remarks on that subject of the reality of Philip’s successes thus far in 
displacing the Athenian influence in the region. Isokrates is clearly not 
concerned to present his audience with a detailed portrait of the current 
state of affairs in the Greek world; he is not, it would seem, writing for 
posterity, but, as with a genuine Assembly-speech, for a contemporary 
audience who knew the background and the immediate circumstances, so 
that unless these were crucial for his argument, there was no need to 
describe them.
This is most clearly demonstrated in the reference early in the 
speech to an embassy: neither the identity of the ambassadors nor "the 
things which they promise (or ’demand’)" are explained, and scholars have 
been divided over whether these are Athenian ambassadors or envoys 
from Athens’ opponents in the Social War, some have even suggested that 
the immediately preceding context might point to the ambassadors being 
from either Philip II or Kersobleptes1. The dismissal of the ambassadors as 
fictional does not commend itself2; such a fiction seems altogether lacking 
in purpose, given the very lack of specificity of the reference. In the
1for a range or earlier opinions see Benseler (Isokrates' ¥erke. Leipzig 1854, 
ad 8.25); Benseler himself discards Philip or Kersobleptes as possibilities and prefers 
the representatives of the rebel allies, since he considers th a t , if the ambassadors 
yere  Athenians ,a future tense vould be required ra ther than the present 
enayyeAAovTca • More recent vievs have rightly  disregarded the possibility that the 
first sentence of 8.25 is connected v ith  the immediately preceding passage vh ich  is 
concerned v ith  Philip and Kersobleptes; 8.17-24 should be seen as a digression, v ith  
the sentence in question at the start of 825 being read as a resumption of the 
discussion of the proposed peace vh ich  is described at 8.16. Benseler's argument 
about the tense of enayyeXXovrca is not conclusive against these being Athenian 
ambassadors, if  the stage represented in the negotiations by Isokrates is not an initial 
decision by the Assembly to sue for peace, but is a  later point at vh ich  the Athenians 
have received response from an embassy sent to the allies and are nov  agreeing to 
ratify a proposal for peace.
Argument as to the meaning of enayyeXXovTca is also indecisive: Benseler 
argues for the sense "demand", vhereas Laistner (Isocrates' De Pace and Philippus, 
p.87) prefers "promise"; both meanings for the middle form of the verb are attested 
in Attic prose; Isokrates’ usage of the verb seems to favour Laistner, since on the 
other occasions vh en  the verb is used in the middle voice (1.19; 10.9; 13 B, 20) the 
meaning is clearly "profess" (though this is, admittedly, not quite the same thing as 
“promise"); hovever, the verb is used by Isokrates v ith  the sense “demand", though 
in an active form (10.57), and the middle is certainly found in contemporary use v ith  
the sense demand (cf. e.g. Dem. 19.193). Interestingly the verb appears at VS. 16222, 
in the associated context of the King “promising" Athens' enemies that he vould join 
them in this v a r against the Athenians (SieSoffy yap Xoyo$ o n  roi$ noAeplois i w  
’A0T]vaW ßaaiXei^ erniyyetXaro rpiarooxav^ vavoi oyymTanoXepfjoew tov$ ’AÖrjvcnot*;).
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20rsini, "La Date", p.lOf.
circumstances the wisest course may be to confess that these ambassadors 
could be either Athenians or representatives from the revolted allies1. 
However, a slight preference for their being Athenians can be advanced not 
only from Isokrates' usage (see above, p. 142, n. 1), but also from a reading 
of the work which takes the sentence at the start of 6.25 to be the 
resumption, after a digression, of the discussion of the peace which is 
described at 6.16; that earlier reference (6.15-16) to the peace proposals, 
the debate upon which forms the background to On the Peace, presents the 
matter only as proposals which have come before the Assembly through 
the prytaneis: there is no reference to the terms “demanded“ by the allies 
(if “demands" were indeed in order), and the words in 6.16 ml xpfjoeca rai? 
cRn#anc utS ramav; at? vvv nve? yeypa4«aiv seem to imply that negotiations are 
not in a preliminary stage, but that response has already been received 
from the Chians and the others, and that the terms of peace are now about 
to be ratified. Whatever the identity of the ambassadors, the key point for 
our purpose is the demonstration here that Isokrates is writing for a 
contemporary audience at Athens who needed no explanation of what are 
to later readers extremely allusive points, or matters of omission, within 
the oration. On the Peace was surely never addressed to a real-life 
Athenian Assembly, but it bears strong indications that it was written for, 
and in, a peculiarly contemporary context for an audience which the author 
could assume was intimately acquainted with both the circumstances of, 
and the background to, the actual debate which had occurred to discuss the 
issue of whether to continue or to conclude the Social War.
Nonetheless, we should try to resolve the matter, since those who 
would date the speech's composition to a time before the Persian protest at 
Chares’ interference in the affairs of the King must either join those whose 
view we have already considered in regarding the setting of the work as 
fictional or they must believe that the speech provides evidence that the 
x^thenians were pursuing peace before any diplomatic protest and apparent 
pressure from the King impelled them to such a course of action. However, 
just as we saw that the sending of a second fleet in 356 to reinforce the 
fleet with Chares is clear proof that the setting conveyed in On the Peace 
could not have represented truly the state of affairs at Athens prior to the 
sea-battle at Embata, so neither the fact that Chares had taken charge of 
the whole force, subsequent to his sending of indictments against his 
fellow-commanders to the Assembly, nor the Athenians' initial approval of 
Chares' success in his service with Artabazos (D. S. 16.22.1-2) accords with
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lSo Schäfer, Dem, u. s. Zeit, l2, p.190 and Momigliano, “KOINH EIPHNH“, p.473.
the scenario in the Athenian assembly which is portrayed by Isokrates; on 
the contrary, Diodoros says explicitly :
The Athenians at first approved Chares' action, but later, vhen the King sent 
ambassadors and denounced Chares, they changed their minds; for vord had been 
spread abroad that the King had promised Athens' enemies that he vould join 
them in their var against the Athenians vith three hundred ships. The assembly, 
accordingly, taking a cautious attitude, decided to bring a close to the var against 
their revolted allies; and finding that they too desired peace they easily came to 
terms vith them. (16222)
Such evidence, then, as we have independently of Isokrates, 
encourages the belief that the Athenians did not resolve to conclude the 
war against their allies until the threat of direct Persian assistance to their 
enemies caused them to make prudent overtures to the rebellious allies.
If Diodoros' account of the end of the Social War is correct, and we 
have no reason other than Isokrates' silence to doubt it, then we should 
accept that On the Peace was composed either during the negotiations 
between Athens and her revolted allies or soon after the conclusion of the 
peace. It cannot have been composed too much after the end of the war, 
since the quotation of a passage from the work in Antidosis (15-66) 
provides a terminus ante quern of 354-3 B. C.1 As for the silence of 
Isokrates regarding the Persian protest about Chares' activity in Asia Minor 
and the rumour that the Persians might cast their support behind the 
efforts of Athens’ enemies in the Social War, one can do no more than 
speculate. Certainly Isokrates is little interested in the peace negotiations 
themselves, which he treats as a foregone conclusion; he is far more 
concerned with the policy of Athens which is to follow the conclusion of 
hostilities against the rebellious allies.2 Furthermore, Isokrates* generally
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1 In the prooimium to Antidosis (15-9) Isokrates says that he vrites in his 82nd. 
year. The year of his birth is intemaUy established as B.C. by reference to his age 
(his 94th year: see 12.3) vhen he began to compose his final vork Panathenaikos (in 
342: cf. 12.17); Dion. Hal. (Isok. ch.l) says that Isokrates vas born in the 86th 
Olympiad, in the archonship of Lysimachos, 4 years before the start of the 
Peloponnesian Var, i.e. 436/5 (cf. also [Plut.lMor. 836F).
Similarly, there is total silence in the speech on the subject of the 
prosecution of Timotheos, Isokrates' pupil and friend, by Chares and Aristophon, a 
theme on vhich Isokrates vas prepared to speak at length in his later vork Antidosis 
(15-101ff.). Isokrates must have knovn of this matter vhen he vrote On the Peace, 
but his refusal to be dravn into any reference to the issue further indicates that his 
purpose here is quite different, and too important to allov peripheral and personal
consistent attitude of hostility towards the Persians would influence him 
against acknowledging that Athens could have its policies dictated by the 
threats of barbarians; a sense of political expediency, determined by 
Persian pressure, may well have restrained him from any demands at this 
time for a panhellenic crusade, but it would be a mistake to read any more 
into the reference to the great King at 6.16 than the intention to define the 
form of broadly-based peace (namely a Common Peace) which he wishes to 
recommend; Isokrates*  call for a peace based upon the terms which the 
Athenians had hitherto formed with the Spartans and the great King no 
more indicates a reversal of Isokrates' views about the actual King's Peace, 
which he condemned in his Panegyrikos. than it implies that he intends 
that the Spartans should now be the guarantors of it, as they had been in 
367. It will be seen (below, pp. 166,161,169) that the glimpses allowed in 
On the Peace of Isokrates' attitude towards the Persians suggest a political 
acuity, not a change in the author's attitude on this subject.
On the Peace has been used by historians both as evidence for the 
recent past and as a pointer to Athenian policy in the immediate future.
For the past, Isokrates' criticism of the Athenians' management of their 
Confederacy has been treated as confirmation of the view that since the 
early 360s the Athenians had been progressively returning to the habits of 
imperialism and that it was this autocratic and self-interested behaviour on 
the part of the Athenians which led to several revolts in the late 360s and 
at last, in 357, to the Social War itself1. This view of Athenian leadership of 
the Confederacy has been denied by J. Cargill in his book The Second 
Athenian League (Berkeley I960, in which Cargill maintains (pp. 131 -166, 
esp., for On the Peace, pp. 176-6) that On the Peace does not provide 
evidence for the degeneration of Athens' leadership of the Second Athenian
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matters to divert the attention of his audience. This also supports the viev expressed 
belov (pp. 164-7) that Isokrates vas not concerned in On the Peace vith making 
attacks on specific individuals (and especially Chares); his subject in this speech is 
the foreign policy of Athens, and his audience's concentration is not to be distracted 
by other issues.
*See Beloch, GG, III“. 1.237-238; Mathieu, Les Idees, p.l 14; Cloche, Politique 
fctraneere. pp.157-158; G. L. Cavkvell, Tubulus", JHS 83 (1963), 52; Ryder, KE, pp.88- 
89; a more cautious account is given by Sealey, HGCS, pp .432-434,440. Byzantion had 
broken avay by 362, in vhich year she v^as disrupting Athenian shipping in the 
Bosporos ([Dem. ] 50.6 - the verb ramyevv, used here, does not necessarily imply an act 
of ,ver on the part of the Byzantines: see de Ste Croix, Origins, p.47), and an Athenian 
(Tod, GHI, II. 142) decree of the same year reveals trouble on Keos.
14b
Confederacy into a policy aimed at renewal of empire;1 in Cargill’s view 
Isokrates is criticizing the Athenian leadership, headed by the politician 
Aristophon and the general Chares, for returning, during the Social War 
itself, to an imperialistic purpose and behaviour. For the future, the advice 
which Isokrates gives is seen as foreshadowing, or publicizing, (depending 
upon one's view both of the timing of the emergence of Euboulos' policy 
and of the relationship of Isokrates' views and those of Euboulos and his 
faction) the policy which was to dominate at Athens in the years which 
followed the end of the Social War; this policy has been associated 
particularly with the politician Euboulos2 *.
Yet not all have drawn the same conclusions about the policy for the 
future which Isokrates advocates in On the Peace: while some have 
equated it, or closely identified it, with that of Euboulos, the policy itself, as 
found in On the Peace, has been characterized as pacificism3, as an 
hegemony to be based upon good-will (ewoia) and the trust of the allies and 
friends4 5, or even as the abandonment of any foreign policy at all5.
Isokrates' opinions and advice in this oration are seen by some as a 
disturbing volte face after the views expressed in earlier works, and in 
particular Panegyrikos: the two issues on which Isokrates is held to have 
significantly adjusted his opinion are the desirability of a renascent 
Athenian naval empire and the acceptability of a general peace among the 
Greeks in which the Persian King occupied a significant role6. The speech is
1See also J. Cargill, "Hegemony, not Empire: The Second Athenian League”, 
Ancient Vorld5 (1982), 91-102.
2See Cavkvell, "Eubulus”, p.52, although he is cautious as to hov far beyond 
the area of finance Euboulos' political importance extended as early as the 350s (cf. 
"Eubulus", p.48).
^Oncken, Isokrates und Athens, pp. 85 & 87; also Meyer, GdA, V. p.482, Sealey, 
"Athens after the Social ¥ar ”, p.77; Orsini, "La Date”, p. 9.
4 J. de Romilly, "Eunoia In Isocrates or the Political Importance of Creating 
Good ¥ il l ‘, JHS 78 (1958), 92-101, esp. 96-98; Gillis, “Structure in De Pace", p.195.
5 Jacoby, FGrH. Illb (II), p.86; see also Jaeger, Paideia, Ill, p.127.
%ee esp. Jaeger, Paideia. Ill, pp.128-9 and Momigliano, “KOINH EIPHNH", p.474; 
also J. Ober,“Vievs of Sea Po’ver in the Fourth-Century Attic Orators“, Ancient ¥orld 1 
(1978), 126-128; cf. de Romilly, “Eunoia", p.98 and Bringmann, Studien, p.61; an 
alleged change in Isokrates' attitude tovard empire (apxfi) depends, of course, upon 
the v iev  vhich one holds of Isokrates' message in Panegyrikos: the interpretation of 
this thesis does not accept that Isokrates vas an advocate of "empire" in the 
discredited fifth-century sense in 380. and so the issue of an about-turn in Isokrates'
regarded by some as the expression of an emergent voice of conservatism 
in Athenian politics* 1, which manifests itself at this critical moment both in 
its attack upon the more radical democrat politicians and in its call for a 
policy which will favour the interests of the rich by promoting peace and 
thereby fostering commerce while relieving the rich of the burden of war- 
taxes. A negativism which has often been discerned in the oration has been 
claimed to express not only the response of Isokrates himself but also a 
general disillusionment among Athenians after the Social War2 *.
Not all scholars would attribute too much importance to the oration 
as a source of information for the history of the events and circumstances 
with which it is concerned. In a discussion of the political antagonism 
between Aristophon and Euboulos, which modern scholarship has sought to 
identify in part by the ascription to Aristophon of a warlike policy in 
support of imperialism and to Euboulos of a policy of pacificism or non­
intervention, R. Sealey has noted that On the Peace and Xenophon's Poroi 
are used as evidence in the arguments advanced in favour of this 
conclusion about the respective policies of these two politicians^ Sealey 
claims, quite reasonably, that the attempt to associate Euboulos with the 
views expressed in Poroi is unconvincing and that the argument which 
concludes that Aristophon would have been opposed to the views published 
in On the Peace is more persuasive, but he seeks to strengthen his case by 
impugning the value of the evidence for the political history of the time:
Above all, neither of the two pamphlets is by a practical politician, and 
although admittedly Xenophon is more realistic in his proposals than Isocrates, 
both stand outside the increasingly exclusive circle of ol noAvrevopevoi.4
attitude to empire between the two works does not arise: this point has rightly been 
stressed by J. Cargill, who also provides bibliographical material in support of 
Isokrates’ consistency on this matter (“Hegemony not Empire", p. 94 & n23).
1See Bringmann, Studien, pp.109-110; Jacoby, Atthis, pp.74 & 131, and FGrH 
Illb (I), 87 & 90; Jaeger, “Date“, pp. 429 & 442-450.
2For the view that On the Peace is an expression of pessimism and defeatism on 
the part of Isokrates himself see Meyer; GdA, V. pp.482-484; Jacoby, FGrH Illb (II), 
p.86; for it as a reflection of a widespread mood among the Athenians see Ellis & 
Milns, Spectre of Philip. p.17, n.8.
“^Athens after the Social Var", pp. 75-77.
4Ibid.,p.77.
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The most complete dismissal of On the Peace as a work of topical 
reference or of serious comment or advice upon contemporary affairs has 
come from Phillip Harding.1 Harding interprets Archidamos and On the 
Peace as epideiktic orations, written closely together ("after 355/4") and 
designed to form " an example of the sophistic-rhetorical device of 
antilogiai, two speeches arguing two sides of the same theme";2 3according 
to Harding, Isokrates is saying through his composition of this pair of 
speeches:
Give me a theme, give me tvo opposite situations and 111 shov  you h o v  to argue 
both sides of the question. On the one hand, peace at any price, on the other, naked 
imperialism .3
Harding reaches this conclusion by the following argument: Archidamos is 
an oration which is inconsistent with the other works of Isokrates; for 
This whole speech runs counter to views that Isokrates expounds 
elsewhere";4 5thus, we should interpret Archidamos as "purely epideictic, a 
show-piece",5 then, if this work is epideiktic, why not others? In 
particular, why not On the Peace, with which Harding claims to find specific 
opposition and precise disagreement to Archidamos in the treatment of a 
number of themes. Harding procedes to compare the treatment of a 
number of themes in his attempt to demonstrate the antitheses between 
these two speeches.6 My discussion of Archidamos has shown that oration 
to have a significance and purpose in its proper historical context; 
certainly, that work does not espouse “naked imperialism" any more than, 
as we shall see, On the Peace can be summed up as an argument for "peace 
at any price“.7 Harding's interpretation of On the Peace as an epideiktic 
work composed as a thematically antithetical companion-piece to
I "Purpose", pp. 137-149.
2Ibid., p.147.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., p.143.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., pp.144-147.
7Cf. Harding, "Purpose“, p.147.
Archidamos has been effectively rebutted by R. A. Moysey1, who shows 
that such antithesis as exists between the subjects of the two works does 
not compel the conclusion drawn by Harding: the themes themselves are 
relevant to the subject-matter of each speech, and some are themes not 
reserved by Isokrates to these two speeches or are even rhetorical 
commonplaces.2 3Moysey points out that the alleged antitheses detected by 
Harding are exaggerated; where similarities of theme or contrasts of 
argument are evident, they can quite reasonably be accounted for by the 
similarity of the issue under discussion in each speech3 or by the difference 
of the historical circumstances and the decision which Isokrates wishes to 
propose.
Moysey then argues that Isokrates' own explanation of the purpose 
of On the Peace, which is given in Antidosis, is strong evidence against 
Harding's thesis by providing testimony for the serious and relevant 
political purpose of the speech.4 For at Antidosis 66 Isokrates quotes two 
passages from On the Peace (6.2 5-56. 132-145): his purpose is to 
demonstrate from his published works that his compositions do not do 
harm to his city nor do they corrupt the young. V/e have already seen that 
a previous passage which he quotes in his defence in this work is drawn 
from Panegyrikos (above, p.41); after that passage Isokrates anticipates an 
imagined objector who would criticize that example by saying that it is an 
easy matter to laud the past, but that it is more difficult, and more 
pertinent, to criticize the mistakes which the state is making at present and 
to offer counsel for the future. In response to this Isokrates appeals to On 
the Peace as an example of a work which was intended to achieve just that; 
he introduces the two passages from On the Peace thus:
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M oysey, "On the Peace“, pp. 118-127; cf. also, J. Davidson, “Isocrates Against 
Imperialism: an Analysis of the De Pace“. Historia 39 (1990), 21 n.3.
^The "antithetical“ themes are: the exhortation to emulate one's ancestors, 
arche and hegemonia. the consequences of peace for the state's territorial possessions 
beyond its own borders, attitude to Theban support for the enemies of Sparta in the 
Peloponnese and the question of freedom and autonomy for all Greek states, tyrants, 
the use of the Athenians as examples for the Spartans and vice versa, mercenaries, 
and the relationships between justice and advantage or between peace and safety.
3 In Archidamos the Spartan Assembly has met to consider courses of action 
which will either lead to war or result in peace (6.3), while in On the Peace the 
Athenian Assembly is met to discuss the question of war or peace (82).
4Moysey, "On the Peace", pp.122-124.
At the beginning of this oration I speak on the question of making peace vith the 
Chians, the Rhodians, and the Byzantines; and after I have shovn that it is to the 
advantage of Athens to end the var, I decry our dominion over the Hellenes and our 
sea-pover, shoving that it is in no vay different, either in its conduct or in its 
results, from tyranny. I recall also the evils vhich that pover has brought upon 
Athens, upon the Lacedaimonians, and upon all the others. After having dvelt 
upon this subject, deplored the misfortunes of Hellas, and urged Athens not to allov 
herself to remain in her present state, finally I summon her to a career of justice, I 
condemn the mistakes she is nov making, and I counsel her as to her future policy. 
(15-63-65: trans. Norlin, slightly adapted)
I have suggested in the case of the Panegyrikos that a statement 
made in Antidosis about a work published almost thirty years earlier is 
more illustrative of the significance which the author saw to be still existing 
in that work many years after its original publication than of the original 
purpose with which it had been composed (see above, pp.41-42). One 
might ask whether the statement in Antidosis about On the Peace is any 
more to be treated as revealing the true purpose of that work. The answer, 
I believe, is that it is: On the Peace was composed and published only a 
year or two before Antidodis. and it seems hardly credible that Isokrates 
could, so soon after his publication of On the Peace, have seriously quoted 
in his own defence passages from a work said to have offered serious 
criticism and counsel upon the contemporary state of Athenian policy and 
affairs, if that same work had been published as a recognizedly epideiktic 
composition. Nor can one escape by supposing that Antidosis itself was no 
more than an epideiktic work: such an interpretation of Antidosis is 
discounted in its opening sentence: "If the discourse which is now about to 
be read had been like the speeches which are produced either for the law- 
courts or for oratorical display, I should not, I suppose, have prefaced it by 
any explanation" 0 5 -1)-1
More could be said in objection to Harding's thesis, but there would 
be little profit in further demonstrating its failure to convince.2 However,
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^ his point is made by Moysey (Ibid., p.l22f.), vho summarizes his rejection of 
the possibility that both Antidosis and Isokrates' other compositions, including On the 
Peace, vere all epideiktic compositions, vith no historical or deliberative purpose, 
thus: “It seems very far-fetched to suppose Isokrates vrote an epideictic oration 
specif ically said not to be epideictic about an imaginary trial in vhich he quoted from 
other epideictic orations in his imaginary defense“.
2por example: the use of Dionysios I, tyrant of Syrakuse, in Archidamos as an 
exemplum vorthy of emulation, but in On the Peace as an admonitory illustration
since the publication of Moysey's article, Harding has reaffirmed his view 
that On the Peace was not written with any intention of influencing 
contemporary Athenian policies or politics: Harding makes no attempt to 
respond to Moysey's criticisms or argument; instead, he adopts a new line 
of argument, which is based upon the conclusions of J. Cargill's study of the 
Second Athenian Confederacy (see above, p,145ff ); Harding accepts Car­
gill's conclusion that Athens did not contravene the terms of the Confed­
eracy and cannot be accused of having re-established a second empire over 
her allies which should be used to explain the revolt of some of Athens' 
allies in 3 5 1 Harding portrays the assessments and descriptions of
(Harding, "Purpose”, p.146), not only fails to provide a  thematic antithesis (in attitude 
to tyrannical rule: see Moysey, "On the Peace", p.121), but also can be accounted for as 
a natural choice for a favourable exemplum in the case of Archidamos (presumably 
the occasion vhere  the exemplum is to be considered contradictory to Isokrates' true 
opinions), since in the first half of the 360s Dionysios I and his successor were 
associated on officially recognised terms of friendship v ith  both the Spartans and the 
Athenians (see above, p. 122 & n.2); or is this convincingly historical explanation for 
the favourable reference to Dionysios I in Archidamos to be either dismissed as 
coincidental or explained as a minutia of vhat Harding calls the speech's "dramatic 
verisimilitude" (“Purpose", p.148}? Again, Harding presses too hard in trying to 
establish elaborate contrasts (see “Purpose”, p 144): it is true that in both speeches 
the speaker claims to be offering advice which is against the trend of current 
opinion: that was not a rhetorical topic limited either to Isokrates or to epideiktic 
oratory (cf. Demosthenes’ opening to his First Philippic (4.1)); h o w re r , it is not 
correct to press further and to say th a t, whereas the Spartans ".are being exhorted by 
their allies to do as the Thebans bid them ( npoaramo is the verb) and let their dpxtf 
over Messeniago", the Athenian allies "are putting pressure upon the Athenians to 
give up their oprf on the sea, and abide by the injunctions (again npocmxTTtü is the 
verb) of the King's Peace": Isokrates does not describe the situation in On the Peace as 
one in vh ich  the Athenians are being pressed by their allies to surrender their opxifj: 
the Athenians are met to discuss the specific matter of peace with their rebel allies, 
and Isokrates is the one vho is advocating abandonment of dpxri; Harding seems to 
find significance in the occurrence of the verb npooTixTTtu in each context, but the 
verb is common enough in Isokrates' xrarks (S. Preuss [Index Isocrateus, Leipzig 1904 ] 
lists over 50 instances) and the implied analogy is not exact, since the tv/o 
occurrences of the verb in On the Peace (8.16,20) do not refer to vhat the allies 
command but to vhat the terms of the Kings’ Peace and subsequent Common Peaces 
have enjoined. Nor again do the texts justify Harding's further elaboration of the 
antithesis vhen  he accounts for the allegedly total opposition to the speakers by 
saying that at Sparta it was "because the Spartans are too veak to resist", vhile at 
Athens it vas "because Athens is so strong and veil equipped at the time that there 
seems every likelihood of success", and to conclude that "Only Isokrates sees the 
situation aright and comes forward to advise peace [in On the Peace 1" is, in any case, 
an over-simplified summary of Isokrates' true position (see belov, pp. l?5ff.).
^See Harding, “Laughing at Isokrates", pp. 18-19: Harding claims that Two 
studies have independently arrived at these conclusions; the other work to vh ich  he 
refers is Hornblov-'er’s, Mausolus (Oxford 1982), but it is not accurate to equate 
Hornblo’v e r’s judgement on these matters with that of Cargill, as Harding in fact 
admits in a subsequent footnote (p.19, n . l ).
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Athens' relations with her allies during the fourth century Confederacy 
which are given by Isokrates in On the Peace as a rehashing of the history 
of the Athenian history of the fifth century. In Harding's estimation Cargill 
has demonstrated with his study of the period of Athens' leadership of the 
Second Athenian Confederacy that "in the case of his song and dance in On 
the Peace about the evils of imperialism and the need to be nice to the 
allies in order to get their good will, Isokrates was completely out of touch 
with the reality of the situation“.1
To say that there was nothing to denounce about Athenian behaviour
beyond her own boundaries for the period prior to the outbreak of the
Social War would not only leave the Social War itself without apparent
explanation,2 *but would also leave On the Peace without any topical
relevance or purpose. Cargill does not choose to be forced into an
interpretation of Isokrates* speech like that offered by Harding, and so he
has to find some contemporary reason for Isokrates* criticism: this he does
by pointing to what he describes as the "wartime misbehaviour of Chares";3
Cargill believes that Isokrates found no cause for criticism of Athens'
leadership of her Confederacy until the time of the Social War; thus the
view, first voiced by Aristotle (Rhet. 1416a, 11.31 - 33), that On the Peace
contained a personal attack upon the general Chares is taken up by Cargill,
who savs: "It seems more reasonable to view the oration as a condemnation *
of Chares and his supporters for having, during the war, converted 
Tirnotheos' benign League into a renewed fifth-century-style Empire - or at 
least for having tried mightily to do so".4
The general description of Athens' foreign policy, which 
Isokrates wants to see changed, is summed up early in the speech, when he 
says that the Athenians must be persuaded that there is more to be gained 
from being at peace than from interfering in the affairs of others, more 
benefit in just behaviour than in acting unjustly, and more advantage in 
being concerned with their own state's business than in coveting what
la u g h in g  at Isokrates“, p.19.
2This difficulty in Cargill's interpretation of events is noticed by none other 
than S. HornbloTver in his review of Cargill's book on the Second Athenian 
Confederacy (CR n.s. '32 (1982), 236); S. M. Shervdn-Vhite makes the same criticism in 
her review of' Cargill's book and concludes that "Cargill perhaps underestimates 
Athens' continuing thrust to empire-build"(JHS 102 [19821270f.).
-■Cargill, "Hegemony, not Empire", p. 100.
4Ibid.
belongs to others;1 only thus can they hope to achieve lasting peace and 
consequent prosperity. Interference in others’ affairs (noXvTTpaypcwvvTi), 
unjust behaviour (dsuda) and a desire for the possessions of others (tojv 
dxxoTpW emöyula) are all very general criticisms, applicable certainly to the 
empire of Athens in the fifth-century; but Isokrates surely cannot have in 
mind that fifth-century situation here: for he cannot be advising the 
Athenians that a policy which had operated in the previous century, but 
which had of necessity been terminated by the defeat of Athens and the 
dissolution of her empire in 404, should now be abandoned if a permanent 
end, rather than a temporary relief, from their present misfortunes is to be 
achieved by the Athenians in 355 This is, indeed, made clear in a passage 
which follows closely:
've think that, i f  ve  sail the sea v ith  many triremes and compel the various 
states to pay contributions and send representatives to Athens, ve  have 
accomplished something to the purpose. But in  fact, ve have been completely 
misled as to the truth; for of the hopes vh ich  Tre cherished not one has been 
fulfilled; on the contrary, ve have reaped from them hatreds and vars and great 
expense. And this Tras to be expected; for in  former times as the result of such 
meddlesomeness ve vere placed in the utmost peril, vh ile  as the result of keeping 
our city in  the path of justice and of giving aid to the oppressed and of not coveting 
the possessions of others ve vere given the hegemony by the Trilling consent of 
the Hellenes - considerations vh ich  nov and for a long time past, Trithout reason 
and Trith utter recklessness, ve have treated v ith  contempt. (8.29-30; trans. 
Norlin)
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The criticism of Athenian leadership which occurs in the earlier half of this 
passage is clearly directed against recent and current practice; this is 
confirmed in the remainder of the passage: the comparison between the 
former (fifth-century) empire and the period which followed, when Athens' 
behaviour towards other Greek states was laudable and resulted in her 
being accorded the leadership of the Second Athenian Confederacy, is 
offered in order to warn the Athenians that their reversion to a less 
estimable attitude to leadership again threatens to end in a manner 
undesirable for Athens.
Nonetheless, the only specific criticism of Athenian foreign policy 
which is available in the passage is the allegation that the allies were being
i 826 oySev 8e royrav otov j eon yeveo8ca nporepov, npiv av TreioBfjre TTjv yev 
fp^ iav  (^ cXHiaJTepav iari icepSaAearrepav eum t% no^pawoowTft, Tijv §e Simoayvinv t% 
aSuaac, rijv 5€ tojv iSW emjAeXeiav tojv aXXorpW emßyuvac.
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impelled to make financial contributions and to send delegates to Athens to 
attend meetings of the Confederacy: the latter point may imply that some 
were by this time reluctant members of the Confederacy. Shortly after 
Isokrates again criticizes the demagogues for urging their compatriots to 
debar from sea-trafficking those allies who were unwilling to pay their 
contributions (owrd^vs), allegedly appealing to the example of their 
ancestors (0-36)- That these contributions had become reminiscent, at least 
in an informal sense, of the much-hated tribute of the fifth-century empire 
is indicated when the word Sac^ oXoyeiv (‘to collect tribute') is twice used by 
Isokrates in criticizing the behaviour of the contemporary Athenians 
towards their allies (6.46,125); this verb had already been used by 
Isokrates in a certainly critical sense to refer to the Spartans’ exaction of 
tribute from Greek cities as part of their oppressive regime in the early 
fourth-century (see 4.123,132). In On the Peace the verb occurs in two 
similar phrases, the other component of which constitutes a second aspect 
of Isokrates' criticism of the Athenians’ behaviour: for he says that the 
allies are being mistreated by the Athenians or their agents (6.46: 
rowjiaxoy$ tov$ fpeTepou^  aviw i8iov$ Xi^ avvopieSa urn Sac^ oXoyoy^ ev, and 6-125-
ynojievo^ ev t t iv  nev ttoX i v  öiaßoXd^  exowov d k  Xuimverai food SaqioXoyei vE X X tivo£ ) ;
at another point the mistreatment of their allies by the Athenians is 
likened to what the Athenians themselves are so critical of in the behaviour 
of the Thebans towards those Greeks in neighbouring towns or cities
(6.115).
The accusation that the Athenians are mistreating their allies leaves 
us wondering how?’ and whom?’. Isokrates does not enlighten us as to 
who were the peoples who suffered at Athenian hands; he does afford a 
little information about the methods, though not much. The first reference 
to "the mistreatment of allies and exaction of tribute" (at 6.46) is said to be 
caused by Athens' need to raise money to pay for the employment of 
mercenary troops: this suggests financial oppression by marauding 
Athenian commanders rather than political interference or usurpation of 
the autonomy of Confederacy members; this is supported by a statement 
made in the conclusion of the work, where it is said that one means of 
redirecting their policy to advantage would be for the Athenians to treat 
their allies as they would their friends, not paying lip-service to allied 
autonomy, while allowing the Athenian generals to treat them in whatever 
way they wished (6.134).
In terms of misdeeds and abuses by the Athenians with respect to 
their Confederacy allies that is all that is offered in this speech. There is no
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catalogue of contraventions of the terms of the charter of the Second 
Athenian Confederacy, only the claim that exactions of contributions from 
allies had occurred and had occasioned resentment;1 these were, it seems, 
effected in many instances in a heavy-handed manner. Nor is there 
specific evidence in On the Peace to confirm the interpretation of many 
modern scholars who believe that a number of events since 369 tend 
support to a revived spirit of imperialism in Athenian policy from the 
beginning of the 360s.2 Yet to fail to find in On the Peace specific testimony 
of Athenian imperialism toward the existing allies would be to mistake the 
message and the purpose of the speech. Isokrates is not saying that a 
transformation of the Second Athenian Confederacy into a renewed 
Athenian empire had occurred. He is saying that there now existed among 
a number of the Athenians, perhaps among many, a view that the 
Confederacy could be used to support actions abroad which were designed 
to promote Athenian prosperity and self-interest without taking any 
account of the interest of the allies; he is saying that the actions of the 
Athenians in pursuit of their own prosperity were causing resentment and 
hostility among the Greeks toward Athens; and he is saying that there is a 
revived spirit of imperialism among a number of the leaders at Athens 
which is welcome to many Athenians. What Isokrates does tell us, which 
has not been sufficiently noted by scholars, is that this renewed Athenian 
empire is a prospect of hope for its proponents rather than a present 
achievement: Isokrates does not advise the Athenians to abandon the 
naval empire, but says that they "should cease being desirous of such an 
empire"; 3 he continues: "Now I believe that I shall make it evident to all 
that we desire an empire which is neither just nor capable of being attained 
nor advantageous to ourselves" (6.66, trans. Norlin, adapted: my 
underlinings); and again:
Although the decree of Aristoteles says nothing about the financial 
arrangements, some method of supporting the cost of the Confederacy’s operations 
,vas clearly necessary. Scholarly opinion about the initial nature of the 
arrangements, and about subsequent possible changes to those arrangements, is very 
varied: for a summary see Cargill, SAL, pp.124-128.
2For a list of these events see G. 1. Cavkvell. “Notes on the Failure of the Second 
Athenian Confederacy“, JHS 101 (1981), 53-54: and see above, p. 145, n.l; cf. Davidson 
(“Isocrates Against Imperialism", pp. 29-30) vho also notes the difficulty of finding 
precise references to imperialistic oppression and revenge in the speech.
38.64: T)v n ocw üL p töa  r% apx% K a ra  eaXarrav emfivuoOvrec; cf. 8.43f.
But that ve could not, if  ve  vould, attain to this empire by conquest I think I 
shall quickly prove. For vhen, vith the help of ten thousand talents, ve  vere not 
able to retain it, hov can ve  acquire it in our present state of poverty, especially 
since ve are no v  addicted, not to the vays of life by vhich ve  gained it, but to those 
by vhich ve  lost it? Furthermore, that it is not even for the advantage of the state 
to accept this empire, if  it vere offered to us, I think you v ill learn very quickly 
from vhat further I have to say. (8.69-70)
For the historian, Isokrates is at times frustratingly imprecise in his 
failure to distinguish precisely between Athenian behaviour toward the 
allies and that toward other Greeks. On the second occasion when he 
speaks of the Athenians maltreating others and exacting tribute (6.125) the 
object of these outrages are "the Greeks", whereas on the former occasion 
the allies are specifically nominated (6 46). The similarity of expression 
and the use of the verb SaouoAoyelv, which seems to be restricted in 
isokrates to the notion of collecting tribute (cf. 4.132; Ep.7.4; also 4.123), 
encourage the assumption that “the Greeks" is used at 6.125 as an 
equivalent to “the Athenian allies". But what are we to make of the 
allegation that, in contrast to their illustrious ancestors, Isokrates' 
contemporaries have drawn mercenaries from x s^ia and have been leading 
them against “the Greeks“ (6 42)? Or, in the same passage, where we are 
told that these same contemporaries have been “subjecting“ Greek cities? 
The use of the word KaraSoyXoi^ evoi here by Isokrates reminds us of 
Thucydides’ use of SovAouv when speaking of the Athenians' subjection of 
the Naxians in the fifth century (cf. I.96.4);1 Norlin refers this specifically 
to the attempt by the Athenians to overcome their rebellious allies in the 
Social War,2 but it should be noted that the expected object of 
raraSoyXoyuevoi is ras ttoAcis Tac'EXAr|vlSa$ and the whole passage offers no 
explicit connection of this contemporary and discreditable policy of the 
x^thenians with their allies. In the absence of evidence which would 
elaborate these general statements we cannot be sure whether the passage 
refers to Athenian activity against her allies or against other Greeks.3
15&
^or the meaning of 'douleia' and its cognates in such contexts see B. D. Meritt 
et al.. The Athenian Tribute Lists. Vol.3 (Nev Jersey, 1950), pp. 155-157.
2G. Norlin, Isocrates (Loeb ed), II, p.31 note c.
3Cf. a similar preference for the use of “Greeks" at 8.79, vhen Isokrates is 
clearly talking of the injustices vhich vere perpetrated upon Athens’ subject-allies 
in the fifth century, although it is no doubt true that the odium vhich accrued to
The exaction of tribute-style "contributions” from Confederacy allies, 
and the unpopularity caused by this, is attested by Isokrates in this speech; 
it is also indicated that the method of collection offered ground for 
complaint and criticism, although it is not made clear whether the causes 
for which the exactions were levied were further reason for complaint. To 
say this is not to equate these collections in a precise way with the odious 
tribute-system of the fifth-century, which had been specifically guarded 
against in the terms of the Second Athenian Confederacy. The levying of 
"contributions", which had certainly been practised since 373,1 was slow to 
develop into any form of regular financial commitment and may never 
have developed into the formal assessment and annual payment system of 
the fifth-century tribute, but On the Peace does provide evidence that by 
the mid-350s the allies had come to find these "contributions" an unwanted 
obligation, even if they could not be described as a "severe burden".2
If Isokrates speaks of a second empire as an unfilled ambition rather 
than an accomplished fact, is Cargill perhaps right when he proposes that 
this imperialist attitude and policy was a very recent phenomenon in 355, 
having only emerged during the Social War? There are three arguments 
which tell against this interpretation. The first concerns the one precise 
criticism made by Isokrates against the current Athenian behaviour toward 
their allies: that is, the exaction of financial “contributions". However, 
references to "contributions" in On the Peace are not specifically associated 
with events of the Social War, nor is there any suggestion that they 
commenced at this time. According to Diodor os, in the Social War the allies 
were more likely to have been attacked and forced to make payments in 
aid of the cause of the rebel allies, whereas Chares, after he had taken 
command of the whole fleet, was anxious to relieve the Athenians of the 
expense: to this end, he sought money, not from the loyal allies, but by
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Athens from those actions was felt by others in  the Greek world than just the allies 
themselves.
M arshall (The Second Athenian Confederacy, p.38) believed that it began 
with the foundation of the Confederacy: however, the silence of the foundation 
charter on the subject, apart from the explicit clause which guarded against the 
payment o f “tribute“ (4opo$) (IG II2. 43.123), seems a strong argument against the 
introduction of "contributions" from the outset. For a discussion of the matter, and 
the arguments for their introduction in  373, see Cawkwell, "Notes on the Peace of 
375/4", pp. 91-93.
2So, Sealey, HGCS, p.433.
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mercenary service with Artabazos (D.S. 16.22.1-2). Can a case be made in 
support of Isokrates* criticism for the period before the Social War?
The question of svntaxeis under the Second Athenian Confederacy is 
controversial in a number of aspects: the silence of the foundation treaty 
on the question of revenues seems to favour the view that in the beginning 
the expectation was that Confederacy funds would be raised irregularly on 
a basis of need, but the process had apparently developed by the later 340s 
into an annual revenue whose total could be predicted, or at least approx­
imated.1 It is also a reasonable assumption that in the earlier years the 
allied synhedrion shared with the Athenians, if they did not actually man­
age the matter themselves, the determining of individual “contributions”; 
again, evidence from later in the Confederacy's history suggests that control 
of the fixing of individual allies* “contributions" passed into the hands of the 
Athenians, although the evidence is not conclusive.2 On the Peace does not 
provide sufficient detail about the syntaxeis to establish whether either of 
these developments (a move to annual tribute or Athenian control of the 
levels of individual sums to be paid) had occurred by 355- What gave 
offence, if we can judge from Isokrates' references to the subject was 
especially the manner in which the payments were collected, but also 
possibly the fact that they had become regular and were no longer 
individually justified and accepted at meetings of the synhedrion. More 
important still was the issue of the very purpose of the Confederacy.
Until the eclipse of Sparta's power at Leuktra and in the events 
which followed in the Peloponnese, Athens' allies can have had little reason 
to be suspicious of the motives of their leader. There is no evidence to 
show that whatever contributions the allies made to the war effort in the 
370s aroused resentment. In 369 two redirections of Athenian policy 
impinged upon the purpose of the Confederacy, and these may have given 
the allies food for thought: first was the ratification of an alliance between 
Athens and Sparta, and second was the reawakening of Athenian ambitions 
to recover territory in the north of mainland Greece. The emasculation of 
Sparta's power, followed by a formal treaty of peace between Athens and 
Sparta, had effectively nullified the specific threat which had occasioned
1 Aisch. 2.71 (in 343 B.C.): "Ithe officers of Chares ] were extracting from the 
Tiretched islanders a contribution of sixty talents a year" (trans. Adams); see also 3.94 
& Dem. 18234.
2See [Dem. ] 58.37f., which says that at some stage the syntaxis of Ainos had 
been determined between the Ainians and the Athenian general Chares; cf. IG II2. 
233,11.12-18, and see Cargill, SAL, p.123-6.
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the formation of the Confederacy; the claim of Athens to Amphipolis and 
the campaigning of her forces in that area in 366 may well have 
encouraged the Confederacy allies to ask why they should be supporting 
the aggrandizement of Athens, even if they had acquiesced in Athens' right 
to Amphipolis.1 Some need for tactful reassurance is witnessed by two 
decrees (of 369/6 and 366/7) in which the Athenians thanked the 
Mytilenaians for their zealous support in the past war (i.e. that of 376-371) 
and commended them for their loyalty, while reassuring them that Athens 
had fought on behalf of the freedom of the Greeks.2 Did Athens pay for her 
northern campaign in 366 from her own resources, or were there also allied 
"contributions“? We do not know. In 367 the Persian king acknowledged 
the Athenian claim to Amphipolis, thus revoking his earlier decision,3 and, 
as there was little prospect of a settlement of affairs among the mainland 
Greeks at this time, Athens in 366 adopted a more assertive role as a naval 
power, gathering funds and extending her influence and control in the 
Aegean and in northern Greece. The years which followed saw Timotheos 
as Athens' most successful general in the expansion of Athenian power: a 
major success in winning Samos from Persian hands in366 was followed by 
campaigns in the Chersonese and the Chalkidike, resulting in many towns 
coming under Athenian control, but none being enrolled as members of the 
Confederacy. Was it in these years of Athenian success that allied 
dissatisfaction with syntaxeis and the methods of collection arose? Not, if 
we are to believe Isokrates: or not, at least, so far as Timotheos was 
concerned; for, in an apologia of his recently-deceased pupil, Isokrates 
assures his readers that Timotheos achieved military miracles on a shoe­
string budget, and in the case of Samos with no financial aid at all from 
Athens or her allies, paying for his success here by spoils of war. The 
impression is given that Timotheos was a most economical commander, who 
made only moderate demands upon the allies and even less demands upon 
his fellow-citizens; his treatment of other cities, and especially of Athens'
^or the claim and recognition see Ryder, KL pp.76 & 128-130.
frod.GHI. II. 131.
$See Dem.19.137: cf. Ryder, KE, p.81. R. A. Moysey (Greek Relations vith the 
Persian Satraps: 371-343 B.C., Diss. Princeton Univ., Michigan 1975, pp.72,78-81) 
appears to disbelieve that the King reversed his attitude to Athens' claim to 
Amphipolis, on the basis that Timotheos vas sent out in 366 vith instructions to help 
the rebel satrap Ariobarzanes: but these instructions vere very cautious and included 
a rider vhich said “provided that he [Timotheos ] does not violate our treaty vith the 
King” (see Dem. 15.9).
allies, was considerate and was based on a sense of justice, in contrast with 
the behaviour of other generals and the consequent suffering of other 
Greeks at their hands; Timotheos’ behaviour is said to have been in 
contrast to that expected from their generals by the Athenians, and he is 
described as exceptional in being well-received by cities which otherwise 
had no love for Athens or Athenians (15.107-126). This account of 
Timotheos’ generalship has generally been regarded as the eulogy which it 
undoubtedly is, and Timotheos has been ranked among those who sought, 
from the 360s, to revive a policy of leadership which savoured more of 
empire than of a benevolent hegemony.1 Even if it were all literal truth, 
which is prima facie unlikely, 2 it does not contradict the picture concerning 
Athens’ relationship with her allies as found in On the Peace: for the praise 
of Timotheos in Antidosis is set against the background of the usual 
behaviour of Athenian commanders, a behaviour which is consistent with 
the imputations of On the Peace. What Isokrates does do in Antidosis is to 
deny that Athens’ most prominent and successful general in the 360s had 
contributed to the poor reputation which he claims Athens has earned 
among her allies and the Greeks by 355 s Yet even this most favourable 
portrait offers us evidence of the true situation; for, after listing the most 
important of Timotheos’ acquisitions, Isokrates adds: "All these cities he has 
taken and has handed over to you, without incurring great expenses, either 
by mistreating [note the word Xy^ vciievo$ and recall its use at 6.46 & 1251 
the existing allies or by forcing you to pay many war-taxes" (15.106: 
cf. 15.113). Syntaxeis were, then, by implication drawn from the allies, but, 
in Timotheos’ case, without unseemly abuses. Samos was besieged for ten 
months by an army of 6,000 with 30 ships, and there the cost was borne
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JSee P. Harding, “Androtion’s Political Career". Historian  (1976), 188f., 195. 
Cargill (SAL, p. 171) defends the Isokratean portrait of Timotheos’ actions.
20n a point of detail: Isokrates says that for the campaign to rescue Kerkyra 
(in 373) the Athenians allowed their general only 13 talents and 50 triremes (15.109); 
Xenophon makes no mention of the sum voted to maintain the force, but gives the 
number of triremes as sixty (5-4.63).
^This distinction is missed by Ober (“SeaPo,ver“, p.128), vho says that in 
Antidosis Isokrates praises Timotheos. "one of the most imperialistic Athenian 
generals of the fourth century", but in the same speech compliments himself (at 
1563ff ) for having condemned the Athenian arche: Ober sees this as evidence for "an 
ambivalence on the part of the orators, and probably the Athenian people as a vhole, 
on the subject of the empire and the arche of the sea"; against such a viev  of 
Timotheos see Cargill, "Hegemony, not Empire", pp.95-96.
entirely by the spoils of war (15.111). But at what cost to the enemies of 
Athens on Samos and to the people of places round about? Was Timotheos' 
fund-raising - praiseworthy perhaps in Athenian eyes - like the cleruchy 
which was subsequently established on Samos? The cleruchy did not 
contravene the letter of the law with respect to the Second Athenian 
Confederacy, but it must surely have offended its spirit in the eyes of some 
allies, especially perhaps those who dwelt nearby.1 Was the financing of 
the capture of Samos unusual, rather than typical, even for Timotheos, in 
not entailing a monetary cost either to Athens or to her allies? The later 
capture of Potidaia is said to have been funded from Timotheos' own 
resources and from "the syntaxeis of those from Thrace" ( 15.113)-
The comparison between Timotheos and the other generals whom the 
Athenians employed at this time offers us a 'normal' picture of the 
Athenians expecting their generals to threaten and intimidate other cities 
and to be at heart more concerned for themselves and for their men than 
for the reputation of Athens; Timotheos sometimes had to visit cities in 
order to collect “contributions" which had not been paid: so too, it is 
implied, did other generals, but they were less moderate than Timotheos, 
and they arrived without warning and permitted their men to plunder, to 
steal and to destroy houses (15121-126). It is a flattering portrait which 
Isokrates draws of his former pupil, and even if it were entirely credible, 
there still remains the fact that Timotheos' conduct towards Athens' allies 
and enemies is said to be the exception rather than the rule, and there is 
clear testimony to the fact that even Timotheos drew upon allied 
“contributions" in his campaigns and that there were times when these 
"contributions" had to be enforced, since they had not been volunteered. 
Allowing that Timotheos' conduct in these matters was less reprehensible 
than that of other Athenian commanders, it would not necessarily follow 
that the allies held as charitable a view as Isokrates of the behaviour even 
of Athens' least oppressive general.
Two other generals are known to have been prominent in the pursuit 
of Athens' interests in the decade prior to the Social War; they are Iphi- 
krates and Chares. Of the former we know almost nothing which relates to 
the conduct of his duties at this time; a little earlier we hear of him raising 
funds at Kephallenia after his successful campaign against against Kerkyra 
(in 372): some contributions were given voluntarily, others had to be
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1See Griffith,“Athens in the Fourth Century", p.Mlf.; see also Hornblover, 
Mausolus, pp.198-200,208.
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enforced (Xen. 6.2.36); but that is all with regard to the allies. It is 
different in the case of Chares. His behaviour at Kerkyra, probably in 
3 6 2 /l,1 is said to have continued that of Leosthenes before him, by 
avoiding the enemy and doing wrong to the allies; for he came to Kerkyra 
and stirred up stasis, which resulted in much bloodshed and destruction; as 
a consequence of this the Athenians were greatly discredited in the eyes of 
their allies, but Chares continued undeterred with other such lawless acts 
(D.S. 15-95-3; the incident is also recorded by the contemporary Aineias 
Taktikos: 11.13-15)- Also Chabrias was accustomed to take a fleet of 
twenty ships with him when gathering “contributions", unlike his protege 
Phokion, who rebuked him for this and sailed around making collections 
with only a single vessel (Plut. Phok. 7.1). Plutarch's moralizing anecdote, 
which contrasts the behaviour of Phokion with that of Chabrias, may refer 
to a time before Leuktra, since the only termini available are the battle of 
Naxos (376) and the death of Chabrias in the first year of the Social War; 
the allies are alleged to have responded well to Phokion's unthreatening 
advances, and, although this may be taken to argue for a date prior to 371, 
the implication of the story is that Chabrias had a less trustful attitude 
toward the allies with regard to their willingness to pay their "contri­
butions"; in support of this is Plutarch's statement that even Phokion had 
to discuss the reason for his mission with the leaders in the allied cities 
before they agreed to make payment; the fact that the allies needed to be 
convinced of the purpose of contributing points to a date in the 3b0s rather 
than the 370s (but cf. Xen. 6.2.36 for some reluctance even in 372, and 
6.2.1 for even earlier criticism of Thebes [in 375/4]).
The second argument against Cargill's interpretation concerns the 
temporal limits of "the war" which is referred to in On the Peace. It is "the 
war" which is to blame for the present state of Athens' fortunes, says 
Isokrates at 6.19; but by “the war" does Isokrates mean the Social War, as 
Cargill understands,2 or something broader? "The war" is held to be the 
cause of great expenditure on the part of the Athenians (6.29); in his next
1Cargill, SAL, pp.172-176, unconvincingly challenges this dating of the affair; 
to little purpose for the question, since he opts for a time in the first half of the 360s, 
still vithin the period vhen Athens' policy tovards her Confederacy is alleged by 
other scholars to have been changing. Cargill further seeks to discard the episode as 
relevant to the relationship of Athens and her allies by the even more unconvincing 
argument that Kerkyra vas not, in any case, a member of the Confederacy: cf. 
Homblover, CR, n.s. 32 (1982), pp. 236-237.
2SAL P-177.
oration, soon to follow On the Peace. Isokrates estimates that 1000 talents 
have been spent in vain upon mercenary forces (7.9); however, from what 
we know of the brief and desultory activity of Athens in the Social War it is 
hardly conceivable that those activities alone could have bankrupted the 
Athenians or their treasury.1 "The war" has endangered the lives of many 
Athenians and has brought disrepute upon Athens; “the war" is said to be 
responsible for a depressed economy at Athens and for a reluctance among 
foreigners to reside there as metics (6. 19-21; see also 127-126). It is 
certainly difficult to conceive of this scenario as one which had developed 
at Athens merely in the brief time of the Social War. We are told that 
Athens* policy in seeking to sustain a naval empire has not achieved its 
expected goals; it has reaped only “hatreds, wars [n.b. the plural, not “war” 
or "the war"] and great expenses" (6.29). Most revealing is the point made 
after Isokrates has explained what misfortunes will be alleviated by 
making an end to the war; for he argues that it will be possible to achieve 
through diplomacy what ”we are now unable to achieve through war and 
great expensed6.2 2): Isokrates goes on to explain that he has in mind the 
fulfilment of Athenian territorial ambitions in Makedonia, Thrace and the 
Chersonese (6.22-24), not, as might be expected if “the war" meant simply 
the Social War, victory over the rebel allies. The fulfilment of these 
ambitions of territorial expansion in northern Greece had been the 
objective of a succession of Athenian military commands since Iphikrates* 
had been sent to that region in 366; Timotheos had succeeded Iphikrates 
and had met with more success in the pursuit of those goals; most recently, 
it had been from there that Chares had been diverted in order to meet the 
challenge thrown up by the revolt of certain Confederacy members. "The 
war", then, with which Isokrates associates those who, in his opinion, are 
pursuing a misguided policy, akin to that of the imperialist Athenians of the 
fifth century, is not simply the recent conflict with the allies, but extends to 
embrace the almost continuous succession of overseas campaigns with 
which forces acting under the instructions of the Athenian people, or with 
its approval, had busied themselves since the early 360s. It is interesting 
to note that Isokrates was not alone in perceiving the period from the early
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icavkirell ("Notes on the Failure of the Second Athenian Confederacy", p.54) 
argues that by “the var“ Isokrates refers to the period from 368 to 355. Cf. Davidson 
("Isocrates Against Imperialism“, p. 30) vho adopts a philosophical and historical 
approach to the speech and takes Isokrates' subject to be "not the Social Var, but the 
entire period of Athenian imperialism from 478 to 355“; Davidson's treatment of the 
speech loses sight of the immediate historical and political relevance of the author's 
intent.
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360s to the end of the Social War as an unbroken war in pursuit of 
expansionist ambitions; Aischines (2.70: in 3^3) had expressed a similar 
conception, linking the initial campaigns to recover Amphipolis with the 
later conflict between Athens and Philip II in the region of Thrace and the 
Chersonese, and thus spanning an even longer time than Isokrates.
A third difficulty with Cargill’s view of the picture of Athenian 
leadership of her Confederacy as offered in On the Peace concerns the 
alleged attack in the speech upon the general Chares. Chares is never 
named in the speech; nor, for that matter, is any other of those whose 
policy or leadership, whether in politics or war, Isokrates is criticizing. 
Failure to nominate those who are criticized need not disturb us: to 
contemporaries individuals could be identified without being named. 
Aristotle certainly believed that Chares was attacked in this oration, just as 
the Spartans had been in Panegyrikos.1 A personal motive existed for such 
an attack, in that Chares had provided the evidence for the prosecution of 
his fellow-generals, including Timotheos, after the battle of Embata. 
Whatever Isokrates thought of his former pupil's policy and behaviour 
when Timotheos was increasing x^thens’ control over other Greeks in the 
360s,2 he was still prepared to write glowingly of Timotheos’ career soon 
after that man’s death.
Editors have professed to recognize five places in the text where general 
criticism of Athenian commanders either embraces Chares or acts as a 
covert attack upon Chares alone. The first two instances are found in an 
ironic comparison of contemporary Athenians, and their reluctance to 
perform military service in person, with the personal involvement of their 
ancestors on behalf of the Greeks: now, Isokrates claims, the irony of the 
situation exists in the Athenians employing mercenaries who were getting a 
livelihood in Asia to fight against Greeks (6.42); moreover, the danger with 
these mercenaries is that they are a weapon which can be turned in fickle 
fashion against the state which first engaged them (6.44: "whenever others
1 Arist. Rhet. 1418a. 11.31 -33: icod ydp övußoyXeycuv KarTiyopex, otov AajceSaipovW 
pev ev T(p navTfyypiiap, XapTfros 8' ev T(p Modem scholars have often agreed:
see e.g. Schafer, Dem, u. s. Zeit, 1^ , p.189, and Jebb, AO, II, p.192 (who both regard 
Chares and Aristophon as the targets of Isokrates* attack in this work); more recently, 
see Moysey, Greek Relations, p.183.
^ringm ann (Studien, pp.56-5?) claims that Isokrates* disapproved of the 
foreign policy pursued by Athens in the decade prior to the Social ¥ar and attributes 
the absence of any political oration from Isokrates* pen between the years 366-355 to 
an unwillingness to criticize his prize pupil Timotheos, who was the most successful of 
the generals responsible for practising that policy.
offer them higher pay, [they] will follow their leadership against us [Athen­
ians]"). We might note a passage of Demosthenes where Chares is reported 
as having come to Athens with a mercenary army and having been sent out 
by the Athenians (in 357) to the Chersonese as sole commander.1 It is 
possible that at 6 42 Isokrates' audience would have thought particularly of 
Chares, but it should be noticed that the criticism at that point is directed 
not against the generals who are involved in leading mercenary armies 
rather than citizen hoplites, but at the Athenians themselves who afford so 
dismal a contrast with their illustrious ancestors; the second passage is in 
no way enlightened by Norlin's note, which draws attention to the fact that 
Chares, after Embata, engaged his troops in the service of the satrap 
Artabazos;2 for the Athenians had initially been delighted by the success of 
this venture; they were not persuaded to alter their opinion by any 
intimation of a threat to Athens from Chares and his troops: Isokrates' 
general point about the risk of engaging mercenaries cannot be exemplified 
by Chares' service with Artabazos during the Social War.
In the next instance, the Athenian government is criticized for its 
failure to set an appropriate example to others; an illustration is given: 
instead of punishing, as the laws command, those who indulge in political 
bribery, ”we elect men who are most flagrantly guilty of this crime as our 
generals and we pick out the man who has been able to deprave the 
greatest number of our citizens and place him in charge of the most 
important affairs" (6-50). Norlin describes this as a covert attack upon 
Chares;3 he finds support for this claim in a statement by Theopompos 
(FGrH 115 F 213), which alleges that Chares paid Aristophon and other 
political figures at Athens to espouse an aggressive foreign policy.
However, we should note that the accusation of political bribery is applied 
to generals (plural), while it is the political agent who is referred to in the 
singular. The developing dichotomy in leadership between politicians and 
generals is also deplored by Isokrates: in the case of the military 
leadership the Athenians now select men whose powers of counsel they 
hold in no regard to send out as sole commanders (6 55); the mention here 
of o r p a iT iy o i ayTOKpdrope^ again evokes among editors the recollection of the
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^Dem. 23.173: rari XdpTft finxv tck)c £evouc, mi arpaTTjyos y<$>’ vuojv aytoiqpdTajp 
ei$ XeppovT|öov e^ enXei.
2Loet> edition, Vol. II. p.36, note t>.
3Ibid, p.40, note a.
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Demosthenes’ passage which mentions Chares' dispatch as cn-patir/os 
avToicparcjüp to the Chersonese (see above, p. 165, u D 1
The final passage which is alleged to have been aimed at Chares 
occurs at the end of the speech: the Athenians are advised, among other 
things, to reform their ways in the manner in which they treat their allies 
and not put them into the hands of their generals “to do with them as they 
[the generals! please" (6.134). This general criticism is aimed particularly 
at Chares according to modern scholars, who quickly point to Diodoros' des­
cription of Chares' discreditable behaviour at Kerkyra (see above, p. 162).2
Chares is certainly the most easily identifiable general to whom the 
broad strictures made in On the Peace apply, and Aristotle’s remark about 
Isokrates attacking this particular commander in this speech may have 
been based upon more than a sequence of assumptions (namely, that 
Chares was, in large part, responsible for Timotheos’ condemnation and 
exile, that Timotheos had been a pupil of Isokrates, that Isokrates had 
written a eulogy of Timotheos in Antidosis not long after Timotheos’ death 
in exile, and, therefore, that criticisms of Athenian military leadership 
made by Isokrates in On the Peace should be regarded as indirect, but 
specific and recognizable, criticism of Chares). However, to say that On the 
Peace is "a denunciation of Chares“ and to add that what has been 
overlooked by modern scholarship is "the extent to which it [On the Peace] 
is an invective against that particular general",3 seriously exaggerates the 
element of personal invective which the speech contains. As we shall see, 
there is more strident criticism of politicial leadership in the speech than of 
military leadership. The focus is upon policy rather than upon specific 
misdeeds of those who are espousing that policy. If Isokrates had intended 
On the Peace to be an attempt to assassinate Chares’ reputation in revenge 
for his part in the ending of Timotheos’ career, one would have expected a 
more damaging and more explicit attack. If scholars are correct in their 
identification of specific points concerning Chares' military leadership being 
contained in various general criticisms of Athenian military leaders, then it
^bid., p.43, n.c and G. Mathieu (Bude ed.) t.3. p.27, n .l.
2V. K. Pritchett, The Greek State at Var, Pt. II, Berkeley 1974, p.39; see also 
Laistner, Isocrates: De Pace and Philippus. p,122f„ and Norlin (Loeb edition), II, p.90, 
note d.
^Cargill, "Hegemony, not Empire”, p. 100. Cargill cites in support Cawkwell, 
Tubulus“, 51f.), but vhat Cavk^ell actually says is that “It vas, according to Aristotle
(Rhet. 1418 A 32), an attack upon Chares..... but it is, in  essence, a denunciation of the
vhole attempt to restore the empire" (p.52).
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should also bo noted that the incidents which have been identified from 
other sources each occurred before the period of the Social War. To 
identify Chares as a specific target among the group of Athenian leaders, 
military and political, whom Isokrates criticizes, does not enhance the 
theory that there was no imperialist attitude or behaviour among the 
Athenians before the Social War, which aroused concern, perhaps even 
resentment, among allies and other Greeks; to recognize Chares as an object 
of Isokrates* criticism of Athenian military leadership is, if anything, to 
acknowledge that the policy which is attacked in this speech had developed 
before the Social War.
The extent to which the imperialist ambitions of many Athenians had 
been translated into action, even by the time of the Social War, may be 
unclear to us now, and the testimony of Isokrates, in view of both the little 
which he does say about recent practice of imperialist ways and his 
statements which refer to hopes and expectations still to be fulfilled, 
indicates that the Athenians in the 350s were still far from repeating the 
domination over their fellow-Greeks which they had exercised in the latter 
half of the previous century. Nevertheless Isokrates is quite clear that the 
imperialist spirit and will are again present for others to see, and to fear, 
and he believes, and expects his audience to believe also, that the goodwill 
which the Athenians had achieved in their leadership of the opposition to 
Sparta's tyrannical behaviour in the 390s and 360s has already been 
forfeited: Athens* imperialist ambitions may be a matter for concern and 
apprehension, but the concomitant loss of hegemony and of the goodwill of 
the other Greeks which accompanies such leadership is already a cause for 
lament. This belief is made clear at the beginning of his argument, when 
“the enjoyment of the high esteem of the Greeks" is stated as the last of the 
four benefits which are to be envisaged as resulting from the establishment 
of peace (6.19); it is reaffirmed in the recapitulation, when Isokrates urges 
his audience to appreciate that nothing is more important, apart from 
showing reverence to the gods, than to enjoy high esteem among the Greeks 
(6.135: see further 136-140). As has been mentioned previously, Isokrates 
is more concerned with the future than with the past in this speech, but he 
is also concerned with the present. Thus his argument falls into two 
sections: in the first Isokrates supports the decision of the Assembly to 
conclude a peace with their enemies of the Social War, although he 
advocates a broader peace, in fact a reaffirmation of the King’s Peace; in 
this part of his argument he deals with the present. In the second part of 
his argument, which begins at 6-64, Isokrates looks to the future and seeks
to persuade his audience that they should abandon their aspirations of a 
sea-empire.
For the present Isokrates wants to see an end to the war against the 
Chians, the Rhodians and the Byzantines (6.16): in this he does no more 
than agree with the proposal of the Council which has won the approval of 
the Assembly. However, he would advise the endorsement of what would 
be a Common Peace:
....ve should adopt, not the covenants of peace vhich certain parties have 
recently dravn up, but those vhich ve have entered into vith the king of Persia 
and vith the Lacedaimonians, vhich ordain that the Hellenes be independent, that 
the alien garrisons be removed from the several states, and that each people retain 
its ovn territory. (8.16)
This is clearly beyond what the Assembly has discussed and approved; it 
confirms the view that for Isokrates the war is more than just the most 
recent hostilities against the rebel allies and includes the various actions 
against other Greeks in which Athens has engaged since the early 360s.
Does this proposal contradict the strongly anti-Persian attitudes which were 
expressed in Panegyrikos? There is nothing in the oration to encourage 
such a view, but sufficient to indicate that the Persians are still the true foe 
for Greeks and a people to be despised. The Athenians of the present are 
criticized for their policy of acting aggressively toward other Greeks and 
they are compared unfavourably with their ancestors who had earnt the 
hegemony among the Greeks by defending Greece from the Persian 
invaders and thereafter liberating their fellow-Greeks from Persian 
domination and driving the Persians back within their own boundaries 
(6 42-43); it is due to policies such as these that Isokrates commends as 
leaders Aristides, Themistokles and Miltiades, while condemning the likes 
of Hyperbolos and Kleophon and contemporary public speakers (6.75). 
There is a contemptuous likening to the great King of the contemporary 
Athenians in their unwillingness to serve the state in person as soldiers, 
preferring to employ mercenary armies (6.47-46).
Isokrates is highly critical of the war. At a pragmatic level he blames 
the war for having brought danger for the state, for having reduced the 
standard of living, for having fostered political disunity at Athens, and for 
having forfeited the respect of the other Greeks which the Athenians had 
regained in the 370s through their leadership of the Second Athenian 
Confederacy; an end to the war will mean security for the city and its 
people, renascent prosperity (including an influx of merchants, foreigners
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and metics who are at present avoiding Athens), and a high reputation 
among the other Greeks, which, once Athens' bona tides has been 
established, may even lead to the acquisition of more territory in northern 
Greece without disturbing other Greeks and without arousing troublesome 
opposition from neighbouring rulers such as the king of Macedon (6.19-24). 
These are the practical consequences of the war and the equally practical 
benefits which may be expected from a policy which upholds the terms of a 
Common Peace. Underlying the war is what Isokrates regards as the ethical 
weakness of Athens' current foreign policy: he explains that here lies the 
heart of the problem:
I think re  should not go forth from this assembly, having merely adopted 
resolutions in favour of the peace, without also taking counsel hov r e  shall keep it, 
and not do vhat r e  are in the habit of doing - namely, getting ourselves involved 
again in the same disorders after a short interval of time - and hov r e  shall devise, 
not merely a postponement, but some means of permanent deliverance from our 
present ills. But no such thing can come to pass until you are persuaded that 
tranquillity is more advantageous and more profitable than meddlesomeness, justice 
than injustice, and attention to one’s ovn affairs than covetousness of the 
possessions of others. (825-26)
Here we have an example of the interrelationship which Isokrates accepted 
between the teachings of the philosophos and the policies of statesmanship. 
The subject had been touched upon in the advice given to the Athenians 
some years before in the Plataikos (see above, pp. 101-103), but here it is 
presented as a central proposition in the argument. It has been these 
attitudes behind Athenian policy which, in Isokrates' opinion, have been 
responsible for the failure of the current policy to achieve the goals which 
were desired by the Athenians. This claim is defended by appeal to the 
past. At the end of the fifth century “meddlesomeness" (noXimpayuowvn) 
placed Athens in extreme peril, when her defeat by Sparta threatened to 
place her at the mercy of her most bitter enemies; on the contrary, just 
behaviour, support for the oppressed and avoidance of coveting the 
possessions of others resulted in Athens willingly being granted the 
hegemony by the other Greeks in the form of her leadership of the Second 
Athenian Confederacy (6 30). Isokrates rejects the argument that in 
interstate relations different rules apply in the interest of expediency; he 
concludes that those who maintain that in practical life justice is 
disadvantageous for those who practise it "fail to see that nothing in the
TiiA fM  A A fifri Vni i f  a  aa  r\AT.tAr/n11rt f / \  *V| ^  o  1 rrAirt I a  otaa/< » 'A riiitA  n rfV |fywliv vcux wnuiivutv ov tv ii.ia.tci lai gaxu, tv gw u icputc, tv iigj.it
action, in a word, to happiness, as virtue and the qualities of virtue" (6-32).
I sokrates deplores the mistaken pragmatism of those who put their faith in 
injustice as the means to the successful advancement of the interest of the 
state (633-35); he then launches an attack upon the politicians who 
advocate the morally-corrupt qualities of imperialism, condemning the 
politicians as deceivers for their fraudulent appeal to the example set by 
the Athenians' ancestors (636ff.). The argument takes two lines: a 
distinction is made between the Athenians of the time of the Persian Wars 
and those of the Dekeleian War; if the advocates of a belligerent policy 
have in mind the latter, then to follow their example may be expected to 
lead to ruin, as it had done at the end of the fifth century (this contrast, 
between the ancestors of the earlier and later fifth century is elaborated 
later in the speech, when Isokrates argues at length that the fifth century 
imperial ways led Athens to the brink of destruction [6.75-94]; for the 
present the distinction is simply noted, with the observation that the 
example of those who led Athens in the later fifth century offers only 
further misfortune). The second line of argument concerns the present-day 
Athenians: they, it is asserted, show little resemblance to those Athenians 
whom they are urged to emulate: they make war upon other Greeks, rather 
than upon the barbarians; they will not undertake the risks involved in 
implementing their ambitions, but seek to achieve them by employing 
others, and they feel no compunction when these mercenaries behave in 
such a manner as to bring odium upon the state of Athens; even the 
domestic management of Athens' affairs is to be deplored: generals are 
elected through bribery, the capacity to corrupt is taken as a 
recommendation for political eminence, consistency and responsibility in 
leadership is being undermined by the growing separation of the roles of 
politician and general, and the Assembly itself seems incapable of pursuing 
a consistent policy (6.41 -55).
These criticisms of the contemporary Athenians have the familiar 
ring of the conservative opponent of the radical democrats; but before one 
assigns a political label to Isokrates on the basis of an outburst such as this, 
it should not pass unnoticed that the Athenians who are rebuked for failing 
to serve their state in person are not the lower class, who row the triremes, 
but those of hoplite-status (see 646):1 this particular criticism of the 
contemporary Athenians is, in fact, one which is echoed by Demosthenes 
only a few years later in the First Philippic (4.7), and, notwithstanding the
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question of its accuracy, the fact that it can be levelled by two men as 
different in their approach to political issues as Isokrates and Demosthenes 
should warn against over-simple categorization of Isokrates' politics or a 
too-ready assumption that he is arguing as the mouthpiece of a particular 
interest-group. So much for criticism of the existing state of affairs; 
Isokrates is at last ready to advise for the future.
He now takes up in practical terms the problem which he has 
previously described in moral terms. There would be no enduring solution 
to be found in the establishment of peace unless attention were also given 
to ensuring that the peace would continue; that would appear unlikely so 
long as the Athenians were led by politicians who would advise a return to 
warlike methods of advancement just as soon as the immediate crisis had 
passed, and so long as the Athenians themselves were convinced that the 
ways of empire offered prospects of power and prosperity. A lasting peace 
is regarded by Isokrates as incompatible with the spirit of 
meddlesomeness, the injustice and the covetousness which he believes to 
be associated with empire. The way in which the Athenians must 
demonstrate their commitment to a more laudable and trustworthy foreign 
policy is to renounce their ambition to re-establish a sea-empire: this, the 
kernel of Isokrates' message in On the Peace, is embedded in the centre of
oration-
Tor I, for my part, consider that ve  shall manage our city to better advantage 
and be ourselves better men and go forvard in all our undertakings if ve stop 
setting our hearts on the empire of the sea. For it is this vhich plunged us into our 
present state of disorder, vhich overthrev that democratic government under 
vhich our ancestors lived and vere the happiest of the Hellenes, and vhich is the 
cause, one might almost say, of all the ills vhich ve  both suffer ourselves and 
inflict upon the rest of the Hellenes. (8.64)
A few lines further on Isokrates makes clear the consequence which he 
believes will come from such a change of foreign policy:
But nov I am addressing myself to you,....vith the desire that I may cause you
to make an end of such a policy and that Athens and the rest of the Hellenes may 
form a lasting peace; it is this peace to vhich my entire speech is devoted. (8.71; 
trans. Norlin, vith addition)
Again we note here in the words "the rest of the Hellenes" that it is a 
Common Peace which Isokrates has in view, not simply an end to the war 
with the allies. The desife for sea-empire is criticized as unjust,
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unattainable and disadvantageous. The first and second criticisms are 
briefly explained: this resurgent desire reveals as hypocritical the stance 
which the Athenians had taken both in the Corinthian War and afterward 
with the formation of the Second Athenian Confederacy, when the 
Athenians had led the opposition to Sparta and her tyrannical behaviour 
after she had won the Peloponnesian War (6.67-69); that their ambition is 
beyond their reach is simply demonstrated by the failure of their fifth - 
century predecessors to protect their empire, even though they had 
available sums of money in the state treasury far in excess of those which 
the present Athenians could ever hope to utilize (6.69). The third criticism 
- that it is mistaken to believe that a sea-empire will prove advantageous 
to Athens - is dealt with at much greater length. The difficulties, the 
dangers, the misfortunes which Athens’ fifth-century sea-empire brought 
with it are retailed in considerable, if not always accurate, detail (6.75-94). 
The corrupting force of empire and the ultimate misfortune which results 
for the imperial state and its people are further demonstrated by a 
description of the Spartan empire which succeeded that of Athens (6.95- 
105). The avowed reason for the inclusion of this second exemplum 
deserves notice: Isokrates tells his audience that he does not wish to allow 
those who are of an oligarchic frame of mind to blame the failure of Athens' 
fifth-century empire on the inadequacies of a democratic constitution 
(6.95). If this is no more than an attempt on Isokrates' part to evade any 
charge of supporting oligarchy or of being pro-Spartan, then it must appear 
somewhat clumsy and out of place; if, however, it is a genuine attempt to 
anticipate an alternative explanation for the previous failure of Athens' 
empire, then it suggests that among those who were supportive of a 
renascent imperialism were some who could also be described in their 
attitudes as pro-Spartan; it would be reasonable to assume that those 
Athenians who held such views would be accounted among the more 
conservative and wealthier members of Athenian society. This small point 
in the argument may provide evidence that the enthusiasm for another 
empire was not simply defined along lines of class and that the support for 
the policy was indeed widespread among the Athenians, as Isokrates 
alleges throughout this oration.
However, the redirection of Athens’ foreign policy would not, of 
itself, be sufficient: the Athenians must abandon not only their desire to 
recreate a sea-empire; they must also repudiate the political leadership of 
those who espoused this policy. The last subject in On the Peace is a 
vigorous attack upon those orators and demagogues who exhort the
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Athenians to such vain ambitions. Despite Aristotle’s belief that On the 
Peace is an attack upon the general Chares (see above, p. 164), it is the 
politicians at Athens more than the commanders of Athens' forces in the 
field who are the object of Isokrates' most strident and persistent criticism; 
it is those leaders in the Assembly who demand a belligerent foreign policy, 
seducing the people with hopes of territorial reacquisition and expansion, 
who receive the lion's share of Isokrates' critical attention. Although 
Isokrates' tactfully exempts many among his ’audience’ from his strictures, 
only targeting with his barbs those who are guilty of his criticisms (6.56f.), 
and although he acknowledges that there are speakers who are advocating 
peace (5-12), it nevertheless suits his purpose to paint those whom he 
criticizes with broad strokes, naming no names, but colouring his critical 
canvas with the commonplaces of Athenian political oratory. At the outset 
Isokrates says that the majority of these speakers, who specialize in 
pandering to the mood of the people, have on this occasion spoken in 
favour of war rather than peace (6-5); since the Assembly has voted in 
favour of the Council's proposal to terminate the Social War (8.15X 
Isokrates cannot mean that the Assembly and those politicians whom he 
condemns have actually spoken against the Council's proposal; what these 
speakers have been encouraging, and what many Athenians still pin their 
hopes upon, must be the continuation of the longer-standing war, focused 
upon Thrace and Macedonia: so much is indicated when Isokrates says that 
these advocates of war "create in us the expectation that we shall recover 
our possessions in the cities and that we shall take up again the power 
which we had previously" (6 6). The expression here, together with 
Isokrates' interest in explaining how Athenian territorial ambitions in 
northern Greece can be fulfilled through a policy based upon peace rather 
than war (6.22-24), reveal that it is fifth-century losses which the 
Athenians wish to make good and fifth-century power which is the aim, not 
merely a return to the state of affairs prior to the outbreak of the 
SocialWar. A wide repertoire of familiar political disparagement is 
indulged in by Isokrates: these demagogues who urge the continuation of a 
policy of aggression are wicked, sycophantic flatterers; they care nothing 
for the people, but deceive and corrupt them; they are reckless about 
public monies, while enriching themselves even as they pursue policies 
destined to impoverish respectable citizens, thereby creating more who are 
dependent upon them as dispensers of the public wealth; thus they thrive 
upon war and disorder; they are unintelligent drunkards, the kind of men 
who have in the past destroyed, rather than developed, Athens' power
(6.4,13-14,36,50,53,122-131). isokrates is careful to avoid criticism of the 
people themselves in all of this; each time he launches an attack, upon 
these demagogic leaders he makes the point that the people do not display 
in public matters the same prudence as they would do in their private 
affairs (6.4,13,52-3,133)- this helps to detach the people from their leaders 
and holds out the promise that the management of the state can be 
rectified, if only the people will apply there the same standards of good 
sense and appreciation of wise advice that they do in their personal affairs.
And so Isokrates arrives at his exordium: the advice he offers is 
fourfold. The Athenians must turn away from sycophantic politicians and 
seek men of wisdom to counsel and lead them; they must treat their allies 
properly, not as subjects; they must seek to acquire a good reputation 
among the Greeks as a whole; and, finally, they must relinquish imperialist 
ambitions and the warfare which is vainly directed to that end (6.133- 
135,142). None of this is tantamount to "pacificism" or defeatism, nor is 
Isokrates counselling a policy of isolation for Athens. Early in the oration 
Isokrates had outlined the benefits, economic in particular, which a 
cessation of the war would bring to the Athenians (6.2Of.); even there it is 
clear that his view7 of the future for Athens is not confined to domestic 
advantage: for he asserts that the most significant benefit will be that the 
Athenians can expect to have all men as their allies - not as allies of 
necessity, but as willing allies, sharing a relationship of true friendship 
(6.21). His enthusiasm about the prospects for the future may run into the 
realms of fantasy by suggesting that when others such as Kersobleptes, 
king of the Odrysians, and Philip, king of Macedon, perceive Athens’ new 
policy they will willingly succumb to diplomatic approaches and cease to 
contest Athens’ claims to the Chersonese and to Amphipolis and may even 
give Athens territories of their own (6.22-23); but these areas were clearly 
the focus of Athenian ambitions and it is a mark of their importance in the 
minds of the x^thenians that Isokrates feels the need to make some hopeful 
statements on the subject, regardless of their plausibility.1 Perhaps more
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^ h e confused past and uncertain future prospects for Athens in the Thracian 
region in the 350s are made clear in Demosthenes' Against Aristokrates (23.102ff.: for 
the. date of this speech as the latter half of 352 see Dionhal. Ep. ad Amm. 1.4; cf. 
Schäfer, Dem, u. s. Zeit, I^ . ■$39-447; A. V. Pickard-Cambridge, Demosthenes and the 
Last Days of Greek freedom 384-322 B. C Nev York & London 1914, p.164); however, 
the decree proposed by Aristokrates in honour of Chari demos indicates that Isokrates 
’vas not the only Athenian vho held a somevhat naive v iev  of the problems of 
political relations vith that region.
credible was his proposal that the Athenians lead the way for the Greeks in 
annexing territory in the Thracian region to provide new land for 
settlements of indigent Greeks: as Isokrates points out, Athenodoros and 
Kallistratos, both Athenians, had, as a private citizen and an exile 
respectively, played a part in such ventures in recent times (5.24).
The clearest vision which Isokrates had at this time for the future 
national standing of Athens is to be found in the exordium: the second of 
the summary points reveals that Isokrates envisages as continuing those 
alliances with members of the Second Athenian Confederacy which will not 
be affected by the peace which will conclude the Social War; for he says:
The second vay [to set right and improve the condition or our city] is to be 
billing to treat our allies just as ve  vould our friends and not to grant them 
independence in vords, vhile in fact giving them over to our generals to do ’vith as 
they please, and not to exercise our leadership as masters but as allies. (8.134. trans. 
Norlin, slightly adapted)
Athens is seen as the guarantor of a Common Peace. Her citizens should 
make themselves ready for war through training and equipping 
themselves, but they should be peaceable in so far as they do nothing 
which is contrary to justice; this will cause other states to refrain from 
attacking Athens, and it may also discourage them from aggressive acts 
elsewhere, if they see Athens ready to act as the champion of the 
oppressed and the upholder of autonomy among the Greeks (none of this, of 
course, relates to acts of aggression against non-Greeks); or, if another state 
is intent upon aggression, then the Athenians will be the ones who will be 
accorded the hegemony by those who wish to protect their freedom and 
independence; it is through the good name which Athens will win by a 
policy which combines justice and power that other Greeks will confer 
willingly upon her both lordship and hegemony (rocc Swaoreias toed tac
rjyeiAov(a$: 5.135 & 136-140).
In essence, Isokrates conceives of a return by Athens to the policy, 
power and status which she had held when she first established the Second 
Athenian Confederacy.1
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iThat Isokrates does not overtly refer his audience to the policy and values of 
the Second Athenian Confederacy may be explained by the quite different and 
apparent threat vhich Sparta posed to the Greek vorld in the late 380s and early 370s: 
at this time it vould be difficult to drav too close an analogy to that earlier situation, 
since no apparent aggressor could be nominated against vhom the Athenians could 
pose as champions.
In prof er ring this advice and this policy Isokrates twice maintains in the 
course of the oration that he speaks as a solitary voice: first he declares 
that no orator has had the courage to argue to the people that peacefulness, 
justice and a concern for their own state’s affairs rather than a desire to 
acquire that which belongs to others are the way to happiness and 
prosperity for the state and its people (6.26-27); then, as he is about to 
state his opposition to the desire for sea-empire, he notes that what he is 
about to say is far removed from the opinion of others (6.63). Are these 
claims merely rhetorical commonplaces, or was Isokrates speaking 
truthfully about the individuality of his position at this time with respect to 
Athens’ foreign policy?
Modern scholars have agreed that when the threat of Persian 
intervention in the war against the allies came Athens was in a state of 
financial exigency and that this impecunious state of the treasury was 
exacerbated by depressed economic circumstances;1 this exhaustion of 
Athens' financial resources is sufficiently attested by Isokrates, both in On 
the Peace and in Areopagitikos (which followed soon after), and in other 
contemporary sources.2 There is also general agreement among scholars 
mat, me penoo iiom uie enu 01 me social war until me acceptance 01 
Demosthenes' aggressive policy towards Philip of Macedon in the later 340s 
was dominated at Athens by a policy aimed at economic recovery : this 
recovery was to be fostered by a change in foreign policy away from the 
expensive aims of the imperialists to a policy based upon maintaining peace 
and avoiding unnecessary wars. Euboulos is recognized as the most 
prominent advocate and instigator of this policy. Less agreement exists on 
the question of how widely-accepted among the Athenians this policy was 
in the period immediately after the Social War.
R. Sealey, in an article which focuses upon these very years in x^thenian 
politics, sensibly cautions against too schematic a division of Athenian 
politicians into “parties" and questions the validity of rigidly categorizing 
those "parties" by policies or principles. Sealey identifies three 
independent groupings of political figures at Athens in the years which 
followed the Social War, but he overstates his case when he attempts to play
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^ .g . Grote, HG, IX, p.227; Marshall, The Second Athenian Confederacy, p.115; 
Hammond, HG, p.516; Cavkvell, Tubulus", p.62, (also "Notes on the Eailure o f the 
Second Athenian Confederacy", p.54); Pritchett, The Greek State at ¥ a r . Part I I , p.78; 
Griffith, "Athens in  the Fourth Century", p.142.
2Isok. 8.19-22,29,46-47,69,128; 7.9,83; Xen. Por passim (esp. 1.1,2.6,5.1.12, 
6.1); Dem. 20.24-25; 23209; 18234; Aisch.2.71.
down the differences between Aristophon and Euboulos over foreign policy. 
He correctly points out that there is a lack of evidence to prove that 
Aristophon and Euboulos were opposed in 355 over the question of 
whether or not to make peace with the allies; he claims that it is more 
plausible to believe that Aristophon would have had enough political 
wisdom to recognize that Athens had no option but to make peace when 
once she was faced with the threat from Persia, and he considers that it 
was unlikely that there was a divergence of opinion among the Athenians 
along party-lines over this decision for peace.1 In fact there is no evidence 
to show what Aristophon, or any other individual politician,2 thought or 
said about this specific proposal: all we know for certain is that it was 
approved by the Assembly. Even if Aristophon did accede to the inevitable 
over the terminating of the Social War, this would tell us nothing about his 
views on other matters of foreign policy: it certainly would not imply that 
Aristophon had abandoned his commitment to a policy of imperialism.
That Aristophon was a leader among the advocates of the attempt to 
revive imperialist ways and objectives can be seen from the career of the 
man himself and from his association with the general Chares:3 in 3&3/2 
he acted as a strategos in the suppression of revolt on Keos; there he earnt 
a bad reputation and was prosecuted by Hypereides, narrowly avoiding 
conviction (Schol. ad Aischin. 1.64; Hyper.4.26); in the same archon-year 
he moved a decree aimed at recovering a debt from the Keian city of Ioulis 
and strengthening the position of the pro-Athenians on Keos (Tod, GHI.
II. 142); he moved another decree designed to send forces out to other 
trouble-spots at that time ([Dem.50.4-6), and he was active about the time 
of the Social War itself in proposing decrees which were intended to
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1 Sealey/Athens After the Social War“, p. 74-81 (= Essays, pp.164-182). An even 
more cautious v iev  about the concept of political parties or groupings at Athens in 
the period of the radical democracy is given by M. H. Hansen, The Athenian Ecclesia 
Copenhagen 1983, pp. 219-222; see also Barry S. Strauss, Athens After The Pelopon­
nesian War: Class. Eaction and Policy 403-386 B.C. (London 1986), pp.15-^, and R. K. 
Sinclair, Democracy and Participation in Athens (Cambridge 1988), pp.186-188.
^ a t  includes Euboulos (see belov, p. 180, n.l): cf. Cloche, vho asserts 
(Politique Etrangere, p.164) that Euboulos played a leading role in the establishment 
of this peace.
Spickard-Cambridge (CAH VI. p221) sees Aristophon and his group as the 
dominant force in Athenian politics in the years 361-TO: of Aristophon’s policy he 
says that it “seems to have been in accordance vith the imperialistic and militant 
predilections of the democracy, and to have been carried out, to a great extent, in 
conjunction Tilth Chares, vho vas a hero to the masses“.
increase the internal revenues of Athens (Dem. 24.11); twice we hear of 
him acting as a prosecutor in trials of Athenian commanders, and in each 
instance Chares is a beneficiary:1 he prosecuted the trierarchs who had 
been defeated by Alexander of Pherae in 361 at Peparethos; the strategos 
of 362 /1 2 Leosthenes was condemned to death for failure here and Chares 
was sent out to replace him, although, as Diodoros caustically remarks "he 
spent his time avoiding the enemy and injuring the allies” (D.S. 15 95-1-3; 
cf. Dem. 51.9, 16); most famous was his prosecution, on behalf of Chares, of 
Iphikrates, Mnestheos and Timotheos after the abortive battle at Embata 
(Din. 1.14; 3-17; cf. Arist. Rhet-1396 a4ff; Polyain. 3.9.29; Plut. Mor.60SF: 
see above, p. 137), which ruined the careers of these three men and left 
Chares in sole command in the war against the aliies.3
Isokrates' presentation of the state of opinion at Athens about the 
decision to end the Social War strongly suggests that, whether or not 
Aristophon and the other imperialists conceded that peace must be made 
with their opponents of the Social War once Persia had threatened to 
intervene, there remained a powerful lobby which could, and did, express 
itself in the Assembly in support of a continuation of warfare in pursuit of 
other, allegedly more attainable, goals. The existence of this faction, and 
the likelihood that these espousers of a policy of sea-empire would
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iSchol. ad Aischin. 1.64: lOEKX^ tiSTum 6 7ApyjTo4w cos vnep Xapf|TO$ pto8o£ Xeyoov; 
for the relationship between the two men see R.A. Moysey "Isokrates and Chares: A 
Study in the Political Spectrum of Mid-fourth Century Athens", Ancient ¥orld 15 
(1987), 85.
^ o r  the date see Schaefer, Dem, u. s. Zeit, p.l50f.; also Cargill, SAL, p.169.
3j. T. Roberts (Accountability in Athenian Government. Madison 1982, pp.45- 
49) discusses the prosecutions which followed the abortive engagement at Embata and 
concludes that there was more to them than a preemptive attempt on the part of 
Chares at self-preservation; she sees here a policy conflict between Chares, 
representing an aggressive and sometimes violent foreign policy, even towards 
Athens' own allies, and a more diplomatic foreign policy supported by Timotheos and 
Iphikrates. If such an interpretation helps to explain the condemnation of Timotheos, 
although Iphikrates and Mnestheos were acquitted, then this further supports the 
view that the imperialist faction at Athens was not cowed by the Social V ar. Roberts 
observes (pp.77-78,165) that three of Chares’ operations were followed by 
prosecutions of one or more of his military colleagues, and she attributes this, in  part 
at least, on each occasion to considerations of self-preservation; however, she does 
not point out the continued reputation which Chares seemed to enjoy with the 
Athenians, despite his rather ordinary record as a general: this is a point which is 
made by Demosthenes in 343 in his De falsa Legatione (19.332); Chares seems to have 
been consistently believed by the Athenians in a way that other prominent generals, 
such as Timotheos and Iphikrates, were not. For Chares and Aristophon as proponents 
of a short-sighted policy of Athenian imperialism see also Homblower, Mausolus. 
P-205.
continue to receive considerable support among the Athenians, provides 
the very background and the purpose of On the Peace.1 Isokrates' oration 
does not support any notion that the Athenians had been cowed by recent 
failures and had come to acknowledge that hopes of sea-empire were now 
vain.2 Was a faction which opposed these imperialists already in existence 
when the Social War ended? If so, had the policies which are generally 
associated with Euboulos and which became largely influential at Athens in 
the following years already been established? To put it a different way, 
was Isokrates an early spokesman for these policies or was he, as he 
professes to do, playing a part in the formulating of such policies?
We have little evidence available to furnish answers to these 
questions. Some historians have expressed the opinion, or have at least 
assumed, that by the end of the Social War a faction had formed at Athens 
in opposition to the imperialists who had in recent years been dominant in 
the Assembly; further, it is believed that such a faction was, from the very 
outset, in favour of the policies which have been described above as those 
to be associated with Euboulos. 3 One scholar has explicitly asserted that in
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*&'. Bringmann, Studien, pp .76-78.
2Cf. Jaeger, "Bate", p.424; Jaeger accepts that the Athenians had already 
achieved a n e v  sea-empire vhich  they vere nov  having to abandon: furthermore, 
he regards Isokrates as having hitherto supported such a renascent imperialism, and 
as n ov  in On the Peace regretfully deserting that position; at most, Jaeger limits the 
opposition after the Social War, saying that “a small group of adventurers,^ 
Aristophon, Chares, and their folio vers, dreamed of restoring the lost dpxii and their 
ovn lost reputation by planning a "national var" against Persia" (p.424, n 2); cf. Ober 
(“Sea Pover". p.125), vho believes that the ambition of empire vas temporarily out of 
popular favour immediately after the Social War, but that its rapid resurgence is 
indicated by the indication of Isokrates' unpopularity, allegedly manifested in his loss 
of an antidosis suit in  354, vhich  d rev  in response the vork Antidosis (see 15-4-5): 
the unfavourable judgment in the antidosis-case may have reflected the unpopularity 
of Isokrates' vie vs upon the current political situation, or even more generally his 
vievs upon the proper nature of the leadership to vh ich  Athens should aspire, but 
again it may have indicated no more, in truth, than the viev  that Isokrates vas 
attempting to evad e a public duty vh ich  he ought to have fulfilled; if broader public 
attitudes to his policies vere involved, then this is additional indication that the 
imperialist attitude continued to thrive, as Ober notes: hovever, there is really no 
firm evidence beyond the conclusion of the Social War itself that the imperialists' 
ambitions fell into temporary disfavour.
3See Meyer, GdA. V, p.482, Jaeger, Paideia. Ill, p. 127; Hammond, HG, p.516; N. 
G. L. Hammond & G. T. Griffith, A History of Macedonia. Vol. II. 550-336 B. C., Oxford 
1979, p284 (hereafter Griffith, M )
1Ö0
On the Peace Isokrates acts as a publicist for this faction and its policies.1 
However, the belief in the emergence of this party and its policies as early 
as the end of the War rests upon the very correspondences between the 
advice of Isokrates in On the Peace and the policies later identifiable with 
Euboulos; there is no independent evidence for this view.2 What the view 
does not acknowledge is that it contradicts the picture of affairs which 
Isokrates himself provides: that he is adocating a policy which is novel and 
runs counter to the existing popular opinion.
Undoubtedly Isokrates would not have been the only critic of the 
imperialist policy: we know from Aristotle of a certain Kydias who 
criticized the Athenians over their restoration of a cleruchy on Samos (Rhet. 
13S4 b32ff.). Demosthenes' oration Against Leptines was delivered in 
355/4: this testifies to an opposition to a law passed on the instigation of 
the otherwise unknown Leptines; by this law the immunities granted in 
the past to certain individuals, exempting them from liturgies, was revoked 
and future exemptions banned; the law had been promulgated in the time 
of the Social War, and its purpose was to assist the state in claiming 
revenues. A ypa4>r} napavopü»» was brought, originally against Leptines, but 
subsequently against the law itself, and Demosthenes tells us that among 
those who defended the law was x^ristophon (20.146); Demosthenes also 
informs us that those who defended the law had personal enemies and he 
names Euboulos and Diophantos (20.137): Demosthenes claims here that 
those who support the law are using it as a guise for private attacks,
iGiUis, “Structure in De Pace“, p. 198: "The elaborate care Isocrates takes 
throughout the early part of his speech to break with the popular views of the war- 
party orators, and to offer a different approach to politics which he knows will be 
controversial, suggests that he was one of the first to oppose current opinion, as 
spokesman for the moderate democratic circles around Eubulus." (my underlining).
^ h e  assertion by some historians that Euboulos was the man who made the 
peace which ended the Social ¥ar has been correctly rejected as an unwarranted 
inference from the words of a scholiast (Schol. ad Dem. 328): the words of the 
scholium do not even satisfactorily relate to the words of Demosthenes which they 
purport to explain: see Sealey, "Athens after the Social ¥ar", pp. 73-76. Cawkwell, 
who agrees with Sealey on this point, is more generally cautious about the time from 
which Euboulos became a dominant political figure at Athens ("Eubulus", pp. 47-49): 
he suggests that Euboulos' political importance may have succeeded his importance in 
financial matters, the latter having been established no later than 353/2; in 
Cawkwell’s estimation Diophantos may have been a political ally and a more important 
figure immediately after the Social ¥ar; but, as Diophantos is an even more shadowy 
figure for us than Euboulos, that does not offer us anything more concrete. The 
standard view had been that Euboulos had quickly established his political 
prominence and influence, even before the end of the Social ¥ar: see e.g. Pickard- 
Cambridge. CAH VI, p222: Bury & Meiggs, HG, p.423; Hammond, HG, p.516.
presumably politically motivated, upon their enemies. This indicates that 
Euboulos and Diophantos were, in 355/4, political opponents of Aristophon 
and others who favoured imperialist ways; what it does not reveal is the 
policies which these political opponents disputed. It is possible that the 
silence of Demosthenes in these circumstances suggests that these political 
enemies had not yet clarified their opposition in terms of foreign policy: if 
they had, and if Diophantos, Euboulos and others had established their 
opposition to further pursuit of empire and unnecessary overseas wars, 
then it would have offered Demosthenes a useful argument against the law 
to have linked his attack upon it to a publicly-defined policy aimed at 
economic recovery and prosperity for Athens. The opposition to the law by 
these politicians may have been political, without involving issues of policy, 
or, if policy were concerned, it may have been limited to financial policy.1 
In sum, there is nothing to contradict the claim of Isokrates that his advice 
in On the Peace was other than original.
There are signs to suggest that the end of the Social War did not 
coincide with a significant and widespread acceptance of change in the 
attitude of the Athenians toward foreign policy. Despite Athens' agreement 
to conclude the war against her allies, rumours persisted that the Persians 
were making naval preparations intended for direction against the Greeks, 
and this belief, according to Demosthenes (14.7), won some credence among 
the Athenians. At Athens, then, in the following year (355/4) there were 
those men who were seeking to persuade the demos to undertake a war 
against the King, and it was to urge the Assembly against such precipitate 
and ill-advised action that Demosthenes delivered his first public speech 
(On the Navy Boards: for the date of 354/3 see Dion. Hal., Ep. ad Arnm. 4). 
Demosthenes argues that Athens herself is in no condition to wage a war 
against the King, and he also emphasizes that the disunity among the 
Greeks and their distrust of Athens at this time wTould render futile the 
proposal that Athenian ambassadors should attempt to rally the Greeks for 
a campaign against the Persians under Athenian leadership (see esp. 14.3- 
13, 33-40). Nor should it go without notice that Isokrates, who is perceived 
by some historians to be single-minded in his desire for a panhellenic war 
against the Persians,2 gives no indication at that time or later that he was 
tempted by these calls for a war against the Persians to alter the policy
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("Eubulus", p.48) implies this, T/hen he says: “in this connexion [as a 
financier j he is aiiuded to in the Lepjtines (137)".
2See esp. Mathieu, Les Idees, pp. 4If., 50,51-64,223.
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which he had advocated shortly before in On the Peace, a policy which had 
no room for importunate conflict with the Great King.
Probably in the same year, certainly soon after the Social War had 
ended, Xenophon composed a pamphlet designed, like Isokrates' oration, to 
advise the Athenians to redirect their sights to new goals which, he claims, 
w ill meet the same ends as those who espouse imperialism. In his short 
tract On Revenues Xenophon acknowledges, as do Isokrates and 
Demosthenes, that Athens is regarded with suspicion by the other Greek 
states at that time; in the opening of the work Xenophon explains that i t  is 
the unjust, but allegedly expedient, manner in which Athens has treated 
other cities which has caused this hostility toward x^thens: empire and 
imperialist ways are regarded by the leaders at x^thens as the means by 
which the state can resolve its internal economic and social problems (For. 
1. 1).
Xenophon picks up the point made by Isokrates (6.20-21) that a lasting 
peace will result in economic prosperity, and in the main body of the 
pamphlet he describes a number of ways by which Athens could make 
herself more prosperous and self-sufficient without resorting to taking by 
force what she required from others. The state of affairs in which his 
economic proposals w ill flourish is one of peace, not war, and the final part 
of the pamphlet is devoted to this question: here Xenophon speaks of a 
state of affairs which is yet to be achieved, rather than one which has 
already been established; if, he argues, his proposition that peace w ill best 
achieve his economic developments for the city is correct, then a board of 
"guardians of the peace” (eipnivo#x<x*:e$: Por. 5-1) should be constituted. 
Xenophon claims that /Athens' prosperity w ill best be served by the 
establishment of a lasting peace; he then proceeds to reject the policy of 
those who wish to see x^thens recover her hegemony by means of war 
rather than peace: the historical argument, designed to show that it  was by 
a leadership of service and not by the exercise of coercion that x^thens had 
most successfully achieved hegemony, reflects the similar argument 
presented by Isokrates in On the Peace (Xen. Por. 5 5-7: cf. Isok. 6.29-32, 
76, 91-92, 105, 107).
Like Isokrates, Xenophon portrays the Greek world as being in a state of 
political confusion, and he envisages Athens as being able to exercise a 
diplomatic role aimed at dispelling this confusion: he makes it  plain that 
diplomatic mediation in the Sacred War would be one such specific 
opportunity, but he goes on to extend the policy to embrace the whole 
Greek world:
Vere you [Athenians ] to show also that you are striving for peace in every 
land and on every sea, I do think that, next to the safety of their own country, all 
men would put the safety of Athens first in their prayers. (Por. 5-10: Trans. E. C. 
Marchant, Loeb ed.)
Again, like Isokrates, it is not pacifism that Xenophon propounds: what 
must be eschewed is unjust action toward others on the part of Athens, so 
that any who would act unjustly toward Athens would find it difficult to 
attract allies to their cause (Por. 5-13)- All this is particularly reminiscent 
of a section of the peroration of On the Peace (cf.6. 136-140). Xenophon 
makes the point that the termination of the Social War has already resulted 
in an appreciable increase in revenues, and that these are not at present 
being committed to further warfare,1 but he concludes by speaking of his 
proposals as a plan which has still to be recognized among the Athenians 
and accepted by them (Por. 6.1-3).
On Revenues does not read as a statement of a policy which has 
already achieved familiarity in the Athenian community, nor does it offer 
any suggestion that it was written as a vehicle for the promotion of a policy 
which had now been established by a group of men who were prominent in 
the political leadership at Athens. It does indicate that Xenophon, like 
Isokrates, recognized that the Athenians had not altogether resolved their 
problems by making peace with the allies who had revolted: there was still 
a possibility that the voices in favour of imperialism would recover their 
strength, now that the interruption caused by the allied revolt, had ended.
Peace with her former allies did not mean that Athens had 
disentangled herself from all conflict. Athens had been at war with Philip 
II of Macedon since 357,2 and nothing had changed that situation: the 
Macedonian king continued his depredations against Athenian interests in
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Athens, however, had not ceased to regard herself as being at war once peace 
had been concluded with her former allies; the war with Philip had begun in 357 (see 
next note) and continued (see Cawkwell, Tubulus’, p. 59f. and Griffith, HM, II, p255), 
although Athens’ capacity to strike back at Philip had been seriously circumscribed 
by her efforts in the Social ¥ar (see Xen. Por. 5.12).
2Athens had no doubt considered herself at war with Philip since 357, in 
which year Philip took Amphipolis and Pydna: certainly, Isokrates considered 
Philip's action at Amphipolis as the start of this war (see 5-2). In July 336 Athens had 
committed herself against Philip by making alliance with a coalition of the Illyrian, 
Paionian and Thracian kings (Tod, GHI. II, 157); admittedly Athens is not recorded as 
having done anything in fulfilment of her undertakings to this alliance (cf. D5. 
16.22.3, where Athens' participation is not mentioned), but Isokrates’ remarks in 355 
(822-23) show that the matter was not forgotten.
the north (Methone was besieged and eventually taken in the course of the 
twelve months which followed the Peace of 355)- There was also the lure 
of territory and income in Thrace, from where Chares had been diverted by 
the crisis occasioned by the allies’ revolt, and Isokrates was well aware of 
continued Athenian interest in this area, when he composed his On the 
Peace. Thus we hear of Chares in 353 lying in wait (unsuccessfully) off 
Neapolis for Philip and his forces (Polyainos 4.2.22); perhaps later in the 
same year1 Chares recorded a victory in the field against a group of Philip's 
mercenaries (Theopomp. FGrH 115 F 249). The year 352 saw Athens make 
some advances in Thrace, where Chares captured Sestos; Kersebleptes 
renewed his alliance with the Athenians at this time and entrusted to 
Athens the cities of the Chersonese, except for Kardia; the Athenians 
reacted promptly by dispatching kleruchs to Sestos and to other Thracian 
cities (D.S. 16.34.3-4; for the kleruchy at Sestos see IG II2. 1613,1-297).
To what extent all, or any, of this activity of Chares can be accounted 
for as being within the "really essential operations" to which, by this time, 
Euboulos and his supporters are said to have restricted Athenian military 
activity is open to question;2 seeking to engage Macedonian forces along 
the coast of Macedonia does not seem comparable with the strategic 
imperative of resisting, in 352 at Thermopylae, Philip's advance into central 
Greece; again, the taking of Sestos and the planting of kleruchies there and 
elsewhere in the Chersonese was obviously more adventurous than the 
subsequent decision (not, in fact, implemented at the time) to send a force 
to relieve Heraion Teichos from Philip's siege (for the decree in the 
Assembly see Dem. 3-4). In short, it is less than certain that the years 
which followed the peace at the end of the Social War saw the total eclipse 
of those who wished Athens to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy, 
even if, for the greater part, the policy favoured by Euboulos and his 
followers was pursued.
There is one other piece of evidence which supports a belief that the 
voices in favour of the tactics of imperialism had not been silenced and 
might again move the Athenians to respond to their calls. Whatever the 
exact origins and earlier history of the Theorie Fund before 355, it seems
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^or the dating see Griffith, HM, II, p.281.
2See Griffith, HM, II, p. 284: Griffith regards Euboulos' policy as paramount in 
the years after 355 and considers Chares’ capture of Sestos as approved vithin that 
policy; he does not state vhether Chares’ activities in the north in the previous year 
should also be seen as coming vithin Euboulos* policy.
that Diophantos and Euboulos expanded this fund into a major element in 
their strategy for the reconstruction of Athens after the Social War. Laws 
were enacted to create a board of commissioners who were elected 
annually to administer the fund, to provide for any annual surplus of 
Athens’ income over expenditure to be transferred to the fund, and to 
preclude the use of moneys from the fund for war without the repeal of the 
law.1 These laws provided the Commission with a capacity, a role and an 
importance which extended well beyond the mere distribution of handouts 
to enable the Athenian poor to attend the public festivals in their city; the 
Commissioners became the financial administrators of the city of Athens.2 
The law which prohibited the use of moneys from the Theorie Fund for war 
was clearly intended to guard against rash decisions by the Assembly and 
made it more difficult for those who advocated war to finance their plans; 3 
such plans would have to depend upon property-tax (e(a4opal) and allied 
"contributions” (Aischines speaks [2.71 (in 343)1 of 60 talents collected each 
year; the figure was to diminish further: cf. Aischin. 3 94 6c Dem. 16.234); 
the law was certainly in effect by 349, and may have been in place even in 
353/2.4 It is an important point for the argument here that the very 
existence of the law implies the real possibility of a foreign policy which 
was more aggressive and costly than that favoured by Euboulos. This, 
coupled with the foregoing points, should be enough to caution against any 
acceptance of the end of the Social War as marking the end of the influence 
of the more determined or optimistic imperialists among Athens’ politicians 
and generals.
It remains to ask whether there is any reason to believe that 
Isokrates’ discourse exerted any influence upon those who were more
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^or a discussion of this subject see Cavkvell, Tubulus", pp. 54-61.
^ f. Aischin. 3-25: 'In earlier times, feUov-citizens, the city used to elect a 
Comptroller of the Treasury, vho every prytany made to the people a report of the 
revenues. But because of the trust vhich you placed in Eubulus, those vho vere 
elected Superintendents of the Theorie Fund held (until the lav of Hegemon vas 
passed) the office of Comptroller of the Treasury and the office of Receiver of Moneys; 
they also controlled the dockyards, had charge of the naval arsenal that vas building, 
and vere Superintendents of Streets; almost the vhole administration of the state vas 
in their hands.' (trans. CD. Adams)
SCavkvell (Tubulus“, pp. 55-56,63) believes that Euboulos may, in fact, have 
been responsible for the creation of the Theorie Commission and further suggests 
that in creating these commissioners Euboulos vas responding to Xenophon’s demand 
for a board of ‘Guardians of peace' (eiprivo^XcocE )^.
4Cf. Cavkvell, Tubulus“, pp. 58-61.
immediately involved in Athenian politics. There is little that can be said 
for certain about this.1 His advice to abandon the quest for a sea-empire, to 
treat the remaining allies justly, and to seek to restore Athens' prestige 
among the Greeks by refraining from vain and aggressive wars, could all be 
regarded as foreshadowing the policy which Euboulos urged upon Athens 
with increasing success in the course of the following decade. However, the 
triumph of that policy had not perhaps been recognized even by 353; for it 
would have been tempting for Isokrates to have acknowledged that his 
advice had won public recognition when in Antidosis he quotes from On the 
Peace in support of his claim that he wrote works which addressed 
themselves to the current political concerns of his city (see 15.63-65).
His support for a renewal of a Common Peace was also a proposal 
which seemed to prove attractive to Euboulos and his supporters, although 
their explicit association with such a policy cannot be attested until after 
the fall of Olynthos in 3a62 Xenophon's pamphlet On Revenues shows signs 
of reflecting the advice which Isokrates had put forward not long before: 
Xenophon is largely concerned with ideas for the economic recovery of 
Athens, but he emphasizes that the prerequisite circumstances for that 
recovery will be a lasting peace (Por. 5-2 edv n ttoXv$ eipriwiv dyowaSiaieXS), and 
the argument which follows, rebutting those who would find prosperity 
again through war, extends into the sphere of Athenian foreign policy: the 
situation which existed at the outset of the Second Athenian Confederacy is 
applauded, and Xenophon maintains that the time is now ripe for Athens to 
take a leading role in reconciling the other Greek states (Por. 5 5-10: esp. 
56
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^aistner thought not (Isocrates De Pace and Philippus, p.19): “It vould appear 
that the De Pace had little effect on Athenian policy and public opinion, beyond 
bringing on the vriter himself much hostile criticism": Laistner sees the subsequent 
defence of his life and his teaching in Antidosis as evidence of his conclusion. Koepp, 
hovever, considered that this vork vas extremely influential upon Euboulos at the 
time ("Isokrates als Politiker", p. 484).
2 It vas probably not long after that event that Eubulos moved the decree 
vhich sent Athenian ambassadors, including Aischines, around the Greek cities in 
pursuit of a coalition to be formed vith Athens to take up the var against Philip 
(Aischin.2.79; Dem.19.10,303ff.; see Griffith, HM, II., pp. 330); the Athenians did not 
abandon their efforts, despite lack of encouragement, and ambassadors from the 
Greek cities vere again expected back vhen the embassy vhich had gone to Philip in 
346 returned to Athens; before that time the synhedrion of the Allies of the Athenian 
Confederacy had met and had recommended that the Athenian Assembly should 
discuss the promulgation of a Common Peace (Aischin. 3-69-71). Hovever, Cavkvell
( T 1 1 K 1 1 I i t V . a  Koy'V frn< PnK niilrvo tn  K ir tViof
\  l i U i / U l U »  ,  J / . V U i Ü W  MAW J /U i lV j r  l/UVAA AUA liU V U U A U l) AW J J J  l / j r  U>i}OA U A 1 £  u i u l
Isokrates’ call for a Common Peace at 8.16 represented “the approved policy in foreign 
affairs".
"Nov, due to the confusion in Greece, it seems to me that the opportunity has fallen 
to the city of v inn ing  back the Greeks vithout trouble, vithout danger and vithout 
expense. For it is possible for her to try  to bring about peace among the states 
vh ich  are at v a r  v ith  one another and to effect a  reconciliation in the case of any 
vho engaged in internal faction“ - my trans.).
If Xenophon is not here influenced directly by Isokrates' oration, then it 
must be admitted that he holds a view of the general situation among the 
Greek states and of the policy most suitable for Athens which is essentially 
in harmony with that of Isokrates. If it can be believed that, in some 
respects although certainly not in all, Xenophon's On Revenues outlined 
plans for economic strategies which were actually implemented by 
Euboulos, then it would seem perverse to deny the possibility of a similar 
influence of Isokrates' On the Peace upon men of affairs at Athens: indeed, 
two of the three broad policies of On Revenues which can be identified as 
having been exploited by Euboulos (viz. the benefits of encouraging metics 
to come to Athens and the encouragement of trade and trading1) may be 
found as seminal ideas in On the Peace (cf. 6.20-21).
A theme which can be show  to appear both in On the Peace and in a 
later work of undoubted political purpose is that of the importance of 
justice being perceived as a basic element of Athens' foreign policy. From 
the start of his oration Isokrates defends the importance of justice as a 
virtue required for a successful foreign policy: there can be no more just 
terms of peace than those which would be embraced in a Common Peace 
(6.16); the cynical argument that injustice is more compatible with 
advantage for a state is denied, and the replacement of a policy based upon 
injustice with one which upholds justice is among the changes which 
Isokrates insists to be necessary if Athens is to be relieved of her present 
ills (6.17, 26, 30-31, 33-35,63); the empire which is coveted by many 
among the Athenians is claimed to be, among other things, unjust (6.66-70); 
injustice is said to be, in part, the explanation for the failure of Sparta's 
hegemony after the Peloponnesian War (6.95-100); in conclusion, it is a 
leadership established on a recognizedly just behaviour which, Isokrates
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iSee Cavkvell, Tubulus", pp.63-65; cf. also P. Gauthier, Un commentaire 
historique des Poroife Xenophon, Geneva 1976, pp .223-231 for a recent revie v  and 
discussion of the issue: Gauthier is more v a ry  than Cavkvell about recognizing 
specific instances of Xenophon’s proposals being applied, but he readily accepts that 
the pamphlet exerted influence soon after its publication upon the Athenians, 
especially on Euboulos and his supporters.
declares, will earn for x^thens a stable and enduring hegemony out of which 
will arise a consequent prosperity (6.1.36-140); Athens must adopt, amidst 
a world filled with injustice and madness, a policy characterized by justice 
and sanity: it is towards this that On the Peace is directed, and others are 
also urged to advise the greatest states towards this end (6.141, 145).
It may be more than coincidental that the importance of justice as a 
perceived characteristic of Athens' foreign policy and behaviour emerges 
clearly in Demosthenes' speech of 354/.31 On the Navv Boards: in advising 
the x^thenians against rushing themselves into a war against the King 
Demosthenes observes that there is little harmony at present among the 
Greek states and little trust of Athens; therefore, the Athenians should 
make defensive preparations, while awaiting a just and fair cause for 
entering into a war, when it could reasonably be expected that the justice 
of the cause would be acknowledged by the other Greeks who would then 
join alongside x4thens (14.3-7); Demosthenes encapsulates his advice by 
saying that Athens must make it clear that she is prepared and ready to act 
should the designs alleged of the King prove to have substance, but she 
must also make it clear that she is a state which is minded towards actions 
which are based upon justice.2 After describing the plans which he has for 
the preparation and readiness of Athens' defences, Demosthenes reiterates 
the importance for Athens of trusting in an attitude towards other states, 
including the Persians, which is just; the x4thenians are urged not to act 
unjustly towards the King, and so risk provoking action against themselves 
in which those of the Greeks who are unfavourably disposed towards them 
may seize the opportunity to join forces with the King; the Athenians 
should be prepared to react against any injustice which may be aimed at 
their state, but they must eschew unjust words or deeds toward others 
(14.35-41; esp. 36 & 4D.3 Demosthenes, like Isokrates, advises the 
Athenians to concentrate upon being prepared to defend themselves, but
166
^or the date of this speech see above, p.181.
2Dem. 14.7 nor odv ropr’ ecrrai, ccv r\ piv Si'vapas i% ttoXsdj e^Tacpievri rm 
napecnoEyaopievT] ttoctiv (favepa, 4*xlvr)Toa Se Sum eni <$poveiv aapoypevT].
•^Demosthenes also demonstrates vhat Isokrates fears in the practising 
politicians at Athens, vhen he qualifies his policy by noting that, if there v/ere the 
possibility of unanimity among the Greeks in banding against the King, then he 
Trould not count it as an unjust act for them to act unjustly against the King! (see 
14.37) Hov/ever, for the Greeks, and one v-nuld not exclude Isokrates, action against 
the Persians could always be justified, even if it vere unjust, so long as the 
circumstances irere propitious. In 346 Isokrates himself wss ready to return to his 
plan of an unprovoked attack upon the territory of the King.
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urges them against precipitate action which will involve them in another 
war at a time when Athens' reputation among the Greek states is not strong 
and when her embroilment in a war with Persia may be sufficient to 
provoke her enemies among the Greek states to seize a chance to do further 
harm to her and to her interests. The circumstances of the Greek world as 
described by Demosthenes only a year or so after Isokrates wrote On the 
Peace supports the general impression conveyed by Isokrates. Moreover, 
the advice about foreign policy which is given by Demosthenes certainly 
reflects, and may well owe something to, the counsel afforded in Isokrates' 
oration.
The issue of justice in foreign relations appears to have been topical 
at Athens about this time, for it is also introduced by Xenophon in On 
Revenues where he is arguing against the profitability of war. He poses the 
question whether even if wrong is done to Athens it should be ignored; he 
answers it in the same manner as Isokrates and Demosthenes by saying 
that injustice most certainly must be resisted, but like them he goes on to 
make the point that, if Athens avoids doing wrong to others, she will more 
surely and swiftly exact vengeance against an enemy since there will not 
be others who will be tempted to cast in their lot with Athens' enemy 
(Por_5 13) The possibility cannot be ignored that it had been the 
publication of Isokrates' On the Peace which had brought this question to 
public attention at Athens at this time.
Isokrates perceived the crisis which confronted the Athenians near 
the end of the Social War. He had warned them through the Plataikos 
about the duties and responsibilities of hegemony, but that advice had not 
been heeded as the lure of imperial power and profit enticed more 
strongly. He recognized that the peace proposed in order to disengage the 
city from the Social War and to evade a possible entanglement with Persia 
was short in statesmanship and offered little more than a temporary 
respite from the city's political and economic problems. Isokrates knew, as 
Demosthenes knew a year later, that Athens in her present state could not 
afford a war against the King or against anyone else for that matter: she 
had not the resources (for which see Dem. 14.9), Sparta was isolated and 
powerless, and Thebes in the eyes of many could not be trusted (cf. Dem. 
14-33-34). The futility of the policy which had prevailed prior to the Social 
War, and which seemed in danger of re-emerging as soon as the immediate 
crisis was past, was recognized: it would bring disaster for Athens both 
politically and economically. Also recognized was the Athenian obsession 
with Amphipolis and northern Greece; optimism expressed about these
igo
matters may have been no more than lip-service, although Isokrates was 
realist enough to know that Persian territories could not at this time be 
held out as alternative prospects for Greek expansion and colonization:1 
Thrace held better prospects, and indeed these were pursued in subsequent 
years, although not by the diplomatic method which Isokrates envisaged.
In On the Peace Isokrates sought to give Athens an ethical and 
rational basis for a foreign policy by which she could at least hope to 
recover the respect and prestige which would enable her to lay claim again 
to the hegemony among the Greek states: no other sensible course was 
available by which she could aspire to such a goal. The fact that such a goal 
is maintained in Isokrates’ vision should dispel any thought that this 
speech marks a moment of despair and disenchantment with his city or the 
abandonment of his wish to see Athens as the leading state of Greece. It 
was not for him to fill out the methods by which economic recovery might 
be advanced, as Xenophon was to do: he wished to demonstrate the 
inadequacy of the existing attitude and policy which many, even most, 
Athenians held towards their relations with the other Greek states, and he 
desired to offer a vision of a leadership based upon laudable moral 
principles rather than upon greed and self-interest. That his advice was 
only the beginning is acknowledged in the final words of the speech:
But I urge and exhort those who are younger and more vigorous than I to speak 
and write the kind of discourses by which they will turn the greatest states - those 
which have been wont to oppress the rest - into the paths of virtue and justice, 
since when the affairs of Hellas are in  a  happy and prosperous condition, it 
follows that the situation for men of wisdom also is greatly improved. (8.145: trans. 
Norlin, adapted)
These concluding words of the speech demonstrate clearly not only 
that Isokrates was concerned with questions of state policy which 
transcended the solution appropriate for a particular situation but also that
^rtaxerxes Ochos, who had succeeded in 359/8, was vigorous in his resistance 
of the revolt of Artabazos and of subsequent insurrection, and may even have been 
the aggressor; he was intent on the restoration of Persian power: see Moysey, Greek 
Relations, p.177 (cf. Tam's assessment [CAH VI. p 2 1 1 “he [Artaxerxes III]possessed 
energy and a policy, and was efficient up to a point"). More important, there is little
P v i/W if 'P  tn  w f f w t  f l f iv  ff lfirp  o rpnpr«1  i n t p r p c t  « n n f t a  t h p  f i rp p tr  c tfttP ?  n f  p i t b p r
W i * \JWAJ. V~W \W W A   ^ »« W ^WAAVA MA AAAWA WV% * - • ‘ - - - - - ^  VAAW W A WWAA W \M\VW WA WA VAAWA
Europe or Asia in supporting the so-called Second Satraps' Revolt, which had begun in 
35?: see Moysey, Greek Relations, pp.169-170,177-180.
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for Isokrates there existed a link between philosophia and practical 
politics.1
Confronted with a policy document such as this it would be a mistake 
to regard it as simply the advice of a politically'-inexperienced idealist or to 
compare it with the kind of advice one might expect from a politician who 
engaged in politically-expedient reactions to public issues. The confidence 
expressed in this speech in a foreign policy based upon eunoia should not 
be considered as mere philosophical fancy: the advantages of such a basis 
for a state's policy toward other Greek states had been acknowledged at the 
time of the Peloponnesian War, especially by the Spartans (see Thuc. 4.67.3; 
4.114.4; cf. 6.92.5),2 and there is enough evidence in the speech to indicate 
that Isokrates was under no illusion that the Athenian people could easily 
be persuaded of the merit of a policy toward the other Greeks based upon 
such a policy. In recent times scholars have been prepared to adopt a more 
sympathetic understanding to Euboulos and his policies^: it is time also
*Laistner (Isocrates' De Pace and Philippus, p.124) criticizes this ending to the 
speech as “weak", comparing it unfavourably to the endings of Philippes, Archidamos 
and Areopagitikos. It is not dissimilar to the ending of Panegyrikos. where Isokrates 
also appeals to others to take up his theme. Any "weakness” in the ending must relate 
to a judgment of it in terms of a true deliberative oration, but in both Panegvrikos and 
On the Peace Isokrates is only maintaining a facade of a deliberative oration: in each 
case his speech addresses issues which extend beyond a particular occasion; in each 
he recognizes that his message cannot be implemented by means of his oration alone; 
what will be needed will be other, more public, figures who will take up his advice, 
repeat it and, eventually, implement it; the situations with Philippos and Archidamos 
are not comparable: in the former Isokrates is addressing himself directly to Philip, 
while in the latter the speaker is Archidamos, not Isokrates; only with AreopagiUkos 
does Isokrates maintain to the very end the form of a genuine assembly-speech. It is 
the teacher, not a would-be statesman, who speaks here at the finish of Qn the Peace: 
as a teacher Isokrates instructed pupils from other states as well as Athens, and he 
makes it clear that the moral virtues upon which he would advise Athens to base her 
foreign policy are qualities which may equally be adopted by other states; if those 
who accept his instruction and his principles can impress upon the Greeks at large 
those principles, then the ideal union of philosophia and ordinary daily life may be 
granted afield in which it may flourish.
2See de Romilly, "Eunoia", pp. 92-101: de Romilly, while generally sympathetic 
to the political concept of eunoia which Isokrates espouses in On the Peace, describes 
Isokrates' criticisms against an imperial policy as "obsolete" and adds that "it does not 
seem that Isocrates really grasped the importance of the hostilities Athens had to deal 
with outside the confederation". I would submit that Isokrates was only too aware of 
the situation.
3See especially the articles of Sealey ("Athens After the Social Var“) and 
Cawkwell (“Eubulus"); however, for a particularly hostile sketch of Athens' policy in 
this period and for Euboulos' part in that see Grote, HG, IX, pp. 270-271.
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that a similar attitude among scholars be extended to this work of 
Isokrates.
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Chapter 5: Areopagitikos
While Xenophon proposed and Euboulos enacted policies and 
practices aimed at bringing about an economic recovery and future stability 
for Athens, Isokrates addressed himself to the need for Athens to steer a 
new course in a work which complements the advice given in On the Peace 
and which addresses not the foreign policy of his city but the domestic 
situation at Athens. In Areopagitikos Isokrates advises his countrymen to 
restore that democracy which had been established by Solon and had later 
been re-established by Kleisthenes after the Peisistratid tyranny: in his 
judgment this is the only way by which the Athenians can avert the 
dangers which are about to confront them and by which they may free 
themselves from the ills of the present (7.16). In particular, he proposes a 
restoration of the powers and influence of the Council of the Areopagos (cf. 
7.37), that body of ex-archons which in 462/1 had been deprived of 
whatever political power it had exercised1 when Ephialtes had launched the 
first of several reforms which brought about the radical democracy.
Areopagitikos has the form of a deliberative speech designed for the 
Athenian Assembly: Isokrates begins by telling his audience' that he has 
come forward to address them on a means of (public) safety.2 In contrast 
to On the Peace the dramatic fiction is maintained right to the final 
sentence, in which the audience* is invited to weigh up his advice and to 
vote for whatever seems to them to be most advantageous for the state 
(7.64). Also in contrast to On the Peace Areopagitikos is considerably 
shorter, in fact is only a little more than half the length, and in its length it
^or the uncertainty of vhat political pov'er the Areopagos held prior to 462/1 
see P.J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian A ttention  PpliteiaQiforü 1981, pp. 
106-108,314-317; cf. .Us!. Moore, Aristotle and Xenophon on Democracy and Oligarchy, 
London 1975, p-246.
27.1. uepl ownjpias tt)v npoooSov enovrpapTjv; cf. Thuc. 2.60.4: t <Ä£ Kar’ oücov 
lanconpayiai^ etarenXir/pevoi to u  kdivo£ t%  ownpiac mfaecsöe. The phrase "the safety of 
the state" seems to have been intended to evoke the magnitude of a situation, and Tras 
certainly used in, or of, just, such occasions: see Thuc. 8.53 3; 72.1; 86.3; Lys. 12.74; 
Arist. AthPol. 292; cf. Aristoph. Eccl. 395-397, & Andreres, HCT, V. 214; Rhodes 
(Commentary, p. 374) says that "the phrase does seem to have become a recognised 
formula for an open debate"; here, ho’wever, Isokrates surely wishes to emphasize 
that he is speaking on a matter of emergency.
may be compared with genuine deliberative orations such as the lengthier 
political speeches of Demosthenes.1
The speech opens with Isokrates setting himself apart from his 
‘audience’; for he describes not a general despair among the people but a 
mood of confident optimism, verging upon belligerence. He depicts an 
Athens which is well-equipped with war ships, enjoying peace in Attika and 
controlling a naval empire, with many allies willing to come to her 
assistance and others obedient and paying their contributions; in short, it is 
not Athens who should be concerned for her safety but her enemies; for 
imperial ambition flourishes at Athens (7.1 - . 3 ) 2
Against this foolish optimism Isokrates recalls the vicissitudes of 
fortune by which the prosperous and confident are wont to succumb to lack 
of understanding and intemperate behaviour, whereas those who are in 
need and are dispirited may well reverse their position by exercising 
prudence and moderation: examples of this among states may be found in 
the respective fortunes of Athens and Sparta over the previous half- 
century (7.3-7). In any case, Isokrates complains that the current 
circumstances of his city are not summed up accurately at all in that initial 
sketch of Athens’ position: Athens is now hated by the Greeks and has 
revived the enmity of the Great King; a little more specifically, she has lost 
all the cities in the Thrace ward region; she has spent more than 1,000 
talents in vain upon mercenary troops; she has been compelled to save the 
friends of her enemies,the Thebans, while losing her own allies; twice she 
has even made offerings of thanks for such achievements (7.6-10)1 In fact,
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1 Areopagitikos occupies approx. 19 pages of text in Benseler's Teubner edition 
(Lipsiae 1898): Demosthenes' On the Chersonese takes up approx. 17.5 pages in 
Dindorfs Teubner edition (Lipsiae 1883), and First Philippic approx. 13-5 pages in the 
same edition. Areopagitikos is the second shortest of Isokrates* political discourses: 
Plataikos is the shortest (13 pages), whereas On the Peace is considerably longer (33 
pages). Demosthenes' deliberative discourses range from 8-13-5 pages of the Teubner 
edition.
2Many historians v'ould not recognize this as an accurate representation of 
Athens' circumstances after the Social War, vhich they have held to have been 
ruinous for Athens; in the previous chapter it ’vas argued that the War itself vas less 
devastating than has often been claimed (see above, pp. 179ff.). Even so. there is the 
possibility that Isokrates uses some ironical hyperbole in the v iev  of present 
circumstances vhich he attributes to those Athenians wtiom the speech purports to 
criticize. Jaeger, h o o v er , w-as so concerned by this opening portrait, and by his 
interpretation of the speech in other aspects, that he sought a date for its setting (and 
for its composition) before the Social War (see belov, pp. 196ff.); Blass (AB; II2. 305, 
n 2 )  resorted to the desperate expedient of explaining the introduction, unlike the rest 
of the speech, as having been written before the War, but dates the remainder of the 
,vork to 355/4 or early 354.
the good fortune presented to her by the achievements of Konon (at Knidos 
in 394) and his son, Timotheos (through his campaigns between 376/5- 
373/2 and 366/5-363/2) have been squandered and dissipated (7.11-12). 
Thus Isokrates begins Areopagitikos by questioning the confidence and 
complacency of many at Athens, who do not perceive any weakness or 
potential danger in the existing foreign policy and in the condition of 
relations between Athens and other states, both Greek and barbarian. In 
view of this it is important to seek to establish the time at which this 
speech was published. A dating for the work is also significant in that 
Athens* foreign policy is the major subject of Isokrates* attention in the 
speech On the Peace, which was examined in the previous chapter, and 
some scholars have regarded the two orations as closely-linked, with On the 
Peace being devoted to a solution for Athens* external difficulties at the end 
of the Social War and Areopagitikos affording a recipe for internal revival.1
There are a number of references in the speech to historical events 
or circumstances. Unfortunately these are less precise than they might 
seem at first sight. The speech opens with a description of an Athenian 
people confident in its present circumstances. Isokrates argues that this 
assuredness is misplaced: the warnings at the beginning of the speech 
about the hatred of the Greeks and the enmity of the Persian king are 
repeated near the end of the work, where he invokes as witnesses the 
Athenian generals and the testimony of letters which the King has sent to 
the Athenians (7.61). He accuses his countrymen of failing to face facts, 
giving a list of recent examples which are tantalizingly abstruse (see above, 
p. 194). The only other reference to relatively recent historical events 
comes in a complimentary mention of the good fortune which Athens 
temporarily enjoyed as a result of Konon's naval-battle and the generalship 
of Timotheos (7.12). None of this offers us a categorical date for the speech. 
No doubt such historical references were as explicit as they needed to be, or 
as Isokrates wanted them to be, for a contemporary audience. The allusive 
nature of these references, typical of the references to very recent or 
contemporary events in all these works of Isokrates, adds to the belief that 
these political speeches of Isokrates had an immediate and contemporary 
purpose and relationship with events. Compositions which were merely 
being invested with a quasi-historical setting might have been expected to 
take more care to identify the historical circumstances, especially if the 
work was composed at some temporal distance from its historical setting.
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!See e g . Bringmann, Studien, p.95.
Early attempts by scholars to date Areopagitikos to a time after the 
Peace of Philokrates (346)1 have been replaced by a modern scholarly 
consensus which locates the work in the time shortly after the conclusion of 
the Social War in 355,2 *although there have been one or two attempts to 
argue for an earlier date, either within the time of the Social War or just 
before it. 3 Jaeger’s proposed dating of the speech to a time shortly before 
the outbreak of the Social War, and thus before the speech On the Peace. 
must be considered in a little more length, since Jaeger's argument depends 
not so much upon the precise identification of the references within the 
speech to more recent or near-contemporary events, as upon a general 
historical interpretation of the situation which existed immediately after 
the Social War and upon the view which Isokrates is alleged to have held in 
Areopagitikos about Athens' empire and the relationship between that and 
the view which he is said to hold upon the same subject in On the Peace. 
Regarding the "general optimism" which Isokrates describes among his 
audience at the start of the speech, Jaeger believes that this would be 
"unthinkable" for a time about the end of, or just after, the Social War 4 
Beginning from that position Jaeger then examines the views which
l This dating stemmed from the 1570 edition of Isokrates' vorks by Hieronymus 
Wolf. The edition has not been available to me, but it is reported by Jaeger in his 
article on the dating of the Areopagitikos ("Date", pp. 411-412).
2The bibliographical material up to 1930 vas collected and discussed in a 
dissertation by F. Kleine-Piening (Quo tempore Isocratis orationes quae neov eiptivtk et 
’AoeonaviTiKoc inscribuntur compositae sunt. Diss. Muenster [Paderborn 1930]): I have 
not been able to consult this dissertation. A more recent discussion of the question is 
presented by Bringmann (Studien, pp .75-81), vho concludes that a date in the earlier 
part of 354 is most likely.
Sßeloch (Attische Politik, p. 365) thought that Areopagitikos vas published 
during the time vh en  Chares iras fighting in  Asia Minor against the satraps of the 
King, a  time v h ich  he dates to summer 355. Eduard Meyer suggested that the vork 
should be dated to a  time after the protest to Athens of the King about the action of 
Chares and his mercenaries in Asia Minor in  355, but before the end of the Social War 
(GdA, V. pp.481, n 2  & 482): Meyer offered no explanation for this dating; Jaeger 
(“Date", p.415) notes that Meyer's dating vas supported by Miltner (Mitteilungen des 
Vereines Klassischer Philologen in Wien I [19241 p.46 - a ’ro rk  not available to me). 
A much more substantial attempt to fix the speech to a  date before the end of the 
Social War is to be found in W. Jaeger's article "The Date of Isocrates' Areopagiticus 
and the Athenian Opposition" pp.409-450 in Athenian Studies (presented to V.S. 
Ferguson), HSCPh Suppl. Vol.I (1940), (cf. Paideia, III, pp.109-110); Jaeger concludes 
that Areopagitikos certainly "belongs to the last period of the second maritime 
confederacy before the beginning of the Social War" and should probably be dated to 
the latter half of the year 357 ("Date", p.439).
4Jaeger, "Date", pp.415-416,422-423.
Isokrates presents about Athens' foreign policy in On the Peace and 
Areopagitikos: On the Peace he sees as a defeatist statement in which 
Isokrates concedes that domination of the sea is no longer possible for 
Athens;1 this view he considers to be a major shift in Isokrates’ thinking 
since the publication of Panegyrikos: for Jaeger believes that Panegyrikos 
was an expression of support for the resurgence of Athenian domination of 
the sea, and he regards that work as contributing to a preparation for the 
Second Athenian Confederacy.2 *I have argued in the first chapter that such 
a view of Isokrates' position and purpose in Panegyrikos is untenable 
(above p. 30f.). According to Jaeger the Social War brought about a com­
plete alteration in Isokrates' views and attitude about his own city and its 
role: thus On the Peace appears as a statement of his “absolute resignation" 
with respect to the prospect for Athens' sea-power.3 Once again, I have 
noted in the previous chapter (above, p. 190) that On the Peace should not 
be read as a counsel of despair. However, Jaeger professes to find in Areo­
pagitikos a very different attitude on the subject of Athens’ foreign policy, 
which he sums up thus: "The Areopagiticus. however, does not yet show 
any trace of a definite liquidation of the Athenian demand for domination. 
This fact, which has been entirely neglected in the discussion about the 
chronology of this speech, places it unmistakably in a time when the pre­
tence of Athenian imperialism still existed and the will to dominate the 
seas was still unbroken.“4 5One might think that this reflects no more than 
the view of other Athenians, which Isokrates presents clearly enough at the 
start of the speech; but for Jaeger it also represents Isokrates' own view in 
this speech; for he insists that “Isokrates himself still clings to the ideal 
that Athens should rule the sea“.5 The other place in the speech where 
Jaeger points to what he describes as “Isokrates' ideal", namely a fervent 
zeal for Athenian imperialism, is in the passage where the radical demo­
cracy is compared favourably with the treasonous regime of the Thirty: 
there the “demotikoi" are applauded for their patriotic determination that 
their city, "which had ruled over the Hellenes“, should avoid becoming itself
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Ubid., pp .424-425.
2 Ibid., pp .426-429.
3lbid., p.427.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., p.428.
under the control of others (7.64); the free use of the word “rule“ (apxe ,^ 
dpx^ ) here and in the remainder of this passage (cf. 7.65,66,69) is said to 
reflect a time before Isokrates developed the "somewhat artificial 
distinction“ between dpxri and ir/epora which is said by Jaeger to appear first 
in On the Peace.1 The assumption that this passage represents without 
qualification Isokrates' views at the time on Athenian imperialism is 
mistaken (see below, pp. 199-201); so, too, is the view that Isokrates’ did 
not distinguish, both in meaning and estimation, between the concepts of 
apXTl and T riv ia  (see above, p.33). In Jaeger’s opinion the constitutional 
reform which the speech proposes is designed to enable the continuation of 
his city’s predominant position abroad; thus Isokrates is not to be 
distinguished in his ultimate purpose from those optimistic imperialists 
whose views he condemns at the start of the speech; he differs from them 
only in his belief that this imperialism cannot be successfully retained 
without internal political reform.2 3
Not only would I take issue with Jaeger over his interpretations of 
Panegyrikos and On the Peace, but the discussion in the last chapter shows 
that he has also misunderstood the circumstances of Athenian politics in 
the period which followed the Social War, when those who advocated a 
continuation of the ill-advised imperialist policy wTere still a force with 
which to reckon (see above, p. 177ff.). Jaeger advances two arguments for 
such an interpretation of Isokrates' view about the empire in 
Areopagitikos: first, he claims that if the outcome of the Social War had 
been known when the speech was written, then it would have been 
impossible for no mention of it to have been made, particularly where 
examples are cited to illustrate the truth of the proposition that a state’s 
fortunes may readily be reversed (7.6-7): surely the calamitous outcome of 
the Social War would have been added to, or given instead of, the examples 
of Athens’ unhappy position at the end of the Peloponnesian War and the 
Spartans’ similarly inauspicious attempt at empire?3 However, as we saw 
with On the Peace, it is not safe to draw firm conclusions about the dating
of a speech from an orator's failure to remind his audience about a recent 
failure, about which they, or at least many among them, probably felt 
keenly; furthermore, it would not have been appropriate to compare the
ilbid., pp .425-429.
2 Ibid., p.429.
3 Ibid., pp.419,431-
loss which Athens sustained in her defeat in the Peloponnesian War with 
the outcome of the Social War, by which, despite Jaeger's assertion to the 
contrary,1 Athens had not lost her domination of the sea. Nowhere in 
either On the Peace or Areopagitikos does Isokrates make such an asser­
tion; Athens' Confederacy was reduced but not ended as a result of the 
Social War: several of her largest allies withdrew, but many of her smaller 
allies continued to participate for a number of years after 355 (see above, 
p. 156);2 the 263 ships (IG ii2 1611,1.9: 357/6 B.C.) with which Athens had 
entered the Social War had been increased, not decreased (despite losses 
during the War), to 349 by 353/2 (IG ii2 1613,1.302), and grew further to 
a total of 392 by 330/329 (IG ii2 1627,1.2 69)3 It should also be remem­
bered that historians have frequently explained the lenient attitude of first 
Philip, and then Alexander, towards Athens by the recognition of the Mac­
edonian monarchs that Athenian sea-power continued to be a force to treat 
with respect, and if possible to use, until Alexander decided to disband his 
Greek fleet, as he did in the winter of 334/3 (see Arrian 1.20.1).4 *
Jaeger's second argument concerns his interpretation of the passage 
in which Isokrates compares the rule of the Thirty to that of the 
democracy, greatly to the advantage of the latter: but it is a distortion of 
Isokrates' argument to take this praise of the democracy out of context, and 
to conclude from what is said here that "in the Areopagiticus it is still the 
main merit of democracy that it has proved so closely connected with 
Athenian domination in Hellas".5 It has rightly been objected that the 
context of this discussion of the present democracy is crucial to 
understanding what is said about it in this passage:6 in comparison with
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1 Ibid, p.424.
2Ihe Confederacy was actually not terminated until after Chaironeia (338) 
(Paus. 1.25 3). Griffith (HM. II, p.607) observes of the Confederacy: "Its value to 
Athens in terms of power since 355 [until its termination i though much reduced, had 
not been negligible.“
SCawkwell (“Eubulus", p. 65) attributes most of this ship-building to the period 
of Euboulos' financial leadership.
4E.g. Griffith. Hi£ II, p.619.
5Jaeger, "Date", p.429.
6Bringmann, Studien, pp.78-79: in the arguments set forth against Jaeger's 
interpretation and dating of Areopagitikos I am much indebted to Bringmann's views 
on this matter (pp .76-79), with which I fully agree, although I do not agree with his 
further discussion concerning the relationship of Isokrates* proposals to the political
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the rule of the Thirty the government of the democrats may indeed be 
characterized as "a divine -creation” (eeonoVos* 1), bu t it should not be 
overlooked that Isokrates also declares th a t the present governm ent “is 
criticized by all” (7.62). Isokrates' final words of the section, which form 
the basis of Jaeger's argument, should also be treated within their context; 
Isokrates says tha t the distinction between the oligarchs and the democrats 
may be summed up thus: oi pev yap {dAvyapxucoi) rfcuwv rw  pev ttoAu w  apxew, 
roi£ Se noXepioic 8oyXe5eu\ oi Se (St^poruml tojv pev aXXajy apyeiv, roi£ Se noXlroa  ^iaov 
lyeiv (7.69: cf. 7.64); bu t even here, noting the strongly antithetical 
structure of the sentence, we should be cautious of treating this as an 
explicit statem ent th a t the democracy stood for imperialism; “the others” 
over which the democrats aspire to rule are contrasted in Isokrates' words 
with “(our) enem ies”, by whom the oligarchs are said to have been willing 
to be enslaved, and not, for example, with “the other Greeks”; taken in its 
context, the words here are not making a distinction between the treason of 
the despicable oligarchs and the laudable imperialism of the democrats: 
the contrast is between the way in which oligarchs and democrats treated 
their compatriots compared to that in which they have behaved towards 
the state's enemies: treason as against patriotism, rather than against 
imperialism. Nor should one be misled by the intensely patriotic assertion, 
(deliberately) reminiscent of Perikies, tha t "even today visitors from other 
lands consider tha t she is worthy to rule not only over all Hellas b u t over 
all the world” (7.66); here too the context is important, not only for its 
conscious Periklean echo (cf. Thuc. 2.41, esp. 2.41.3: ovie repynriKocplorrocptptjav 
ox Q.VX ?-V’ dikov ccpxt-im, cf. Isok. 15-234), but- also because the comparison 
between the Thirty and the democrats in this instance is being draw n 
between the one group's blatant disregard for the public buildings of 
Athens and the other’s careful attention to achieving such a rem arkable 
visual and public example tha t visitors to Athens have been compelled to 
acknowledge the city's claim to exemplary status. Finally, Isokrates' own 
words as he passes from his comparison of the Thirty with the present 
democracy leave no doubt about the relative nature of his praise.
view's of Theramenes and those who are said to have followed his "moderate” politics 
(see below, pp. 223ft.).
1A anck Xeyopevov and an unusual idea to apply here; perhaps emphasizing the 
abyss of difference between the monstrous rule of the Thirty and even the less than 
perfect government of the radical democracy. Pindar ref erred to the QeoSprjroc 
eXeyflepta of the Dorian constitution (Pyth. 1.61), but Isokrates may haw more in mind 
the use of the epithet ÖtoSpriroc applied to Athens by the tragedians in recollection of 
the legends of Kekrops, Athena and Poseidon (Soph. El. 707; Eur. IT. 1449; Hipp_. 974).
I have recounted these things for tvo reasons: because I 'panted to shov, in the 
first place, that I am not in favour of oligarchy, or special privilege, but of a just 
and orderly government of the people, and, in the second place, that even badly 
constituted democracies are responsible for fever disasters than are oligarchies, 
vhile those vhich are veil-ordered are superior to oligarchies in that they are 
more just, more impartial, and more agreeable to those vho live under them.
(7.70: my underlining)
Isokrates continues to emphasize the purely comparative nature of 
his applause for the radical democracy by distinguishing between the 
degeneracy of the modern Athenians and the superiority displayed by their 
ancestors, who truly manifested the natural advantages which they 
possessed by virtue of their Athenian birth. Whereas those ancient 
Athenians fought bravely and successfully against Amazons, Thracians, 
Peloponnesians and Persians (7.75), the present Athenians “have fallen into 
into folly and confusion, and are eager for wicked things“ (7.76: eimenrakapev 
ei£ avowv icairapaxijv Kai TTovrjpdjv upayparow emSyinav). However, Isokrates 
refrains from continuing in this critical vein, because, as he says, he has 
dealt with this subject before and will do so again, if he fails to persuade 
the Athenians from making such errors (7.77). How, the words quoted 
above from 7.76 are closely alike to the criticism of the state which is found 
in On the Peace, where the criticism is clearly linked to the mistaken 
foreign policy which is associated with the the radical democrats: there too 
the policy is described as "folly“ (avow: cf. 6-17,31,61,121), the motivation is 
"an eagerness for wicked things" (emövpw twv novriptav npayptmjav: cf. 
6-3539,73,79,120)1, and the consequence is "confusion" (lapaxfi: cf.
6.64,103). If, as Jaeger would claim, Areopagitikos was composed before 
On the Peace, then the promise near the end of Areopagitikos (7.77) to take 
up again the subject of the inadequacy of the current democracy could be 
seen as being fulfilled by the subsequent production of On the Peace: 
however, this leaves no sense in Isokrates' statement at the same point 
that he has already addressed the subject.2
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^ h e  adjective novripo^  is also frequently applied in On the Peace to the political 
leaders at Athens vho are in favour of an imperialist policy: e.g. 8.13,53.
2This point is noted by Bringmann, Studien, p.81. In addition, note that 
Isokrates also says at 7.74 that he has spoken “often" and "to many people" on the 
subject of the natural advantages imbued in those born in Attika (cf. 8.94). These 
references to previous occasions when Isokrates has spoken on the same theme 
should be treated vith some caution as evidence for dating the speech, since they may 
be no more than part of the attempt to create the atmosphere of a ’genuine' 
deliberative speech.
The final refutation of Jaeger's view comes from a consideration of 
what Isokrates says that he expects his reforms to achieve: if the 
Athenians reject his advice, then they can expect to continue to hold 
counsel, engage in wars, and live, suffer and fare much the same as they do 
at present; if, on the other hand, they take his advice and set about 
imitating the constitutional practice of their ancestors in the time of Solon 
and Kleisthenes, then not only can they hope for internal harmony within 
their state as well as an attendant prosperity, but they can also anticipate 
that the other Greeks will once again willingly place themselves in the 
hands of Athens, while the barbarians, in particular the Great King, will 
cease to trouble them or the other Greeks ( 7.76- 53) The prescription in 
this speech of internal reform (political, but more importantly, moral), is 
also to be found in On the Peace, just as the outcome of following the 
prescription is also similar in both works. At the end of On the Peace 
Isokrates lists three ways by which the Athenians may separate 
themselves from their present unhappy state of affairs: the first of these is 
to transfer their support from the self-seeking demagogues to the kind of 
men whom they would also accept as suitable to manage their private 
affairs (or, as they are called, "the fair and the brave" [oi koXoI laxyoceol]1), and 
to stop treating as oligarchs anyone who fails to mouth the cant-phrases of 
the radical democrats (6.133); second, the moral basis which Isokrates 
advises in Areopagitikos should underlie the internal condition of the state 
is no less the guiding principle which he envisages in On the Peace for the 
state's foreign policy (cf. 6. 134- 135); third, the outcome in terms of foreign 
relations is seen in both speeches as the willing acceptance among the other 
Greeks of Athens' power and of her leadership (cf. esp. 6- 135- toi$ yap o&tgd 
Siajceijievois eicovre^  toal ids wvacreiou; icod ra  ^rjyepovia^  BiSoaaiv).
On the Peace and Areopagitikos do not present different attitudes 
and viewpoints about Athens' empire, any more than they adopt different 
views about the existing democracy; these two speeches represent two 
sides of the same coin, but they are more even than this; for each ‘side of
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11 foliov Gomme's guidance (HCT, III, p. 480) in translating this expression; 
for Gomme's full discussion of this expression see “The Interpretation of KAAOI 
KATAOOI IN THUCYDIDES 4.402“, CQ n.s.. 3 (1953), 65-68, and for a general discussion 
see Dover, Greek Popular Morality, pp. 41-45. Dover's final summation is particularly 
indicative of what Isokrates seems to have in mind here: “the poor Athenian was 
normally willing to apply the expression kalos kagathos to any man who had what he 
himself would have liked to have had (wealth, a great name, distinguished ancestors) 
and was what he himself would have liked to be (educated, cultured, well-dressed and 
well-groomed, with the physique and poise of a man trained in fighting, wrestling 
and dancing)“ (p.45).
the coin’ shows something of what is recorded on the other. If anything, 
then, the situation described at the start of Areopagitikos. the viewpoint of 
Isokrates within the speech and the relationship of this to his viewpoint in 
On the Peace suggest that the two speeches were written not far apart in 
time and that the Areopagitikos could well belong to a time soon after the 
conclusion of the Social War. The question remains whether the references 
within the speech to recent or contemporary events and circumstances can 
be accounted for upon such an assumption.
The evidence which points to a date for the speech sometime not long 
after the Social War is as follows: the strongest point is the mention of 
letters which the King has dispatched to Athens and in which, it is said, the 
barbarians express their contempt for Athens (7.51). Some have thought 
this to be a reference to the Persian protest at Chares’ intervention in 
support of the rebel satrap Artabazos early in 355.1 In speaking of this 
incident Diodor os does not mention any letter, but says that ambassadors 
were sent to Athens to lodge a protest (16.22 .2); it is quite conceivable that 
the ambassadors brought with them written complaint from the King. It is 
also possible that some further communication took place between the King 
and the Athenians which led the Athenians to hold an assembly in 354 to 
discuss whether they should take preemptive action against the King; it is 
true that Demosthenes, who spoke against the idea, makes no mention of 
any official contact, and denies that there is any clear proof that the King 
intends to attack the Athenians (14.3-4); however, it should also be noted 
that Isokrates does not speak of an attack, but claims that the 
correspondence from the King which has been received at Athens indicates 
the (deplorable) contempt with which the barbarians are at present able to 
treat the Athenians. We know too little about the diplomatic affairs of the 
Athenians and the King at this time to be precise, but the tantalizing 
fragments of information which we do have point to a tension and some 
kind of diplomatic communication in the years 355-354, whereas there is 
virtually nothing which could support Isokrates’ statement for some years 
prior to 355.2
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*See Bringmann, Studien, pp.75,81; cf. Jaeger, "Date", p.413.
2It is likely that the King did not irelcome Timotheos' expulsion of the Persian 
garrison and Persian-supported government at Samos in 365 ’tfith the subsequent 
introduction of a kleruchy there, but ve kno v  nothing of his response to this 
situation. Xenophon, in his Agesilaos. an enkomion presumably written not long 
after the Spartan king s death in 360, makes a general reference to the anti-Greek 
behaviour of the Persian kings, vho in the past marched against Greece, and to the
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A second reference also points strongly to a date for the speech 
which would be no earlier than the middle 350s: it is said that the 
Athenians have lost all the cities in the Thraceward region (7.9). From 360 
the Athenians had renewed their interest and ambitions in northern Greece 
(and especially in regaining Amphipolis), when first Iphikrates and then 
later Timotheos directed Athenian efforts in this region; the former had 
little success, but Timotheos fared better: during his commands in this 
region between 364-362 Methone, Pydna, Potidaia and Torone are 
mentioned as cities which were brought into Athenian hands (Dein. 1.14; 
Isok. 15-106, 113; D.S. 15-61.6; Polyain. 3-10.15); it is difficult to see how 
Isokrates could make his statement about losses in the Thraceward region 
(especially when he also praises the success of Timotheos as a general 
[7.12]), until after Philip II had begun to dispossess Athens of her 
possessions in this region: in 35? the Makedonian king took first 
Amphipolis, which Athens did not own but had long coveted, and then 
Pydna; in the following year (356) Potidaia was lost, and then, probably 
very late in 355, Philip laid siege to Methone, the one remaining Athenian 
base on the Makedonian coastline, and that too fell, probably sometime 
before the end of summer 354; also, in the winter of 357/6, Philip had 
detached the independent Chalkidians from /Athens by concluding an 
alliance with them against Athens.1 The evidence here points very strongly 
towards a date for Areopagitikos sometime in 354, possibly after the 
capitulation of Methone.
The other events are either less easy to define or less helpful.
Konon's naval victory is obviously that at Knidos in 394, whereas the 
strategia of Timotheos could refer to either of his two series of commands 
(375/7-373/2, 366/5-360/59),2 although his last, in the Social War(356/5),
current king, who is guided in his employment of alliances, gifts of money and 
peaces by his desire to harm the Greeks (Ages. 7.7); but this statement should perhaps 
be understood to embrace contemporary times, and need not be taken as a ref erence to 
any particular incident at the time when Xenophon wrote the passage.
Jaeger (“Date“, pp.417-418) rejects the attempt to associate these “letters“ from 
the King ’with events of 355-354 and suggests that Isokrates refers to a series of 
communications between the King and the Athenians associated with the succession 
of Common Peaces starting from the King's Peace of 387/6; the interpretation is not 
convincing (cf. Bringmann, Studien, pp.80-81) and takes no account of the changing 
attitude of the King in his relations with the Athenians and the other European Greek 
states in this period.
1See Beloch, GG, III2.1.230-231,253; for the date of the siege and capture of 
Methone see Griffith, HM, II. 255.
2For the list of Timotheos' strategic see Beloch, Attische Politik, pp.296-298.
is not possible, since Isokrates is applauding the success of his leadership.1 
The Athenians* "salvation" of the friends of the Thebans could allude to 
either the Athenian alliance with the Arkadians in 366 or to a purely 
defensive alliance between the Athenians and the Messenians (probably of 
355: cf. Paus. 4.26.1-2; Dem. 16.6-10), although the latter did not yield any 
action on the part of the Athenians in support of the alliance. The two 
occasions when sacrifices had been performed to celebrate the good tidings 
in connection with events such as Isokrates has questioned are wreathed in 
obscurity: it has been suggested that one occasion was the initial welcome 
at Athens of the news of Chares* success and reward in 355 for his services 
in Asia Minor (D.S. 16.22.1-2 );2 if this is a correct supposition, then this 
would refer to Isokrates* questioning of the wisdom of a policy which 
included “having made enemies of the barbarian" (7.10: r<5ßapßap(pnoXe|jum 
yeyovotes), and it would further assist in dating the speech to a time in 355- 
354, a second possible occasion is difficult to identify .3 The expenditure of 
a thousand talents to no purpose on the employment of mercenaries (7.9) 
need not refer merely to the Social War; the use of mercenaries had 
become a regular feature of fourth-century warfare, for Athens no less 
than for other Greek (and barbarian) states; but the allegation that the 
money had been spent "to no purpose" should not be overlooked: that 
would seem to exclude much of Athens* military activity since the 
formation of the Second Athenian Confederacy in 377: much of Athens* 
campaigning since that time had been at least mildly successful; the one 
objective which Athens had notably failed to achieve was the recapture of 
Amphipolis, a goal which had engaged the attention of a succession of 
Athenian-led forces from 366; but, apart from Amphipolis itself, Timotheos 
had been relatively successful in regaining cities in Thrace after he took 
over the command in 365, and a date for Areopagitikos which was before
205
^ e  Bringmann, Studien, pp .79-80.
2See Schäfer, Dem, u.s. Zeit. I2, p.171, n.2; also Rauchenstein, Ausgevählte 
Reden, pp.l35f., 152.
SRauchenstein (Ibid., p.152) suggests as a possibility the celebrations vhich  
Theopompos reports that the Athenians held in consequence of Chares’ victory over a 
Makedonian force (Theopomp. FGrH 115 F 249): the difficulty is that this probably 
took place in summer 353, since Chares is kno'vn to have commanded a force stationed 
at Neapolis in that year (Polyain. 4.2.22): cf. Griffith, HM, II, 231-282. It is 
conceivable that that the successful campaign against the Thebans and their friends 
in Euboia in 357/6 could have been in Isokrates’ mind: that campaign achieved its 
goal in less than 30 days (see DS. 16.72; Aisch. 3 85; cf. Dem. 8.74-75; 21.174; 22.14; Tod 
GHI. 11.153).
the disadvantageous outcome of the Social War would need to rely rather 
heavily upon the futile quest for Amphipolis in order to give point to 
Isokrates’ words about wasted money. In sum, nothing in the historical 
references either compels a compositional date which is earlier than 355 or 
excludes the probability that the Areopagitikos was written not long after 
the conclusion of the Social War; however, Jaeger is correct when he says 
that these historical references are not sufficient to date the work: the 
most important information in the speech with respect to its dramatic 
setting, and hence to its compositional date,i is provided by the general 
picture given of the situation at Athens and the advice which Isokrates 
himself offers.
The essential explanation for this catalogue of misfortunes and for 
the present deplorable state of affairs is given as the inadequacy of the 
existing form of government. Isokrates declares that the politeia or 
constitution is the soul of the state and exercises as much power over it as 
the mind over the body.1 2 It is the politeia which constitutes the true 
defences of a city, and at Athens, although the citizens are said to bemoan 
the present standard of government, there is no real perception that the 
politeia has been corrupted and no attempt be remedy matters (7 13~ 15)- 
It is against this background that Isokrates proceeds to a proposal for 
constitutional reform.
The government of Athens under Solon and, later, Kleisthenes is 
characterized, and compared with that which has subsequently come into 
being in the form of the radical democracy, in the effect which each is said 
to have had upon the other Greeks: under the former politeia the 
Athenians won hegemony with the willing consent of the Greeks, whereas 
already once before, at the end of the fifth century, the Athenians of the 
radical democracy made themselves hated by all, suffered many terrible 
things, and all but teetered over the brink of disaster (7.17-16). In the 
main body of the speech which follows (7.20-55) comparisons are made 
between the politeia which is claimed to have existed under Solon and
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1 It should be clear by nov that I do not accept the proposition that Isokrates 
vrote these political discourses at times significantly later than the date at vhich the 
speech is set. There is no positive evidence to sustain such a viev. and the very 
allusiveness of much of the detail of the contemporary references in the speeches 
can best be explained on the assumption that Isokrates' audience vas familiar vith  
the background of events and circumstances; a deliberate recreation of the 'setting' 
vould varrant more explicit references in establishing the historical context.
2The metaphor is repeated at 12 (Panath ). 138.
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Kleisthenes and that which has operated since the radical reforms of the 
mid-fifth century; a catalogue of criticisms of the effects of the current 
democracy is matched against a parade of virtuous effects of the older 
democracy. Thus democracy' has given way to insolence', freedom' to 
lawlessness*, ‘equality of political rights* to an undesirable 'outspokenness* 
and *happiness* to 'the licence of doing whatever one wants' (7.20); an 
equality, based upon merit and capacity, giving each man his due, has been 
replaced by an unfettered equality which makes no discrimination in 
making awards but permits the magistracies to be filled by lot with no 
preselection (7.21-23); an altruistic attitude of service which governed 
those who accepted the public duties has been replaced by an unseemly 
scramble for public offices directed by motives of private gain from public 
affairs (7.24-27); a due and modest reverence for religious traditions has 
given way to extravagant and inconsistent celebration in which emphasis is 
placed upon exotic foreign cults to the neglect of traditional religion (7.29- 
30);1 a likemindedness and a respect between social classes, which 
functioned in public affairs and extended into private life and which saw 
the rich acknowledging their wealth and using it to the benefit of those in 
need, has been replaced by a divisiveness among the classes and a 
reluctance upon the part of the rich to invest or to expend their money for 
the good of the state (7.31-35) Very importantly, the moral role of 
guardian of the state, which is claimed to have been exercised by the 
Council of the Areopagos, has largely vanished, although it is alleged that of 
the awesome respect which that former body of men of noble birth and 
august life had commanded enough remains even now to exert a sobering 
influence upon some of the unworthy men whom the lot has selected for its 
ranks (7.37-36). This Council had performed a most important function in 
supervising the upbringing of the young; for then the Athenians had relied 
upon careful education to produce a law-abiding people whose respect for 
the laws was based upon a personal sense of morality, whereas now the 
city relies upon hedging the people about with laws in an attempt to 
circumscribe an inner lawlessness (7.39-42). The Council watched over the 
lives of all citizens both by punishing those who offended and, more 
importantly, by seeking in advance to guard against wrongdoing; this it
^ h e  example of a public sacrifice of 300 oxen (7 .29) seems to be recalling some 
specific occasion. The only occasion 'which vould seem to fit ’would be a celebration 
in honour of Chares' success in  355 in the service of the satrap Artabazos: for this 
Chares vas richly regarded and was inordinately proud of his achievement (D.S. 
1622.1; Schol. ad Dem. 4.19; Plut. Aratos 16.3).
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had particularly sought to achieve with the young by guiding them into 
vocations, if they belonged to the poorer classes, or, if they had sufficient 
personal means, by ensuring that they pursued 'worthwhile' and traditional 
activities (horsemanship, athletics, hunting and philosophy); in comparison, 
under the radical democracy the young are said to waste their days in 
gambling-dens and in the company of flute-girls, or in lounging around the 
market-place behaving disrespectfully and immodestly (7.43-49). The 
social harmony among the citizen-body, the good will felt towards the city 
by the other Greeks and the fear inspired in the barbarians has changed to 
a scene of social disruption characterized by litigiousness, tax-levies, 
poverty and warfare; the old satisfaction with a simple life where none 
experienced want has given way to an urban brashness and ostentation 
masking a poverty which compels many citizens, dressed in rags, to queue 
before the law-courts in the hope of receiving the paltry three obols a day 
payment for service as jurors (7.51-54).1
After the comparison between the two forms of government 
Isokrates digresses before the peroration in order to defend himself against 
any charge of seeking to subvert the democracy or of wishing to establish 
an oligarchy, in this section he compares the rule of the Thirty at Athens in 
404/3 with the leadership of the radical democracy and firmly approves of 
the latter as the lesser of two evils (7.56-70). Then, in returning to his 
theme and in moving into the peroration, he again regards it as necessary, 
since he has just praised the radical democracy, to make it clear that such 
praise was only relative and that it must not obscure the real weaknesses 
which he perceives in contemporary Athens. Thus he returns to the eulogy 
of the Athenians' ancestors, culminating with an euphoric assertion:
For I knov that Trtiile other regions produce varieties of fruits and trees and 
animals, each peculiar to its locality and much better than those of other 
lands, our ovn country is able to bear and nurture men vho are not only the 
most gifted in the ’vorld in the arts and in the po’vers of action and of speech, but
iM.M. Markle III has argued that the three-obol daily payment to jurors in the 
fourth century vas sufficient recompense to a llov all citizens to serve ("Jury Pay and 
Assembly Pay at Athens" pp. 272-281, esp275-276, in Crux: Essays in Greek History 
presented to GI.M. de Ste.Croix on his 75th birthday, edd. P A. Cartledge & FD. Harvey, 
London 1985). I find this difficult to accept in v ie v  of the fact that in the course of 
the fourth century it vas found necessary for the payment for attendance in the 
Assembly to be doubled from 3 obols to 1 drachma (see Arist. Ath Pol. 622; cf .41.3); cf. 
also Sinclair, Democracy and Participation, p.l 17.
are also above all others in valour and in virtue. (7.74)1 
By contrast, he portrays the current Athenians, and especially their 
political leaders, as unworthy of their forefathers due to their laziness and 
wickedness; they have failed to capitalize on their noble inheritance and 
instead have fallen into folly, confusion and the desire of wicked things 
(7.76).
The peroration returns to the matter of Athens* standing in the eyes 
of others. Isokrates argues that by re-adopting the constitution which 
operated before the radical democratic changes one may reasonably expect 
a revival of the attitudes held towards Athens by other Greeks and by the 
barbarians: that is, many of the Greeks will feel such confidence in the 
Athenian political leadership that they will readily entrust themselves to 
Athens* guidance, while the barbarians* current contempt will be replaced 
by an attitude of respect and fear. The citizens of Athens will put aside 
their internal jealousies and rivalries and will expend their energies upon 
resisting any who would invade their land. Above all, the current shameful 
destitution will be transformed into a proud prosperity with a livelihood 
for all (7.77-63).
The portrait which Isokrates gives of Athenian political, social and 
economic life may arguably be only one viewpoint, but the various 
criticisms which are made can be found more generally in the written 
evidence from the fourth (and later fifth) century, and these criticisms are 
not confined to writers of notably anti-democratic persuasion. A lengthy 
passage towards the end of Demosthenes’ Third Olvnthiac oration (349 B.C.) 
bears a strikingly similarity to certain aspects of the critical picture 
described in Areopagitikos: Demosthenes maintains that his advice is 
directed by a desire to put the interest of the state above any personal 
political point-scoring, and in doing this he claims to be following the illust­
rious example of men of earlier days who were true statesmen, such as 
x^risteides, Nikias, Demosthenes (son of Alkisthenes) and Perikles: but since 
then the politicians have shown themselves more concerned with transient 
political popularity, seeking to identify, and so to follow, the popular mood 
in preference to offering sound political advice; Demosthenes, like 
Isokrates, makes the comparison between the present Athenians and their
20$
iThe hyperbole vhich is to be observed in this patriotic claim is a feature of 
Isokrates* praise for the Athenians' forefathers in this oration (cf. 7.12: "For vhen all 
Hellas fell under the pover of Athens, after the naval victory of Konon and the 
Strategie, of Timotheos“); in part, the exaggerated praise may be intended to 
contribute to the realism' of the setting of the York as a deliberative oration (see 
above, p. 193).
ancestors, to the advantage of the latter, although he differs from Isokrates 
in turning for ancestral exempla mainly to the leaders of the earlier period 
of the radical democracy, rather than to the period prior to the radical 
democratic reforms. Such leadership and behaviour by their ancestors, 
says Demosthenes, resulted in the willing acceptance by the Greeks of 
Athenian power and the appropriately respectful submission of barbarian 
peoples (such as Makedonians and Persians); the wealth of the state was 
devoted to public works which enhanced the beauty of Athens, while the 
private residences of the public figures were noted for their austerity and 
simplicity; in sum: "selfish greed had no place in their statesmanship, but 
each thought it his duty to further the common weal. And so by their good 
faith towards their fellow Greeks, their piety towards the gods, and their 
equality among themselves, they deserved and won a great prosperity" 
(3-26); and yet, while in recent years the misfortunes or distractions of 
other major Greek states have left open the way for the Athenians to take 
up the leading position, all that has happened is that the Athenians have 
been robbed of their own territory, they have wasted more than 1500 
talents on unnecessary objectives, allies have been lost, and Philip has been 
given the practice which has made him into the enemy that he now is. 
Demosthenes sneers at the domestic policy of those who at present direct 
Athenian government, and condemns the men responsible: "Look rather at 
the men whose statesmanship has produced these results: some of them 
were poor and now are rich, some were obscure and now are eminent, 
some have reared private houses more stately than our public buildings, 
while the lower the fortunes of the city have sunk, the higher have their 
fortunes soared" (3 29); the people have become the lackeys of these 
politicians, who treat them with contempt and aim to keep them in a state 
of subservience by means of doles and public entertainment (3 2 1-32).1
Detailed study of the men who, in the fifth and fourth centuries, were 
prominent at Athens because of inherited or acquired wealth has revealed 
the basic truth of the general picture of Athenian society and political 
leadership which Isokrates provides.2 With the coming of the radical 
democracy about the middle of the fifth century the rules of the political
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1 Demosthenes had already used some of this material a fe v  years previously in 
his speech Against Aristokrates (in 352 [for the date see above, p.174, n .l I see 23.196- 
198,201,207-210).
2See J.K. Davies, Vealth and the Foyer of ¥ealth in Classical Athens, N ev  
Hampshire 1984, passim: cf. also P. MacKendrick, The Athenian Aristocracy, 399 to 31 
B.C., Cambridge (Mass.) 1969, Ch. 1.
game changed as did the requirements for participants: the earlier power - 
bases associated with religious cult and ostentatious public expenditure, 
which were closely related to family dynasties and inherited wealth, were 
progressively superseded by the new requirements of rhetorical skills, 
whether before the Assembly or in the courts, and by individual capacities 
for financial and administrative management; these talents were educable 
rather than inherited; only the generalship, and perhaps other senior 
military positions, remained largely in the hands of "those of good family” 
(oi xpTjcrrol) and the "well-off" (oieimopoi) (cf. [Xen] Ath.Pol. 1.3; Arist. Pol. 
1262a 31-32)-1
This did not mean that the scions of the wealthy families dropped out 
of contention for political office and honour: the expensive education to be 
acquired at the feet of Isokrates and others was more accessible to the sons 
of wealthy men than to those of the poor, and this education was precisely 
aimed, in considerable degree, at the cultivation of the new skills required 
for the public arena; however, success in public life now had to be 
achieved amid the hurly-burly of public debate and political prosecutions. 
The evidence of the entries by Athenians in two- and four-horse chariot 
races at the festivals over the sixth to fourth centuries seems to indicate 
that the rich at Athens of the fourth century no longer saw a political 
advantage to be gained from such expenditure, and so refrained from 
participating, not because they could no longer afford to do so, but because 
they chose not to;2 the influx of wealth which had come with the fifth- 
century empire had meant that public building programmes could be 
financed by the state, and no longer depended upon the largesse of rich 
private citizens, although, until defeat in the Peloponnesian War spelled the 
end of the empire, the wealthy did retain a common interest with the poor 
in an empire which afforded both rich and poor alike with opportunities for 
financial prosperity^ with the loss of the empire the interests of the rich 
and the poor in terms of foreign policy tended to diverge; however, the 
change which had been occurring both in the behaviour and the 
composition of the political class since about 440 B.C. meant that there 
could be no easy resumption of the old leadership based upon family 
dynasties among the rich; the aristocratic paternalism of Nikias as leader
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1 Davies, ¥ealth and the Pover, pp.l 14-129.
2Ibid., pp.l02-103; cf. also MacKendrick, The Athenian Aristocracy, p.3. 
^Davies, ¥ealth and the Poorer, pp.89-90.
of the "notable men" (oiem^avev?) should be regarded as an anachronistic 
exception for this period of the developed democracy at Athens (cf. Arist. 
AthPol. 2 6 3,5)- The loss of empire and the prospects for gain therefrom 
produced among the wealthy of the fourth century a firmer interest in 
peace than had been the case in the previous century (cf. Hell.Oxy. 6.3; 
Aristoph. Ekkl. 197-196); the restrictive prohibitions of the charter of the 
Second Athenian Confederacy (cf. GH! 11.123. U-25-31, 35-46) would have 
done nothing to alter this lack of attraction for overseas warfare among the 
rich Athenians, although by the 350s the situation is not entirely 
predictable since the acquisition in the latter half of the 300s of possessions 
in overseas territories (e.g. at Samos and in the Thracian region),which 
were deliberately excluded from the provisions, and the protection, of the 
Confederacy’s charter, must have offered some appeal to the rich as well as 
to poor Athenians who were prepared to settle in the overseas cleruchies. 
This all appears to coincide with Isokrates' assertion in Areopagitikos that a 
wedge has been driven between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots’ at Athens 
with envy on the part of the poor and no public responsibility and no sense 
of public charity on the part of the rich (cf. 7.24,32,35)-1
The composition of the wealthy (or liturgical) class had been 
changing since about 440 B.C., and in the fourth century the composition of 
the class was more fluid.2 *One means by which men moved into the 
liturgical class under the democracy was through the moneys to be 
acquired personally as a result of military or political office.3 Bribery and 
peculation were among the perquisites of office for military commanders 
and politicians: the evidence for the fourth century is largely to be found 
in the speeches of the rhetor es. but even allowing for exaggeration and the 
political nature of many of these allegations, it is impossible to deny the 
basic truth that such corruption widely existed.4 Already in the 420s the
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1The veracity of the evidence of Isokrates on this matter is accepted by Davies 
(ibid., pp .88-89).
2Ibid., p.68; cf. [Dem ] 42.4: "to enjoy unbroken prosperity is not iront to be the 
permanent fortune of any large number of our citizens.”
^Davies, Vealth and the Po^er, pp .66-68.
Widespread political corruption vas also an assumption in Athenian comedy: 
see K.J. Dover (Greek Homosexuality. London 1978, p.147), vho notes that it is a 
“characteristic feature of comedy, the assumption that all holders of administrative 
offices feather their ovn nests" (cf. Aristoph. Lys.490,578; Birds 1111-1112;
Thesm .936-937; ¥ast>s 556-557; Clouds 1196-1200).
Old Oligarch declared the practice of political bribery to be influential in the 
Boule and in other areas of public government dXen] AthPol.3.3). even if it 
was not a novelty (Themistokles was said to have experienced a dramatic 
rise in wealth from the time when he entered public life, with his property 
increasing from 3 to perhaps as much as 100 talents;1 tales of this man's 
venality go back to his own lifetime: cf. Hdt. 6.4.2-5-3; Plut. Them. 7.5-6, 
19.1)2 3; in the time of the 'Old Oligarch' Kleon attained contemporary 
notoriety for his peculation and corruption.3 For the fourth century and for 
the time approximate to Areopagitikos Demosthenes and Demades are two 
politicians whose careers in this respect provide analogies with Isokrates' 
criticism.4 perhaps the most infamous example was the 300 talents which 
Alexander was alleged to have sent to Athens for the purpose of bribery, of 
which Demosthenes was charged with having pocketed 70 talents (cf. 
xAdsch.3.239); Demades' rise from poverty appears to have owed much to 
the bribes which he could command for his skills as an ay tempore public 
speaker (cf.Dein. 1.69, 104; 2.15; Hyp. AgainstDem. 2 5 )5 &Examples of 
political embezzlement and bribery for the earlier decades of the fourth 
century can be found in the speeches of Lysias (see 21.13 -14,16; 2 7.1 - 3,9- 
11; 26. Iff.; 30.25-27); in these speeches we see the related accusations
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Historians have been inclined to accept a general truth behind the literary 
sources' allegations that corruption T/as common among Athenian political and 
military leaders (and officials) under the democracy: see e.g. Sealey/'Callistratos of 
Aphidna", p. 180 (= Essays, p.135) and de Ste Croix, Origins, p.360, n.5. Of course there 
,vas not alwTS substance to individual charges, see e g. Lys. 27.3 & esp. Lys. 19 for a 
case based upon the falsity of the popular belief in such corruption; the fifth- 
century demagogue Kleophon, despite the hostile press in our written sources, is not 
accused of bribery or corruption (cf. Lys. 19.48; in the same context Lysias exonerates 
Alkibiades [19.521): caution against the frequent allegations of sycophancy and 
corruption of officials is given by D. G. Lateiner in Lysias and Athenian Politics, Diss. 
Stanford 1971, pp.158-159; Sinclair (Democracy and Participation, p. 186) considers 
that the picture of frequent political corruption and bribery at Athens in the fourth 
century is a reflection of the significantly increased evidence for this period rather 
than evidence of a decline of moral standards among public leaders.
iKritias Er. 88 [81 ]B 45 (D.-K = Ael. VH 10.17).
f u r th e r  see J.K. Davies, Athenian Propertied Families, p.215.
3 Ibid., p.3i9.
4For the period a  little before Areopagitikos Kallistratos is possibly not vithout 
taint (see Theopomp. FGrH 115 F 97): c f. Sealey, “Callistratos of Aphidna”, p.180 
(=Essays, p.135).
5for further detail see Davies, Athenian Propertied Families, pp.100 (Demades)
& 133-!35 (Demosthenes).
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which also appear in Isokrates' writings: these leaders' are lining their 
own pockets at the expense of their fellow-citizens; they are increasing 
themselves from poverty to riches; their unscrupulous behaviour towards 
Athens' friends brings nothing but detriment to the reputation of the city 
and its honest and honourable citizens; in the guise of serving the people 
they set out to rule them, exercising their tyranny over the people in the 
courts, where they threaten that the jurors will have to go without pay if 
they do not find the victims of these politicians guilty.
The mechanisms of the Athenian democracy sought to take account 
of the danger of bribery and other abuses of public office: those who pre­
pared to enter public office were required to foreswear bribery at their 
preliminary scrutiny (dokimasia) (cf. Arist. AthPol. 55 5X and the public 
examination which each office-bearer was required to undergo at the end 
of his term (euthunai) should have provided an even more rigorous check 
upon such abuses. However, Isokrates for one claims that these checks up­
on accountability have fallen into neglect (7.36), and it would seem that in 
practice a certain degree of tolerance was exercised by the Athenians in 
respect of such conduct among military and political leaders (see Hyp. 
Against Pern. 24-25: esp. (25) "You willingly give permission, gentlemen of 
the jury, to the generals and orators to reap many rewards and it is not the 
laws which grant them this privilege but your tolerance and generosity."); 
Lysias implies the same when he urges the jury not to do as a jury had 
done on a previous occasion and acquit Epikrates, an able speaker and a 
public man of wealth and influence, who is now before the court on charges 
of embezzling state funds and taking bribes (Lys. 27.1-6);1 nor ought they 
to find the man guilty, but then to impose only a trivial penalty (ibid. 16); 
Lysias' speech Against Hikomachos provides us with a case of a man who 
has twice, at the end of the fifth century, served on state commissions, and 
who is accused of failing to submit his activities to audit (Lys.30.3,5)- It 
would seem that the checks available within the democracy against the ab­
use of public office could be, and were, at least occasionally, implemented 
in a cursory manner, behind which lay a certain degree of tolerance for hu­
man frailty and a reluctance to believe all the highly-coloured allegations of 
prosecutors; thus, Isokrates' complaints that the scrutinies were being neg­
lected and that the courts were not always as strict and harsh as the law al-
1 If it is the same man, Hell.Oxv. (2.2) gratuitously accuses Epikrates and 
Kephalos of seeking to lead Athens in 395 into var in order to embezzle public money; 
he vas later accused of taking bribes and, it seems from Lysias' silence, acquitted: cf. 
Sealey, “Callistratos of Aphidna", p.180 (=Essays, p.135).
lowed (7.33-34) would not seem to be altogether unjustified; however, the 
cynical interpretation which Isokrates places upon such laxity, that those 
responsible were preparing the ground for their own faults and misdem­
eanours to be ignored, ascribes a collective conspiratorial intent which may 
be more in the eye of the beholder than in the actions of the perpetrators.
Leaving the criticism of the political practice, Isokrates extends his 
dissatisfaction to the education system which begets those who will come to 
lead the state. In particular, he expresses concern about the failure of the 
Areopagos Council any longer to supervise its 'traditional' role of acting as 
the moral supervisor and educator of the young. As a consequence he sees 
the young men as being idle and disrespectful; from that idleness he traces 
a chain of consequences which leads through poverty to evil-doing. The 
decadent ways of the young provide a ready target for moralizing critics of 
any age, and the plays of Aristophanes (esp. Clouds and Wasps) reveal that 
such criticism in Athenian society goes back at least to that time when the 
New Education invaded Athens, inspired by the teachings of the sophists. 
Here, too, the evidence of the fourth-century orators affords some 
confirmation of Isokrates' picture of the life-style in which at least some of 
the younger men at Athens indulged during the 350s. Early in the century 
(probably in the later 390s) Lysias wrote a speech for the defence of a 
relatively young man Mantitheus who was facing a dokimasia before taking 
a place in the Boule: after disproving the specific charge that he had served 
in the cavalry during the regime of the Thirty, Mantitheus turns to a 
general account of his life and conduct: in the course of this he distinguishes
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in dice or drink or the like dissipations" (Lys. 16.11). Then, a little after the 
publication of Areopagitikos. Aischines, in his speech Against Timarchos 
(3^5 B.C.), includes a virulent description of the character and the conduct 
of one of Timarchos' associates, Hegesandros, a man of good family who 
held public offices and who engaged in political activity, including a 
prosecution of the democratic politician Aristophon and advising on matters 
of international policy;1 not only does Aischines allege that Hegesandros 
had practised, or at least attempted, embezzlement in the course of his 
public duties, but his general life-style is dissolute, even vicious: his 
homosexuality is alleged, as a partner of Timarchos, in whose company he
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1 Hegesandros' stewardship (as tamias) of the goddess Athene in 361 /0 (see 
Aisch. 1.109-110) designates him as a member of the highest property-class 
(pentakosiomedimnoi); for his political activity see esp. Aisch. 1.64.
frequents taverns and gambling-dens and engages in revelling, brawling 
and physical attacks upon the persons and property of others (see Aisch. 
1.56-65,70,74-75,95,109-111,154); the arrogant, loutish behaviour of 
Hegesandros, Timarchos and their cronies is reminiscent of the stories 
which surrounded Alkibiades in the previous century.1 Demosthenes’ fifty- 
fourth oration gives graphic descriptions of the anti-social, sometimes 
vicious, misbehaviour of a number of young Athenians. Isokrates’ 
portrayal of the habits of contemporary young men, and perhaps especially 
of the young men of the wealthier families, is to some extent a caricature 
(he would hardly levy such charges against those young men whom he 
taught), but that does not lessen its essential credibility as a description of 
the life-style of some of those young men who might have been expected to 
be contributing in a more sober and responsible way to the good 
government of Athens.2
One last criticism of current Athenian public behaviour, namely the 
ostentatious celebration of state religious festivals and the enthusiasm for 
imported cults at the expense of the ’ancestral’ religious practices (7.29-30, 
53), finds an interesting correlation in a specific court-case at the beginning 
of the century. After the restoration of the democracy in 403 Nikomachos 
was appointed as a member of a commission whose task was to revise the 
laws relating to religious ceremonial; in his speech for the prosecution 
Lysias accuses Nikomachos of having enlarged the list of sacrifices so that 
the state is both expending excessive sums of money on these religious 
ceremonies and allowing certain of the ancestral rites to be neglected 
(Lys.30.17-25). The incident is specific, but it affords an interesting case­
in-point of Isokrates' general accusation.
All these more particular criticisms add up to the two broad 
statements which epitomize Isokrates’ critical view of the state of Athens' 
internal affairs, namely that the desirable virtues of good government have 
degenerated into correspondingly corrupt forms (7.20) and that Athens has 
become a city in which litigation, sycophancy and war-taxes assail the 
citizens and poverty and war are the norm (7.51). Obviously one's total 
judgment at the time was a personal matter, and the words at the opening
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Thuc. 6.15 >4; Pint. Aik. 4.4; 6X5; 8.1-2,4-5; 16.1-4.
2For other critical comment on this subject by fourth-century writers see Plat. 
Theait.l73c-d (vhere Sokrates compares the life-style of the philosophers Tilth that of 
the bon viveurs. vho, be it noted, manage to combine their private life-style vith  
activity in the courts and the public assemblies and councils); cf. also Theopomp.
FGrH 115 F 213 (= Athen. 532 b-d).
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of the oration testify that not all Athenians would have agreed with 
Isokrates. However, enough can be adduced in support of the specific 
criticisms to say that Isokrates is not presenting a picture without 
justification; furthermore, the very policy which was followed by Euboulos 
and those who were largely influential in making Athenian policy in the „ 
years which immediately followed the Social War indicates that many 
Athenians would have been sympathetic to the call for an end to fruitless 
and costly expenditure on warfare outside Attika and would have 
welcomed an increase in the general prosperity of themselves and their 
city.1 While others would surely have recognized Isokrates’ portrayal of 
his city and its citizens as it appeared in Areopagitikos, some, including 
those who managed to assume political prominence and power after the 
Social War, sought different remedies. It is now time to focus attention 
upon the solution offered by Isokrates’ in this work.
We saw above in our summary of the speech that the return to this 
’ideal' politeia would involve a restoration of the influence of the Council of 
the Areopagos. That in itself would not be sufficient; for, in Isokrates' time 
the membership of this Council had ceased to exemplify those aristocratic 
qualities which he applauded; officially, a century earlier (in 457/6), the 
archonship had been opened to the zeugitae and, in practice, by Isokrates' 
time it appears that thetes also were being admitted to the office and hence 
to the Council of the Areopagos (see below, p.219). More change to the 
current practice of the democratic constitution was required.
The key to Isokrates’ reform is the proposal that selection of 
magistrates by lot should be replaced by a process whereby "the best and 
the ablest" would be selected for each of the public duties (7.22: o w il  
dndvrouv r d c  dpxd^ ic X ip o w re s , dXXa tov$  ßeX T icT oi^ rat ro y $  Iravtororovs e<f>’ qoocotov t w  
ep y u v  TTpoxplvovrec; cf. 7.23). This recommendation is justified by the 
argument that true equality in a politeia does not consist in distributing the 
same opportunities and responsibilities for leadership to all citizens but in 
allocating to each citizen what is fitting (7.2 If.). This, it is alleged, was the 
principle upon which the Athenians' ancestors had acted in making
1 As for the unending political machinations of the sycophants, it seems 
plausible to assume that the attitude of the average Athenian in the 350s ’vould have 
been essentially little different from that of his father or grandfather at the time 
vhen the Thiry first seized poorer: Aristotle tells us that the people vere delighted 
vith the first reforms of the Thirty, vhich included measures to put an end to the 
“informers and vicked mischief-makers vho flattered the people to their 
disadvantage" (Ath-Pol. 35 3 [trs. Moore I cf. Xen. 2.3.12).
appointments to political offices. This criticism and proposed reform of the 
radical democracy was not an invention of Isokrates; the oligarchic 
reformers of 411 and 404 had on each occasion introduced measures to 
lim it the practical involvement in politics to the propertied classes (see 
below, p. 222); after the restoration of the democracy in 403 proposals to 
restrict the political activity of the poorer classes were no longer raised in 
active politics but they continued to exercise appeal for the political 
theorists of the fourth century.1 The limitation of active political 
participation in magistracies to those who could afford the time involved in 
occupying annual offices had been removed by the radical democrats 
through the development of sortition (the use of the lot) in the selection of 
all but the strategoi and the higher financial officials and through the 
introduction of payment for public offices. Isokrates did not regard either 
of these developments as desirable.
I t  is not precisely clear what procedure Isokrates has in mind for the 
appointment of officials; at 7.22-23 be speaks of abolishing the process of 
sortition:
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qkovv tt}v ttoAiv , ovK e£ dndvTwv tow; dpxd$ KXTjpoyvies, aXXa toiV  ßeXTioroy$ Kai to?)o 
kavarraTOi^- e<$>’ exacrrov tojv epyafv npOKplvovre$. roioyroys yap ffXniZov erecflca Kid 
roy$ dAAoy$, otol nep dv amv 61 tojv TTpaypdTajv emcraroyvTes. enevra Kd 
S^OT\>ajjTepav evop\4ov etvav Tayrr)V tt)V Kaidcracav T| tt)V 5\a toö Aayxdvevv 
yxyvopevriv* ev pev yap iq  KXrjpubei tt)v ryxTjv ßpaßeyGevv, Kai ttoAAokv; Xiji|ffö0ai to$ 
apX<k royo oAiyapxiac emflyiJioyvTac, ev Se TTpoKpivetv royc emeuceordroy^ rov 
5f|piov eöec8ai Kypiov eAecto roy$ dyancavTa  ^paMcrra tt]v KoöecrTGüoav noAvreiav.
The crux of the matter is whether the two uses of the verb npoKpimv in this 
passage should be understood to mean simply ’select', as it  commonly does 
(see L.S.J. s.v. Ia), or whether the verb is being used in the technical sense 
of 'make a preliminary selection' (see L.S.J. s.v. Ib); the same verb is used 
by Isokrates in his final work ( 12.[Panath.] 145) when he is again 
comparing the practice of the ancestral Athenians in appointing magistrates 
with that of his own time. If Isokrates intends the more general sense of 
npoKpvveiv, then he is recommending a practice of simple election; but if the 
technical sense is envisaged, then he must mean a process of selection 
which involved two stages: sortition from within a pre-selected group
1See Jones, Athenian Democracy, t> .45-50; cf. Plato, Rep. 558c; Lavs, 757; Arist. 
Pol. 1280a, 1301a, 1317t>, 1318a; by such criticism as this Sokrates is said to have led 
the young to despise the established constitution (Xen. Mem. 12.9; cf. Arist. Rhet. 
1393b 4-8).
(k>.tpüxji$ oc npot l^ray). The matter is not simply to be resolved by appeal to 
what was believed by fourth-century Athenians to have been the practice 
before the radical democracy. Different accounts from the fourth century 
and consequent scholarly dispute surrounds the method by which the 
archons were appointed under Solon’s constitution.1 Aristotle himself 
provides contradictory testimony: in his Politics Aristotle claims that Solon 
made no change to the election of magistrates and restricted the 
magistracies to the upper classes (1273b 35- 1274a 3, 1274a 16-17, 1261b 
25-34); however, in Athenaion Politeia he says, at 6.1, that Solon altered 
the procedure so that magistrates were selected by lot from a group 
previously elected by the tribes, although he appears to contradict this at 
22.5, where he says that prior to the archonship of Telesinos (467/6) all 
archons had been elected.2 Further reform came in Perikles' era, when the 
archonship was opened to the third class of citizens, the zeugitai (Arist. 
Ath-Pol. 26.2); hitherto it  had remained the prerogative of the two 
wealthiest classes (the pentakosiomedimnoi and the hippeis:);3 
subsequently, in practice, thetes too seem to have been admitted to the 
office;4 finally, at some later stage the practice of icXrjpcocis k  npoKÄipoweto?, 
which obtained in Aristotle's own day, was introduced (see Arist. AthPol.
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ifo r  a summary of the debate see Rhodes, Commentary, pp. 146-148; Rhodes 
concludes that Athenaion Politeia should be believed, despite the uniqueness of its 
testimony; contra: Moore, Democracy and Oligarchy, pp220-221.
Rhodes (Commentary, pp. 272-273) does not consider this latter passage to 
contradict vhat is said at 8.1; he maintains, plausibly I believe, that Solon's KXfjpooois k  
TTpOKpiiw ,vas replaced under the Peisistratid tyranny by direct election vh ich  vas 
not changed until 487/6, vhen kXtJpohis k  npoKplxojv vas re-introduced; see also Moore, 
Democracy and Oligarchy. p245.
3See Rhodes, Commentary, pp. 148,330.
4See Moore. Democracy and Oligarchy, pp. 219.292; c f. Rhodes. Commentary. 
pp.145-146.
6 .1).1 Thus appeal to Isokrates' wish (at 7.16) to restore the democracy of 
Solon, which had been re-established by Kleisthenes, does not assist us, 
since under Kleisthenes the archons appear to have been elected, while 
under Solon possibly, and certainly after 467/6, sortition operated within a 
pre-selected group; it is also not clear whether in Isokrates' eyes any 
practice which existed prior to the assault upon the constitution which 
began with Ephialtes in 462/1 could be viewed as belonging to 'ancestral' 
practice.2
Certainly Isokrates wished to return to a state of affairs like that 
which operated for the archonship before it was opened to the zeugitai in 
457/6: so much must be understood by his view of what should constitute 
political 'equality* (and by the contrast which he makes between "selecting 
the magistrates by lot from all (the citizens)“ and “selecting the best and 
the ablest for each of the tasks" (7.22). His point that selecting by lot was 
exposed to the risk of oligarchic sympathizers obtaining office, whereas by 
his scheme they would "select" only the most capable, may incline us 
toward straight election, since a process of pre-selection, based upon social 
class and property, would not avoid the risk of such would-be oligarchs 
attaining office (but this is not a decisive argument: the point about the
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1V. Abel (Prokrisis, Diss. Stamford 1974) argues that prokrisis was never 
abandoned during the classical period at Athens of the fifth and fourth centuries, at 
least until the time of Demetrios of Phaleron; it is Abel’s contention that throughout 
this period the process remained that of prokrisis-klerosis (see esp. ch.3); the almost 
universal assumption among modern scholars that the process of prokrisis-klerosis 
was changed under the radical democracy of the fifth century to a process of klerosis 
ek kleroton is denied, and the evidence here of Isokrates at 7.22-23 against Abel’s 
thesis is rejected on the ground that Isokrates (and also Ath-Pol. 3.1) “may be 
referring to the double sortition within the tribes and ignoring the prokrisis ’within 
the demes" (p.62f.). Isokrates could have been objecting to the use of sortition as a 
second step to decide among a group of preselected candidates for public offices, but 
the force of his criticism is certainly very much weaker, if  Abel’s contention that a 
continuing process of prokrisis-klerosis throughout the period of the radical 
democracy meant that in reality the Athenian government had been well-served by 
candidates of general ability due to the first-step process of prokrisis; Abel’s rejection 
of Isokrates' evidence also makes it more difficult to see what process Isokrates was 
seeking to attribute to the constitution under Solon and Kleisthenes.
2A. Fuks, The Ancestral Constitution. London 1953, p.109, believes that the 
constitution which was favoured by the ’moderates' at the time of the oligarchic 
revolution of 411 was “basically rather close to Athens’ constitutional practice as it 
was before Perikles". It would be rash to trust that what Isokrates regarded as the 
’democratic’ constitution of Solon and Kleisthenes was the product of a strong 
historical knowledge (see M.I. Finley, The Ancestral Constitution, ch 2  of The Use and 
Abuse of History [London 1975L p.57 - this chapter is a revised version of his 
inaugural lecture of that title, delivered at Cambridge in 1971).
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danger of oligarchic officers under a system of sortition may be no more 
than the specious argument that it is, and it could be claimed that if pre­
selection is truly intended at 7.23 land at 7.22], the procedure could be 
used in order to exclude such dangerous persons).
His discussion of the constitution of the ancestral Athenians in 
Panathenaikos is also less than precise: there he commends the admixture 
of an 'aristocratic' element in a democracy, emphasizing the importance of 
putting in charge of their public offices and business those who are most 
able and those who will manage public affairs in the best and most just 
manner (12.131-132; cf. 153* 154); at 12.143 he says that their forefathers 
“considered as counsellors and leaders, not those whom chance decreed, but 
the best and wisest, and those who had lived most nobly": these they also 
“elected" as generals and sent out as ambassadors when the need arose 
(euoiowro öyjißoyXov$ rai npocrdras oy roy$ ryxovras aXXa roy$ ßeXTicrroy$ rai 
<tpovi4(ordToy£ Kod raXXicrra pepuixorac, Km tck)$ ayroys royroys arparriyoy  ^fipowro loat 
npeopeis... enepnov); it may be pressing too hard, but there seems to be a 
distinction in this last statement between looking to men as counsellors and 
leaders (who, the next sentence reveals, operate in the public assemblies) 
and the election of these same men as generals; he goes on then to mention 
specifically the magistracies, saying (12.145) "At the same time they 
appointed to the magistracies those who had been selected (pre-selected?) 
by the tribes and demes (12.145: nepi 8e roy$ ayToy$ xpovoy$ retÖioTacrav enl to$ 
dpx<x£ tcr)$ TTpoKpi8evTO£ i'ttö tw 4^Xtrw KatSi^ oTow): again the language is not 
decisive, but there appears to be a redundancy in saying that they 
“appointed those who had been selected" if a simple process of election is 
meant. To conclude, it is more likely that npoiqplmv possesses its technical 
sense of pre-selection in each of these speeches of Isokrates;1 certainly in 
the Areopagitikos this more 'moderate' intention would be in keeping with 
the cautious recommendations which appear in the work as a whole, as we 
shall soon see in more detail.
The introduction of payment for public office-holders was another 
fundamental reform which had enabled citizens of all classes at Athens to 
participate actively in the practice of democracy (Arist. Ath. Pol. 24.3; 27.3; 
Pol. 1317t>3^-36)-2 Isokrates does not state that payment for office should
1 Contra: Rhodes (Commentary, p.147), reporting an unpublished v ie v  of GI.M. 
de Ste. Croix.
2The introduction of payment for jurors, and for other officers, cannot be 
precisely dated, but must belong to the reforms of the mid-fifth century vh ich  passed 
political poy^er into the hands of all Athenians: see Gomme, HCT, I, pp 328-9; cf.
be abolished, but it is to be understood as implied by his account of those 
who should be considered as eligible for appointment to office: they are to 
be drawn from "the best and the most able" (7.22: oi peAiioroi um ol bcouwTaroi) 
and they will be "the most respectable" (7.23: oiemeuoEOTaroi1); more 
precisely, they will be those who can afford the time and possess sufficient 
means (see 7.26).
Restoration of the authority and influence of the Council of the 
Areopagos and abolition of paym ent for state offices are both constitutional 
changes which were associated with w hat had become known a t Athens as 
the 'ancestral constitution' (narpios noXvieia). An investigation into this had 
begun in 411 a t the time of the oligarchic revolution of that year: to the 
motion of Pythodoros which ended the democratic government and 
introduced oligarchic rule Kleitophon added a rider, calling upon those 
chosen to lead under Pythodoros’ decree to "search out the ancestral laws 
which Kleisthenes passed when he established the democracy" (Arist. 
xAxth.Pol. 29.3). In the revolution of 411 the oligarchs abolished paym ent of 
office-bearers except for a small contribution to expenses of 3 obols a day 
to the nine archons and the prytaneis (Arist. A thPol. 295; cf Thuc. 6-65 3); 
even when the Four Hundred were replaced by the more m oderate Five 
Thousand the abolition of paym ent for public office was reaffirmed (Thuc.
5 97.1; Arist. Ath Pol. 33.1): on each occasion the reason given was th a t the 
cost imposed by the war could no longer adm it such a use of public money. 
Again, under the rule of the Thirty (in 404/3) paym ent for offices was 
abolished, since the oligarchic rulers and their supporters had no need of 
ideologically repugnant state pay (Xenophon [2.3.1 U says that the Thirty 
“appointed members of the Council li e. the Boule] and others just as they 
saw fit"; cf. Arist. A thPol. 35-1; DS. 14.4.2). One of the first acts of the 
Thirty was to take down the laws which had been passed by Ephialtes 
regarding the Areopagos Council; in the Ath. Pol. (35-2) it is implied that 
this was one of the measures carried out by the Thirty in pursuit of their 
claim to be restoring the ancestral constitution.
However, as a weapon of constitutional propaganda appeal to the 
ancestral constitution became a two-edged sword: Kleitophon's rider of 411 
was doubtless intended to allay the fears of those who saw the oligarchs as
222
C. Hignett, A History of the Athenian Constitution. Oxford 1952, pp. 219-220,342-343 
(Hignett notes (p220) that members of the Areopagos itself do not appear to have 
received pay).
^or the substantive use of this adjective applied in a class sense, in contrast to 
“the multitude“ (to ttät}8o$), see Arist. Pol. 13Cföb27.
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preparing to dismantle the democratic constitution,1 again, in 404, the 
Spartans, in making the peace-terms, ordered the Athenians to re-adopt 
their ancestral constitution. This led to very different interpretations by 
democrats and oligarchs of what should be regarded as the ancestral 
constitution (Arist. AthPol. 34.3; cf. D.S. 14.3-2-3): from this point there 
developed a dual tradition of interpretation regarding the ’ancestral 
constitution'.2 *
Kleitophon is mentioned by Aristotle (AthPol. 34.3) as being in 404 
one of those who were led by Theramenes and professed to be seeking to 
establish the ’ancestral constitution'. Theramenes’ break with the Four 
Hundred in 411 and his support for the broader-based government of the 
Five Thousand (Arist. AthPol. 33-2), together with his self-defence at his 
trial which is reported by Xenophon (2.3.49), has led to the association of 
Theramenes with Kleitophon‘s rider and its call for the rediscovery of the 
'ancestral constitution’, allegedly that of Kleisthenes. Alexander Fuks 
believes that there was propaganda prior to the establishment of the Four 
Hundred which was designed to reassure the democrats that the democracy 
was not to be abolished, and he regards Kleitophon's rider as part of the 
propaganda at that time of a group of moderates, among whom Theramenes 
should be counted;3 these moderates, or Therameneans" as Fuks calls 
them, pursued an ideal of a "mixed-moderate constitution“.4 Before Fuks, 
Werner Jaeger had argued that the views held by Isokrates with regard to 
the ideal constitution for Athens, which are especially prominent in
1 In AthPol. (29.3) the reason for Kleitophon's addendum is given as being that 
the 'democracy' of Kleisthenes vas not democratic but similar to the constitution of 
Solon (scholars have tended to treat this explanation as Aristotle’s interpretation of 
Kleitophon's rider rather than as part of the rider itself: see e.g. Andrews & Dover, 
HCLVol.V, p.215).
^ f .  Hignett, Athenian Constitution, pp. 5-6, and Finley, Ancestral Constitution, 
pp .39-40.
^See Hignett, Athenian Constitution, p.273; Hignett notes (pp.278-279) that 
Thucydides' account of the revolution of 411 clearly associates Theramenes v ith  the 
extreme oligarchs prior to the establishment of the Four Hundred, and that even 
vh en  Theramenes and others later decided to disassociate themselves from the Four 
Hundred and to throv their support behind the broader government of the Five 
Thousand, Thucydides does not credit Theramenes v ith  truly moderate motives.
4Fuks, The Ancestral Constitution, 3-13-
Areopagitikos. were derived from a tradition stemming from Theramenes;1 
Jaeger professes to find in the measures advocated in Areopagitikos 
resemblances with those said to be attributable to Theramenes in his 
pursuit of the moderates' version of the ndipios noXitek; Jaeger then links 
up the ancient biographical tradition which claims that Theramenes had 
been among the teachers of Isokrates, and he declares that this 
biographical ’fact' provides the connection between the pursuit of the 
ancestral constitution' by the moderate conservatives at the end of the 
fifth century and the revival of this Theramenean tradition by Isokrates in 
Areopagitikos.2 3A relationship between Isokrates’ political programme for 
Athens, as expressed in Areopagitikos. and that attributed to the moderate 
reformers grouped around Theramenes at the end of the fifth century has 
long been asserted.3 This accords with the consensus view of Isokrates' 
political viewpoint which labels him as a ’moderate’ or a 'moderate- 
conservative’; Fuks represents a view commonly held among modern 
scholars when he says: "Isokrates was influenced by the views of the 
Theramenean group, and he supported a somewhat similar trend in 
contemporary politics".4
However, although the two matters may not be unrelated, we are not 
concerned here with Isokrates’ general political viewpoint but with the 
advice which he is offering in Areopagitikos. Does this speech really 
present a call for Athens to adopt a constitution similar to that advocated 
by those of a moderate political persuasion at the end of the fifth century, a 
'mixed' constitution, with elements of democracy and oligarchy, said to
224
^ h e theory of a lost literature of Theramenean political ideology vas 
formulated by Vilamo’vitz (Aristotles und Athen, I, pp. 165-167).
2Jaeger, “Date", 442-447.
3More recently see esp. Bringmann, Studien. 83-95: for a bibliography on the 
subject see Bringmann, Studien, p. 83. n . l .
4Fuks, Ancestral Constitution, p.5 (a bibliography for Isokrates’ political vievs 
is given by Fuks (p.26, n.10), to vhich add Bringmann, Studien, pp .83-95,110-111; 
Bringmann describes Isokrates as a ’conservative’ after the tradition of such fifth- 
century figures as Kimon, Thoukydides (son of Melesias), Nikias and Theramenes, and 
suggests that from the beginning Isokrates' school had taught the virtues of the 
Theramenean version of the narpio$ noXueia, although the policy vas not publicly 
preached until the publication of Areopagitikos. Most recent scholarly opinion has 
been inclined to support the v iev  of Isokrates as a political "moderate“ and often also 
a Theramenean": see Moysey,"Isokrates and Chares", p. 81,n.l (for a bibliography): 
Moysey himself agrees vith the "moderate" characterization of Isokrates’ political 
ideology (pp .83-84).
reflect the ‘democratic’ constitutions of Solon and Kleisthenes, and claimed 
by its proponents as the ndrpios noXvreta.? Or, is it, indeed, more insidious, 
and is Isokrates in fact a covert oligarch, and is Areopagitikos a subtle 
proposal designed to prepare the way for an oligarchic government, with 
Isokrates seizing upon the discomfiture of the democrats and imperialists 
after the Social War as an opportune moment to put forward a case for 
oligarchy?1 Views as to what form of government Isokrates is here 
espousing tend to be related to whether one regards Theramenes as a 
genuine moderate or an extreme oligarch who only turned to more 
moderate attitudes when he became apprehensive about backlash against 
the violent behaviour of the extreme oligarchs. The two pieces of evidence 
which best support the view that Theramenes was a genuine moderate are, 
first, the words quoted in his self-defence by Xenophon:
But I, Critias have always been consistently opposed to those who think that there 
can be no good democracy until the slaves and the sort of people who would sell 
their country if  they needed a drachma take part in the government; and I have 
also equally been opposed to those who think that there can be no good oligarchy 
until the state is brought into the condition where a few men rule with absolute 
poorer. To me the best thing is to organise the government in company with 
those who, whether in the class of cavalry or in the class of hoplites, are able to 
be of use. This is what I thought in the past and I have not changed today. Name 
one instance, Critias, if you can, when I have joined forces with either the 
extreme left or the extreme right wing and helped to deprive decent people of 
their citizenship. (2.3.48-49)
and, second, Aristotle’s tripartite division of factions concerned with 
forming a government at Athens after the capitulation to the Spartans in 
404; for, in addition to the democrats and the oligarchs, Aristotle tells us 
about a third group: Those who did not belong to any political club, but 
were in other respects admirable citizens aimed at establishing the 
ancestral constitution; among them were Archinos, Anytus, Kleitophon, 
Phormisios and many others, and their leader was Theramenes" (Ath Pol.
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!So M.I. Einley, Ancestral Constitution, p.5Q; Finley ranks Isokrates as a leader 
among oligarchic pamphleteers; cf. J.A.O. Larsen ("The Judgment of Antiquity on 
Democracy", CPh. 49 (1954), 7), who sees Isokrates as presenting himself as a democrat 
but in truth as being a “moderate oligarch". More recently MAI. Markle III ("Support 
of Athenian Intellectuals for Philip. A Study of Isocrates' Philit>t>us and Speusippus' 
Letter to Philip", JHS 96 [1976 1 98-99) has described Isokrates' message in 
Areopagitikos as the advocacy of an oligarchic constitution and he sees Isokrates as 
an anti-democratic intellectual who shared with Plato and other fourth-century 
intellectuals at Athens the desire to introduce a "hierarchical and authoritarian state" 
under the guise of a political utopia.
34.3: trans. Moore). However, neither of these passages are disinterested 
statements, and are not sufficient to clear Thermanes' reputation and place 
him firmly as a moderate.1
Attempts to relate Isokrates' proposals in Areopagitikos to the 
allegedly ’moderate’ policy among some leaders of the late fifth century, 
and in particular to the policy of Theramenes, must confront a blunt fact: 
Theramenes is nowhere mentioned in Areopagitikos. nor for that matter in 
any other work of Isokrates. Furthermore, none of the political slogans of 
the ‘moderates', or oligarchs, of the late fifth century, such as ndrpioc noXuek 
or onXaTTapexouevm appear in Areopagitikos. This has been explained as ’tact' 
on Isokrates’ part.2 *Yet his pupil Androtion, an active politician in the mid­
fourth century 3 and son of the politician Andron, himself an associate of 
Theramenes,4 is said to have "more boldly" publicized a favourable account 
of Theramenes with whom he felt a political sympathy.5 By contrast,
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R ecently  Rhodes (Commentary, pp .359-360) has noted that "Nineteenth-
century judgments on Theramenes vere largely unfavourable....[and ] tventieth-
century opinion has remained largely unenthusiastic", but he himself alio vs that 
Theramenes ” may sincerely have held the ’moderate’ political vie vs ascribed to him 
in X. H. II. iii. 18-19,43-49"; but cf. Commentary, p.434, vhere  Rhodes says "all that ve 
knov of Theramenes suggests that Lysias’ account of his part in  the setting up of the 
Thirty is correct, and that Diodorus and A. P. have in different vays distorted the truth 
to conceal his guilt“.
2Jaeger (’’Date’’, p.447): "For obvious reasons Isocrates never mentions 
Theramenes explicitly in his speech, as he apparently avoids his slogan of the return 
to the ’constitution of the ancestors' because, for many good democrats, it had the 
connotation of the oligarchy into vhich  Theramenes' attempt to realize it had finally 
developed" (cf. Paideia. Ill, pp.114-115); see also Jacoby, FGrH, Illb Suppl.1.97,2.81; 
Fuks, The Ancestral Constitution, pp.9-11, and Bringmann, Studien, p.95. Contra, see P. 
Harding, "The Theimanes Myth", Phoenix 28 (1974), 109; I agree v ith  Harding that it 
is right to question this interpretation of Isokrates’ silence on this matter, although 
Harding goes too far vhen  he concludes that Theramenes had ceased to be a name of 
any importance in political discussion by the middle of the fourth century; it is still 
the commonly held viev  (pace Harding)that Aristotle’s favourable treatment of 
Theramenes in Ath. Pol, vas dravn from an earlier fourth-century source, very 
possibly Androtion's Atthis (see Rhodes, Commentary, pp. 15,17-22).
3for a recent discussion see Harding, "Androtion's Political Career", pp. 186- 
200; Harding does not believe that Androtion can be tied dovn to any particular 
political ideology, and that in  this he is typical of politicians in fourth century 
Athens.
4For the family relationship see Krateros, FGrH 342 F 3; c f. [Plut. ] Mor. 833E. 
For the connection v ith  Theramenes see Harding, "Androtion's Political Career", p.187 
&n.l3.
%>ee Bringmann. Studien. t>.95: "Sein Schüler Androtion v a r mutiger"; see 
also Jacoby, FGrH. Illb, Suppl. 1.99.
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I sokrates was clearly capable of eulogizing another pupil and friend, 
Timotheos, in spite of the public discredit which he suffered after the battle 
of Embata a t the hands of his political enemies (cf. 7.12; 15-101 -139).
Even if we allow that, in contrast to Androtion, Isokrates may have 
considered it expedient not to associate openly his proposals with the 
'moderate' constitution said to have been favoured by Theramenes and 
others, it  m ust be acknowledged that political adroitness would be more 
appropriately characterized as hypocrisy when it is rem embered that the 
constitutional reforms of 411-410 and 404 are explicitly rejected in the 
speech. Isokrates says tha t some of those who have heard him extolling 
the virtue of the constitution of his ancestors in the period before the 
radical reforms of the mid-fifth century have cautioned him that there is 
no prospect of the people accepting his proposals, and that there is even the 
risk that, in promoting such a view, he may be thought to be advocating an 
oligarchic government and may thus be branded as a hater of the people 
(uicoSrpos: 7.57). His response to this is to declare that he is not proposing a 
course such as that which was pursued in 411(7.56): then a commission 
was established with full powers to draw  up m easures which the 
commissioners considered to be in the best interests of the state and 
designed to ensure its safety (Arist. Ath. Pol. 29.2; cf. Thuc. 8.67.1) and this 
led to the oligarchic rule of the Four Hundred. Isokrates writes in a way 
which shows that he is clearly aware that, despite any professions about 
restoring "the ancestral laws se tu p  by Kleisthenes” (Arist. Ath. Pol. 29-3X 
what occurred in 411 was not a reestablishm ent of the constitution of their 
forefathers; his words a t 7.58f. seem to imply a belief that w hat happened 
in 411 involved deceit and subterfuge (esp. dxxaSiei^y^avnepiSioiicnoea^ ovk 
dncMOEicpuwievYft [as had been that in 411] dAAdncm4*xvep%). He continues by 
asserting that he has consistently condemned oligarchies and "special 
privileges" (nXeov€£fci) and has supported democracies and "equality of 
privilege" ((ooTTrres); however, he does not applaud democracies 
indiscriminately, bu t rather those which are “well-ordered" (dw&o&s 
raöecm^m). This seemingly unimpeachable statem ent is somewhat 
compromised from a truly democratic viewpoint by the fact that he then 
assesses the Spartans as being in his day the most democratic of Greeks: he 
commends them for their method of selecting their magistrates and for 
being superior to other Greeks in upholding among themselves "equality 
and sameness of rank" (ai{o6rT)Te$ raid^oiorTfrec), as well as for their daily
life and for their other customs (7.61).1 Finally, he states categorically that 
no-one would compare favourably the infamous rule of the Thirty even 
with the present democracy, despite the shortcomings which some, 
Isokrates included, would find in the latter (7.62). Let us look next at the 
reforms which Isokrates propounds to see whether they ought to be 
adjudged as insidiously oligarchic, or even, less radically, as belonging to a 
Theramenean' tradition.
The speech is, as its title indicates, a recommendation for restoration 
of the influence and authority of the Areopagos Council. To that end the 
fundamental proposal for change is that which would see the government 
of the state based not upon a principle of equality which makes distribution 
equally to all but upon an equality by which each is honoured or checked 
according to his worth; this latter principal thus differentiates between 
"the good" (oixpwol) and “the bad" (oinovripol) (7.2 If.). In terms of political 
accessibility the democracy employed selection by lot and payment for 
office as the two means by which all citizens could participate in most 
magistracies, although the strategoi. other military commanders, and, in the 
fourth century, the major financial officers were elected. As we have seen, 
Isokrates certainly advocates abolition of the simple use of sortition as the 
means of selecting magistrates, but he appears to have in mind a system of 
sortition from among a preselected group of candidates rather than a 
straightforward process of election (see above, pp. 2 16-22 1); payment of 
magistrates is not discussed, but it is implicit in the description of the class 
of citizens to which magistracies will be restricted that a modest financial 
reward would not be necessary to enable or to induce such men to put 
themselves forward for public office; moreover, the summary of the 
division of political authority which is alleged to have existed under the 
constitution of their forefathers makes it clear that the office-bearers 
would not require recompense from the state treasury: "those citizens who 
could afford the time and possessed sufficient means should devote 
themselves to the care of the commonwealth" (7.2 6).2 These reforms are,
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1Cf. 12.153-154, vhere Isokrates asserts that these meritorious aspects of the 
Spartan politeia vere due to Lykourgos imitating the ancestral constitution of the 
Athenians.
2It should be noted that Aristotle distinguished four types of democracy (Pol. 
1291b30-1292a38; 1292b22-1293al0; 1298al0-34; 1318b6-1319b32); the fourth type is 
clearly meant to represent the radical Athenian democracy: this type is the most 
recent; it depends upon the capacity of the state's revenues to provide the poor (= the 
demos) vith the leisure to participate actively, and thereby the poor, led by 
demagogues, usurp the sovereignty of the lavs. Isokrates' proposals in Areopagitikos
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however, only a step toward the major reform which Isokrates would urge; 
after sketching an idyllic picture of the political and social structure of 
Athens as he imagines it to have been in the time of Kleisthenes, he returns 
to the constitution which he sees as having been responsible for this 
halcyon state of affairs, and he sets forth as the corner-stone of that 
constitution the Council of the Areopagos, "a body which was composed 
exclusively of men who were of 'fair' birth and had exemplified in their 
lives exceptional virtue and sobriety"1 (7.37). It is assuredly this Council 
whose membership the aforementioned reforms concerning selection of 
magistrates are intended to change; it is this Council's alleged capacities 
prior to the reform of Ephialtes which constitute the central section of the 
speech. This, then, is the sum total of the measures advocated by Isokrates 
in this speech, which would suffice, it seems, to reproduce for Athenians 
the ideal politeia of their ancestors.
Now, as we have seen, the abolition of state pay, the limitation of 
magistracies to those with greater means, and the cancellation of laws 
which opened the Areopagos Council to all members of the demos were all 
changes which are recorded in connection with the actions of the oligarchs 
either in 411 or 404 (see above, p. 222). Presumably Theramenes 
supported these changes, since he was involved in the establishment of the 
oligarchic government on each occasion. However, there is no reason to 
associate any of them with Theramenes in particular. It is true that the 
moderates, with Theramenes among the leaders, who brought about the 
replacement of the rule of the Four Hundred with that of the Five 
Thousand, endorsed the abolition of state pay and the limitation of access to 
magistracies, but there is no suggestion that these measures, and in 
particular the latter, were designed to revitalize' the composition and the
vould not seem to debar his reformed t>oliteia from qualifying vithin the less radical 
of Aristotle's types of democracy: for under a democratic government vhich is guided 
by lavs, not by demagogues, “the best among the citizens occupy the positions of 
authority” (Arist. Pol. 1292a7-9); it is even possible for public office-bearers to have 
to meet a property-qualification, although this vould be lov (ibid. 1291b39-41); nor is 
payment for public officers or for attendance at the assembly a necessary element in 
a democracy (ibid. 1292b23-42; cf. 1317b35-38); even the choice of magistrates maybe 
made by either election or by sortition (ibid. 1298a23-24; cf. 1318b23-25). Indeed, 
Isokrates' 'ancestral' democracy vould seem to accord quite veil vith a type of 
democracy outlined and applauded by Aristotle at Pol. 1318b28-1319a6.
Gorlin's rendering of roi$ koAo£ yeyovoca as “of noble birth" v ill not do; 
Solon's reform vas based upon the replacement of birth and vealth as the 
qualifications for the social classes vith vealth alone (see Arist. Ath.Pol. 7.3-4; Plut. 
Sol. 18.1-4). For the rendition of the expression icoXoi idyaBol as “the fair and the 
brave" see Gomme, HCT, 111.480.
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reputation of the Areopagos Council, and it is clear that the two former 
measures were not the particular preserve of the moderates. The 
Areopagos Council is not mentioned in connection with the revolution of 
411-410, while the annulment in 404 of the laws of Ephialtes and 
Archestratos concerning the Areopagos Council cannot have been intended 
by the Thirty to lead to the reinstatement of that Council as a separate 
authority alongside their own; the Thirty did not intend to share their 
power.
It is interesting that this reform is placed by Aristotle among a 
number of measures which the Thirty are said to have taken at the start of 
their rule and which Aristotle says were designed to create a pretence of 
restoring the ancestral constitution: moreover, it is said by Aristotle that 
they were well-received at the time. What is especially interesting is that 
Aristotle includes the repeal of the laws of Ephialtes and Archestratos 
among these measures which he describes as popular. The passage is 
worth quoting in full because it seems to give us an indication that 
Aristotle, at least, believed that constitutional reform which professed to be 
restoring even the oligarchic version of the "ancestral constitution" could be 
regarded as acceptable by the Athenian demos and that such reform could 
include a more conservative attitude towards the Areopagos Council; it also 
offers some ideas as to what aspects of the democracy were popularly 
regarded with disaffection, if not revulsion:
At first they behaved with restraint tovards the citizens, and pretended to be 
aiming at the ancestral constitution; they took dovn from the Areopagus the 
lavs of Ephialtes and Archestratos about the members of that body, repealed 
disputed lavs of Solon, and abolished the pover of the dikastai; they claimed to be 
correcting the constitution and removing ambiguities. For example, they made it 
legal for a man to leave his property to anyone he vished vithout restraint, 
abolishing the irritating provisos ’unless he be of unsound mind, incapacitated 
by age, or under the influence of a vornan'; their aim vas to eliminate 
opportunities for informers. They made other similar reforms. They carried 
these measures at an early stage, and they got rid of the informers and the 
vicked mischief-makers vho flattered the people to their disadvantage. The 
people vere delighted, thinking they made these changes for the best of motives. 
(Arist. Ath.Pol. 35-2-3: trans. JM. Moore)
It is also necessary to draw attention to what Isokrates does not advise and 
to some quite positive statements which he makes in support of democracy.
To begin with what he does not propose. Both the revolutions caused 
by the oligarchs near the end of the fifth century involved a limitation of
citizenship, including the right to attend the Assembly: in the first case the 
stated intention was to limit such rights to the five thousand wealthiest 
citizens; that did not actually prove the practice at first, as the Four 
Hundred took matters into its own hands, but eventually the wider group 
of the Five Thousand was called into being, if only for a short time; the rule 
of the Thirty was a very much more brutal affair and never permitted any 
wider exercise of power, even to the wealthy, some of whom proved 
attractive targets for the violence and cupidity of the Thirty and their 
henchmen. On the other hand, even allowing for the imprecision with 
which Isokrates outlines his reforms, there is nothing in Areopagitikos to 
suggest that there should be a restriction of the rights of any citizen to 
attend the Assembly or to be protected by the laws, or that those who 
occupied positions of authority should be outside the supervision of the 
demos.1 If Isokrates' proposals in Areopagitikos had been regarded by his 
contemporaries at Athens as anti-democratic, then it seems not unlikely 
that he should have been attacked by those who saw themselves as the 
watch-dogs of democracy, in much the same way as a proposal by 
Phormisios to limit the citizenship after the downfall of The Thirty in 403 
had evoked quick, and effective, opposition from more democratic-minded 
Athenians, one example of which has been preserved in a portion of a 
speech composed by Lysias for an unknown opponent of Phormisios' 
proposal (Lys. 34). Of course, it could be argued that a pamphlet composed 
by an arm-chair critic like Isokrates was not to be compared with the very 
real threat to democracy created by a proposal before the Assembly such 
as that which had been brought by Phormisios in 403- However, Isokrates' 
unsuccessful defence of an antidosis-suit involving a trierarchy about this 
time provided his opponents on that occasion with the opportunity to seize 
upon, and to make capital of, v iew  of his, and aspects of his life, which 
might influence a jury against him; Isokrates tells us that he had been 
surprised to find, as a result of the trial, that he was not, as he had thought, 
generally well-regarded by his fellow-citizens, but that some were 
prepared to accept the misrepresentations of his way of life and others who 
were jealous of him (see 15 4-5). Nevertheless, it is notable that in 
Antidosis, the work in which he defends himself against his calumniators, 
he does not make any reference to the themes of Areopagitikos. which is 
his immediately previous major composition, whereas a passage from On 
the Peace is quoted in his defence (see 15.63-66).
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1-rhe point is noted by Moysey, “Isokrates and Chares“, p. 84.
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Another demonstration of the restriction of Isokrates* focus to 
reforming the Areopagos Council and of his distance from the late fifth- 
century constitutional reforms is his silence upon the Boule or Kleisthenic 
Council of Five Hundred. For one who was purporting to restore the 
Kleisthenic constitution it would be difficult to do much to change that 
Council which Kleisthenes had himself reformed, although Isokrates might 
have argued that the original method of appointing members to the Boule 
was by lot from a preliminary election,1 the practice which I have argued 
that Isokrates* approved. For the oligarchs, however, the Boule was a 
matter of concern: the lengthy description afforded by Aristotole 
(Ath.Pol.30-31) of the detailed proposals by a committee of one hundred 
for first an interim and then a revised Boule makes a notable contrast to 
the silence about the Areopagos Council in the time of the first oligarchy; 
as soon as these plans had been completed the existing Boule was dissolved 
(in 411 on 14 Thargelion [9 June: Arist. Ath. Pol. 32.1], probably a few days 
after the assembly at Kolonos2). It is possible that under the Five Thousand 
the leaders agreed to Alkibiades* demand that the Kleisthenic Council 
should be restored (Thuc. 3.66.6), although membership may have been 
determined by direct election rather than by lot, and presumably eligibility 
was restricted to the Five Thousand.3 In the time of the Thirty a Boule of 
five hundred existed, but that was a body appointed by the Thirty, 
presumably comprised of their supporters (Arist. Ath. Pol. 35-1: cf. Xen. 
2-311,36; D.S. 14.4.1-2). Isokrates* failure even to mention the Boule 
makes our appreciation of the total constitutional picture which he holds 
more difficult, but it also suggests that he was not especially concerned 
with delineating a completely reformed politeia: for him the key institution 
was the Areopagos Council. It is a point which has not been appreciated by 
those who characterize Isokrates' politeia as Theramenean" that not only is 
the Boule, an institution which attracted much attention among the 
oligarchs in 411, totally disregarded by Isokrates in this work but also the 
fundamental institution of Isokrates* concern is the Areopagos Council, an 
institution which it was hardly in the interests of any oligarchic group to
Hignett, History of the Athenian Constitution. p226f.
2See Rhodes, Commentary, p.405f.
3See Hignett, History of the Athenian Constitution. pp279,373; cf. AndreTres, 
HCT. V. p.288.
restore to its 'ancestral' form (the last thing murderous oligarchs would 
have wanted was an independent homicide court).
It is also interesting in a speech which is critical of the current 
government that there is so little strident denigration of the present 
political leaders. On the Peace provides rather harsher comment upon the 
shortcomings, as perceived by Isokrates, of the contemporary politicians. 
The selfishness and self-interest, the complacency and the wickedness of 
the current leaders does not pass unremarked (7.24-25, 72-73, 76), but the 
accusations of drunkenness, of peculation, of deliberate assault upon the 
wealthy by the demagogues are not to be found, as they are, among other 
criticisms of the leaders, in On the Peace (6.13, 14, 50, 52-55, 75-76), and 
there is certainly no passage in Areopagitikos to compare with the 
extended and fierce criticism of the current democratic leadership which 
occurs towards the end of On the Peace (6 .121-13 D 1 On the other hand, 
Areopagitikos is also more 'balanced' in its criticism of elements within 
Athenian society: Isokrates criticicizes the weaknesses and indulgence of 
the young men of Athens, but professes not to lay the blame upon the 
young, whom he claims would prefer to live more industriously and more 
purposefully; rather, those who must be censured are the leaders who 
failed to take on the responsibility for ensuring that a proper guidance 
should be afforded to the young by the state (7.47-51); the indigent, too, 
receive Isokrates' sympathy rather than censure: their lack of concern for 
the public welfare is understandable when they are confronted by the 
struggle to maintain a daily existence (7.63).2 Isokrates does not speak 
only from the viewpoint of the wealthy: the criticism of the habits of the 
young men, their haunting of gambling-dens and keeping company with 
flute-girls (7.46), points to a lifestyle more likely to be engaged in by a 
young man of means than one who was impecunious; among the wealthy 
the social distancing caused by arrogance towards the humbler citizens, and 
the reluctance of the rich to lend money to the needy, and thus to use their 
wealth in a way which would benefit, both rich and poor (7.32, 35), are seen
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1 It is vorth noticing that politicians as veil as pamphleteers could criticise the 
contemporary democracy and compare it unfavourably vith that of their ancestors: 
Demosthenes, it seems, had a particular reputation for this, and for his readiness to 
speak frankly and critically to the Athenians: see Plut. Pern. 14.2 (eg. Dem .3 21-32; 
23.196-214 [see above, pp. 209-210]).
2In On the Peace Isokrates also exhibits a sympathy tovards the poor vho are 
described as being deliberately kept in a dependant status through pay for jury- 
sevice and assembly-attendance not by the veal thy class but by the odious 
demagogues (8.130-131).
as undesirable aspects of an internal disunity and should be replaced by a 
benevolent patronage which the well-to-do citizens should display towards 
their poorer fellow-countrymen and which Isokrates believes would reflect 
the way of their ancestors and produce true harmony within the state. It is 
time that scholars reconsidered the view that Isokrates is simply a 
spokesman (even propagandist) for the wealthier Athenians;1 the 
interpretation of the evidence presented here would suggest that his 
position was both more complex and somewhat idiosyncratic.
Throughout the speech there is a notable emphasis upon the fact 
that the constitutional reform which is being proposed does not represent a 
departure from democracy, although it does amount to a substantial change 
from the present form of the democracy. Isokrates insists that the 
government under Solon and later under Kleisthenes was a democracy:
For I find that the one way - the only possible way - which can avert future 
perils from us and deliver us from our present ills is that we should be willing to 
restore that earlier democracy which ’was instituted by Solon, who proved 
himself above all others the friend of the people, and ’which ’was re-established 
by Cleisthenes, who drove out the tyrants and brought the people back into 
power (7.16: cf. 7.15,20,23)
There is no doubt that in Isokrates' mind the role of the demos was to be 
the sovereign authority; the magistrates' function was to render service to 
the state and to be accountable to the demos:
In a word, our forefathers had resolved that the.people, like a tyrant, should 
appoint the magistrates, call to account those who failed in their duty, and judge 
in  cases of dispute; while those citizens who could afford the time and possessed 
sufficient means should devote themselves to the care of the commonwealth, as 
servants of the people, entiüed to receive commendation if they proved faithful 
to their trust, and contenting themselves with this honour, but condemned, on 
the other hand, if  they governed badly, to meet with no mercy, but to suffer the 
severest punishment. And how, pray, could one find a democracy more stable or 
more just than this, which appointed the most capable men to have charge of its 
affairs but gave to the people authority over these same men? (726-27: trans. 
Norlin, with adaptations, my under linings)
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*See esp. Jaeger, Demosthenes, p.51: “it [Areopagitikos 1 is obviously a pamphlet 
written to promote the policies of a certain particular group. ¥ e  cannot account for it 
by regarding it as a  mere product of the rhetor's personal initiative“; c f. Jaeger, 
"Date", pp. 441-442; Paideia. Ill, pp.l 1>117; more recently, see Markle, “Jury Pay and 
Assembly Pay at Athens", p272.
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Finally, in speaking of this constitution of their forefathers it is observed 
that the people had the right to select the magistrates, although there was 
restriction upon those citizens from whom they could choose (7.23).
If the historical model is described as a democratic constitution, so 
too is the constitution which is intended: there is no intention of 
abandoning democracy, as had occurred on a previous occasion (in 411) 
(7.56); history is claimed to be capable of showing that democracy is 
always more advantageous for states than oligarchy, and it is argued that 
even the present democratic government is vastly preferable to the 
appalling regime of the Thirty (7.62ff.); this argument concludes with a 
summary of its purpose and a further enforcement of the speaker's support 
for democracy:
I have recounted these things for tvo reasons: because I ^ranted to shov, in the 
first place, that I am not in favour of oligarchy or special privilege, but of a just 
and orderly government of the people, and, in the second place, that even badly 
constituted democracies are responsible for fever disasters than are oligarchies, 
vhile those vhich are veil-ordered are superior to oligarchies in that they are 
more just, more impartial, and more agreeable to those vho live under them.
(7 .70)
There is, I believe, only one possible place in the speech where 
anyone who would claim that Isokrates' whole proposal is a devious case in 
support of oligarchy might find evidence that Isokrates' reforms really 
sought to go beyond what is openly stated. One of the deplorable aspects of 
Athenian society which it is said did not occur when the Areopagos Council 
held power was that the indigent did not have to cast about for means of 
relief: by comparison "who among intelligent men can fail to be chagrined 
at what goes on, when we see many of our fellow-citizens drawing lots in 
front of the law-courts to determine whether they themselves shall have 
the necessities of life, yet thinking it proper to support at their expense any 
of the Hellenes who will deign to row their ships" (7.54). It might be 
tempting to read into this a belief that Isokrates would also advocate 
abolition of jury-pay and even some limitation of the right of all citizens to 
participate in the administration of justice. However, this would certainly 
read more into the words than is explicitly stated, and the context here is 
also relevant; the constitutional change which is at issue at this point in the 
speech is the re-establishment of the power of the Areopagos Council; such 
a revival of that body's power would lead to the remedying of many of 
what Isokrates sees as the serious social, rather than political, ills which are 
hampering the Athenian state. The statement about the courts and those
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who seek to gain a livelihood through sitting in them as jurors, while 
avoiding at considerable cost to the state other possible ways of earning a 
living, such as through military service, is presented as an example of what 
could be expected to change if the advice about restoring the power of the 
Areopagos Council were to be heeded; it is not being offered as another 
separate political reform which would be required in addition to the reform 
of the Areopagos Council; that Council would itself provide the change 
necessary to dispense with a need for able-bodied men to queue outside 
the courts in order to achieve a livelihood'.1
Isokrates surely knew of the arguments which had occurred in 
Athenian domestic politics at the end of the fifth century concerning the 
'ancestral constitution', just as he must have been aware of the dubious use 
which was made of the term by the proponents of oligarchy. What 
Areopagitikos has to say about reform and about former constitutions and 
governments at Athens should encourage the view that Isokrates did not 
wish to associate his advice with either the personalities, the political 
changes or the acts of either of the two political revolutions which occurred 
at Athens near the end of the fifth century. The evidence of the speech 
indicates that Isokrates wanted to carry the Athenians back to what he 
perceived to have been an earlier, and preferable, form of democracy 
which he believed to have been practised by the Athenians prior to the 
reforms which created the radical democracy about the middle of the fifth 
century.
What is notable about the proposal of the Areopagitikos is its 
idiosyncracy. Not only does the proposal not reflect the constitutional 
ideals of the oligarchs at the end of the fifth century, but there is little 
interest displayed in the history of Athens' constitution; indeed, Isokrates' 
work is of very little value to the historian of the Athenian constitution of 
the sixth or fifth centuries. No mention is made of the origins of the 
Areopagos Council (cf. Plut. Sol. 19) or of the argument about whether that 
Council or Themistokles should receive the credit for ensuring that the 
Athenians had a fleet prepared to fight the critical battle of Salamis.2 The
1 Jones (Athenian Democracy, p.50) argues that a juror's pay amounted to 'little 
more than bare subsistence" and that in the fourth century, on the evidence of 
Isokrates himself, only the unemployed vere attracted by it: but that, of course, is 
precisely Isokrates' point.
2This historical point appears to have been a matter of dispute among 
Atthidographers in the time soon after Areopagitikos vas TOtten, and it is treated as a 
touch-stone for distinguishing the political standpoint of individual vriters (see
idealized historical portrait of a benevolent Areopagos Council seems to owe 
more to the personal imagination of Isokrates than to any standardized 
version and should be compared with w hat is to be found in Aristotle and 
Plutarch on the subject (Arist. Ath. Pol. 3.6,4.4,6.4; Plut. Sol- 19.1-2).
Two im portant points need to be made about the Areopagitikos. First, 
it  is a work which advocates a reformed democracy, bu t a democracy which 
is tem pered by a significant element of aristocracy. Claims tha t Isokrates is 
supporting reforms which are tantam ount to oligarchy are misleading; the 
real emphasis in the reforms is the role to be played by an aristocracy 
based upon wealth. The emphasis for the aristocrats is upon duty and 
service to the state: it is not upon power. Power will continue to reside 
with the demos. The constitution of Kleisthenes was characterized by 
Plutarch (Cim. 15-2) as aristocratic, and Isokrates, in his last work 
Panathenaikos. describes tha t constitution of their ancestors which he takes 
as his model in Areopagitikos as "a democracy compounded with 
aristocracy” (12.153' SrpoKparia... apicrToicpaTl<3t^ eiJiiyuevT|); in the same work 
Isokrates tells us tha t he recognized only three forms of constitution: 
oligarchy, democracy and monarchy, and he gives his approval to a 
democracy which makes use of the best men (12.13 If - SripoKpaTfa... 
<xpvaroKpaTi<3cxp(4JievTi). I t has been said that Isokrates' avoidance of a separate 
category of constitution of aristocracy and his insistence that the 
constitution of his ancestors which he advises as a model in Areopagitikos 
should be described as a democracy, while he vigorously eschews any 
notion of sympathy for oligarchy, is occasioned by reasons of personal 
caution and political tact.1 This is to overlook the careful description and 
distinction of roles which is envisaged by Isokrates for the demos and for 
those who are expected to give service as leaders.2 I t also ignores the fact
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Jacoby, Atthis, pp.74-75): Isokrates’ pupil Androtion is regarded as the likely source 
of the interpretation in Aristotle (Ath .Pol 23.1) vhich favours the Areopagos, vhile 
Kleidemos supported Themistokles (FGrH 323 Fr. 21: Jacoby [p.74 ] suggests that 
Kleidemos' work wes published c.354 and that it should be regarded as a democratic 
reply to Isokrates' pamphlets - I irould suggest that in v iev  of Isokrates' lack of 
interest in historical detail or accuracy in matters of the Athenian constitution, and 
in vie v  of the lack of any especial connection between the political views of Isokrates 
and those of Androtion's Atthis, we should refrain from any attempt to see the ideas of 
Areopagitikos as part of a contemporary debate over political ideologies).
^uks. The Ancestral Constitution, pp.10-11.
2There is an interesting analogy to Isokrates' prescribed role for the ’wealthier 
citizens, vhere Aristotle is speaking of vays by vhich a democratic form of 
government may be made more enduring, if  the ’well-to-do citizens are prepared to 
take action by ensuring that public revenues are not squandered by doles, as the
that apvöTOKparia was not an e&o$ noXvreia ,^ and that fourth-century political 
theorists regarded democracy as being, potentially, capable of being 
"aristocratic", inasmuch as this would mean a government in which the 
most suitable men would be elected to office by the masses,which is exactly 
Isokrates' point.1
The second point is tha t the speech is a t heart concerned with moral 
rather than political reform.2 This is a further reason why the ‘moderate* 
or Theramenean' tradition and the political slogans connected with tha t 
tradition do not appear in the work. In the minds of the initiators the 
revolutions of 411 and 404 were essentially political in purpose and 
concerned with the question who was to hold power in the state; on the 
first occasion the oligarchs seized the opportunity presented by Spartan 
support and the absence of the fleet and its thetic class oarsmen to press 
forward with reforms designed to dismantle the democracy (see Xen. 2.3-2- 
3; Lys. 12.71-76; cf. D. S. 14.3-6-7). We do not. know w hat promises of 
advantage the reform ers held out to the poorer citizens in 411, other than 
the argum ent that only by abolishing the democracy could it be hoped that 
the Persians would swing their support away from the Spartans and to the 
Athenians; one is led to suspect, given the propaganda about the 5,000 
aimed a t the moderately wealthy citizens, tha t little if any concern about 
advantage for the poorer citizens was manifested or intended; in 404 their 
subsequent behaviour makes it clear that, the Thirty were unconcerned by 
any considerations about the advantages for the demos as a whole to be 
wrought through their regime. The situation when Areopagitikos was 
composed was quite different: on Isokrates’ own admission a t the s ta rt of 
the work the Athenian people were not immediately going to acknowledge 
a state of crisis concerning the public safety (7.1-3); there was no question 
of any group seizing upon a crisis of public confidence to subvert or to 
change the constitution; we saw in the previous chapter that even the 
unfavourable end to the Social War did not lead to a crisis of confidence 
among the democrats a t x^thens; the issues for the Athenian state focused
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demagogues vould have, but are deployed more wisely for the benefit of the needy; it 
is, Aristotle says, the mark of a truly democratic person to see that the multitude is 
kept from extreme poverty (Pol. 1320a29-bl 1).
*Cf. esp. Plat. Menex. 238 c-e: and see Gomme, HCT. II, p. 109.
2See Mathieu, Idees, pp. 129-131, M7; Bringmann, Studien, p.94, Jaeger ("Date“, 
p.440) notes that "Hitherto, the Areooagiticus appeared more as the 'vork of a moralist 
and educator than that of a politician“: such a statement itself implies too clear a 
distinction between tvo possible purposes of the Trork.
upon future foreign policy, and economic matters. Isokrates addressed the 
foreign-policy question in On the Peace and in this speech he focused upon 
the internal issues which confronted the state ( the two are not, of course, 
unrelated, as is made clear in each of the orations); while others sought 
solutions in commercial policies or proposals and through financial 
measures directed by the state, Isokrates approached the issue as a 
moralist; his solution was 'historical' in that it claimed that by restoring a 
system of public leadership which he believed had provided Athens with a 
public prosperity and social harmony those public advantages would again, 
of necessity, be regained.1 The clearest expression of the moral basis of 
Isokrates' argument appears in his views about the laws: it is not sufficient 
for a state to rely simply upon a system of laws aimed to cover every 
situation; if that were sufficient, then any state could become just, orderly 
and well-managed merely by adopting a written code which had been 
proven; on the contrary, a state which is hedged about by a profusion of 
laws is a state which is badly-governed; justice resides not in statute- 
books, but in men's souls, and to that end a true sense and spirit of justice 
must be developed through one's upbringing and it must be demonstrated 
and practised in each and every act of daily life (7.39-42); this is what 
Isokrates wants to persuade his listeners to believe was the goal of the 
leaders of the state in the days of their ancestors and that foremost in this 
role was the x^reopagos Council.2
In Isokrates' argument change to the politeia is a means to an end, 
not an end in itself. The peroration makes this clear. The very last 
exhortation is not that there should be a change of politeia, nor even a
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^ ee esp. 7.78: “if r e  effect a change of polity, it is evident by the same 
reasoning that such conditions of life as our ancestors enjoyed wi\\ come about for us 
also; for from the same politicial institutions there must alreys spring like or similar 
reys of life.“
2Although it res not appropriate for Isokrates to have said so in this context, 
his öTO teaching res premised upon the pursuit of practical resdom and the 
relevance of this to all citizens, not merely to those who became the active political 
figures (see lb.203-204). Fundamental to the development and practise of moral 
virtues is the porer of discourse, vhich above all distinguishes man from other 
creatures (cf. 15-233-237: esp. 255 "for the porer to speak rell is taken as the surest 
index of a sound understanding, and discourse vhich is true and lavful and just is the 
outrerd image of a good and faithful soul“ - and the 'soul' of a state is its politeia 
[7.14 D; and the Athenians are said to surpass all other men in, among other things, 
their native capacity for discourse (cf. 7.74: npo$ id$ rexvas icod to$ npa^eic lood toi>$ 
Xoyoy$ ey^eoTarcK^. Therefore, in reply to the critic vho should ask him hov the 
Areopagos Council could be expected to perform such an idealistic moral leadership or 
vhere such men of quality reuld come from to fill its ranks, Isokrates could point to 
the practice and purpose of his own teaching.
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specific reference to the restoration of power and authority of the 
Areopagos Council: the speech ends with a demand that the Athenians 
should determine to imitate their ancestors, for by thus doing they will not 
only deliver themselves from their present misfortunes but they will 
become the saviours both of their own city and of all the Greeks (7.64).
This conclusion links with and confirms the conclusion which was presented 
in On the Peace: the Athenians have a duty and a destiny to provide 
leadership to the other Greek states; what Isokrates makes clear in each of 
these orations is that they can only fulfil that obligation if they make wise 
decisions about their policy and their public practice of leadership both 
within their state and in their relations with other states. These speeches 
are not the despairing advice of a man who has lost confidence in his state 
or his fellow-citizens; it is the advice of a man of intense patriotism and 
commitment to his polis. a man whose career has been bound up in the 
education of young men, some of whom were destined to become leaders in 
his own and other states, a mam who has judged that the time has come to 
share with the Athenian community as a whole his views on the 
interrelationship between the aims of education and the results which this 
should have in producing men who would endorse public virtues capable of 
effecting economic prosperity, social harmony and international respect.1
Before leaving our discussion of the meaning and intention of the 
work we must pause briefly to take account of a quite singular 
interpretation of this discourse which has recently appeared. Philip 
Harding has swept aside all previous interpretations of the Areopagitikos 
and has pronounced it to be an elaborate joke on the part of its author.2 
After returning, in the first part of his article, to his attack upon the topical 
relevance of On the Peace which he had launched in an earlier article,3 
Harding seizes upon the idealized portrait of the past which Isokrates gives 
to create a summary of the work which could better be described as a 
caricature; the belief that Isokrates’ view of the past places him as a 
“conservative reactionary" is rejected by Harding in favour of a view of the 
work which makes Isokrates into a latter-day *\ristophanes, who is said to
1 It might be noted that in Antidosis (15 306-308) Isokrates considers the 
characters and background of their Athenian ancestors vho ?on distinction; he 
concludes that they ’vere not only outstanding vith respect to their birth and their 
reputation, but also in their msdom and eloquence.
Warding, “Laughing at Isokrates", pp. 18-23.
^Harding, "Purpose", pp. 137-149: see above, p. 148.
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be describing the "ideal” past, not to eulogize it, but to ridicule the 
traditionalists who argued that what was good for the fathers was good for 
the sons; those who regard Isokrates in Areopagitikos as acting as a 
propagandist for a small, wealthy, elite section of Athenian society are said 
to be faced with a conundrum: for in Harding’s opinion a basic theme of the 
discourse is the adoption of a popular prejudice that spurned the New 
Education, with its propensity to question society and traditional ways, and 
looked with simple trust upon the honest ways of one's forefathers; how 
can Isokrates seriously be upholding a view of the past which was held by 
the "uneducated majority" and which "was hostile to the very profession by 
which he made his living"?1 Harding's answer is to treat all the solemn 
approval of ancestral virtues and attitudes as sententious clap-trap 
designed “to make fun of that very popular notion that the past was always 
better than the present“.2 3The difficulty for Harding's argument is that 
humour must be recognizable, and it must be admitted that Areopagitikos 
does not immediately strike one as full of laughs. However, Harding 
procedes undeterred to identify a catalogue of "reminiscences", and "comic 
techniques", such as "exaggeration'' and “incongruity“, which are positively 
Alexandrine in their reconditeness.3 Harding assumes that an Isokratean 
reader would have possessed a detailed knowledge of the texts of 
Aristophanes which would have been envied by Kallimachos. He is right to 
question the common view that Isokrates was a propagandist for a 
particular political or social group in his day, but his humorous 
interpretation is unnecessary and challenges credulity.
It may be that Isokrates had shared with friends and pupils the 
ideas which he sets forth in Areopagitikos. although the evidence which we 
have from his other writings reveals only that he had spoken before on the 
theme that the soil of Attika produces better men than any other (7.74: cf. 
6.9 4),4 and that he had previously been critical of the contemporary
Warding, “Laughing at Isokrates“, p.20.
2 Ibid., p 23.
3 Ibid., pp .20-22.
Admittedly the one reference to On the Peace cannot, of itself, account for the 
claim that the argument has been advanced “often" and “to many men" (cf. 7.74: rat 
toOtov eipTflca tov Xoyov ov vvv TTpmrov, aXXd noXAdja? t>8t^ rat npd$ ttoaAou$).
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political leadership (7.76-77: cf. 6.49-55);* however, his proposal 
concerning the Areopagos Council does not appear in any previous extant 
work, and the question remains as to why he chose to publish the ’solution’ 
of Areopagitikos sometime soon after the end of the Social War. Perhaps 
the answer should be associated with the fact that the Social War provided 
the Athenians with their first major setback since (in 367) the fleet led by 
the Spartan Antalkidas seized control of the Hellespont and forcibly put an 
end to their renewed attempt to establish an empire. Although the 
situation in 355 cannot be compared in its seriousness to the failure in 
Sicily in 413 or to the defeat at Aigospotamoi in 405, it nevertheless did 
involve a loss of face for Athens as a naval power and may thus have at 
least temporarily brought about a loss of confidence among the poorer 
citizens, who were presumably those who provided the strongest support 
for those politicians who promoted an imperialist policy; there can be no 
denial that in the period after the Social War Athenian foreign policy 
changed as Euboulos and other politicians who were opposed to an 
imperialist policy began to gain what was to become a strong hold over 
Athenian policies for the next decade. So, if the reform which Isokrates 
advances in Areopagitikos was something which he had long advocated in 
his school and among his friends, he must nevertheless be credited with 
having waited (perhaps a very long time) for a singularly propitious 
moment at which to put his ideas before the Athenians as a whole.
On the other hand, the mise-en-scene at the opening of 
Areopagitikos (and the whole background to On the Peace which has been 
described in the previous chapter) should caution against too ready an 
acceptance that the situation after the Social War was closely comparable to 
the bitter blows to its self-confidence which the democracy experienced in 
413 and 405; nor was it likely (and indeed there is no evidence) that the 
outcome of the Social War released a surge of reactionary opportunism 
among men at Athens who favoured an oligarchy. The proper 
interpretation of the political situation at Athens after the Social War is that 
the policy of imperialism was being questioned, even if it had not been 
discredited; the Athenians were in the mood to hear alternative proposals
Jacoby (Atthis, p.74) believes that On the Peace and Areopagitikos constituted 
a renewal of literary attacks upon the radical democracy and that in these works 
Isokrates gave public expression to ideas which he had propounded through lectures 
to his students for a generation or more. Isokrates’ words at 7.56-5? may indicate that 
he had set forth his current proposals considerably earlier, but the words may mean 
no more than that he had discussed his current work with others as he was preparing 
it: for vhich practice cf. 5-2-7,17-23.
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by which they could accede to the prosperity which they had hitherto 
sought through ruling others. Isokrates recognized this mood, and he also 
realized that the voice of the imperialists had not yet been overcome: to 
that end he wrote On the Peace as an alternative approach by which the 
Athenians could aspire to the international repute which they had come to 
regard as their proper preserve; Areopagiükos, too, continues the 
encouragement to achieve that status in international affairs, but it further 
draws attention to a need, as Isokrates perceived it, for the state to 
reconsider its internal principles: for, if the internal standards of the 
Athenians in their domestic public behaviour was at odds with the 
standards required for a successful foreign repute, then there was little 
hope that Athens' international status could be achieved, much less 
maintained.
Others, politicians and pamphleteers, were receptive to the 
opportunities of this temporary openness in the political mood of the 
Athenian people at this time, and were directly addressing the issue of 
increasing Athens' prosperity. Isokrates' achievement in On the Peace and 
Areopagiükos was to perceive and to address two fundamental aspects of 
the political situation which the practical policies of the politicians seem to 
have ignored: first, Isokrates recognizes that Athenian pride would not rest 
satisfied with a policy which was essentially isolationist; sooner or later 
Athenians would again aspire to a hegemonial role in the Greek world; 
second, Isokrates recognized the necessity for a consistent standard of 
political conduct between domestic and foreign politics: prosperity would 
not, of itself, bring about a satisfying international status for Athenians, 
unless it were accompanied by a rejuvenation, as Isokrates saw it, of the 
public, as well as private, integrity which their ancestors had displayed 
both at home and abroad.
In both these perceptions Isokrates shows himself adopting an 
individual position; there is no reason to seek to align him with any 
political or social group. His perceptions, like his solutions, are 
idiosyncratic, and bear the mark of a keen and competent observer of the 
times. His appeal for a revival of the general authority and powers of the 
Areopagos Council should be seen as an individualist's proposal, owing little 
or nothing to the tactics and policies of oligarchs especially or to the 
supporters of any political faction either past or contemporary. The policies 
and tone found in Areopagitikos are addressed, not to any particular faction 
either of supporters or opponents, but to the Athenians as a whole; so 
much is clear from his commendation of policies which would benefit the
state as a whole (see the policies of the democrats which are approved at 
7.64-69), from his generally tactful and low-key criticism of the 
contemporary democracy, and in particular its leaders, and from his 
sympathetic attitude towards the less-fortunate among the Athenians while 
he levies polite criticism against the wealthier citizens of his day. Given the 
individualism of Isokrates' advice in these two discourses, and the fact that 
those who governed Athens’ foreign policies in the years immediately after 
the Social War did not seem as receptive as Isokrates to the underlying 
desire of Athenians to occupy a position of prestige in international affairs, 
it must be asked whether there is any evidence that the Athenians took 
any heed of Isokrates' particular advice with respect to the Areopagos 
Council.1
It is a fascinating fact is that there is considerably more heard of the 
activities of the Areopagos Council between the time of Areopagitikos and 
the defeat of the Athenian democracy in the Lamian War (322) than in the 
whole of the preceding century from the time when Ephialtes stripped the 
Council of most of its powers (462/1); moreover, the Council’s activities in 
the third quarter of the fourth century extend well beyond the limited 
powers which had been left to it by Ephialtes.
It. is generally well-known that after the reforms of Ephialtes the 
Areopagos Council had very limited powers and functions: it. continued to 
serve as a court, for cases of homocide (Arist. AthPol. 5 7 .3), and it exercised 
responsibility in certain religious matters, such as the guardianship of the 
sacred olives (ibid. 60.2; Lys.7. Iff.). Clearly the calibre of its membership 
must have deteriorated after sortition was introduced for the office of 
archon, and it. would be a reasonable assumption that the members of the 
Areopagos Council would have been less likely to be especially interested, 
as well as qualified, to take a prominent political part once their path to 
membership had become determined, not by especial political interest or 
skill, but by chance.2 Nevertheless, Isokrates makes what is perhaps a 
surprising attestation of the authority, if not the power, which the 
institution of the Council could command, at least among its members: even
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^or a positive response to this question vdth reference to the advice given in 
general both in On the Peace and in Areopagitikos see Jaeger, Paideia. Ill, pp. 126-127: 
Jaeger claims that "The n ev  generation vhich had dedicated itself, after the collapse 
of the second naval league, to the task of remaking the life of the Athenian state, vros 
deeply influenced by Isocrates' criticisms" (p.126); Jaeger includes Demosthenes 
among those vho vere influenced.
2See P.. Sealey,"Ephialtes“, CPh 59 (1964), pp.13-14 (= Essays, p.45).
in his own day, says Isokrates, the tradition of this institution is capable of 
overriding the base natures of its individual members (7.36).
Two pieces of evidence from the century prior to Areopagitikos offer 
some confirmation of Isokrates' claim. In Sisyphos. a lost play by Kritias, a 
view of the laws (nomoi) as man-made and designed to replace "brutish 
disorder" is followed by an atheistic account of the gods as also a human 
invention; in commenting upon the passage Aetios makes the point that 
the author (whom he believes to have been Euripides) put these views into 
the mouth of his dramatic character Sisyphos rather than expressing them 
himself, since he was afraid of the Areopagos (see Aet. 1.7.2 = D-K, <36 B 
25)- Of course, this is not particularly strong evidence coming from a 
commentator of the 2nd. century A.D. who may have held an anachronistic 
view of the Areopagos' authority and more especially its power, but as the 
matter relates to a question of religious orthodoxy it is not inconceivable 
that the Areopagos Council could have continued to inspire caution against 
too blatant a publication of heretical views.1
More important, though not without its obscurities, is the decree 
moved by Teisamenos in 403/2 after the restoration of the democracy 
(Andok. 1.6.3-64): in this decree Teisamenos calls for the Athenians to be 
governed by the laws of Solon and the statutes of Drakon and for the legal 
commissioners (nomothetai) to draft such other laws as they consider 
necessary; the decree continues: "When the laws have been ratified, the 
Council of the Areopagos shall act as guardians of the laws". This proposal 
that the Areopagos Council should act as guardians of the laws is most 
interesting, for it does not sit comfortably with the evidence of Aristotle, 
who attributes a guardianship of the laws to this Council in the days before 
Ephialtes (AthPol. 3-6; 4.4; 6-4), but who says that Ephialtes deprived the 
Council of this responsibility (ibid. 25.2). For Teisamenos, at the time of the 
restoration of the democracy, to have proposed that the Areopagos Council 
should again exercise a guardianship over the laws seems remarkable, but 
it does link up with the early action of the Thirty in rescinding the laws of 
Ephialtes, which Aristotle tells us was part of the behaviour at- the start of 
the regime which wTon widespread approval (ibid. 35-2). Whatever was
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*Sowe find the Areopagos Council conducting some form of enquiry into a 
resolution which Timarchos had proposed concerning the dwellings on the Pnyx, a 
matter which perhaps had religious connotations, and, at a meeting of the Assembly, 
rejecting the proposal (Aischin. 1.81-82).
actually intended for the practice of this guardianship by the Areopagos,1 
Teisamenos' decree affords strong support for Isokrates' assertion that the 
Council had not lost its august reputation. After all, it is not inconceivable 
that once the odious composition of that Council, as a body of wealthy and 
influential men, had been changed, the very process which Isokrates 
describes could have occurred: namely, that when men became members 
they were impressed by the traditions and the ancestral aura about the 
Council;2 the efforts by the democrats about this time to assert their own 
version of the ancestral constitution may also have had some influence.3
Almost nothing is heard of the Areopagos Council during the first half 
of the fourth century, beyond an occasional reference to it fulfilling its 
traditional religious duties. By contrast, there is considerably more 
frequent mention of it in the last decades of the democracy, all of these 
references dating to times after the appearance of Areopagitikos and a 
number revealing the Council acting in ways which seem to lie outside its 
expected competency.
A vigorous testimony to the Council’s reputation for probity and 
integrity is to be found only a couple of years after Isokrates’ work had 
appeared; in this case its champion is Demosthenes, and the passage is 
worth quoting to demonstrate the unequivocal nature of its approval:
There are many institutions of ours the like of which are not to be found 
elsewhere, but among them one especially peculiar to ourselves and venerable, - 
I mean the court of Areopagos. Concerning that Court I could relate a great 
number of noble stories, in part traditional and legendary, in part certified by
our ovn personal testimony, than could be told of any other tribunal...... This is
the only tribunal which no despot, no oligarchy, no democracy, has ever dared to 
deprive of its jurisdiction in cases of murder, all men agreeing that in such cases 
no jurisprudence of their own devising could be more effective than that which 
has been devised in this court. In addition to these great merits, here, and here 
alone, no convicted defendant and no defeated prosecutor has ever made good any 
complaint against the justice of the verdict given. (23 (Against Aristokrates ], 
65-66: 352B.C.: trans. J.H. Vince)
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1P.J. Rhodes is quite sceptical, wondering whetherTeisamenos himself even 
knew (The Athenian Boule, Oxford 1972, p.205, n.4).
2Perhaps in much the same way as a novus homo like Cicero could become 
more jealous of the Senate’s reputation than some of the members from long- 
established families.
^Rhodes, Athenian Boule, p.2Q5
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A few years later, in 345, Aischines confirms the commendations of 
Isokrates and Demosthenes, when he calls upon the jury which is trying 
Timarchos to follow the example set by the Areopagos Council in matters of 
jurisdiction; for of that august body he says:
Take the example of the Senate of the Areopagus, the most scrupulous tribunal in 
the city. I myself have before now seen many men convicted before this 
tribunal, though they spoke most eloquently, and presented witnesses; and I 
know that before now certain men have iron their case, although they spoke 
most feebly, and although no ’fitnesses testified for them. For it is not on the 
strength of the pleading alone, nor of the testimony alone, that the members of 
the court give their verdict, but on the strength of their own knowledge and 
their own investigations. And this is the reason why that tribunal maintains its 
high repute in the city. (1.92: trans. CD. Adams)
While there may be some rhetorical exaggeration in these two laudations of 
the Areopagos Council, it must be true (as also with Isokrates' claims) that 
such statements were expected to meet with general approval among the 
Athenians who sat in the courts; it would be ridiculous to make such 
commendations if the people as a whole commonly regarded that Council as 
a bastion of reactionary conservatism, dangerous to the interests of the 
democracy, or even as an anachronistic institution which had no relevance 
in the contemporary state. Although, as we shall shortly see, there was a 
moment, after Chair oneia, when the Areopagos Council fell under some 
suspicion that it, or at least some of its members, might prove disloyal to 
their countrymen, the high reputation of the Council as a court continued: 
in 330 Lykourgos spoke of it as a court in which even those convicted by it 
admit to the justice of its judgments and the refusal of its members to be 
misled by orators' tricks (1.12); even later, in the notorious incident 
concerning the money brought to Athens by the fugitive Makedonian 
Harpalos, it was the Areopagos Council which was entrusted with the task 
of conducting the preliminary investigation into the alleged disappearance 
of 350  talents and those individuals who were suspected of having 
accepted bribes from Harpalos (see Dein. 1.1, 3-6, 45, 51, 61; cf. Plut. Dem. 
26.1); in the subsequent trial of Demosthenes, who was one of those 
brought before the heliastic courts on the recommendation of the 
Areopagos, Deinarchos also makes particular point of the honourable 
tradition and current reputation of the Areopagos Council, reiterating the 
claim that even those who had been adjudged guilty by it did not normally
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protest against that judgment (1.61, 66-67).1
The laws themselves required that the Areopagos Council, like the 
Boule, had annually to enter its accounts before the board of auditors and 
to submit to scrutiny before the heliastic courts (see Aischin. 3.20); ex- 
archons also were required to pass a scrutiny before they could be 
admitted as Areopagites ([Dem ] 26.5). However, official scrutinies 
notwithstanding, the members themselves were zealous in guarding their 
corporate reputation: crimes and transgressions of its rules of conduct 
committed by Areopagites were investigated and were reported 
scrupulously to the demos so that action could be taken if this were 
adjudged to be applicable; thus an Areopagite who had robbed a ferryman 
of his fare was fined and reported; another, who had falsely claimed five 
drachmas of public money, was likewise reported; a member who, contrary 
to custom, had sold his portion of the sacrificial meat to which Areopagites 
were entitled, was fined and expelled. For Deinarchos, who recorded these 
misdemeanours (1.55-57), the Areopagos Council was sterner in its 
expectations than the demos, since each of these offenders was 
consequently tried and acquitted by the people.
In this period, which broadly equates with that of Demosthenes' 
public career, the evidence suggests that the Areopagos Council's reputation 
was accompanied by a political and judicial involvement which went 
beyond the traditional role which had been left to it after 462/1. An 
incident, probably to be dated to about 340,2 reveals the Council acting 
under a decree of Demosthenes which empowered it to "use the ancestral 
laws and to punish anyone who offended against the laws" (Dein. 1.62). 
Demosthenes himself records the story: at the dockyards he had arrested a 
man, Antiphon, who had been disenfranchised and had returned to Athens, 
allegedly with the purpose of supporting Philip by setting fire to the 
Athenian dockyards; Demosthenes brought the man before the Assembly, 
where he was acquitted with the aid of Aischines; unwilling to let the 
matter go, Demosthenes apprised the Areopagos Council of the facts, the
^ h e continuation to the end of the democracy of the Areopagos Council's 
reputation for incorruptability and general probity is recognized by modern 
scholars, see A.R.W. Harrison, The Lats of Athens. Vol. 2, Oxford 1971, pp.39,196; 
Harrison makes the point that, although bribery vould have been easier in the case 
of Areopagites than Trith Heliastic jurors, nothing is ever heard of such a charge (cf. 
also D M. MacDo'well, The Lav in Classical Athens, London 1978, p.l 16).
^or a discussion of the dating see R. Sealey,“0n Penalizing Areopagites", A lPh 
79 (1958), 72 (= Essays, p.184).
Council investigated the case, arrested the man, and brought him before the 
people so he could be sent to trial; he was found guilty and executed (Dem. 
16-132-133: cf. Dein. 1.62-63; Plut. Dem. 14.4). Here we have a democratic 
orator passing a decree which extended the power of the Areopagos Council 
and enabled it to take action and to make recommendation to the demos on 
a matter which could be represented as concerning the public safety; 
moreover, Deinarchos does not attempt to challenge Demosthenes' decree as 
undemocratic.1 Sometime after the Areopagos Council's involvement in the 
prosecution and condemnation of Antiphon it again involved itself in 
political matter : x^ischines had been chosen by the demos to act as an 
advocate in support of Athenian claims concerning the temple at Delos, it 
seems that the demos had in some way invited the Areopagos Council to be 
involved in the selection and that it had promptly debarred Aischines on 
the ground that he was a traitor and had instructed Hypereides to take his 
place (Dem. 15.134). Then, in the panic at Athens after the defeat at 
Chaironeia ( 336) the more reputable citizens, alarmed at the prospect of the 
popular element's nominee, Charidemos, being appointed strategos. sought 
the support of the Areopagos Council: the members of the Council 
employed their influence upon the people as a whole and succeeded in 
having the nomination changed to Phokion (Plut. Phok. 16.3). x^  certain 
obscurity surrounds the manner in which the xAxreopagos Council became 
involved in the selection of an advocate to plead the x^thenian claim 
concerning Delos, although we may assume that the Council's involvement 
was connected with religious issues: it seems at least possible that its 
participation could have been as the result of a Assembly decree, as in the 
matter of Antiphon, although it cannot have been as a result of that same 
decree of Demosthenes; on the other hand, the question of wTho was to be 
appointed to take command of x^ xthens' forces in the fearful aftermath of 
Chaironeia raises no suggestion of an official appeal to the Areopagos 
Council: rather, it seems that on that occasion the xÄxreopagites were invited 
to exercise their influence in a purely informal manner. Deinarchos cites 
other examples of the Areopagos Council acting to uphold the laws of the 
state in accordance with Demosthenes' decree: one of these cases resulted
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^ ee  Sealey, “Ephialtes", p. 12 (= Essays, p. 44).
in the exile of a certain Charinos (1.63)1 In the celebrated affair (already 
mentioned: see above, p. 247) concerning Alexander's treasurer Harpalos, 
who fled to Athens in 324, the preliminary investigation which was 
conducted by the Areopagos Council was specifically authorized by the 
demos: in fact Demosthenes was a mover of the decree (Dein. 1.3-4, 61, 62- 
63, 66); in this case, the Council's authority is limited to the preliminary 
inquiry: those whom it nominates are then to be tried before a heliastic 
court, although it should be noted that in the speech Deinarchos says that 
the Council's own power to judge cases and to exact penalties as severe as 
exile or even death have been extended beyond its traditional sphere of 
authority (see 1.6).
Not all that we hear about the Areopagos Council in these years is 
sympathetic to its reputation or to its enhanced political activity. A law 
proposed by Eukrates in 33"/62 sanctions the slaying of anyone who 
should attempt a political coup at Athens, and it makes specific threats 
against x^reopagites who should be tempted to give sanction to such a 
tyranny. This may be a specific response to recent political activities by 
the Council,3 but it may be a more general precautionary act of democratic 
drum-beating at a time when the political future at Athens seemed 
uncertain, as a result of Makedonian superiority. By this time the 
Areopagites themselves could hardly have been regarded as a group to be 
identified with a social class; however, the appeal to them after Chaironeia 
by those who supported the appointment of Phokion indicates that the 
wealthier class rather than the poorer citizens would look towards them in 
a situation where the issue could be divided along class lines. Individual 
xAreopagites could also find themselves the target of a political trial, which 
might bring odium upon the Council as a whole and offer ammunition to 
those who might seek to make political capital out of an attack upon the 
Council: such a case appears at the time of Chaironeia when an xAreopagite 
x^utolykos was prosecuted and condemned for having removed his family
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^or the Areopagos Council's involvement in arresting and punishing by 
death men found guilty of treason in the period immediately after Chaironeia see 
Lykourgos 1.52; cf. Dein. 1.6, vho seems to imply another particular authorization for 
the Council in this crisis.
^ W ished  by B. D. Meritt ("Greek Inscriptions", Hesoeria. 21 [19521355-359).
3See Sealey, “On Penalizing Areopagites", pp. 71,73 (= Essays, pp.183,185): 
Sealey regards the lav  as a political retort to the lav of Demosthenes vhich led the 
Council to intervene in the case against Antiphon.
2 5 1
to a safe place at the time of the battle (see Lykourg. I.53 Sc fr.9; 
Harpokration, s.v. a£t6xvko$).
Not only the reputation of the Areopagos Council but also its active 
political involvement seems to have grown in the decades which followed 
the publication of the Areopagitikos. Politicians spoke without fear of 
contradiction of the prestige of the Council and of its continuing reputation 
for integrity and justice, and some passed decrees which entrusted to the 
Council the task of conducting inquiries in matters of state business which 
lay outside its traditional areas of formal responsibility under the 
democratic politeia; it is possible that the Council itself was sometimes 
empowered to go beyond preliminary investigations and conducted trials, 
passing judgments and imposing penalties; it may even have gathered the
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in some instances. AW in all, it can fairly be said that in the eyes of the 
Athenian people the Areopagos Council enjoyed in the last two decades of 
the Athenian democracy in the fourth century a reputation and a public 
role which transcended any that it had possessed since it had suffered the 
encroachments caused by Ephialtes' reforms in 462/1.
It cannot be proven that the endorsement of the Council by Isokrates 
when he published his Areopagitikos in 354 was directly or singularly 
responsible for the apparent, revival of the Council in Athenian political life 
which followed. Indeed, it would seem unlikely that Isokrates alone 
initiated this process, the very complimentary assessment of the Council 
which was included by Demosthenes in his speech Against Aristocrates in 
352 might more cautiously be taken as showing that Isokrates was but one 
of those who was considering the Council with fresh, and favourable, eyes 
in the period which followed the Social War, although the possibility cannot 
be excluded that Isokrates’ views of the Council in Areopagitikos did 
directly reawaken other Athenians to the merits which a sympathizer could 
find in this body of ex-archons. What should be said is that Mosse is too 
sceptical when she concludes that "11 ne fait aucun doute que les 
propositions d’ Isocrate ne furent pas ä r  origine de r  accroisement des 
pouvoirs de 1' Areopage".1 In looking to the Areopagos Council to provide a 
leadership in Athenian politics and society Isokrates correctly assessed that 
many Athenian citizens either still held the Council in considerable esteem 
or were now again prepared to be convinced that they should do so; he 
also adjudged accurately that the time was ripe for the Athenians to
1C. Mosse, La Fin de la democratic athenienne, Paris 1962, p281.
permit, even to invite, the Council to extend its role in public leadership 
beyond the severely resticted limits within which it had acted during the 
previous century.1
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1 It cannot be discussed here, but it should be noted in conjunction with the 
change in attitude among Athenians with respect to the Areopagos Council which it 
has been argued took place in the decades which followed the Social Var, that a 
significant change in attitude has also been observed in the area of public finance. It 
has been argued that from the time of the Social ¥ a r  the Athenians became prepared 
to adjust their attitudes to matters of political principle in the interest of financial and 
economic improvement; this is particularly to be observed in the times of the 
leadership of Euboulos and, later, Lvkourgos: see P.J. Rhodes, "Athenian Democracy 
After 403 B.C.", CJ75 (1980), 305-323; Rhodes summarizes the position in this respect 
thus: “in financial administration we see a clear shift from democracy as the fifth 
century had practised it towards a more efficient system in which men of ability were 
entrusted with considerable power." (p.314); see also Sinclair, Democracy and 
Participation, p213.
253
Chapter 6: Pfuiippos
In 349 Philip II of Makedon launched his assault upon Athens’ ally 
Olynthos.1 At last, the Athenian assembly resolved to respond: the 
Athenians voted first a mercenary force and ships under Chares, then 
another under Charidemos; when these proved ineffective, finally, in 345, 
a citizen-army was levied and dispatched; but, it was too late: Olynthos 
had already fallen (Sept. 345), the city was plundered and its inhabitants 
sold into slavery. The news shocked the complacent Athenians, and 
indications of interest among some Athenians to news that Philip was 
prepared to negotiate a peace with Athens wTere silenced. In the following 
year Philip proceeded to engage in diplomatic activity in the Peloponnese, 
where he took the side of Sparta's enemies and sought to manoeuvre 
himself into the role of controller of political affairs in that region, a 
position which Thebes, now bound up with the Third Sacred War, had held 
in the aftermath of Leuktra (371).
In 347 the appeal of Thebes to Philip to intervene in the Sacred War 
exacerbated Athens’ anxieties. Early in 346 it became known in Greece that 
Philip intended to march south with the Thessalians to settle the Sacred 
War. On a motion of Euboulos Aischines and other Athenian ambassadors 
were sent around the Greek cities to summon representatives to Athens to 
discuss the co-ordination of resistance to the Makedonien.
Also in 347 the Phokian general Phalaikos had been replaced and 
assistance had been sought from both the Spartans and the Athenians. The 
latter responded early in 346 with the dispatch of the general Proxenos 
with 50 ships to aid in preventing the Makedonians from passing 
Therm opylai. However, internal political feuds continued among the 
Phokians; Phalaikos was restored to his command, and the Athenian 
support was rejected. To the Athenians neither the loyalty of the Phokians 
nor the security of the pass at Thermopylai seemed any longer to be 
matters of trust or hope.
tThe brief summary of events vh ich  fo llow  is based upon the historical 
account vh ich  has been developed by G. Cavk^ell (see esp. “Aeschines and the Peace 
of Philcrates", REG 73 [i9601 416-438 & "Aeschines and the Ruin of Phocis in 346“, REG 
75 [1962 1 453-459: the former article has been reprinted in Philip and Athens, ed.
S Perlman [Cambridge 19731 pp.68-89; see also Philip of Macedon [London 19781 
pp.91ff„ & ‘The Peace of Philocrates Again", CQ n.s. 28 [19781 93-104).
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Thus, early in 346 (about the end of Gamelion or early in 
Anthesterion: i.e. late February) the Athenians abandoned their efforts to 
resist Philip by force and sent an embassy to Pella with instructions to 
negotiate for peace. Despite some wishful thinking among the Athenians 
that Amphipolis could still be reclaimed, the embassy returned to report 
that Philip would agree to a peace. In the presence of the Makedonian 
ambassadors, the Assembly debated the matter on 15 & 19 Elaphebolion 
(about mid-April). Even now the Athenians remained hopeful that they, 
not Philip, could dictate the terms. On the 16th the Assembly discussed 
two proposals: one, proposed by Philokrates, urged peace and alliance 
between Philip with his allies and Athens with her allies, although Phokis 
and Halos were to be excluded from the list of Athenian allies; the other 
proposal, which was initiated by the synod of Athens' allies, recommended 
a peace which any Greek state might join within three months. The latter 
proposal would, of course, have permitted Phokis and Halos to elect to join, 
but this was quite unacceptable to Philip. Between the first assembly and 
that on the following day Philip's ambassadors must have made it plain 
that a Common Peace was not to be entertained: neither Phokis nor Halos 
was to be allowed an escape. On the following day Antipater, a Makedonian 
ambassador, was called to speak in the assembly; many Athenians were 
uneasy, despite the assurances of Philip's representatives concerning their 
king's plans for Phokis and for central Greece; however, they were not 
prepared to confront the alternative which Euboulos recommended: that 
they should equip themselves immediately for war, and should pay war- 
tax and make over the theoric funds to a war-chest.
The Peace of Philokrates was sworn by the Athenians and a second 
embassy sent off to Pella to accept Philip's agreement to the Peace. The 
Athenian ambassadors had first to cool their heels at the Makedonian court 
until Philip returned from a campaign in Thrace; Philip took the oath at 
Pella, but delayed the swearing of the oath by his allies until he and his 
army had travelled as far south as Pherai; the Athenian ambassadors were 
kept even longer with him, until, in fact, he was on the point of marching 
for Thermopylae Thus, by the time the Athenian ambassadors had 
returned in mid-July (13 Skirophorion), it was too late; Philip had marched 
swiftly and was already at Thermopylae which was soon to be abandoned 
by the Phokian commander Phalaikos and his 6,000 mercenaries. Ten days
^For this sequence of events see Griffith, HM, II, p.344, n.4.
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later the Phokians had capitulated and the Sacred War had been ended 
(Dem. 19-56-59). The Athenians declined Philips invitation for them to 
send a force to join him in ending the Sacred War; they sent instead an 
embassy, which returned to Athens to report the dismal fact that the 
Phokians had capitulated and harsh terms had been imposed by Philip, 
although surely not as severe as the Thebans and others of the Phokians' 
enemies would have wished.
In this setting, at some point between the Athenian assembly's 
decision on 19 Elaphebolion to accept a peace with Philip and the 
announcement at Athens on 27 Skirophorion (latter half of July) that the 
Phokians had surrendered and that Philip had handed the matter over to 
the Thebans (cf. Dem. 19.60), Isokrates composed his last major political 
work. That the setting falls within this period is clearly revealed by 
internal evidence: the Peace of Philokrates has been made (5.7-6), or at 
least, agreed to, whereas the Phokian War is still being waged and the 
Thebans are awaiting the arrival of Philip to assist them in this business 
(5-50, 54-55, 74). Strangely enough, despite the enthusiasm manifested in 
the case of others of Isokrates' political compositions, no scholar has 
ventured to suggest that Philippes was actually written sometime later 
than the period within which it is set; in fact, there is an almost 
embarrassing agreement that Philippos was not only set but written during 
the weeks between 19 Elaphebolion and 27 Skirophorion 346.1 Such a 
silence among the sceptics is the more remarkable, given that the speed 
with which this work was written contrasts dramatically with the tradition 
of Cinna-like gestation which attaches to Panegyrikos (see above, pp. 25- 
26 ).
Philippos is a lengthy work addressed by Isokrates to the 
Makedonian king, Philip II. In the midst, of a leisurely prooimion (5 1-30), 
in which Philip is told something of an earlier work directed to him, upon 
which Isokrates had been working when the decision for peace rendered it 
obsolete, Isokrates spells out the message of Philippos as two-fold: Philip is 
to take the lead in establishing concord (homonoia) among the Greek states 
and is to direct a campaign against the barbarians (i.e. the Persians) (5-16). 
More specifically, in the case of the first proposal, Philip is advised to 
attempt, to reconcile Argos, Sparta, Thebes and Athens (5 30). The themes,
*See e.g. Schäfer, Dem, u. s. Seit, II2, p. 235, n 2; Blass, AB,. II2, p.314; Mathieu, 
Les Idees, pp. 155-156 (Mathieu dates it even more specifically to April-June); Perlman, 
"Reinterpretation", p.306 (= Philip and Athens . pp .1Q4); Bringmann, Studien, p.97; 
Ryder, KE, p.99: Griffith, HM, II, p.458, n.3.
as Isokrates himself acknowledges (5 9-11; cf. 503 f, 93, 129), had already 
engaged his attention in his much earlier work, Panegyrikos. and the plan 
for a campaign against Persia, at least, is said to have appeared in some 
other works (5 136; cf. 5 130: and see below, pp. 297ff). Here again in 
Philippos these two initiatives are proposed as complementary, and it is at 
this point that scholarly discussion starts. Questions arise as to the 
relationship of the two themes, the role envisaged for Philip himself in 
promoting and implementing the proposals, the method(s) by which the 
plans might be carried out; also a subject for discussion is Isokrates' 
purpose in writing this address to Philip. Part of the difficulty lies in the 
fact that the work is not intended to be a blue-print for action, but rather it 
is a proposal, an exhortation, a challenge, the details of which Philip is to fill 
in himself; a number of matters are left unspoken or are only hinted at.
For example, the manner in which the Sacred War should be settled, the 
burning issue at the time, is not discussed (the War itself is mentioned only 
in passing, as an illustration of the current incapacity of the Thebans to deal 
even with a minor issue such as this: see 5-5 5^-55); then, too, just how 
are the major Greek states to be reconciled? Isokrates argues that the task 
is not impossible, although it may seem so, but he says little specific about 
what Philip should do to promote this beyond his strenuous advice that 
force is to be eschewed, and the implication that a commitment by Philip to 
a campaign against the Persians will encourage good-will (eunoia) and 
harmony (homonoia) among the Greek states; so, too, with the campaign 
against the Persians, it is not clear whether Greek participation, in addition 
to sympathy and support, is envisaged.
It is this kind of diffuseness about Isokrates' proposals which 
discourages critics from regarding them as serious propositions or which 
leads to varying interpretations. Thus, when Perlman came to re-examine 
the Philippos. he observed (in 195")- "there is still no great measure of 
agreement as to its [Philippos'] aims.''1 By some it had been regarded as of 
great historical and political importance; by others it had been dismissed 
as an irrelevance.2
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1 Perlman, “Reinterpretation “,p. 306 (= Philip and Athens, p.104).
2Beloch (GG. III2. 1.524, n .l) calls this work "die politisch bedeutendste aller 
seiner Schriften"; by contrast, Schafer (Dem, u. s. Zeit, II-, p238) saw it as nothing 
more than "Herzensergiessungen des neunzigjährigen Greises, dessen reine und gute 
Absichten unsere ehrende Anerkennung fordern, obgleich wir aussprechen müssen 
dass er in seinem Ziele sich vollständig vergriff und über Philipps Sinnesart und 
Staatskunst ganz im unklaren war“.
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Perlman's "reinterpretation“ concludes that the Philippos was a 
serious attempt to deal with a real political situation; like others who 
sought to influence the Athenian demos. Isokrates was trying to solve a 
real political and military threat posed by Philip; it was the work of a man 
who ranked his city's interests most highly, followed then by those of the 
other Greeks; he was not Philip's 'creature', nor had he been seduced into 
any visionary restructuring of the Greeks into a new political unification to 
be headed by Makedon. With one significant exception (see below, pp. 
274-277), Perlman provides an interpretation which faithfully reflects the 
arguments and emphases of the work. Yet he has not, I think, exposed just 
how well attuned the arguments and their presentation are to the political 
circumstances in which they are presented.
Nor has his article laid to rest controversy and speculation: Minor M. 
Markle 111 has offered an interpretation according to which virtually 
nothing in Philippos is to be taken at face value; in Markle's view Isokrates 
is propagandizing for Philip by pretending, for the benefit of the Greeks, to 
espouse a peaceful and diplomatic reconciliation of the Greeks, and urging 
upon Philip a campaign which he knew the king had already decided to 
pursue: his purpose in all this is said to be a bid to win patronage from 
Philip for himself and for his school.1 Markle sums up the first part of 
Isokrates' advice, that Philip should effect a reconciliation among the Greek 
states, as "not practicable but good propaganda“.2 *For Markle does not 
believe that Isokrates was actually serious about the implementation of 
this advice: if he were, then, in Markle's judgment, that would reveal 
Isokrates to be no more than a fool, whose advice amounted to no more 
than "the vain illusion of a senile pedant".3 These are strong words, which 
Markle is loth to accept. Led on by a desire to rescue Isokrates from such a 
judgment, Markle concludes that the advice about reconciling the Greek 
states was directed not at Philip, but at the Greeks themselves, Athenians 
and others; Markle claims that "Isokrates did not expect to win favour by 
persuading Philip to reconcile the Greek states and to lead an expedition 
against Persia";4 on the contrary, he believes Isokrates was really 
signalling to Philip through this address that reconciliation could only be
Markle III, "Support of Athenian Intellectuals", pp. 80-99.
2It>i<J., p.82.
3lbi<J„ p.83.
4 Ibid., p.86.
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achieved through the use of force: this message, however, had to be 
concealed by outwardly appearing to recommend to the Makedonian king a 
course of action which the Greeks would approve. This is certainly an 
original, but somewhat perverse, interpretation.
Markle is not the only historian of recent times to consider the first 
proposal of Philippes to be beyond achievement: in a recent history of 
Makedonia it is stated that "One of the more sensible and practical sections 
of the Philip of Isocrates is that in which he tells Philip that he has only to 
gain the co-operation of the leading four Greek cities and the rest of Greece 
will give him no trouble." However, such a judgment is immediately 
qualified by it being pointed out that in his whole life Isokrates never 
actively engaged in politics and was, in effect, a "political journalist" whose 
“limited experience of life is reflected in the deceptive simplicity of his 
suggestions to Philip."1 It is observed that history did not offer much hope 
for reconciliation between Sparta and Argos, nor between Sparta and 
Thebes, while Athens and Thebes would need a good "fright" to bring them 
together again (in fact, the first two combinations are conceded by 
Isokrates himself as seeming to be unlikely candidates for reconciliation:
5 39).2
Yet, it must also be acknowledged that Isokrates was perfectly well- 
aware that his planned reconciliation might seem incredible, and even 
impossible: he admits as much (5-24: "My purpose in recounting all this is 
that if, in what I say at the beginning, anything strikes you as incredible, or 
impracticable, or unsuitable for you to carry out, you may not be 
prejudiced and turn away from the rest of my discourse, and that you may 
not repeat the experience of my friends, but may wait with an open mind 
until you hear to the end all that I have to say"; cf. 5 39), and he explains 
that this is the reason why he describes how some of his "associates" 
(nXi-joiiMjavreo; 5 17), who had ridiculed his temerity in proposing to advise 
Philip on Makedonian foreign policy, had completely reversed their opinion 
when once they had heard what he had written (5 17-24). Even after he 
has put forward his arguments in favour of reconciliation, Isokrates 
considers the possibility of failing to achieve reconciliation among the major 
city-states, and he consoles Philip with the thought that the effort will have 
been worthwhile, since he will nevertheless win the good-will (eyvow) of the
G riffith, HM, IL p.456.
2 Ibid., p.456f.
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Greeks, which is certainly preferable to taking many Greek cities by force 
(5.66). What reason, then, had Isokrates to believe that his proposed 
reconciliation now had a chance of success? Was this merely arm-chair 
optimism?
Isokrates is under no illusions that the foreign policies of the Greek 
states were governed by anything so much as by self-interest; he puts the 
point bluntly: "our states care nothing about their former enmities or about 
their oaths or about anything else save what they conceive to be expedient 
for themselves, and that expediency is the sole object to which they give 
their affections and devote all their zeal" (5-45). He also admits that, when 
one state is in a position of greater power than others, it will inevitably 
block any attempt to share alike rather than pursue individual self- 
interest; this had, indeed, been the case when Sparta and Athens had been 
predominant powers. But Isokrates argues that circumstances have 
changed: "they [the Greek states] have all been brought down to the same 
level by their misfortunes, and so I think that they would much prefer the 
mutual advantages which would come from a unity of purpose [ &  1%  
qiovoia?] to the selfish gains which accrued from their policy in those 
[earlier] days” (5-40).
The "unity of purpose" which Isokrates has in mind is, of course, a 
■campaign against the Persians to be led by Philip. Isokrates believes that 
the announcement of such a venture will act as a spur to encourage those 
Greeks who are fearful of Philip s intentions towards themselves to trust 
Philip and to cause those Greeks who look to Philip as a forceful 
interventionist on their behalf to realize that they must reconsider how 
they are going to resolve their present difficulties.
Before proceeding to examine in detail the present circumstances of 
Sparta, Argos and Thebes (Athens is passed over on the ground that she 
has already accepted the merit of making peace) [5.46-56], Isokrates 
introduces a second argument to convince Philip that he might achieve the 
seemingly impossible: he selects historical examples to show that the 
dominating principle of self-interest has resulted in a number of cases 
where formerly bitter enemies have become reconciled in order to advance 
their own interests as these are currently perceived (5-42-45). The 
examples do not prove that the present situation can be resolved with an 
effective reconciliation, but they do illustrate that political principles can be 
repudiated in favour of pragmatic expediencies: so the King's Peace in 
367/6 saw both Sparta and Athens willing to accept the influence of Persia 
in their affairs, despite the enmity which had arisen between the Greeks
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and the Persians as a consequence of Xerxes' invasion; closer to home, and 
to Isokrates' argument, are the shifting relationships of Sparta, Athens and 
Thebes within Isokrates' own lifetime. Of course, the weakness of these 
exempla is that they also illustrate the very fragility of Greek inter-state 
relationships. Nonetheless, one cannot contest the truth of Isokrates' 
judgment about the overriding importance of expediency in determining 
foreign relationships.
Isokrates’ choice of the ‘big four', whose lead others would follow, 
may seem surprising: it is not easy to see how Argos could still be 
reckoned a power comparable with Thebes or even, perhaps, with Athens 
or Sparta, Sparta herself now claimed authority with words rather than 
deeds. It would be easy to discount Isokrates' judgment in making these 
nominations as no more than an anachronistic assessment, appropriate to 
the second half of the fifth century rather than to the second half of the 
fourth. That would fail to do justice to what Isokrates says of each of his 
candidates. He speaks of each in a way which is both suggestive and 
designed to arouse Philip's interest.
First Sparta (5-47-50): Isokrates shows that he is well-aware that 
Leuktra had crippled her and that in the ensuing years the Spartans have 
had to fight, not to protect their crops, but to save the city itself and their 
women and children; at first Sparta's neighbours had been aided by the 
Thebans in their depredations of her territory, but at present she is in a 
virtual state of siege from her neighbours alone, however, "the greatest 
trouble is that the Spartans live in continual fear that the Thebans may 
patch up their quarrel with the Phokians and, coming back again, may 
encircle them with greater woes than those which happened before" (5 50: 
rny trans ). This scenario of a resurgent Thebes again asserting its influence 
and power in the Peloponnese could not have appealed to Philip, who had 
himself sh o w  interest in adopting an influential role among the 
Peloponnesian states just as Thebes had done in the past (see below, p.
266 ).
Next Argos (5-51-52): over 30 years earlier the same four states 
had been said by Isokrates to have been in the past, and are said to be still 
at that time, the greatest in the Greek world (cf. 4.64); it is interesting to 
note that in Isokrates' judgment she is now, in 346, even weaker than 
Sparta in terms of her capacity to control her neighbours, yet both she and 
Sparta retain their places in Isokrates' list of the most important Greek
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states;1 what is worse, the Argives exhibit a deplorable willingness to 
engage in murderous internal stasis, putting to death "the most eminent 
and wealthiest of their citizens";2 it is perhaps not without interest that 
those citizens who are the object of the bloody attacks of their fellow- 
citizens are described as oi evSo^oraroi icod nXovoimraToi (5 -5 2 )- inasmuch as 
Philip himself is described twice in this letter as ev8o£o$ (5-14, 62). Was the 
choice of adjective here at 5-52 deliberate, to encourage Philip's interest in 
supporting the leading men in Argos?3
Then Thebes (5-53-55)- although their overall failure to exert control 
outside Boiotia is noted, in addition to the fact that their present fortunes 
seem to depend largely upon Philip's promised assistance, it will not hurt to 
remind the Makedonian king of the aggressive and expansionist ambitions 
of this state; Thebes' readiness to interfere in the Peloponnese is 
mentioned again, but even more pointed is the reminder about her 
ambitions to reduce Thessaly to subjection (5 53- ©eiraXiav 8' eToXpouv 
raTa$ovXoyc8aO; Isokrates knows well that Philip is now archon of Thessaly 
(cf. 5-20), and he will not have forgotten that Philip spent time as a hostage 
at Thebes between 3b6 and 3b5, as a direct consequence of Pelopidas' 
efforts to extend Theban influence northward through Thessaly and into
^ .A . Tomlinson has recently attempted to construct a history of Argos from 
the paucity of evidence available (Argos and the Argolid from the end of the Bronze 
Age to the Roman Occupation. [London 1972]); Tomlinson has little to offer about 
Argos' role after the King's Peace (pp. 136ff.)(Argos had been aligned with Athens, 
Thebes and Corinth, in the Corinthian Var {see Hell .Ox v . 2.2]); Tomlinson describes 
her in the period after Leuktra as "strangely subdued“, calling the time after 
Mantineiaone of “sad decline“ for Argos, and concluding that during the mid-fourth 
century “Argos had essentially disappeared from the list of significant Greek states“ 
(pp.142 & 143). The one fact ’which seems not to conform with this picture is the 
despatch to Egypt c. 344-3 of 3,000 Argive troops (1,000 Thebans were also sent), at a 
time when Sparta refused Artaxerxes' request for men (see D.S. 16.44.1-2: for the date 
see G. Cawkwell, "Demosthenes' Policy after the Peace of Philocrates I“, CQ n.s. 13 
[1963 L 121-122 [= Perlman, Philip and Athens, pp. 147-148]). The sending away by 
Argos of such a large force of men, at a time not so very long after the composition of 
Philippos at least brings into question the adequacy of Tomlinson's assessment of 
Argos' position in the mid-fourth century and reveals a certain confidence on the 
part of the Argives both in  their own strength and also in Philip's guarantee of 
protection.
2This must be a reference to the infamous 'skvtalismos' of 370 (see D.S. 15.57.3-
58.4).
3The adjective is listed 8 times by Preuss (Index Isocrateus). Isokrates seems 
especially fond of the word in this work, which accounts for 5 of the occurrences; it 
is applied negatively of Dionysios I (“a man of no repute"), with whom Philip is being 
favourably compared (5.67); it occurs also in the first Letter to Philip (Ep. 2.6), 
although not of Philip himself; otherwise cf. 5-55 & 1 37.
Macedonia itself;1 Philip may have appreciated the opportunities which 
came to him from his time at Thebes, in particular the chance to observe 
and learn from that great commander Epaminondas (see Plut. Pel. 26.5; cf. 
D.S. 16.2.2-3), but he can hardly be supposed to have looked upon the 
Thebans with trust or affection.
Finally Athens (5.56): but her recent acceptance of peace and 
alliance with Philip obviates the need to argue her readiness to follow 
Philip's lead. It suffices to add that an announcement by Philip that his 
policy towards the Greeks is governed by the intention to campaign against 
the Persians would cement her enthusiasm to line up with Philip.
In all of this it is essential to Isokrates' argument that he makes 
clear the impotence of each of these states at the present time and to 
indicate that in their present circumstances they have little to hope for, if 
they continue to pursue a path of unilateral action. He must also arouse 
Philip's interest and indicate the advantages for him in pursuing his 
advised course with these particular states; this he does by a mixture of 
selected historical facts and some hints about possible future intentions on 
the part of these states, facts and intentions which are designed to make 
Philip feel uneasy and to encourage him to reflect upon his present policy. 
However, there is more to the proposal than this. What Isokrates is 
recommending is not the combination of diplomacy and threatened action 
towards the Greeks which Philip has followed to this time; in other words, 
Isokrates is not outlining a proposal which matches, or links with, what 
could be seen of Philip's plans towards the Greeks.
The key to the proposal is the inclusion of Argos. It is true that the 
mythological connection between the present Makedonian dynasty and 
Argos was available as an encouragement for Philip's interest and as a 
claim upon his loyalty; the 'fact' is not overlooked: "Argos is the land of 
your fathers, and is entitled to as much consideration at your hands as are 
your own ancestors" (5 32).2 This alone does not account for Argos being
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Philip's time at Thebes see Griffith, HM. II, pp. 204-206.
2 According to legend Perdikkas I vas a descendant of the Argive hero 
Temenos, and had established the current dynasty in Makedonia after being expelled 
from Argos (see Hdt. 8.137-139; cf. Thuc. 2.99.3; 5-80.2 [this last is esp. interesting, as 
the ancestral connection with. Argos is put forward by Thucydides to explain a 
political action by Perdikkas II in 418/417 ]: for the historical background to this 
alleged connection see ¥ ¥ .  Hov& J. ¥ells, A Commentary on Herodotus (Oxford 1912), 
2.282-283): see also Ap. Dascalakis, The Hellenism of the Ancient Macedonians 
(Thessalonike 1965), pp. 97-146; the tradition of Perdikkas I's expulsion from Argos
regarded as a candidate to lead a reconciliation. It was a fact of Sparta's 
policy since her defeat at Leuktra and the establishment of an independent 
state of Messene that she had refused any suggestion that she should 
accept this new dispensation within the Peloponnese; Isokrates recognized 
this when he wrote Archidamos (see above, pp. 132-133)- Sparta had stood 
alone in refusing to participate in the Common Peace after Mantineia in 
362, and she had continued to seek opportunities to re-establish the old 
arrangement which gave her power within the Peloponnese. In 346 Sparta 
was 'down', but not yet 'out'; her enemies in the Peloponnese still lived in 
apprehension that Sparta might succeed in reasserting her power; thus, 
within the last decade they had continued to look for support from some 
strong power outside the Peloponnese, first Athens, then Thebes, and 
finally, Makedon.* 1 Neither Philip nor the Athenians would have wished to 
see Thebes resume her political or military activity within the Peloponnese; 
Makedonian support to Sparta's enemies could have been no more welcome 
to Athens; Athens herself had rejected the Peloponnesian opponents of 
Sparta; but it was still by no means sure that these anti-Spartan states 
could successfully continue to resist a Sparta which showed no sign that she 
would ever rest until she had regained her former territories. Putting it 
briefly, the anti-Spartan Peloponnesian states could not safely be expected 
to maintain a balance of power within the Peloponnese without assistance, 
and there was no prospect that Sparta would ever accept the current state 
of affairs. A stronger x r^gos, acknowledged as leader of those anti-Spartan 
states just might be sufficient to discourage Sparta from attempting to 
overthrow her neighbours;2 it was also just possible that historical 
tradition would offer sufficient precedent that Sparta would accept 
negotiations with xAxrgos, whereas she would never do so with the newly-
263
may be relevant to Isokrates' emphasis upon the Argives' readiness to treat 
mercilessly "the most eminent end veal thy of their citizens”.
1 In 353 Archidamos and the Spartans had reneved their efforts to reestablish 
the old order: the moment had seemed propitious vith Thebes engaged in her var 
vith Phokis; the Megalopolitans had appealed to Athens, but had been rejected (Dem. 
16); campaigns between the Spartans and their Peloponnesian enemies f ollowed 
vithin the Peloponnese over the next tvo years and Thebes again sent a contingent to 
assist the Arkadiens (D.S. 16.34.3; 39.1-7); as Thebes became more embroiled in the 
Sacred Var Philip began to explore the opportunities created by this 'vacuum' (see 
above, p. 253 & belov, p.266).
2After Leuktra Argos seems to have acquiesced in Arkadia's taking the leading 
role in opposition to Sparta (see Tomlinson, Argos and the Argolid, p. 142).
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founded state of Messene or the city of Megalopolis.1 Argos had played a 
consistent role as a significant opponent of Sparta in the Peloponnese 
between 421 and 362, especially between 420-416, during the Corinthian 
War and in the decade after Leuktra. Furthermore, although Argos might 
be admitted by Isokrates to be even weaker than Sparta in 346, he perhaps 
knew better the current international status of Argos among the Greeks 
than moderns allow; Thucydides attests the excitement in Argos in 421 at 
the prospect of the state again playing a leading part in Peloponnesian 
affairs (5-262-3); Xenophon speaks of Argos' power in 366 (4.7.2) and 
rated her and Arkadia as the two most powerful Peloponnesian states after 
Leuktra (7.2.2), a fragment of the official Greek reply to an appeal for help 
from rebel Persian satraps in 362-361 was found in a well in /^rgos (Tod, 
GHI. II. 145) and may indicate Argos as one of the states to which 
representatives came from the satraps, seeking aid; the King himself still 
saw Argos as a source of military assistance in 344 (see D.S. 16.44.1-3). 
Isokrates' proposal for a revival of Argos' international status can thus be 
seen as a consequence of the author's realization of the impossibility of 
reconciliation within the Peloponnese so long as the present stalemate 
remained, but it is also an attempt to provide an alternative to the 
approach which had been employed, since Sparta's power had been 
curtailed, of Sparta's enemies looking for support from a powerful outside 
state. Isokrates should be seen as sympathizing with the men at Athens 
who supported the Athenian alliance with Sparta; he would have preferred 
to see a re-establishment in the Peloponnese of the old power-structure 
dominated by Sparta and x r^gos, than to risk the unpredictable 
consequences of a power-vacuum in which either Thebes or, more likely 
nowT, Philip could operate.
Isokrates adduces a further proof and two other arguments to 
persuade Philip that he can, and should, act to accomplish this reconciliation 
among the Greek states; the proof is that lesser men than Philip 
(specifically, Alkibiades, Konon, Dionysios I of Syrakuse, and Kyros the 
Great) have acted and have achieved their ambitions, despite being either 
constricted by inferior qualifications or confronted by more difficult 
circumstances at the outset; Philip, blessed with such distinguished 
ancestry and already king of Makedon and ruler of so many people, should 
have comparatively little difficulty in effecting Isokrates' advice (5 57-67);
1 Argos and Sparta had agreed to a 30-year truce in 451 or 450, and had abided 
by this, Argos remaining neutral during the first part of the Peloponnesian Var (see 
Thuc. 5-14.4; 282 ) .
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the other arguments in favour of Philip's acceptance of this challenge are, 
first, that 'history' reveals benefactions performed in favour of the 
Makedonian royal house by each of the four major Greek states, and these 
now justify benefactions in return, despite the fact that relationships 
between these states and Makedon may have become rather less cordial in 
more recent times (5 -3 2 -3?); second, there is the need, as Isokrates would 
argue, that Philip should dispel the rumours, which are circulating among 
the Greeks, that he is building up his forces in order to conquer the Greeks, 
by siding with some and using force against the others; such a plan of 
action might be expected, might even be considered worthy of respect, 
from the Great King, but it is hardly an honourable policy for one who 
claims to be descended from Herakles, the famed benefactor of the Greeks 
(5-72-60). These arguments were designed to flatter Philip, but they were 
also, presumably, meant to persuade. Can the advice be taken seriously?
It would be hard to dispute Isokrates' assessment that the major 
Greek states were at this time in a considerably weakened condition. No 
less accurate is his understanding of the essentially selfish nature of the 
policies of those states, with the assumption that any of them would be 
likely to attempt again to exert its dominance the moment that its 
circumstances changed for the better; that had been the more recent 
history of the struggles of Athens, Sparta and Thebes, each having 
attempted to assert her authority during Isokrates' own lifetime; the result 
had been a succession, almost continuous, of largely inconclusive inter-state 
wars. Isokrates' perception of the Peace of Philokrates, which Athens had 
just concluded with Philip, was much the same as his attitude had been 
toward the peace which marked the end of the Social War; that attitude of 
scepticism which had decided him to write On the Peace now impelled him 
to the considerations which had led to the composition of Philippos (cf. 5-6- 
9).
In one sense those who disparage Isokrates' call for reconciliation 
among the Greek states would appear to do so justifiably: for, even though 
Isokrates' general assessment of the weakness of each of these major'
Greek states in 346 appears to be sound, there is no reason to believe that 
these states were in a mood of themselves to seek an effective 
reconciliation of their various differences and thus to live at peace with one 
another. However, Isokrates is not arguing that the Greeks can achieve a 
reconciliation of thoir own accord: quite the contrary. He argues that Philip
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the problem and the danger lay in the fact that Philip, in 346, was
displaying all too much interest in participating in Greek affairs and that 
the methods which seemed likely to be used would result in a disturbingly 
dominant position for the Makedonian king within the Greek world, a 
position which would threaten, or at least leave as a question, the 
independence of the Greek states and would afford little room for Athenian 
influence.
The fact of the matter was that in the recent past Philip had begun to 
display a disconcerting interest in the affairs of the Greek states. It was 
common knowledge that he was coming south at this very time in response 
to the appeal of the Thebans and his Thessalian friends to settle the long- 
running war against the Phokians (see 5- 55- “now they [the Thebans] rest 
upon you the hopes of their own deliverance"). Rumour was also rife 
concerning Philip's alleged plan, after the Sacred War was resolved, to go to 
the assistance of the Messenians, aided by all those who wished to see the 
Spartans utterly overcome; having driven the Spartans from their house 
and home, it would then be an easy matter to overpower the rest of the 
Greeks ( 5 .74 ). Already in 346 Philip had sought to woo some of the 
Arkadian leaders (Dem. 19. 10- 11, 303 - 306; cf. Aischin. 2 .79 ). Isokrates 
stresses that he does not believe these rumours and portrays those who 
give voice to them as men who are envious of Philip rather than his friends: 
for such rumours, Isokrates assures Philip, will not. enhance, but will 
damage, his reputation (5 73 - 60 ). Selective alliances and forceful 
intervention are not. the means by which Isokrates envisages Philip playing 
a part, in Greek affairs. His objective was to recommend a means by which 
Philip's authority could be employed in order to effect a reconciliation, 
while at the same time avoiding the infringement, of that independence 
much-cherished by Greek states.
Isokrates is emphatic that Philip's method in dealing with the Greeks 
must be diplomatic. From the moment when the dual-advice is first, 
announced the point is made that persuasion is the appropriate method for 
dealing with the Greeks, whereas with the barbarians force should be used 
(5.16; cf. 5-66); both the method of treating the Greeks as a benefactor and
thA rliQtinrtinn hAtwAAn thA w av in whirh ftrAAVc; an<i barbarians QbAnlrt hAV VTAV V V» V Ihr V V I I V V AA Vtt* V ( ■ M * AXA I I A A A  VA* V A V V Akw UaA -JT *W MA AS ‘UkA AMAAW WAA %S kAA *W V
dealt with are repeated throughout the work: of the former Isokrates says 
"throughout my discourse I am trying to incline you to a policy of 
benefactions towards the Greeks and of gentleness and humanity" (5.116); 
force is not a desirable method for dealing with the Greeks (5.66): for 
they, unlike others peoples, are not accustomed to subservience to a
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monarch, a point which Philip's father, Amyntas II, and Perdikkas I, 
founder of the dynasty, are said to have recognized (5-106-107).
The claim of the Makedonian royal house to trace its descent back to 
Herakles is a prominent theme throughout Philippos: this offers the chance 
not only to flatter Philip, but also, and perhaps more importantly, to stress 
the popularity of Herakles among the Greeks and the assertion that this 
popularity had arisen from Herakles' role as a benefactor to the Greeks; so 
the point is made that, although many have praised Herakles for his 
valorous deeds, the crucial thing is "that i t  was more by his wisdom, his 
lofty ambition, and his justice than by his strength of body that your 
ancestor surpassed all who lived before his day" (5-110); Herakles is even 
invoked as providing the mythological precedent for the course of action 
which Isokrates recommends, namely the reconciliation of the Greeks and 
after that an expedition against the barbarians of Asia (5.111-112). The 
distinction between methods appropriate for the treatment of Greeks and 
barbarians is designed to lead to a policy which w ill earn the trust of the 
Greeks, but which w ill inspire fear in the barbarians (5 60). The separate 
methods of approach are summed up at the very end of the work: "I say 
that you should behave as a benefactor towards the Greeks, you should be 
a king to the Makedonians, and you should rule over as many of the 
barbarians as possible" (5-154). Philip is to be to the Greeks a bringer of 
reconciliation, but his role is recommended to be that of a benefactor, 
whose airn in this is the acquisition of glory not power (on this last point 
see the highly rhetorical commendation of honour and glory against wealth 
and powTer at 5-133-136)-
The case has been put to show that reconciliation was timely and 
possible for the Greek states, although it  would need strong outside 
persuasion for it  to be accomplished. The role which Philip is to play has 
been made clear. Another question arises: what form should the 
reconciliation take? Here Isokrates is less than specific, except for 
venturing that Philip should announce his intention to engage in a 
campaign against the Persians (5.56, 66ff). But how, then, were the Greeks 
to make manifest their support for this? There are, I would submit, 
indications of what he had in mind. When he refers to the jealous rumour - 
mongers, who accuse Philip of planning to conquer and rule Greece, he 
portrays them as eager for turmoil within their own cities and opposed to a 
peace which is shared by others: 5-7 3 Se n6xei$ wujw tiSioiieva»' ei$
Tapaxo^  raöiaravcn, red ifjv eipfjvr)v rfjv ro% aXXoic roivf|V noXe^ov tg% avTcay (Sio\£ tlvoa 
voii^ovTcw. Isokrates is referring here to those Athenian demagogues who
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were ardent for war .1 The phrase rfjv toi$ aXXov; Kovvrjv “which is shared by 
the rest [of the citizens]“ is meant to balance and contrast with ro% ayi-uv 
(Siovs, and presumably refers in particular to the rest of the Athenians, 
although the whole passage is couched more generally, referring to “cities“ 
and not to Athens in particular, and so there could be a wider idea of a 
peace which was shared by all except those self-seeking politicians who 
found more self-interest in a state of war. The use of row) here, to express 
the idea that peace was something which was of interest and advantage to 
all but corrupt and rapacious politicians, is an unusual choice of word. Not 
much later in the work Isocrates uses the same adjective of Philip himself, 
when he advises the king to avoid a policy of partiality towards some Greek 
states and instead to show himself to be "common to all" (5-30: [ffv eecXifanc] 
kmvos 'xnacn [yeveo8ai]). These two uses of the adjective *mvo$ could not be 
regarded as implying a technical usage tantamount to the expression kowt\ 
eipTjvri which occurs in a number of passages of Diodoros in reference to 
fourth-century peace-treaties, and also, rarely, in fourth-century authors 
and in one inscription;2 nevertheless, the concept of a Common Peace was 
not foreign to Isokrates' thought; 3 nor, if such a solution was what he had
1 The antithesis of "peace" and "war", and the criticism of the Athenian dema­
gogues is repeated, most interestingly, in a letter of protest from Philip to the Athen­
ians a few years later (340); there the point of Isokrates’ criticism is clearly spelt out: 
[Dem ] 12.19 yap ol ttj$ noXvrela^ t%  nap’ ?jpiv ejmeipoi irjv pev etptjvTiv noXepov ay- 
toi£ ttvca, Tov 5e noXepov eipfjvr|v x\ yap ayvayouvt^opevoy^ to% arpaTTjyoi£ ff avioo^tp- 
mvvm; aei n  Xappdveiv nap’ ovtwv, e n  Se row ttoXu w  to% yvapipaaäToi^ taxi tw  e^ GUÖev 
rou; fvSo^ otixtoic XoiSopoupevoys eni rot) pnp.aros uepmoifia8ai napd roy TTXrj8oy$ So§ocv 
eioi Srporaol; if the letter is really from the hand of Philip, or approved by him, then 
the reference to "those who are experienced in your [the Athenians']government” 
surely refers to Isokrates and to this passage of Philippos (see Blass, AB, II“, p.317).
M. Pohlens, "Philipps Schreiben an Athen". Hermes 64 (1929), 4Iff. and f  .R. 
¥üst, Philipp II von Makedonien und Griechenland 346-336 (Munich 1938), pp.l33ff. 
have argued that the Letter is, or represents in essence, the Note which Philip sent to 
Athens in 340; P. ¥endland, Anaximenes von Lampsakos (1907), pp,13ff. argued that, 
like the reply’ ([Dem. ] 11), it was the work of Anaximenes. These works have not 
been available to me, but are reported in a recent discussion, with further 
bibliography on the question, by Griffith (HM, II, pp. 714-716): Griffith is cautious in 
his judgement, but on balance seems to incline to Pohlenz* view.
2See Ryder, KE, pp jci-xiii (the solitary inscription in which it is confirmed is 
Tod, GHI, II. 145,11.5-6: the other two inscriptional examples cited by Ryder are in fact 
both conjectures). Ryder's observation (ibid, pxiv) that the technical phrase does not 
occur in any of the works of Xenophon, Isokrates or Demosthenes is not challenged by 
these passages in Philippos. However, the word '*mv6$' does occur in  Isokrates in 
contexts concerned with such a Peace (see 4.176,177; 8.20).
3He had favoured such a Peace in  On the Peace (8.16: see above, pp. 168,171).
in mind for the form of his reconciliation, was he alone in his thinking at 
this time.
In the course of events which had led up to the Peace of Philokrates 
the Allied synedrion had met at Athens to discuss the proposal for peace 
and an alliance which the first Athenian embassy had brought back from 
Philip; the response from this meeting had been that Philip's offer of 
alliance should be ignored and the agreement confined to a peace; 
moreover, it was proposed that this peace should not be restricted to Philip 
and his allies and to Athens and her allies, but it should invite any others of 
the Greeks who wished to subscribe to the peace to do so within three 
months; the peace should be a defensive agreement which would allow 
others to come to the aid of a member in need, if the agreement were to be 
broken (see Aischin. 3.69-70). This proposal amounted to nothing less than 
a Common Peace.1 At the first day's discussion in the Athenian assembly 
(on 16 Elaphebolion) the recommendation won considerable favour, not 
least among some of those who had served on the embassy to Philip, 
including Aischines himself (3.71); this optimistic attitude wTas effectively 
quashed in the following day's debate by Athenians who better understood 
what Philip would and would not accept, and, it appears, by the statements 
of Antipater, leader of the Makedonian mission which had come to Athens 
(Aischin. 3 72). The point remains that a Common Peace had been mooted 
in the xA.thenian assembly in April 3^6, and that it had found public support 
among Athenians and their allies.
Could Isokrates have been thinking of a Common Peace as the form 
for a general reconciliation among the Greeks? He must have witnessed, or 
at least heard first-hand report of), that meeting of the Assembly on 16 
Elaphebolion, just as he must have appreciated that such an agreement was 
unacceptable to Philip. Certainly he is by no means as explicit about the 
form of the reconciliation which he was commending Philip to accomplish 
as he had been when he advised the Athenians in On the Peace to- sponsor a 
Common Peace. Lack of clarity might be explained by deliberate intent to 
avoid pushing at Philip a course of agreement which the king had very 
recently rejected. This tactful imprecision is itself an indication that 
Isokrates looked for a serious hearing from Philip for his observations and 
proposals.
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^or acceptance that a Common Peace -^as here intended see Cavk^ll, 
"Aeschines and the Peace of Philocrates", pp .434-435 (= Perlman, Philip and Athens, 
pp .86-87), Ryder, KE, p.96f., & Griffith, HM, II, p. 340.
There were two basic elements of a Common Peace: the one that the 
peace should be open for all Greeks to join, the other that the freedom and 
autonomy of every Greek city or state be acknowledged.1 The first of these 
essential elements is recognized clearly enough in Philippos: the initial 
mutual reconciliation of the four major states is to be merely the necessary 
prerequisite to a widespread reconciliation among the Greeks (5-30-30.
The other essential was trickier. At the negotiations which preceded the 
Peace of Philokrates it had been made plain that Philip was not amenable 
to a peace which would prevent him from laying hands on Halos or 
resolving the war against the Phokians in whatever way he chose; these 
two states were not to be allowed to escape through becoming signatories 
of any peace. Then, too, with a Common Peace there might be the question 
whether states would be entitled either to lay claim to their own territories 
or to what they held;2 Philip would have a very definite opinion about any 
such clause. The issue of entitlements which would have to be resolved in 
making a common peace would be better left, unspoken; yet, such a 
problem seems still to have been in Isokrates’ mind, and to have left a 
legacy in his address. For, at the start Isokrates says that he had been 
composing another work to be directed toPhilip in which he was aiming to 
address the question of Amphipolis and Athens' claim to that city, which he 
believes to have been the root-cause of the dispute between Philip and the 
x^thenians in the north. Since x^thens’ agreement to the Peace of 
Philokrates tacitly acknowledged the relinquishment of her long-held claim 
to Amphipolis, it is surprising that Isokrates should have begun Philippos 
by summarizing the argument which he had developed before the Peaces 
he had intended to advise that Philip should voluntarily cede to Athens 
control of x^mphipolis and that in return Athens should in future look to 
more appropriate places in which to establish colonies; for Philip any loss 
of revenue would be more than compensated by having earned the 
friendship of Athens, and, in any case, Philip would not have to rely simply 
on Athenian good-will, since the Athenians would send out colonists whom
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^ ee Ryder, KE, pp.xvi & 118f.
2for the rvo possibilities in earlier Common Peaces see Ryder, KE, p.84f.
^Kennedy (Art of Persuasion, pp.199-200) sees this introduction as reflective of 
the general rhetorical, not deliberative, purpose of the speech: "It is doubtful 
whether this [introduction ] ’vould have much effect on Philip, vhereas it ,vas of 
consuming interest to Isokrates and to his pupils, vho ,vere intended to regard the 
speech as a model of hoT7 to address a king." (p.199).
Philip could then regard unofficially as hostages for Athenian good conduct 
in their relations with him. As an example of such a utilitarian friendship 
Isokrates recalls the Thrakian king Amadokos the elder and the Athenian 
settlers of the Chersonese (5.2-6).1
Isokrates' purpose in opening his discourse in this way is revealed 
when he congratulates Philip and Athens on having anticipated him by 
making peace, but he goes on to express his concern that this Peace has not 
truly resolved underlying issues, and may be no more than a matter of 
buying time (5-7-9). The introduction of the apparently resolved issue of 
x^thens' claim to xAmphipolis is thus intended as a warning to Philip that the 
Peace, as it stands, may be no more than a truce. Whether Athens could 
seriously have expected under a Common Peace to have her claim to 
Amphipolis recognized is questionable,2 and it is unlikely she could have 
sent Athenian settlers there without contravening the terms of such a 
Peace; but it is interesting that Isokrates should still want to try to argue 
to Philip that he could actually derive advantage if he were to concede the 
Athenians' right, to the control of Amphipolis. Isokrates' argument has a 
double-edge: it says that, if Philip were to accede to Athens’ right to 
Amphipolis, he would gain more than he does at present by holding it 
himself; on the other hand, it warns the Athenians that, if they were to 
regain the town and send Athenians there to settle, they would place those 
citizens in the position of being virtual hostages to the Makedonian king 
and would therefore guarantee future good relations between Axthens and 
Makedon. Implicitly, then, in the event of a more secure Peace (a Common 
Peace?), along the lines that the Athenians had tried unsuccessfully to 
negotiate with Philip, advantages could be described for the Makedonian 
king if Amphipolis were recognized as under Athens' authority, while the 
Athenians are warned of a potential hazard in using Amphipolis as a colony 
within the reach of a powerful Makedon (as is diplomatically suggested, 
xAthens would be well-advised to seek opportunities for colonization in less
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^ his Thrakian ruler, otherwise knovn as Medokos or Amedokos, vas induced 
to become a friend and ally of Athens in 389 by Thrasyboulos (see Xen. 4.8.26); his 
successor, Hebryzelmis and, after the death of Kotys, his oim son Amadokos II, also 
maintained friendly relationships ’frith the Athenians, until the latter (in 347/6) 
allied himself ’frith Philip against Kersobleptes (see Tod, GHI. 11.117,151); cf. Eeloch, 
&G, 1112.2.86).
Certainly the Athenians negotiated in 367 ’frith a v iev  to achieving 
recognition in a Common Peace of their right to Amphipolis (and probably also to the 
Chersonese), and under diplomatic pressure the King agreed to acknowledge this (see 
Ryder, KE, pp. 80-81).
contentious, and less dangerous, places: such a plan would not infringe a 
Common Peace, as the territories concerned would be those of barbarians, 
who are said to be accustomed to subjection [5.5]).
If Common Peace was the envisaged method for reconciliation, there 
is one possible aspect of such a solution which is notably avoided. While 
Philip is urged to adopt the role of benefactor towards the Greeks, no 
mention is made of any possibility that he should be seen as the 'hegemon* 
of the Greeks.1 The silence on this point in Philippos contrasts with the 
open recommendation of that role and title for Athens and Sparta in 
Panegyrikos and for Athens alone in On the Peace (see above, pp. 37- 
43,157f.).2 The word Tiyejjtcov (or its cognate forms) is not used in Philippos 
in association with the recommendations concerning Philip's relations with 
the Greeks; even more noticeably the verb-form is only once used in 
connection with Philip's proposed leadership of a campaign against the 
Persians (5-97). However, the identification of an hegemon was not 
essential to a Common Peace. The Common Peace which wTas established 
after the battle of Mantineia (362), unlike earlier such Peaces, does not 
appear to have been sponsored or guaranteed by any Greek state, or 
outside power (i.e. Persia), which claimed hegemony and pressed for the 
Peace;3 instead, it arose from the self-interest created by the general 
condition of exhaustion vrtiich was felt among the Greek states (Sparta 
excepted) after that battle (see D.S. 15-69.1).
A brief editorial passage (5.61-62) serves as a transition between the 
two principal themes of the discourse; in this Isokrates apologizes to Philip 
for giving advice when he is neither a general nor a politician nor a holder 
of any other position of power or authority, claiming instead general 
intelligence and a good education as the basis upon which he uses his 
natural capacities to proffer advice in his writings to the Athenians, to the 
Greeks, and to "the most distinguished among men" (5 62: la d iw  avSpoiw to%
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*See U. Yilcken, "Philipp II u. <3. panh. Idee", p. 312 (= Perlman, Philip and 
Athens, p.202); cf. Perlman, "Reinterpretation", p.314 (= Philip and Athens, p.112).
2&rote, HG, IX. pp .422-423, nevertheless thinks that Isokrates regarded Philip 
as hegemon; also Bury & Meiggs, HG, p.431f. Laistner, HGV, p 248 is more accurate, 
although he too vievs Isokrates as a man of panhellenic vision.
3See Ryder, KE, p.84.
evSo^ omTois).1 The latter half of the work is concerned with the proposal for 
a Makedonian campaign against the Persians.
An announcement of his intention to lead a campaign to Asia is the 
method by which Philip is advised to encourage harmony (homonoia) 
among the Greeks (see 5-141) and good-will (eunoia) on their part towards 
the Makedonian king (see 5-95; cf. 5-66). However, the actual launching of 
the campaign is said to be contingent upon the response of the Greeks:
Philip must not act until the Greeks are either sharing in the campaign or 
exhibiting much good-will to the undertaking (5$6).2 *This only makes 
plain what Philip would have perceived for himself: that he could not safely 
turn to Asia while there was a danger that some among the Greek states 
might challenge Makedon’s security or interests in Europe; but there could 
be a more subtle reason for emphasizing this precondition: it offered an 
explicit inducement to those Greeks who wished Philip to be diverted from 
intruding in Greek affairs to understand that an agreement to achieve a 
reconciliation among themselves would be a prerequisite before Philip 
could be expected to depart eastward.
Despite the views of some historians,3 Isokrates did not consider it 
necessary or inevitable that the Greeks would elect to join Philip in the 
proposed adventure. As has just been seen, Philip is advised to undertake 
the expedition so long as the Greeks are sympathetic to it. Certainly 
Isokrates believes that Philip will find a plentiful supply of Greek soldiers 
(far more readily available than Kyros and Klearchos had found at the 
beginning of the century), but they will be mercenaries, not citizen levies 
(5 95-96). Nevertheless, it is equally clear that, if reconciliation is achieved, 
Isokrates expects that at least some of the Greeks may actually decide to 
participate rather than merely endorse the venture.4 Greek military
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ifor Philip as tic roiv evSo^ OTtxTOJV see above, p. 261.
2Cf. 5-83: "But as to the expedition against Asia, we shall urge upon the cities 
which I have called upon you to reconcile that it is their duty to go to war with the 
barbarians, only wrhen we see that they have ceased from discord."
*H. Bengston (Griechische Geschichte.4th ed. [Munich 19691 p.319) says that 
Philip was advised by Isokrates to lead the Greeks against Asia; c f . also Grote, HG, IX, 
p.422; Pickard-Cambridge, Demosthenes, p.290; ¥ilcken, "Philipp II u. d. panh. Idee", 
pp .296-297 (= Perlman, Philip and Athens, pp. 186-187); Markle, Support of Athenian 
Intellectuals", pp .80-81.
4See 5-86; cf. 5123, where Philip is exhorted to set his own sights on the 
liberation of the Greeks in Asia as a minimum goal, and to encourage the Greeks 
themselves to pursue the same purpose; also at 5115 the campaign is commended
participation in the fulfilment of the plan to attack the Persians would seem 
desirable in Isokrates' eyes, but it is not regarded as necessary for the 
implementation of the project. There is, however, one interpretation which 
considers Athenian military involvement as being particularly 
recommended.
Perlman argues that a very particular role is envisaged for Athens: 
namely, that "Athens should be Philip's partner in Greece and her naval 
power should complement his land army".1 This conclusion is based upon 
two passages: the first is the paragraph in which Isokrates notes that 
Athens is ahead of the other three major city-states in that the Athenians 
have already agreed to a peace with Philip; however, it is suggested that 
even more committed support for Philip might be expected from the 
Athenians: so, vuv 5' ayTtjv o'fym rat övvayojyidööca toi$ vtto öqv npaiTopivoi^, aXXa^  re 
rav SvvT|8xj cjyviSeiv oti raSra Sioirak rrpo 1% eni tov ßdpßapov crrpareias (5-5&)- 
Perlman takes <rovayoü&neiö8oa to imply that Athens would use her naval 
power to Philip's advantage; he also takes the prefix to indicate that 
Isokrates is signalling the possibility that Athens will become the king's 
ally.2 3This view is mistaken on two counts: first, the Peace of Philokrates 
was both a peace and an alliance, as was made plain by Demosthenes in the 
Assembly on 19 Elaphebolion (Dem.19.40; Aischin. 2 .51 3 72);3 second, it is 
clear that to% utto ao?) n parr ope voi$ and the following roDra, which are what 
Isokrates predicts Athens would give her support to, refer to the
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because it Tsill result in Philip “making expeditions, not vdth the barbarians against 
men v/ho have given (you) no just cause, but vdth the Hellenes against those upon 
whom it is fitting that the descendant of Herakles should make var.” (hovever, in this 
passage, vhere rhetorical antithesis is important in the use of the phrase perd iw  
'EXÄTjvajv, it is not certain vhether “vith the Hellenes“ is synonymous for ‘Vith the 
city-states").
Perlman, "Reinterpretation", p.311 (= Philip and Athens, p.109).
2Ibid.; also "Reinterpretation“, p.31? (= Philip and Athens, p.115) for the notion 
that Athens v/as not by the Peace of Philokrates an ally of Philip.
3Cf. Griffith. HM, II. p. 341. The alliance posed a quandary for the Athenians, 
as this put them in a potential dilemma should Philip attack the Phokians, v-ith vhom 
the Athenians vere already allied (since 356: see Aischin. 3113; Dem. 19.61; D. S. 
1627.5, cf. Paus. 3-10.3: Bengston, Staatsverträge, Ho. 310); hovever, after some 
wvering, Realpolitik prevailed in the Athenian Assembly; Isokrates' silence on the 
issue of Phokis is perhaps a tacit acknowledgment of Athenian embarrassment over 
the matter. That Isokrates does not attempt to promote the optimistic interpretations 
of Philip's intentions with regard to the Phokians, vhich Trere bruited in the 
Assembly by Aischines and others (see Dem. 19.321), is a clue vhich suggests that 
Isokrates ^^ as not a 'Philippizer', nor seeking to convince an Athenian audience of the 
honour of Philip's intentions.
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reconciliation of the Greeks, not to a campaign against Persia; the verb 
ca>vay(i»'\e\G0ca does not have to have an implication of literal physical 
participation, but can be used, as here, more generally to denote taking up 
someone else’s cause;1 it certainly cannot be Isokrates’ intention to suggest 
that Athens would use her military strength to assist Philip in effecting a 
reconciliation among the Greeks: such a method of producing a 
reconciliation is discounted by Isokrates, even for Philip.
The second passage used by Perlman in support of his argument 
concerning Athens’ role is that in which examples are adduced to prove to 
Philip that even lesser men have achieved more difficult ambitions.
Perlman concentrates upon the examples afforded by Alkibiades and 
Konon. He is troubled by what he perceives to be an apparent lack of 
relevance between the exploits and accomplishments of these two 
Athenians and the conciliatory task which Isokrates sets in front of Philip; 
he searches for a common denominator and finds this in "dominion of the 
sea".2 I believe Perlman has been misled by the fact that the first two of 
the four examples involve Athenians (the others being Dionysios I and 
Kyros); his emphasis upon naval-inspired disaster for Sparta as a result of 
accepting Alkibiades’ advice and upon Athenian renascence in the 390s as a 
result of Konon’s successes loses sight altogether of the other two examples, 
neither of whom were noted for achievements or failures due to naval
*Cf. Dem. 18.25. By comparison, when Isokrates speaks of the Greeks rf 
oyvayowtfopevoyc rj noXXfjv gyvoiav exovra£ tov? nparropevois (5.86), an active military 
co-operation is meant. Perlman's comparison ("Reinterpretation", p.311, n.35 = Philip 
and Athens, p.109, n.35) of Isok. Ep. 2.17, where the verb is again used, neither implies 
that Athens is not an ally of Philip, nor that any literal joint military action is being 
suggested; the situation envisaged is either of an Athens wtiich is demonstrating 
open support for Philip or of an Athens which at least shows herself favourably 
disposed to his policy (oy yap povov auvaycuvi^opevri yiyvovr’ av a v r i a  aoi ttoXXü3v ayaödjv, 
dXXa icai 4>iXik% exeiv Soicoyoa povov): the consequence for Philip would be that he 
could more easily keep under control those who are presently under his influence  
(the Letter is dated to either 344 or 342: see below, p. 281, n . l ), as they would not find 
in Athens a haven of refuge against Philip, and he would more quickly overthrow  
whichever barbarians he wished (Ep. 2.17-18); the point here is that a friendly 
Athens will not give Philip's enemies an alternative: Isokrates is warning Philip that 
Athens is a potentially powerful force in Greece (cf. Ep. 2.20), though not, of course, 
as strong as Philip himself, but he is surely not advising Philip that Athens could be 
expected to assist him in exercising any kind of military control over the Greeks; that 
would be entirely contrary to the message about how to manage the Greeks which he 
gives in Philippos.
^Perlman, "Reinterpretation", p.312 (= Philip and Athens, p.110).
power.1 The point of the four examples lies more obviously in the parallels 
of the achievements of the men rather than in the methods by which they 
attained their ambitions. What is common in the examples is that each man 
succeeded in producing a significant change in the course of events: 
Alkibiades not only managed to bring about his own recall to Athens, but 
he reversed the balance in the war between Athens and Sparta, and by his 
advice to the Spartans wrought the eventual collapse of their attempt at 
empire; Konon, by his naval victories, restored the power of x^thens; 
Dionysios and Kyros were both able to reverse their personal fortunes, so as 
to achieve from unprepossessing origins exceptional power and influence. 
Isokrates' point is simply as he says at 5-67: that. Philip may well expect in 
the admittedly daunting task of reconciling the Greeks to surpass the 
achievements of men who started with for graver disadvantages or from a 
more intractable state of public affairs.
Isokrates might hope that Athens would readily lend assistance and 
public support to diplomatic efforts by Philip which were aimed at 
achieving harmony among the Greeks, but he does not push any claim for 
an /Athenian participation in a joint hegemony against Asia, nor does he 
even make special mention of xWienian participation in the proposed 
venture to x^ sia. In fact, in the course of addressing the question of an 
expedition to Asia, he states that he has abandoned the effort of trying to 
persuade the xAxthenians of the merit of such an enterprise; they prefer, he 
says, to be guided by the ranters in the assembly (5-129). Isokrates 
appears to have hoped that the Greeks would recognize the advantages to 
be gained from joining Philip in Asia, but his failure to use this as an 
encouragement to Philip to pursue the plan suggests that he was not 
sanguine about such active co-operation. Still less are we entitled to 
deduce from his cautious optimism that Athens might increase her 
commitment to her new relationship with Philip and openly side with the 
king in encouraging a reconciliation among the Greek states; nor do the 
illustrative examples of the careers of Alkibiades and Konon indicate that. 
Isokrates was advocating to Philip some kind of power-sharing 
arrangement between the king and Athens. Isokrates no more envisages a 
joint-hegemony in Greece, involving Philip and Athens, than he conceives of 
Philip as sole hegemon of the Greeks. The remarkable and indicative fact is
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Perlman says ("Reinterpretation", p.312, n.38 = Philip and Athens, p.l 10, n.38) 
that naval poorer was regarded as essential for hegemony in Greece, but we must not 
forget that Isokrates is not recommending that Philip should claim hegemony in 
Greece (see above, p. 272).
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that I sokrates says nothing to Philip about Athenian naval power; he does 
not even make suggestive reminders about Athens' glorious naval history 
(especially Salamis): such neglect would be surprising were I sokrates 
wishing to promote a co-operative venture.
I sokrates' proposal that Philip should commit himself to a campaign 
against the Persian kingdom emerges from his belief that such an 
announcement by the Makedonian king would be instrumental in 
promoting a reconciliation and consequent state of harmony among the 
Greek city-states. What had Philip to gain from such a venture, apart from 
the gratitude of those Greeks who looked to such a resolution of the unease 
and unrest in Greece?
It is alleged that those who have previously engaged in a war against 
the Persians have become “illustrious“ (Xaimpoi), "wealthy“ ( ttXo w i o O  and 
"lords of much territory and many cities" ( ttoX X %  rai ttoXc w  Seonorca): 
they have gained distinction, wealth and power (5.69). The prospects for 
Philip are said to be very much brighter even than those who succeeded' 
before him; comparison with the Ten Thousand, led by the Great King's 
brother Kyros and the Spartan Klearchos (in 401-400), shows Philip to 
possess a host of advantages over these predecessors: Kyros' expedition 
revealed both the weakness of the King's forces and the perfidious nature 
of the Persian monarch; Philip can command forces larger and superior to 
those available to Kyros (5 90-92, 96); while Philip outstrips Klearchos as a 
military leader, his opponent, the present Persian king (Artaxerxes III), is a 
less formidable foe even than his father (Artaxerxes II), who had shown 
himself to so little credit against Kyros and Klearchos: many Persian 
subjects only await a champion for their cause of freedom (5-97-104); 
unlike the time of Klearchos' campaign, when the Greeks of Asia feared 
Spartan dekarchies more than they did the rule of the Persian king, the 
present Greeks in Asia will readily support Philip as their liberator (5 95 ) -
However, there is a more compelling advantage which I sokrates 
wishes to bring before Philip's attention; the major reason which is offered 
to appeal to Philip is the prospect of glory; I sokrates perceives Philip as 
ambitious for a fame which will excel that of other mortals, and will carry 
him to the verge of divine status (5.116-116, 141-142). In pursuing this 
ambition Philip will be maintaining the tradition of his ancestors, in 
particular his divine ancestor Herakles, who set an example of effecting a 
reconciliation among the Greeks and of then showing them that the proper 
objective against which they should direct their energies was the 
barbarians of Asia (5.106-115). This glory is to be acquired through the
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recognition of the Greeks, who will be offered by Philip’s conquests the 
practical advantages of land in Asia and security and peace in Europe, but 
who will also acknowledge that Philip has taken his place in their history as 
one who has put the Persians in their proper place (of subordination to 
Greeks) and who has exacted vengeance for the invasion of mainland 
Greece by the Persians (5-120-124).
The connection with Herakles is a principal theme in this part of the 
Philippos. Although Isokrates stops short of saying that Philip himself 
might achieve a status on a par with the divine Herakles (see 5.114), he 
remarks that Philip's unique freedom as an autocratic ruler gives him the 
means to regard all Greece as his homeland, in contrast to other 
descendants of Herakles who live among the city-states and owe a more 
limited allegiance to their state: thereby he is the natural choice to lead a 
campaign against Asia (5.127). It is a disgrace that the barbarians in Asia 
should live in prosperity while Greeks live in straightened circumstances, 
and it is even more shameful that the king of Persia should be addressed 
wTith the honorific title "Great”, while the descendants of the divine 
Herakles are addressed by more humble names (5.132)- Isokrates repeats 
that wealth and power are not of themselves sufficient inducement for a 
man such as Philip to undertake this project; the most important attraction 
is urged to be "surpassing and most fair renown" (5-134: peyiorTiv... mi 
K;aXXicm-|v... So£av; cf. 5-145); this, with the assistance of good-will, praise, 
good-report, and memory, will survive even death and is the means by 
which one may achieve immortality (5-134-136); he then sums up his 
argument thus:
You will best resolve upon this question [whether to undertake the expedition ] if  
you feel that you are summoned to this task, not by my words only, but by your 
f orefathers, by the cowardice of the Persians, and by all who have won great 
fame and attained the rank of demigods because of their campaigns against the 
barbarians, and, most of all, by the present opportunity, which finds you in the 
possession of greater power than has any of those who dwell in Europe, and finds 
him against w'hom you are to make war more cordially hated and despised by the 
world at large than was ever any king before him. (5-137)
Philip is advised to be both statesman, working for all the Greeks through 
his benefactions, and as general, overwhelming the barbarians by his 
military leadership (5.140); thus, the two themes and plans are linked 
together again as the work closes.
Isokrates reminds Philip that he has been moved to write this work 
by a two-fold desire, which he attributes to a divine power: this divine
force is said to be anxious to see Greece freed from its current ills and to 
confer upon Philip much greater glory than he possesses at present (5-149). 
It is suggested that both adviser and advised are part of a divine purpose: 
for Isokrates claims to recognize in Philip's achievements to date indication, 
due to their magnitude, of divine favour; he then ventures to declare that 
such divine influence could never have intended that Philip should confine 
his mission to conquer barbarians to those in Europe alone; his campaigns 
so far must properly be seen as the prologue to the main act which is to be 
played on the stage of Asia (5-151-152).
These are the arguments in favour of Philip undertaking an 
expedition against. Persia. Isokrates is thus advising Philip upon a course of 
action which is quite different to that which he had taken so far in his 
dealings with the Greeks and to that which it would appear likely that he 
was going to take in the immediate future. Was there any reason to believe 
that Philip would respond favourably to this appeal? How would this 
lengthy address have been received at the Makedonian court?
Opinion ranges: one scholar has declared that the plan "can only 
have evoked ridicule" at Pella.1 Blass believed that Philip received it with 
approval, pointing to the reflection of the thought at 5-7.3 in Philip's Letter 
to Athens in 342 ([Dem.] 12.19);2 Kessler claimed that Philip would have 
received with joy the invitation by the famous rhetor and publicist to unite 
Greece and to take the lead against the barbarian.5 Was Philip in summer 
346 in the mood to consider the promotion of a reconciliation of the Greek 
states and was he ready to entertain the idea of leading an army against 
the Persians?
Markle's answer to the first of these questions is that the plan for the 
reconciliation of the Greek states was impractical and that. Philip would 
have had no intention of being diverted from his plan to bring Greece 
under his control; Markle further believes that Isokrates could not have 
failed to appreciate these facts, and so he explains the speech as an 
elaborate work of propaganda addressed to Philip, but in reality aimed at 
the Athenians and the other Greeks, with the purpose of disguising Philip's
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*P.A. Brunt, “The Aims of Alexander", G&R 12 (1965), 207; cf. also Vilcken, 
“Philipp II u. d. panh. Idee“, pp.296-297 (= Perlman, Philip and Athens, pp.186-187): 
¥ilcken regarded Isokrates as naive for believing that Philip ’would undertake a war 
in Asia in order to fulfil a list of benefits for the Greeks.
2Blass, AB, II2, p. 317; cf. above, p. 268, n.l.
^Kessler, Isokrates u. d. panh. Idee, p.62.
true intentions towards them, while signalling to Philip that he recognized 
that force would be needed and would have his approval; in constructing 
this "propaganda“ Isokrates is said to be seeking to win royal favour for 
himself and for his school.1 Markle is correct to make the point that 
Philippos is not written solely for Philip; it is also addressed to the 
Athenians and to the other Greeks: Isokrates indicates as much (see 5-23; 
cf. 5-1, 12,82, 155 row ajoowvTajv]).2 *That is not surprising: the 
proposals required the acceptance of both Philip and the Greeks. Isokrates 
surely wanted both the king and the Greeks to consider his proposal, and 
for each to perceive the other side as doing so. Nor is it surprising or 
unaccountable that Isokrates uses arguments which are able to attract the 
Greeks as well as Philip to the proposals; Markle himself admits that the 
plan for a campaign against the Persians could only be effected if it had 
general support.3 However, the argument that in Philippos itself, and in 
two subsequent epistles to Philip (Epp. 2 & 3), Isokrates covertly reveals to 
Philip that he understood that force would have to be employed in order to 
bring the Greek states into a position where they would accept Philip’s 
leadership of an expedition against the Persians is not convincing:4 it is 
true that in Philippos Philip’s absolute power as a monarch is 
acknowledged, as is the fact that he exercised this power with ever- 
increasing success (see 5.14-16, 41); what Greek with eyes in his head 
could have failed to perceive the fact by this time? Philip's power is the 
reason why Isokrates addresses his proposal to him and it hints to the 
Greeks at why they should realize the merit of the proposal: to ignore this
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1 Markle, "Support of Athenian Intellectuals", pp.80-89. Markle is not only 
troubled by the perceived impracticality of the joint-plan; he also seeks to account 
both for the argument at the beginning of Philippos that Philip should cede 
Amphipolis to the Athenians, a proposal which he describes as "otiose" if it ’were truly 
directed at Philip, and also for the fact that Isokrates is vague about the position 
which Philip should occupy vis-a-vis the Greeks. The call for the return of 
Amphipolis to Athens is explained as an attempt by the author to make the Athenians 
well-disposed towards him (Markle points to evidence of Isokrates' self-confessed 
unpopularity among his Own people) and to encourage them to approve his proposal 
that they should accept Philip as the leader of a panhellenic campaign against the 
Persians (ibid., pp.81-82); similarly, any clear-cut statement foreshadowing Philip's 
hegemony of Greece might have offended the Greeks and so is avoided (ibid., p.84).
2Cf. Perlman, "Reinterpretation", pp.308,316 (= Philip and Athens, pp. 106,
114).
3Markle, "Support of Athenian Intellectuals“, p.85.
4 Ibid., pp. 86-89.
power would be to their peril. Yet it is really not easy to see why Philip 
should perceive from these quite understandable acknowledgments of his 
power that Isokrates meant to indicate to him that the very much more 
prominent importance which is given throughout the speech to the need for 
persuasion, not force, as the appropriate means for effecting a reconciliation 
among the Greeks is only a facade of propaganda, designed to delude the 
Greeks. Why, one asks, should Philip have been expected to see what the 
Athenians and other Greeks were not? Nor is Markte s case enhanced by 
the evidence of the relationship between Philip and Athens which Isokrates 
urges in his letter to the king a couple of years later:1 it is perverse to 
claim that a possibly euphemistic description of Philip's settlement of 
affairs in Thessaly during the period after the Peace of Philokrates (Ep.2.20: 
"Consider, too, that to many you appear to have been well advised because 
your treatment of the Thessalians has been just and advantageous to them, 
although they are a people not easy to handle, but high-spirited and 
seditious"2) should be the clue for Philip (but not, apparently, the Greeks) 
to appreciate that the author is being insincere, and indulging in 
propaganda, when he speaks of the desirability of "paying court” (eepccneveuO 
to Athens in order to win her "good-will” (ewoia) in a way which would 
involve "no risk" GmvSiW;). The conclusion to his advice makes it quite 
clear that he is encouraging the same justice and concern for their interests 
to be exhibited towards the Athenians as has been shown to the 
Thessalians (Ep.2.17-2 1: esp. 2.2 1 "For it is a much greater glory to capture 
the goodwill of cities than their walls; for achievements like the latter not 
only engender ill-will, but men attribute the credit for them to your armies; 
yet if you are able to win friendships and goodwill, all will praise the 
wisdom shown by you"). A second letter, written after Chaironeia, and so
JThe date of Epistle 2 is variously given: many have followed E. Meyer's date 
of 344 (Isokrates' zw iter  Brief und Demosthenes' zweite Philippika. Sitzungsberichte 
der Preussischen Akademie, 1909, pp .758-779: a^rork vh ich  has not been available to 
me); cf. Beloch, GG> III .^ 2.289; Mathieu, Les Idees, p. 165. This year seems best to suit 
the historical context of the ^-ork, but it has been dated later (to 342-341): cf. Blass, AB,. 
11^ , pp. 326-327; Kessler, Isok. u. d. panhell. Idee, p.64.
20f this passage Markle comments ("Support of Athenian Intellectuals", p.88): 
"To Isocrates ‘just and advantageous* treatment of other states seems to consist of 
ensuring that one’s friends are in control of them either by internal subversion or 
external attack"; he refers to intervention by Philip in Thessaly vh ich  began in 344 
(for an historical account see Griffith, HM. II, pp. 523-544).
shortly before Isokrates' death,1 merely states the fact that Chaironeia had 
made plain to all: Philip could no longer be advised to approach the Greeks 
by diplomacy; their defeat in battle had left them with no option other 
than to be wise and to show accord with Philip's acts and intentions. The 
statement of this manifest fact does not show either that the advice which 
had been given earlier in Philippes (and had been repeated in Epistle 2) 
had been offered only as propaganda for the Greeks or that Isokrates now 
welcomed Philip's undisputed power over the Greeks. When Isokrates 
says, in concluding this last’ letter, that he welcomed the fact that he had 
lived to see this day, it is quite clear from the contest, both before and 
after, that what he rejoices in is the prospect that Philip will now commit 
himself to a campaign against the barbarians of Asia; it says nothing about 
his attitude to the power which Philip has now demonstrated himself to 
have over the Greeks, and it is quite compatible with an interpretation 
which would understand him to wish to see Philip distracted from any 
exploitation of that recent victory at Greek expense to a campaign which he 
fondly believed could bring advantages to the Greeks as well as to the 
Makedonians.
Markle’s justification for this "propaganda" by Isokrates is that it 
was aimed at winning the Makedonian king's patronage for himself and for 
his school. However, he produces no evidence for this belief; it is merely a 
conclusion drawn from the interpretation of the work as a propaganda- 
piece. It is true that Isokrates was prepared (probably in 340 or 339: for 
Athens was at war with Makedon - see Ep.4.1) to write to Antipater in 
recommendation of an otherwise unknown former pupil Diodotos and his 
son, who had gone to live in Makedon, and that in another letter of 
unknown date he writes a brief missive to the young prince Alexander 
upon the subject of the relative merit of eristic philosophy as opposed to 
the kind of rhetorical training which Isokrates afforded through his own
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^ h e  details vary, but our sources agree that Isokrates did not long survive the 
Makedonian victory at Chaironeia in 338 ([Anon. 1 Vit. Isoc. in G. Baiter & H. Sauppe, 
Oratores Attici [Zürich 18501 p.5, col.l, 11.43ff.; [Plut.lMor. 837E, 838B; Dion. Hal. 
Isokr. ch.l; Paus. 1.18.8; Philostr. Vit. Soph.. 506). The authenticity of Epistle 3 was 
first questioned by ¥ilamowitz (Aristoteles und Athen. II. pp.395-397; cf. also K. 
Musischer, RE, IX, cols. 2219-2220; more recently, Perlman has declared it spurious 
"on chronological grounds” [“Reinterpretation”, p.316, n.65 (= Philip and Athens, p.
114, n.65) ]); however, the majority of scholarly opinion has accepted it as a genuine 
work of Isokrates: e.g Blass, AB, II2, p.329 & n.9; Jebb, AO, II, p.30; Kessler, Isok.u.d. 
panh. Idee, pp.5,72,n.2; Mathieu, Les Idees. pp.172-173.
school (Epistle 5 ) 1 Another former pupil of his, the historian Theopompos,2 3
had in fact found favour at the Makedonian court; Theopompos, together 
with Isokrates himself, are subjected to criticism by Speusippos (who had 
succeeded Plato as head of the Academy at Athens) in a letter to Philip 
(343) in which the writer commends to the king one of his own pupils, 
Antipatros a Magnesian.3 However, neither of these Isokratean letters 
really show that their author was participating in a contest with other 
philosophers to win favour for himself or for his school at the Makedonian 
court. It is not altogether easy to envisage the nonagenarian Isokrates in 
346 either wishing or needing to win patronage for himself or for his school 
at the Makedonian court.
To interpret Philippos as propaganda also takes insufficient account 
of what Isokrates says about why he wrote the speech and for whom, and 
it does not accurately represent the 'tone' which the author adopts in 
addressing Philip. Isokrates is quite explicit that the original motive which 
prompted him to compose Philippos was his concern lest the Peace of 
Philokrates should prove to be merely an interlude during which the two 
sides, or more particularly Athens, gathered strength for renewed military 
conflict, the focus of his concern is plainly Athens, when he says that his 
reflection upon this problem reached the conclusion that “on no other 
condition could Athens remain at peace, unless the greatest states of Hellas 
should resolve to put an end to their mutual quarrels and carry the war 
beyond our borders into Asia, and should determine to wrest from the 
barbarians the advantages which they now think it proper to get for
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1 Isokrates' remarks upon eristic philosophy may reflect the fact that in 342 
Aristotle had returned to the Makedonian court to act as tutor to Alexander (Plut. Alex. 
7), but the very brief letter does not read as part of a  campaign to engage Philip's and 
Alexander's attention and favour for Isokrates' educational curriculum in preference 
to that of the Platonists. Philip v--as not one to take sides in such disputes.: his court 
could accommodate representatives from both schools, and his selection of Aristotle as 
Alexander's tutor may have been guided more by past association ’with the man 
himself and ’vith Aristotle's father, vho had been court-physician to Philip's father 
Amvntas, than ^ ith  a decision based upon philosophical conviction (for a discussion 
see Griffith, HM, II, pp. 317-522).
2For Theopompos as a pupil of Isokrates see FGrH 115 T 5sc for his presence at 
Philip's court see Speusippos, Letter to King Philip, §12.
3For Speusippos' Letter to King Philip, see esp. E. Bickermann & J. Sykutris,
Cä At AAA D mj V  * /-v 71V. 4 1 4 ^  /■. . Taw* TT k  wa at TTjA+AMAnt DajkJ aU *au i i  ci ail iv.ua Ai k. run i v y . 1 g a i , u l/ c i  umci a u i i &g i i ,  l»c i  i u u c  uuc 1
die Verhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie der ¥issenscheften, philologisch­
historische Klasse (Leipzig 1928); also J. Wickersham & G. Verbrugghe, Greek 
Historical Documents: the Fourth Century B.C.. (Toronto 1973), No.69.
themselves at the expense of the Hellenes“ (5-9). This is his purpose, as he 
tells us it had been thirty-five years earlier in his Panegyrikos; it is a 
purpose aimed at the interests of his fellow-Athenians and the other 
Greeks; Philip's role is that of the agent in promoting and effecting this 
policy. Isokrates maintains this attitude consistently throughout the speech 
(cf. 5-23, 62, 149, 154), and it is repeated, when he refers back to this 
speech at the start of his letter to Philip in 344: "on a former occasion (i.e. 
in Philippos) [I had] given you with most kindly intent such counsel as I 
believed would lead to a course of action worthy of one in your position.... 
...I then did decide to concern myself with your affairs, in the interests of 
mv own state and of the other Greeks as well" (Ep. 2.1-2; my underlining).
That Isokrates speaks to Philip first from an Athenian and then from 
a Greek viewpoint is further supported by the manner in which the 
Makedonian king is addressed. Philip is told that the speech does not seek 
to be either epideictic or encomiastic: it is "to urge you [Philip] to a course 
of action which is more in keeping with your nature, and more noble and 
more profitable than any which you have hitherto elected to follow" (5 17); 
the work is one of advice, not sycophancy (see 5-17-23)- So, although 
Isokrates has to admit the achievements of Philip to this time and has also 
to employ a necessary degree of judicious flattery in order to capture the 
interest and attention of so potent a leader, he does not shrink from 
expressing or reporting views about the king and his policies which exhibit 
a certain reserve.
In this we can compare Isokrates* address with the epistle of 
Speusippos, which actually takes Isokrates to task for failing sufficiently to 
record the favours which Philip and his ancestors had done for Athens or to 
respond adequately to Philip's critics (under this heading Speusippos 
defends Philip's right to Amphipolis and to other cities which he had taken 
or coveted); by contrast, Speusippos maintains that his protege Antipatros 
has successfully accomplished all this in a critique of Isokrates' Philippos. 
With masterly understatement Markle notes that Speusippos' Letter to King 
Philip "displays more open support of the Macedonian king than the 
Philippus of Isocrates“.1 Isokrates opens his speech by referring to the 
question of Amphipolis in such a way that the arguments over claims to the 
city are by-passed, while it is suggested that recognition of Athens' claim to 
Amphipolis could actually be construed as advantageous to Philip (5-2-6); 
this is certainly a rather different approach to the fawning acquiescence,
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1 Markle, "Support of Athenian Intellectuals“, p.92.
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backed by arguments in favour of Philip's claim to this and other cities 
which are provided by Speusippos (Letter to King Philip. SS5-7). By 
contrast, Isokrates on several occasions warns the king that the Greeks w ill 
not tolerate subservience to a monarch (see esp. 5-107), and this is the 
basis of his argument that Philip must use persuasion, not force, in his 
dealings with the Greeks; both Agesilaos and Klearchos are cited as 
cautionary examples for Philip in his relationship with the Greeks 
(Agesilaos because he committed the error of attempting two policies which 
were incompatible and incapable of being pursued simultaneously: namely 
of trying to make war on the Great King while also attempting to put his 
friends in control in the cities of Greece [5-67-66];1 Klearchos, for trying to 
wage war on the King despite the hostility of the Greeks of Asia, who were 
resentful of the Spartan dekarchies and feared further imposition by the 
Spartans if Klearchos were to be successful (5-951)- Nor does Isokrates 
hedge about mentioning that rumour has it  that Philip intends to make 
himself master of Greece, even if he introduces the calumny only to express 
disbelief (5-73-75). Finally, we have seen that Philip's proposed position 
with respect to the Greeks carefully avoids any suggestion of Philip 
adopting the position of hegemon (see above, p. 272). In answer to the 
question whether Philip was likely to be receptive in 346 of a proposal that 
he should lead a campaign against the Persians Markle claims that 
Isokrates "is not reaJJy attempting to persuade Philip to undertake an 
expedition against the Persians, since he knows that the Makedonian king 
already has this ambition".2 The only evidence which is produced in 
support of this statement is a sentence from Isokrates' last epistle to Philip 
(Ep. 3), where Isokrates says th a t, in reply to those who ask whose was the 
idea of making an expedition against the barbarians, he cannot be sure, 
since he had not been acquainted with Philip before he wrote Philippos. but
Although Isokrates strangely speaks of Agesilaos' twin ambitions as “both 
laudable" (koX<x$ pev ap4mepac), what follows shows that he does not approve of the 
ambition to place pro-Spartan sympathizers in  the Greek cities: for he calls the tvvo 
ambitions “inconsistent“ (oü 8’ dAXfjXaic) and says that this policy of
interference in the affairs of the Greeks produced “ills and dangers for the Greeks" 
and that the resultant "confusion" prevented them from having the time or the 
capacity to prosecute the war against the Persians.
2"Support of Athenian Intellectuals", p.80; see also Markle, "The Strategy of 
Philip in  346 B.C.“, C_Q n.s. 24 (1974), '268; it is a weakness of Markle's interpretation of 
Philippos that all the wieght of the communication is placed upon the issue of the 
reconciliation among the Greek states: this overlooks the structure of the work in  
which (roughly) the second ha lf addresses the question of Philip leading an 
expedition to Asia.
he wrote that work on the assumption that Philip would have given the 
matter thought and that what he (Isokrates) proposed was in line with 
Philip’s thinking on the subject.1 This is hardly proof that Philip had 
already conceived, much less decided upon, such an expedition outside 
Europe.
There are only two other pieces of evidence which attest that Philip 
had plans with regard to Persia prior to the battle of Chair oneia. Diodor os 
records at the end of his account of the settlement which Philip arranged 
with his fellow-Amphiktyones at the end of the Sacred War that Philip 
"returned to Macedonia, having not merely won for himself a reputation for 
piety and excellent generalship, but. having also made important 
preparations for the aggrandizement that was destined to be his. For he 
was ambitious to be designated general of Hellas in supreme command and 
as such to prosecute the war against the Persians. And this was what 
actually came to pass" (16.60.4-5). It is not obvious from the preceding 
narrative quite how this settlement of the Phokians' affairs should be 
perceived as significantly or directly preparing the way for a war against 
the Persians: the only connection would appear to exist, in a sentence which 
tells us that. "In similar tenor the Amphiktyons laid down regulations for 
the custody of the oracle and other matters affecting due respect for the 
gods and the general peace and concord of the Greeks (....rcdiocavriy exprivriv wd 
opovoiav To%vEX.\T|cn,v avfjicovTa)" (16.60.3: my underlining); whether this is 
Diodor os' own comment, or that of his source, it. is probable that, it was 
written with the advantage of hindsight; if Diodoros found it in his source, 
then it is possible that it. does reflect Philip's own thoughts in 346, but, 
given the publication of Philippos at that time, we have in Isokrates' work 
at least, an alternative explanation for the claim, without needing to 
attribute it either to hindsight or to a knowledge of Philip's thinking on the 
subject of Persia at that time.2 Our other piece of evidence is much less 
specific: it comes from Demosthenes' Fourth Philippic (mid-341); 
Demosthenes is arguing that the Athenians need money for a war against 
Philip and that they should look to the Persian king for it: he is likely to be 
a willing source of supply as he has in his hands Hermeias of xAxtarneus, who
*Ei>. 3 3: ey(ü 5J ouk eiSevai pev <$>rpi to cra^ ec, ov yap övyyeyevfjöÖal cm npdrepov, ov 
ptjv aXX’ oTtctfai oe pev eyvcacevca nept tchJtüä», epe Se aweipTpcevoa rate em8upiai$.
G riffith (HM, II, p. 439) proposes Demophilos, or possibly Theopompos (or a 
later historian vho used Theopompos), as Diodoros' source; Griffith is somewhat 
equivocal upon the question of vhether Diodoros is recording Philip's ovn  ambition, 
as held in 346, or not.
is described as an agent of Philip and "privy to all the preparations which 
Philip is making against the King" (Dem. 10.32). Whatever exchanges took 
place betv/een Philip and Hermeias probably occurred in the latter part of 
342, and it has been reasonably argued that it was much more likely that it 
was Hermeias, needing help, who approached Philip than the other way 
about.1 Clearly Philip indicated through this connection that he was no 
friend of the Persian king, but Demosthenes has a motive for overstating 
the situation with regard to Philip’s intentions towards Persia, and in the 
event nothing was done by the Makedonians to assist Hermeias.
Despite this tenuous evidence, three recently-published accounts of 
Philip's reign have expressed the belief, in varying degrees of certainty, 
that Philip had at least conceived the idea of an expedition against the 
Persians at some time in the 340s. Ellis takes the firmest stand: he says 
that Isokrates “decided to sow the seeds of encouragement on what already 
appeared to be fertile ground“.2 Cawkwell admits the tenuousness and the 
Athenian origins of the evidence for Philip's aims in 346 and says that 
Isokrates did not know them at the time he wrote Philippos: nevertheless 
he believes that Philip had conceived the idea of attacking Persia before the 
Peace of Philokrates was made.3 Griffith is the most cautious: he denies 
that Isokrates knew anything of Philip's plans when Philippes was 
composed; he does not believe that Philip revealed anything of his 
thoughts about an expedition against Persia until after Chaironeia; he 
believes that Philippos itself attests that there was in 346 some public talk 
about the possibility of a campaign to be led against Persia by the 
Makedonian king: Griffith says that Philippos is evidence of the fact that 
"the programme of a Persian war has become by this time at any rate a 
talking-point in some Greek circles", although he then prudently reduces 
the radius of the circle to possibly just Isokrates and his friends; however, 
he, too, at least believes that Philip's mind had independently conceived, 
and had been attracted by, the prospect at some future time of a campaign 
against the Persians, and thus "All that is in doubt is, how definite were his
G riffith, HM, II, pp. 518-522.
“J.R. Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism (London 1976), p.130.
SCaTFkwell, Philip of Macedon, pp. 103,111-113; see also "Demosthenes' Pol­
icy. I“, CQ n.s. 13 (1963), 128, n.4 (= Perlman, Philip and Athens, p.154, n.4)
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plans in 346“.1
In their conviction that Philip in 346 was already thinking ahead to a 
conflict with Persia all three historians are influenced not so much by the 
evidence which has been noted as by their desire to explain two matters 
concerning Philip's relations with Athens in the 340s. The 'Persian plan' is 
thus offered to account for the fact that Philip made a peace and alliance 
with Athens in May-June 346, and it also seems to explain the surprising 
moderation which Philip accorded to Athens on several occasions: first, 
after her refusal to send troops to assist in the closing stages of the Sacred 
War and her rejection of his invitation to participate in the negotiations and 
settlement which followed the Phokian capitulation, and then again after 
the ludicrous Athenian response to Philip's request in 343 for a revision of 
the Peace of Philokrates, and of course, finally, after Chaironeia itself. On 
two occasions after the Peace of Philokrates, when Athens had defied her 
ally and when the king was present with his army in central Greece, the 
Athenians thought that their hour had come and that Philip was about to 
unleash his military might upon their territory and city; yet upon each 
occasion Philip stayed his hand. Why? The answer is held to be that Philip 
wanted Athens, and more particularly her navy, as an ally for his intended 
campaign against the Persians.2 *6
However, it is not necessary to explain Philip's wish for peace and 
alliance with Athens from 347 by a long-term plan of attacking Persia and 
the consequent desirability of having the Athenian navy available for the 
enterprise. Errington, in a critique of the historical accounts of Ellis, 
Cawkwell and Griffith, has emphasized the hypothetical basis of their 
explanation for Philip's alliance with Athens and for his continued 
moderation in his dealings with her until 342, even when the Athenians 
were at their most intransigents He reasonably points out that in the years
1 Griffith, HM, II, pp. 458-461; cf. also pp.487,519.
2See Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism, t>.144; Cawkwell, Philip of 
Macedon, p.l 11. Griffith is again more circumspect; he raises the question at the time 
of Athens' defiance in mid-346, but offers no specific reason why Philip appeared 
anxious to continue to hope for advantage from the peace and alliance with Athens 
which he himself had sought (HM, II, p. 455f ); after Chaironeia wrhen the attack 
upon Persia had become a published plan, the preservation of the Athenian state and 
her navy may well explain Philip's treatment of Athens after the battle, but Griffith
now goes further and projects this motive for his action in 338 back to be “the
overriding reason for his whole policy towards Athens“ (ibid., p.619).
3r .M. Errington, “Review-Discussion: four Interpretations of Philip 11", ATAH
6 (1981), 69-88.
immediately after 346, notwithstanding Persian hopes or dreams, Philip 
had more than enough to deal with in northern Greece itself and also in 
central, and perhaps even southern, Greece; these interests and concerns 
alone could account for his willingness to come to terms with the one Greek 
state whose interests and pride had been injured by his actions hitherto, 
but with whom, now that he had settled affairs in and around the 
Chalkidike to his advantage and satisfaction, further confrontation would 
seem futile; then, too, he would not have forgotten how Athens had once 
before (in 352) frustrated him by her defence of Thermopylai.1 In 346 
there was enough in Philip's aims and concerns around his own kingdom 
and in mainland Greece and in his past relations and experience with the 
Athenians to explain his policy of peace and alliance with Athens; there is 
no need to appeal either to a 'Persian-plan' or to any other conditional plan 
in 34b.2
Philip's thoughts about Asia and Persia up until the publication of 
Philippos cannot be ascertained; such thoughts do not need to be invoked 
to explain his policy towards Athens which resulted in , and followed from, 
the Peace of Philokrates. Isokrates, for his part, shows no sign in Philippos 
that he knew anything of them. Whatever Isokrates knew, or thought that 
he knew, about Philip's future plans in the months from April to June/July 
346 must have seemed to Isokrates himself and to many other Greeks far 
more sinister for the future of Greece than for that of the Persian kingdom. 
When he penned this speech to Philip Isokrates did not know whether 
Philip had thought about attacking Persia; it would not have required
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Ubid.pVg.
'^Another suggestion has recently received some attention as an explanation 
for Philip's policy towards Athens in, and after, 346: Markle (“The Strategy of Philip
in  S4A B C " 'rvr' 7 B S -2 6 8 '1 a-? M-rcnip.-t tVist Philirs*? nrpfpt’tsaa nrstinn -vr/ViPn Vip -enncrVit
peace and alliance with the Athenians in 346, was truly what some Athenians, who 
were less antagonistic to him, put before the Assembly: namely, that he wanted to 
engage Athens' help in destroying Theban power in Central Greece (cf. Aischin. 
2.104-106,136-137; Pern. 6.30; 9.11; 19.19-24,33 [cf., however, 19.44]); Philip, it is 
alleged, needed to control Greece south of Thessaly and was afraid of resistance from 
an Athenian-Theban alliance. The prospect of Athens and Thebes entering an 
alliance in 346 to resist Philip seems remote, and Markle's thesis has been critically 
considered by both Cawkwell (“The Peace of Philocrates Again", pp. 93-104) and 
Griffith (HM, II, p. 345, n .l); Markle's thesis won approval from Ellis (Philip II and 
Macedonian Imperialism, pp.101-102) and discussion has continued (see Markle, 
"Demosthenes' Second Philippic: a Valid Policy for the Athenians against Philip", 
Antichthon 15 [1981 1 62-85, asp. 78-S3; Ellis, Philip and the Peace ol Philocrates , 
pp.43-59 in ¥.L. Adams & E.N. Borzo. [edd. I Philip II, Alexander the Great and the 
Macedonian Heritage Washington 19821 also Errington, "Review-Discussion”, pp.73- 
74).
remarkable prescience to suspect that Philip had given thought to affairs in 
Asia, particularly the part close to northern Greece, but to have 
contemplated an expedition into Asia would have been a significantly 
larger mental step. However, Isokrates did have cause to fear that Philip 
planned to put an end to the rivalries of the Greek states in a manner far 
more drastic than by diplomatic mediation. Yet with the new Peace he had 
a ground for hope that Philip might, after all, be amenable to some cautious 
advice from a long-standing observer of Greek affairs. Indeed, one might 
speculate whether Isokrates saw his very detachment from personal 
involvement in the everyday political life at Athens as a recommendation 
in Philip’s eyes; this could be at least one reason for the several occasions 
in the speech when Isokrates is at pains to point out his lack of 
involvement in Athenian politics (see 5-17-21, 61-62,129-131- in this last 
passage Isokrates dissociates himself from the Athenian demagogues and 
their policies and stresses that the advice he gives is entirely his own: iw  
p.ev ydp eipTttievojy ovhdc iceicoivoMiice 15-131D- If Philip's plans for Greece in 346 
were aimed at establishing an hegemony and if there had not been any 
public suggestion that the Makedonian king had thoughts of an expedition 
to Asia, why did Isokrates see any hope that what he was advising would 
make any impression upon the king?
First, it would be well to consider the alternatives which existed for 
Athenian policy in mid-346. On the one hand, there was the policy of 
offering physical resistance to Philip's encroachments: this approach had 
been inspired by Demosthenes before the Peace of Philokrates, even though 
he recognized the need in 346 to acquiesce temporarily in the Peace and 
the futility of going to war over "the shadow in Delphi" (see Dem. 5 (On the 
Peace]); but Demosthenes and his supporters were the very persons whom 
Isokrates seems to have in mind when he expresses his fear that the Peace 
will be no more than a respite from war; even as in his speech On the 
Peace he cautioned against a resumption of war which would risk Athens 
having to face her several enemies simultaneously, Demosthenes hinted at 
a future opportunity when his city might resume war over an issue such as 
Arnphipolis (which would not concern either the Central Greek or the 
Peloponnesian allies of Philip).1 On the other hand, there were those who 
were willing to seek compromise and co-operation with Philip, whether
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1See Dem. 5-Hff., esp.25, for the viev  that the Peace 'vss no more than a 
respite; Cavk’vell says: "From the moment that the nevs arrived in Athens in mid- 
346 that Philip vas vithin the Gates, Demosthenes vas looking for an opporhmity to 
resume the v/ar” (Philip of Macedon, p.118).
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because, although genuine patriots, they saw no prospect of success for 
Athens through resistance to Philip and so sincerely sought to prosecute 
Athens' interests through a policy of co-operation with the king, or (less 
likely) because they were, as their enemies portrayed them, Thilippizers", 
traitors to their own country, perhaps even in the pay of the king.1 In 
Athenian politics the years which immediately followed the Peace of 
Philokrates, until the war-faction gained the upper-hand, has been 
described as a battle between the two groups on the issue of Athens' 
relationship with Makedon, focussing on the Peace: “Thus there were two 
opposed views: the Peace was too damnable to be maintained, and the 
peace, however damnable, should be maintained. The political history of 
Athens in these years is largely the struggle of the former against the 
latter."2 The delineation of these two factions based upon their policies 
with respect to Philip and the Peace may not have been so clearly 
discernible at the time when Philippos was written; certainly, two of the 
leading protagonists in the struggle spoke differently at the time when the 
Peace was being established from the positions which they occupied in the 
subsequent debate for Aischines, who became an advocate of peace with 
Philip, had spoken in favour of Athens' vain claim to Amphipolis on the 
first embassy to Philip (Aisch. 2.32-33), and on 16 Elaphebolion he had 
supported the proposal for a Common Peace which had been put forward 
by the synod of Athens' allies (Aisch. 2.63; 3 ” 1; cf. Dem. 19.14, 144); 
support for the Peace on Philip’s terms had to corne from Demosthenes, 
among others, at the second meeting of the Assembly on 19 Elaphebolion 
(Aischin. 3-71-72), and it was Demosthenes who spoke (in his work On the 
Peace) firmly against the bellicose feeling among the Athenians a short 
while later when, with Philip now in control of affairs in Central Greece and 
a member of the Amphiktyonic Council, the Athenians seemed intent on 
provoking Philip by a series of diplomatic snubs. Nevertheless, the bitter 
hostility towards Philip which had existed at Athens after the attack on
P h ilip  undoubtedly offered 'gifts' to embassadors (see Dem. 19.139-HO), but 
the ceaseless allegations of this sort against Athenian politicians and ambassadors, 
which emanated from Demosthenes and those who favoured war, should be treated 
with discretion (see Cawkwell, Philip of Macedon, pp. 122-123; also "Demosthenes’ 
Policy after the Peace of Philocrates. II”, CQ n.s. 13 (1963), 204-205 1= Perlman, Philip. 
and Athens, pp.169-170 ]).
^ w k w eii, Fhiiip of Macedon. p i 20.
3See Cawkwell, Philip of Macedon. pp. 119-120.
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Olynthos until right up to the dispatch of the first embassy in late 
February/early March 346 was sufficiently changed by sheer necessity so 
that Philip's proposal for peace and alliance had to be accepted by the 
Athenians in April. Even if, in the weeks which followed the acceptance of 
the Peace at Athens, many Athenians shared the view of Demosthenes and 
the fear of Isokrates that the Peace was to be no more than a breathing- 
space, while Athens better prepared herself and awaited a more favourable 
opportunity, there were also some who entertained a more optimistic hope 
that co-operation with the Makedonian could work in Athens' interests (see 
Dem. 5.10).
Isokrates, I would suggest, found no hope in either of these policies. 
Clearly he did not share the fond belief that Athens could, at some future 
time, offer Philip the resistance which all but the most sanguine of the war- 
faction acknowledged was beyond Athens' capacity in the circumstances of 
spring 346.1 Now, as before in 355, at the end of the Social War, he advised 
his fellow-citizens against a potentially futile and ruinous policy of trying to 
assert her influence and mastery upon Greek affairs by force of arms. Nor 
was he prepared to trust Philip's ambitions and intentions with respect to 
the Greeks.2 To the end of his life Isokrates maintained a belief in his own 
city as the fairest among the Greek states and in the vital importance for 
her and for the Greek way of life to be based upon political independence. 
He makes it clear in Philippes that he sees no formal or permanent role for 
the Makedonian king to occupy in relationship to the Greek states: Philip is 
urged to be content with facilitating the reconciliation of the Greeks, but not 
to expect any formal position within the Greek world; in place of this Philip 
is encouraged to look further afield, to the rich pickings of Asia, and in so 
doing to earn both glory for himself and the gratitude of the Greeks. Thus 
Isokrates rejects both the broad, publicly-espoused alternatives for 
Athenian policy towards Makedon in spring 346; instead, he puts forward 
a plan which he hopes will prove attractive to Philip, and which would 
redirect Philip from a policy which seems ominous for Greek independence 
to a plan which, if the king were to succeed, might bring about benefits in 
which Greeks could share, or which, alternatively, might bring the ruin.
iThe only Athenian politician kno’wn to have remained intransigent to the 
Peace at its inception 'was the demagogue Aristophon (see Theopomp. EGrH 115 F 166).
^ f . P. Cloche (Un Fondateur D'Empire: Philippe II Roi de Macedoine [St. 
Etienne 19561 pp.162-163), vho sees Isokrates as an undisguised admirer of Philip.
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even the demise, of this uncharacteristically potent and threatening 
Makedonian ruler.
There were two reasons to hope that such a proposal might be given 
serious consideration by Philip. The first is that Philip was willing, even 
preferred, to use diplomatic means to achieve goals in foreign relations. He 
had made a favourable impression upon various members of the First 
Embassy (Aischin. 2.43, 52); his “adroitness and cordiality in diplomacy" 
was regarded in antiquity as more significant in his success than his 
military achievements (D.S. 16.95- 2; cf. Polyain. 4.2.9), and this verdict has 
been supported by modern historians.1 2* Examples of his preference of 
diplomacy to force, particularly in his relations with Athens, are more 
numerous after the Peace of Philokrates than they are for the period before 
that, but it should be remembered that already in 346 Philip m s  making 
overtures to Athens in search of a peace and alliance (see Aischin. 2.12- 
17)2
The other ground for hope was Philip's vanity. We have seen how 
strongly Isokrates appeals in his address to Philip's ambition for power and 
glory, but also to his passion to demonstrate to the world his Herakleid- 
descent (see above, p. 267). This connection of Philip with the famous 
benefactor of the Greeks was not invented by Isokrates: from the earliest 
of Philip's coinage the Herakles-theme is prominent, particularly on the 
gold and silver coinage used as currency outside Makedonia,3 and the name 
of Herakleia Lynkestis for what was probably his first city-foundation (in 
356) should not go unobserved.4 Philip's acclaimed descent from Herakles
^ .g . Hammond, HG, p.574; Markle correctly directs the reader's attention to 
the fact, but uses it in his argument in a way which fails to convince: for how* would a. 
man who prided himself on his diplomatic skill be impressed by the 'secret' message 
conveyed to him in Philippos that the only way by which he could achieve his 
ambition to control the Greeks was by force? This would be more properly described 
as diplomatic treachery than skill, although, of course, in reality, Philip was not 
averse to such tactics, as he had demonstrated to the Athenians early in his reign in 
relation to Amphipolis.
2See Griffith, HM, II, p.329; cf. also pp.326-327. Part, at least, of Aischines' 
narrative and -dating at 2.12ff. may be tendentious: the request to Philip of Phrynon, 
the message of peace and goodwill from Philip borne by Ktesiphon and the first 
motion by Philokrates that Philip be allowed to send a herald and ambassadors should 
perhaps belong after the fall of Glynthos: see E. Badian & J. Heskel,''Aeschines 2.12-18. 
A Study in Rhetoric and Chronology", Phoenix 41 [19871 264-271).
3See Griffith, HM, H  PP- 663-669.
4 Ibid., p.660.
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may have been beneficial in establishing his recognition as leader of the 
Thessalians, since Thessalos, eponymous hero of that state, was of the same 
descent.1 Nor was Isokrates the only Athenian who reveals to us his 
awareness of the importance of this ancestral claim to Philip: turning to a 
true propagandist, we find that Speusippos (or his protege Antipatros) 
managed to unite the king's Herakleid-descent with a 'proof that Isokrates 
could, if he had been truly competent, have addressed Philip as a fellow- 
Athenian (Letter to King Philip. SS2-3). To the Greeks of the fifth and 
fourth centuries the Makedonians were "barbarians“, not by virtue of their 
language but because their civilization was not that of the world of the 
Greek city-states,2 for most Greeks, who accepted the tradition that the 
Makedonian royal house traced its descent from the Herakleids, the 
Makedonian kings were Greeks who ruled over non-Greeks: this is the 
attitude we find even in a work such as Philippos. which certainly did not 
seek to offend (see 5 106: Perdikkas I was a Greek who established his 
rule over a people "not of kindred race" km  ouo4*JAov yevoucD.3 Conversely, 
it v/as regarded as an injurious barb by Philip's enemies to deny that he 
was an Hellene: so Demosthenes chastized the Greeks for sitting by idly 
while Greece was being threatened and encroached upon by this 
Makedonian king who was “not only no Greek, nor related to the Greeks, 
but not even a barbarian from any place that can be named with honour, 
but a pestilent knave from Macedonia" (931; cf. 19.3^5 for alleged similar 
charges by Aischines, before he altered his policy towards Philip). Clearly 
Philip wanted to be recognized among the Greeks as an Hellene: so, when 
Aischines abandoned his initial hostility to Philip in favour of a more 
conciliatory attitude, he is said to have spoken of the king as "the most 
Greek of men, a most skilful orator, and a most sincere friend of Athens" 
(Dem. 19-306: eAAtiviKttfrarov dvöpajfrrojv, Seiwrarov Aeyeiv, 4>iAa#rjvai6TaTov). Philip's 
membership of the Amphiktyonic Council and his presidency of the Pythian
^■ee T.R. Martin, Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical Greece (Princeton 1985),
p.91.
2See Thuc. 2.80.5-7; cr. Griffith, HM, II, p. 45-
-■The belief that the Makedonians, unlike their rulers, were barbarians, not 
Greeks, has been argued by Dascalakis (Hellenism of the Ancient Macedonians, 
pp .225-276) to be a calumny, promoted by the Athenian orators, which was not 
generally held among the Greeks of the fifth & fourth centuries. Dascalakis attempts 
to deny that Isokrates, at 5-108, was saying that, although the Makedonian royal house 
was of Greek descent, the Makedonian people themselves were not of Greek origin.
His arguments are not convincing.
Games, achieved in 346, was recognized by Greek contemporaries as being 
most important to him.1 Philip celebrated other Greek connections on his 
coinage: in particular the successes of his horses at the Greek festivals and 
Zeus, father of Herakles and supreme god of the Greeks, who had not before 
appeared on the coinage of Makedonian kings.2
If Isokrates' advice to Philip in 346 was impractical and mere 
wishful thinking, was it any more so than the expectation that Athens could 
resist Philip's advance by force? If it attempted to persuade Philip to a 
different course of action with respect to the Greeks than that which he was 
indicating, at least it appealed to methods and interests of which Philip 
himself had given evidence, unlike the hopeful imaginings of those 
Athenians who proclaimed that Philip's secret intentions south of 
Thermopylai were going to show themselves to be in accordance with 
Athenian interests. Before we consider how the advice offered in Philippos 
can be perceived in view of the actions of Philip and of the Athenians and 
other Greeks in the succeeding years, there is one other interpretation of 
this discourse which must be discussed.
Modern scholarship has perceived the development in the fourth- 
century Greek world of a movement which has been labelled 
'Panheilenisrn'. Panhellenism was based upon an antithesis between Greeks
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1 Demosthenes listed Philip's presidency of the Pythian Games alongside his 
securing of the p8ss at Thermopylai and the credit for bringing to an end the Sacred 
Yar as the king's highest ambitions at the time (5.22).
20n horse-racing Plutarch says that Philip proudly recorded his victories in 
horse-racing at Olympia on his coinage (Alex. 4.5): on the day that Philip captured 
Potidaia (356) he received three items of welcome nevs, one of vh ich  T/as that his 
horse had von a victory in the Olympic Games (Plut. Alex. 3 5); this victory vas 
recorded on the reverse of silver didrachms from this date; a victory (probably in 
348, less probably in 352 [see Griffith, HM. II, p. 664f. ]) v ith  a. tvo-horse chariot, also 
at Olympia, is celebrated on gold staters. On the introduction to Makedonian coinage 
of coins v ith  the head of Zeus on the obverse and a bearded rider on the reverse 
(Philip himself?: cf. C.T. Seltman, Greek Coins. 2nd. ed. [London 1955 i p . 199) Griffith 
(HM, II, p. 667) comments: "It is possible that Philip vished to shov  himself after 348 
as a  mediator betveen Macedonians and Greeks on the reverse of the Zeus coins." Eor 
Philip's coinage and the publicity-value of its motifs see also C.M. Kraay, Archaic and 
Classical Greek Coins (London 1976), pp. 145-147: the head of Zeus on the silver coins, 
vh ich  began early in the reign are said to reflect Philip's panhellenic propaganda, 
similarly the later gold coins vh ich  had the head of Apollo, reflecting the king's 
friendly relations v ith  Delphi and his leadership from 346 of the Amphiktyonic 
Council. A recent detailed study of Philip's coinage has been published by G. Le Rider 
(Le Monnayage d argent et d'or de Philippe II, frappe en Macedoine de 359 ä 294 [Paris 
1977 ]): and see also the re vie v  of this by M.J. Price ("The Coinage of Philip II", NC 10 
[19791231-241).
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and barbarians.1 The notions of the superiority of Greeks to barbarian 
peoples and of the barbarians, and particularly the Persians, as the natural 
enemies of the Greeks had not been invented by Isokrates; Greek political 
figures and statesmen could appeal to this prejudice, not in any interest of 
Greek unity but in order to muster support for the imperial or hegemonial 
aspirations of their own states; thus the Spartan king Agesilaos sought to 
invest his campaign in Asia Minor (396-394) with a panhellenic aura: 
before the king and his forces crossed to Asia messengers were sent around 
the Greek cities to call for support for this campaign and the king himself 
attem pted to re-enact a t Aulis the legendary sacrifice made by king 
x^gamemnon prior to the Trojan expedition; in Asia Agesilaos maintained 
the propaganda image of fighting for the liberty of the Greeks in Asia and 
propagated an image of himself as a "Persian-hater" (nvoonepcrr^ : Xen. 
Ages.7.7) and "philhellene" (4>C\eX>u)v: ibid. 7.4) (Xen. Hell.3.4.3-5: 4.2.2-4; 
Ages. 1.35-35; 7.4-7; Plut. Ages.6.3-5; 9.4; 16.4).2 The idea of a 
commonality shared by all Greeks had also been expressed, usually bu t not 
always in a more philosophic context, by some sophists: panhellenic 
sentim ent had been invoked a t major Greek festivals by Gorgias, who had 
called for homonoia among the Greeks and for the redirection of the efforts 
of interstate warfare to a common enemy, namely the barbarians (see 
above, p. 13). The notion of a brotherhood among the Greeks had been 
voiced by Hippias: addressing an audience from a num ber of cities he is 
reported to have said: "Gentlemen,... I count you all my kinsmen and 
family and fellow-citizens - by nature, not by convention. By nature like is 
kin to like, bu t custom, the ty ran t of mankind, does much violence to 
nature" (Plat. Protag.337c-d). Hippias, perhaps, bu t certainly some other 
sophists, including Antiphon and Alkidamas, extended this notion of 
brotherhood beyond Greeks to all mankind, and questioned the idea of 
slavery as a natural state of being for some races; others, like Sokrates, 
accepted the more limited notion of brotherhood confined to Greeks: as 
Sokrates says: "I affirm that, the Hellenic race is friendly to itself and akin,
JSee S. Perlman, "Panhellenism, the Palis and Imperialism", Historia 25 (1976), 
‘if. For a summary of the concept as a political ideal in the fourth century see M.B. 
Sakellariou, "Panhellenism: From Concept to Policy", pp. 128-145 in M.B. Hatzopoulos & 
Lh. Loukopoulos (edd.), Philip of Macedon (Athens 1980).
Xenophon’s Agesilaos, published soon after the Spartan king’s death in  
360/359 (for the date of his death see Ca’ykirell, "Agesilaus and Sparta", p. 63, n.8), 
indicates a revival at the end of Agesilaos' life of his reputation as a Philhellenist; cf. 
Cavkirell (Ibid, pp.66-71), v/ho argues for an Agesilaus vho ’yas consistently 
Panhellenist throughout his kingship, even during the 380s and 370s.
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and foreign and alien to the barbarian“, the latter being “enemies by 
nature“ and thus appropriate objects for Greek bellicosity (Plat. Rep.470c).1 
However, when Panhellenism is used for a political ideal held by Greeks of 
the fourth century, more is meant than just an antithesis between Greek 
and barbarian, but the translation of the concept of a brotherhood of all 
mankind into a political contest has to await the eulogists of Alesander.2
In the fourth-century Panhellenism is associated with an ideal of 
unification of the Greek city-states and with a campaign against the 
Persians; the latter project was intended not only to provide the Greeks 
with a common cause but also to resolve the economic and social ailments 
of the mainland Greek world. Isokrates is declared to be a leading spirit in 
this movement; in fact, he is the only significant surviving source,3 
although Gorgias has been credited with having revived the ‘movement at 
the start of the fourth century 4 His alleged advocacy of this ideal and of 
the plans to fulfil the ideal has led to his recognition by some historians as 
a political visionary who had recognized that the old city-state system was 
outmoded and had demonstrated its incapacity to attend to or to resolve 
the problems which beset the Greeks in the fourth century.5 Students of 
Isokrates have pointed to the themes of his first and last major political 
works, Panegyrikos and Philippes, each of which advocates the
hjn this subject of panhellenism and on attitudes of universal brotherhood 
among the Sophists see Guthrie, The Sophists, pp.24,43-44,119 n .2 ,133-163.
*See esp. V.1¥ . Tarn, “Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind", 
Proceedings of the British Academy 19 (1933), 123-166. Tarn's views in this paper 
vere  effectively questioned by E. Badian,"Alexander the Great and the Unity of 
Mankind". Historia? (1938), 423-444 (both articles h aw  been reprinted in G.T. Griffith 
(ed.), Alexander the Great: The Main Problems [Cambridge 1966 L pp.243-286 & 287- 
306) .
Sperlman ("Panhellenism", p.23) notes that Isokrates is regarded es "the 
foremost and most influential representative of Panhellenism in the Greek world". 
CawkweU (Philip of Macedon, p.122) says that Isocrates is the only Athenian 
Panhellenist who can be named with confidence, but assumes that he had a following 
(at Athens); beyond Athens names are lacking, but Cawkwell concludes that "the 
creed must have been widespread"; this latter judgment is based on evidence from the 
time of Alexander, when there is no doubt that panhellenic propaganda was invoked 
by the Makedoniens, in a manner reminiscent of Agesilaos in the first decade of the 
century, in order to encourage Greek support for the expedition to Asia.
4See G. Dobesch, Untersuchungen zum Korinthischen Bund I: Der 
panhellenische Gedanke im 4 .Tr. v. Chr. u. der 'Philippos' des Isokrates (Österreiches 
Archäologisches Institut 1968), pp. 10,18,22.
5See e.g. Bury, HG,. p.431f.; Jaeger, Paideia. III, pp. 82-83-
establishment of homonoia among the Greeks and urges a campaign against 
the Persians. Those who regard Isokrates as a Panhellenist assert that the 
achievement of these goals was his lifelong ambition; some believe that, 
from the time of his initial announcement of his Panhellenic goals in 361/0, 
he maintained a search, more or less consistently, at first for a state (or 
rather states) and then for a powerful and prominent individual to unify 
the Greeks and to lead his projected expedition against the Persians;1 this 
last belief finds some support in Isokrates' own statements, but it also 
derives from the Letter of Speusippos to Philip, in which the author, 
malevolent to Isokrates, alleges that the speech which had been sent to 
Philip by Isokrates was no more than a rehash of similar letters which had 
already been sent to Agesilaos, then to Dionysios, tyrant of Syrakuse, after 
that to Alexander the Thessalian, and finally to Philip (Letter to King Philip.
$ 13).
Apart from Gorgias' public appeals, Panhellenic ideas before 
Isokrates can be perceived at a pragmatic level as a useful tool for 
propaganda available to, and used by, ambitious leaders of city-states; 
they also provided material for discussion at a philosophic level. With 
Isokrates the philosophic and the practical political consequences are seen 
to come together; the ideas and ideals of Panhellenism are treated as 
engaging with the world of practical politics. Thus, not only Isokratean 
scholars, but historians of the period have regarded Isokrates as a 
Panhellenist: so Griffith observes that Isokrates had been wanting a war 
with Persia "for years and years";2 Cawkwell, who regards Isokrates as the 
leader of a group of kindred spirits; at Athens, and possibly elsewhere 
(none of whom, unfortunately, can be identified), believes that these 
“Panhellenists" gave support, to those at Athens who favoured the Peace (of
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1 Major works on Isokrates' Panhellenism include: P. ¥endland, Beiträge von 
der königlichen Gesellschaft der ¥issenschaften zu Gottingen, Philol-hist. Klasse: I 
König Philippos und Isokrates (Berlin 1910), pp.123-182; J. Kessler, Isokrates und die 
panhellenische Idee (Paderborn 1911); G. Dobesch (above, p. 297, n .4: with full 
bibliography). The belief that Isokrates was a Panhellenist is fundamental in 
Mathieu's study (Les Idees): although he does not claim that Isokrates finally (with 
Philippps) abandoned democracy in favour of monarchy (see p.l 57) and although he 
does not deny that Isokrates was a patriotic Athenian (see p.96), Mathieu nevertheless 
concludes that "Ses cinquante dernieres annees avaient ete consacrees ä precher V 
union des Grecs contre les bar bares“ (p.l 74); see also Jaeger, Paideia, III, pp .74-83, 
133-134. For the continuing search for a leader in the years between 381/0 
(Panegyrikos) and 346 (Philippos) see Kessler, Isok. u. d. panh. Idee, pp .47-48; 
Mathieu, Les Idees. pp.93-112; Dobesch, Der Panhellenische Gedanke, pp.43-45.
Griffith, HM, II, p. 459.
Philokrates), and helped to re-enforce the myth that Persian domination 
was oppressive to the Greeks in Asia and that the Great King posed a threat 
to Greece.1 Belief in Isokrates as a Panhellenist and in the influence of 
Panhellenists and their “creed“ upon contemporary affairs is thus persistent 
and pervasive in Isokratean scholarship and historical studies of the fourth 
century.
A passage in Isokrates' final work (Panathenaikos) has been noted as 
appearing to confirm this view of Isokrates as a publicist for Panhellenism:2 
reference is usually given to the words at 12.13f-, but it is appropriate to 
take the words there in a wider context. Isokrates compares his writings 
with the subjects addressed by the platform orators:
"...but since I was barred from public life I took refuge in study and work and 
writing down my thoughts, choosing as my field, not petty matters nor private 
contracts, nor the things about which the other orators prate, but the affairs of
Hellas and of kings and of states.....these orators are either wrangling among
themselves in the assemblies over deposits of money or insulting our allies or 
blackmailing whosoever of the rest of the world chances to be the object of their 
attacks, while I, for my part, have led the way in discourses which exhort the 
Hellenes to concord among themselves and war against the barbarians and which 
urge that we all unite in colonizing a country so vast and so vulnerable that those 
who have heard the truth about it assert with one accord that if we are sensible 
and cease from our frenzy against each other we can quickly gain possession of 
it without effort and without risk and that this territory will easily accommodate 
all the people among us viio are in want of the necessities of life." (12.11-14)
However, this passage tells us no more than what we could already 
ascertain from the previous discourses. The "affairs of Hellas”, which 
presumably refer to the subjects of Panegyrikos and Philippos. are but one 
of his concerns, along with “the affairs of kings and those of states" (12.11: 
nepi t w 'EXX^ vikw ladßamXiJOGüv icednoXvrwjav npaypaiw), and Isokrates speaks of 
himself as a leader in composing discourses which encourage the Greeks to 
achieve homonoia among themselves and to pursue a war against the 
barbarians (12.13: [xoycüv] TW nopouoocXoyvTajv TüiJ^EXÄinvocc em- re rrjv opovoiav rrjv
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fC&wkwell, Philip of Mace don, pp.120-122: CawkweU does concede that 
Isokrates himself did not persist in his aggressive attitude toward Persia after 
Panegyrikos, and associates the Persian scares at Athens in the 3b0s to others (p.121).
“See e.g. Kessler, Isok. u. d. panh. Idee, p.67 and Dobesch, Per Panhellenische 
Gedanke, p.144, n.41.
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TTpö$ dXXr|Xoy$ Km rtjv  o r p a t e ia v  rtjv  eni r o y c  ßapßapou^ ). This passage does not offer 
compelling evidence for an exclusive or continuing pursuit of "Panhellenic“ 
goals.
Far stronger support for the belief comes from Philippos itself. At 
5- 126ff. Isokrates responds to a possible criticism that by appealing to 
Philip to lead the expedition against the barbarians he is passing over his 
own city. His reply to this is that he had initially offered the leadership of 
the venture to Athens, but came to despair of his fellow-citizens, who 
preferred to heed instead the demagogues; the remainder of his reply 
should be quoted:
I gave her [Athens ] up, although I did not abandon my efforts. ¥herefore I 
might justly be praised on every hand, because I have persevered throughout the 
vhole time, employing this poorer vhich I happen to possess, in urging var vith  
the barbarians, in condemning those vho oppose my plan, and in striving to 
arouse to action whoever I think will best be able to benefit the Hellenes in any 
vay and to rob the barbarians of their present prosperity. Consequently I am 
now addressing myself to you,... (5.129-131: trans. Norlin, slightly adapted)
This passage affords strong credibility to Speusippos' allegation, although it 
should be observed that the first objective, “to benefit the Hellenes in any 
way" is much less precise than the first proposal of Philippos. which 
recommended reconciliation of the Greeks among themselves. Another 
passage, soon after, seems to corroborate further the belief in Isokrates' 
consistent pursuit of an expedition against the Persians. At 5-136 he says:
I should have given much to be able to blend into one all the speeches I have 
delivered on these matters; for the present discourse would then appear more 
worthy of its theme. But, as things are, it devolves upon you to search out and 
consider, from all my speeches, the arguments which bear upon and urge you to 
this war; for so you voll best resolve upon the matter (trans. Norlin, with slight 
adaptation).
On the other hand there are two difficulties in accepting these 
statements by Isokrates and the allegation of Speusippos as proof that 
Isokrates appealed to a succession of prospective commanders-in-chief of 
an expedition against the barbarians after it became clear that his fellow- 
Athenians did not intend to assume the role. First there is the fact that in 
Philippos Isokrates mentions several times that he had treated the same 
themes previously (see 5.9-11, 63-64, 93); the difficulty is that in these 
passages, two of which explicitly mention Panegyrikos by name, Isokrates
speaks in a way which seems to exclude further treatm ents of the theme in 
the interval between these two surviving works: a t 5 9ff. he introduces his 
intention of advising the pursuit of the twin-goals of reconciliation among 
the Greek states and a war against Persia: he adds "anep ev TQjnavrryi^ iiapXoytj) 
Tuyxdvto GuiißeßoyXeiwtJL^ " and continues “toyra 8e Sutvor]8ti^ , icod vopiicsoc^  oySenor’ dv
301
eypeöfjvoi raXXim Tayrrft yTTo8ecav oySe jcoivorepav oy8e pidXXov duaaiv 4iiv  crc^^poyoav, 
empöT^ v naXiv ypchfrca nep' ayi%, .... opmv 8’ o n  xaXendv eon  nepi rfjv ch5tt|V yndeecnv 5yo 
Xoyoy$ overran eureiv". The resolution of the apparent contradiction between 
these passages and those mentioned above (at 5 129-131 & 136) is to be 
found in the fact tha t in these passages where Isokrates speaks as if he has 
only once before written in this way he means to include both his themes 
of reconciliation among the Greeks and of an expedition against the 
barbarians;1 on the other hand, the passages where he speaks of having 
treated the subject on a number of previous occasions, he refers only to the 
proposal of an expedition against the barbarians.
The second difficulty is that the list of recipients offered by 
Speusippos, and added to or emended by modern scholars, is based in some 
cases upon conjecture and in others cases the supporting evidence is 
problematical. At 5-61 Isokrates does refer to a letter which he had sent to 
Dionysios the tyrant. This seems to provide a link with Speusippos' claim 
that Dionysios the ty ran t had been merely the first of several prominent 
leaders of states to receive an address from Isokrates in which he urged his 
Panhellenic projects. Speusippos' allegation concerning Dionysios I is also 
linked to the proem of a letter to this ruler which appears in the Isokratean 
corpus as Epistle 1. It is often assumed that w hat was to follow the proem 
was an invitation to Dionysios to assume the role of leading the Greeks in 
pursuit of the plans advanced in Panegyrikos.2 The assumption, while 
seductive, goes beyond the evidence. The context of the reference in 
Philippes is important: a t 5-61-2 Isokrates apologizes to Philip for his 
apparent presumption in writing to him, when he (Isokrates) is not a 
leading public figure; it is this apology which he tells Philip he had also 
extended to Dionysios when he had written to him; there is no implication 
th a t the two letters shared the same theme. The proem of Epistle 1 seems
U nless the Ninth Letter (to Archidamos) v/as ever a completed ’work (see Ep. 
9.1119; and see belov, pp. 303-306).
2See e.g. Kessler, Isok. u. d. panh. Idee,, p.47; Mathieu, Les Idees. p.102; 
Bringmann, Studien, pp.55; Dobesch. Per Panhellenische Gedanke, p.43; but c f. 
Jaeger, Demosthenes, p.249.
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to promise more. The Letter is dated on internal evidence to a time 
between the Spartan defeat at Leuktra in 3? 1 and the death of Dionysios in 
367; Dionysios I had rendered assistance to Athens' allies the Spartans 
during the Boiotian invasion of the Peloponnese in 369 (Xen. 7.1.20-22; D.S. 
15-70.1), and in 366 the Athenians passed a decree honouring Dionysios 
and his sons, which was followed in the next year by an alliance between 
Athens and Dionysios (Tod, GHI, II. 133 &136); on these grounds Isokrates' 
Epistle 1 is commonly dated to 366-367: some scholars have argued that its 
completion was preempted by Dionysios’ death.1 A problem with this 
explanation for the Letter's incompleteness is that, if it is this Letter to 
which Isokrates refers in Philippos. Isokrates' wording (5 61: anep eueoreüa 
Km TTpöc Aiovyuiov) indicates that a letter was sent, not merely composed and 
never completed.2 Another difficulty is that the diplomatic context of 366- 
367 does not seem an appropriate time for Isokrates to have addressed a 
public letter to Dionysios in which he urged the tyrant to lead the Greeks in 
a war against the Great King: for the Athenian decree honouring Dionysios 
commended the tyrant and his sons for their friendship towards Athens 
and her allies and for their support of the King's Peace, which had been 
concluded by the Athenians, the Spartans and the other Greeks (Tod, GHI 
II. 133,11.19-26). Given this background of Athenian public foreign policy 
it seems singularly inappropriate and injudicious that Isokrates should 
have chosen such a time to advocate that the Greeks should unite behind 
Dionysios in a war against Persia. Careful examination of the Letter itself 
advises further caution. The proem which survives reads like a collection 
of topoi which occur also in Philippos: however, there is a significant 
difference, since Epistle 1 offers no specific or immediate context in Greek 
affairs which is said to have prompted the author to take up his theme (cf. 
the remarks upon his concern for the long-term security of the Peace in 
Philippos [5 6-91); Isokrates makes the point, used also in Philippos. that 
public festivals are suitable for oratorical displays, but are not the 
appropriate venue or means for those who wish to get something achieved; 
nor is he addressing the leaders of some (Greek) state since his concern is 
broader: he has decided "to give advice concerning the safety of the 
Hellenes" (Ep. 1.6-7). His theme is no more precisely defined than this, 
although he ventures to offer the belief that "our city would gladly make
^or the date and for the explanation of its incompleteness see Drerup, 
Isocratis Opera Omnia pp. CLVIII-CLIX; also Mathieu, Les Idees. pp.103-104.
2Cf. Jaeger, Demosthenes, p.248.
herself available to support you, if you were to do some good on behalf of 
Greece" (Ep. 1.6; with this expression cf. 5 130); there is no mention of an 
expedition against the barbarians. In the light of what we know of Athens' 
foreign relations at the time not long before Dionysios* death, it would seem 
surprising, to say the least, if Isokrates had at that time intended to 
compose a discourse aimed at encouraging Dionysios to lead Athens and the 
other Greeks against the Persians.
Of Speusippos' other two alleged recipients of invitations from 
Isokrates to assist in fulfilling his Panhellenic goals no corroborative 
evidence exists. Agesilaos, whom Speusippos claims to have been 
addressed on the theme by Isokrates before he turned to Dionysios, has 
been suggested as representing a confusion on the part of Speusippos 
between Agesilaos and his son Archidamos.1 Archidarnos is the one 
candidate listed for whom there is credible support for the view that 
Isokrates addressed his Panhellenic theme in a work other than the two 
major discourses which survive: Epistle9 of the Isokratean corpus is 
addressed to Archidamos, and, like that addressed to Dionysios, only 
survives as a proem; in it Isokrates says that he is now 60 years old 
(Ep.9.16), thus dating the Epistle to 356, in the course of the Social War. 
Unlike the Letter to Dionysios, that to Archidamos specifically recommends 
a Persian-war to provide the solutions to the problems which confront the 
Greek world; he notes with approval that the only Greek who has 
endeavoured to bring such a campaign to reality has been Archidamos’ 
father, Agesilaos; however, Agesilaos made the mistake of similarly 
attempting to establish in power his friends in the Greek cities (this same 
criticism is found also in Philippos [cf. 5-67]); xArchidamos is advised that 
the prerequisite for a war against Persia must be the successful 
reconciliation of the Greek states among themselves (Ep.9.11-14); however, 
this Letter shares with that to Dionysios the fact that no specific historical 
moment or context is given which prompts the writer.
Speusippos' allegation that Alexander the Thessalian had also 
received an appeal like that addressed to Philip was thought by Blass to
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*See Mathieu, Les Ideas, p.105, n.l; Mathieu says that a textual corruption is 
also possible (’Ayrpttdtp having been corrupted from \^pxi5ap(pT0\^yr|cnAccoyL but this 
seems unlikely as it ^rould list the recipients out of chronological order; it is better to 
distrust the veracity, or the accuracy, of Speusippos; see also Blass, AB, II ,^ p. 293. 
Cavk^-ell (“Agesilaus and Sparta", pp.69-70) accepts that in the 370s Isokrates 
"considered Agesilaus a suitable person to take charge of the Panhellenic campaign 
against Persia"; cf. P. Cartledge, Agesilaos. p.185, vho only says that “perhaps" 
Agesilaos figured in a list of Isokrates' Panhellenic "champions".
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have been a confusion with Epistle 6 of the Isokratean corpus, which is 
addressed ‘To the Children of Jason" (to%  Toöüvo$ ttgogIv );1 like the Letters to 
Dionysios and to Archidarnos, this Letter is also only a proem, but there is 
no question of this Letter containing any Panhellenic appeal to these rulers 
of Pherai, who had conspired to murder the previous tyrant Alexander (in 
359/6). In this Letter Isokrates predicts that he intends to advise the 
recipients on the principles of good government in their situation, thus 
making the Letter akin to an earlier work, that addressed to the Kyprian 
ruler Nikokles (To Nikokles): Mathieu, however, considers it possible that 
Isokrates, who was friendly with Alexander's uncle Jason of Pherai (see 
Ep.6.1), might have written to Alexander about his Panhellenic plans, he 
does not attempt to associate the mention of Alexander the Thessalian in 
Speusippos' Letter with Isokrates' Epistle 6 2 3Believers in the notion of 
Isokrates' search for a Panhellenic leader have introduced another name, 
connected with this Sixth Epistle: for some modern scholars have included 
Jason of Pherai as a possibility in the list of those to whom the Panhellenic 
goals were suggested . 3 However, the addition of Jason to the list is nothing 
more than surmise, based upon a claim by Isokrates of friendship with the 
tyrant (Ep .6. 1) and the remark in Philippos (5-119) that Jason was 
promulgating a plan to cross over to Asia and make war upon the Great 
King, an intention which had been reported by Xenophon (6.1.12).
If one assumes that any approach by Isokrates to a prominent 
person involved an address in the manner of Philippos,it must be confessed 
that no trace has survived in the Isokratean tradition, apart from the 
allegations of Speusippos, of such a work being addressed to anyone other 
than Dionysios I and Archidamos; it must also be admitted that there is no 
independent evidence to encourage us to believe that the proems which 
survive as Epistles addressed to those two persons are, in fact, the prefaces 
of lost works, unless they are among the works alluded to by Isokrates at 
5.1.36, where the obvious implication is that reference is being made to 
completed works, which dealt with the subject of an expedition to be 
mounted against the barbarians, and that these were available to Philip, if
1 Blass, AB, I I2, p . 294.
2Mathieu, Les Idees, p.101.
3See Schäfer, Dem, u. s. Zeit. II2, p.235; Blass, AB, II2, p.89, n.3; Drerup, 
Tpikritisches", p.649 (= Seek [ed.l Isokrates, p.13); Kessler, Isok. u. d. panh. Idee, p.47; 
Mathieu, Les Idees, pp. 100-101; Dobesch, Der Fanhellenische Gedanke, p.43, n.63.
he should choose to consult them. If they were works which were never 
completed, then we can only speculate on why this was so; the death of 
Dionysios in 307 has been offered as an explanation (though not the only 
one) for the failure to complete Epistle 1}  and the events which led to the 
conclusion of the Social War, including the threatened intervention of the 
Persian king (in 355: see above, p. 135), are suggested in explanation of the 
incompleteness of the Letter to Archidamos.* 2 3 I am less than convinced by 
these explanations: I do not believe that Isokrates laboured particularly 
long over his deliberative works, which he intended to have immediate 
political relevance: Philippos is clear proof against that; if the Epistle to 
Archidamos was indeed begun in 356, as internal evidence says, then it 
seems too long for the events of the following year to have caused the 
abandonment of the project.3 Even more speculative is why they survived 
in the Isokratean corpus in their present form, if they were genuine 
prefaces to unfinished deliberative works. These two Epistles provide the 
only solid evidence to substantiate the claims made by Isokrates in 
Philippos that he had hitherto addressed a succession of leaders on the 
theme of an expedition against the barbarians in the years between his 
Panegvrikos and Philippos; however, I have suggested that there is no 
certainty that what was to follow in the Epistle to Dionysios was precisely 
the exposition of the author's Panhellenic plans, either for the 
establishment of homonoia among the Greeks or for an expedition against 
the barbarians; nor even is it a safe inference that the letter referred to at 
5.61 was the work which we know as Epistle 1: in addition, it must not go 
unnoticed that Epistle Q has been one of the Isokratean Epistles which has
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*See Mathieu, Les Ideas, p.104 & n.7.
2 Ibid., p.109.
3 Jaeger (Demosthenes, pp .247-248) notes the puzzle posed by these three 
proem-Epistles.
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been proclaimed spurious.1 Of the two cases for which any text survives it 
seems that whatever Isokrates planned to say was never completed. We 
are left with the best prospect being that we should accept what Isokrates 
himself indicates in Philippos: only on one earlier occasion had he issued a 
public statement of his twin-proposals for pursuing homonoia among the 
Greeks and for undertaking a war against the Persians, and that the 
statement was the work known as Panegyrikos; however, the proposal to 
mount an expedition against the barbarians, which would bring with it 
advantages for many Greeks, had been suggested on other occasions, to 
people who cannot now with certainty be named. The portrait of Isokrates 
as a political commentator whose thinking was dominated by his faith in 
Panhellenism and whose regular response in particular political 
circumstances was unrelentingly to advocate his ambition of achieving a 
unification of the Greeks by means of a campaign against the barbarians 
can be queried also on other grounds.
I have argued that it is without foundation to assume that from the 
publication of Panegyrikos Isokrates pursued remorselessly the twin goals 
of reconciliation among the Greeks and an expedition against Persia; such 
evidence as we have indicates that, if he addressed the latter plan more 
often than we know, these appeals were not, apart, from Panegyrikos and 
Philippos. made in conjunction with the plea for reconciliation among the 
Greeks. However, it is the call for the Greeks to lay aside their inter-state 
quarrels and rivalries in favour of a condition of homonoia which is the 
essential end of Panhellenism: the campaign to be waged against the 
barbarians is only the means, either to promote or to consolidate homonoia. 
Isokrates' plea for the Greeks to replace their persistent inter-state warring 
with a concord or harmony (homonoia) is interpreted by those who see
Hdathieu has discussed the authenticity of Isokrates' Epistles in his Bude 
edition (t. IV, pp. 163-183) and has declared all nine to be genuine. However, the 
authenticity of a number of them has been questioned, and Epistle 9 specifically has 
been pronounced spurious by Münscher (RE, IX, col. 2204) and 0. Schmitz-Kahlmann 
(Das Beispiel der Geschichte im politischen Denken des Isokrates. Philologus 
Supplement, Band 3h Heft 4 [Leipzig 19391 pp. 123-126). Dobesch (Der Panhellenische 
Gedanke, p.46, n.73) rejects it as spurious and also cites a dissertation by L.E. Smith 
(The Genuineness of the 9th and 3rd Letters of Isocrates, Diss. Columbia Univ. 1940: 
not available to me) vhich argues that these tiro Epistles are not genuine. Vhile I do 
not have a definite vie v  upon the authenticity of the Epistles, I think that there are 
serious problems about the three Epistles vhich survive as proems of vhat allegedly 
purport to be longer vorks. Perhaps they could have been rhetorical tasks set by the 
master for pupils to complete (although vould the teacher then have framed them as 
vorks vhich purported to come from his pen and vould he have included personal 
details?).
I sokrates as a Panhellenist to mean that some form of unification of the 
Greek states is to be desired, the creation of a Greek nation. Particular 
emphasis is given to a passage in Philippos which is said to support this 
interpretation: Isokrates tells Philip that, if he agrees to support this goal 
of effecting a reconciliation among the Greeks and the pursuit of homonoia. 
then:
Men of the highest reno'vn Trill come as ambassadors from the greatest states to 
your court; you Trill advise Trith them about the general Trelfare, for vhich no 
other man Trill be found to have shoTm a like concern; you Trill see all Hellas on 
tiptoe Trith interest in whatever you happen to propose; and no-one ’will be 
indifferent to the measures vriiich are being decided in your councils, but, on the 
contrary, some 'will seek neT/s of hoT7 matters stand, some Trill pray that you will 
not be thTrarted in your aims, and others Trill fear lest something befall you 
before your efforts are crovned Trith success. (5.69-70)
This passage is claimed to show that what Isokrates has in mind is a united 
Greece led by Philip, meeting in a council (svnedrion) under Philip’s 
presidency and bound by formal alliance (symmachia).1 Yet, even those 
who interpret the passage this way, admit that this is to practise the art of 
reading between the lines;2 some also acknowledge the point which has 
been made above (see pp. 256,266-267,272) that Isokrates is extremely 
cautious both about how reconciliation is to be achieved and, even more, 
about the nature of Philip's role both in promoting this and then in general
*See Vendland (Beiträge, p.l 34) says; "ein Bundesstaat soll begründet T/erden, 
an dessen Spitze Philipp steht"; Kessler, Isok. u. d. panh. Idee, pp.54-56; atp.80 
Kessler speaks of Isokrates' ideal for Greece as "Einigung Griechenlands in Eorm eines 
Staatenbundes“; cf. Dobesch, Der Panhellenische Gedanke, pp.152-153,220-226 
(¥endland's "Bundesstaat" seems to go too far in implying some kind of federal state; 
Kessler's "Staatenbund" envisages the less structured concept of a League [de 
Ste.Croix, (Origins, p.104) observes that the German language is richer than English 
in its technical terms to cover such concepts]). Neither concept receives any 
encouragement from the arrangements Triiich Philip made Trith the Greek states after 
Chaironeia, vh ich  did not amount to an alliance, much less a federation (see Ryder,
KE. pp. 150-62 & Griffith. HJ£ II. pp. 626-630).
2This precarious practice has been endorsed by several Isokratean scholars; 
see Meyer, GdA. V, p.362, n.l; Wendland, Beiträge, pp.123-126; Baynes,"Isocrates", 
p.148; Dobesch, Per Panhellenische Gedanke, p.89. The danger lies in arriving at 
conclusions Triiich contradict, rather than supplement, Triiat Isokrates does say; this 
is illustrated by Harding's interpretations of On the Peace and Areopagitikos and 
Markles interpretation of Philippos (see above, pp. 148ff,240-1,257f,279ff).
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for his relation with the Greek states.1 For it must be admitted, and has 
been recognized by some scholars, that nowhere in Philippos. nor in any 
other of Isokrates' works, does he attempt to describe his idea of homonoia 
among the Greek states as being achieved through the unification of the 
Greeks into a new political body which would transcend, and make 
redundant, the existing city-state system.2 As for the campaign against the 
barbarians, I have noted that Isokrates carefully avoids picturing Philip in 
some formal relationship with the Greek states, and the title of hegemon is 
eschewed in Philippos. In a number of ways the presentation of the 
Persian-war does not measure up to the Panhellenic ideal: first, the 
campaign may not even happen; for the reconciliation of the Greeks may 
not actually occur (5.66), and this reconciliation is the necessary 
prerequisite for the expedition against x s^ia (5 63); second, the 
participation of the Greeks, as states rather than as individual mercenaries, 
is not a condition of the expedition (5-66, 96: see above, p. 273f ); third, 
the argument for the campaign has changed from that which was advanced 
in Panegyrikos: there the material benefits from the campaign, which will 
actually be fought by the Greeks themselves, will relieve the economic and 
social misfortunes which confront the Greek world and so will assist in 
bringing about the desired state of homonoia among the Greek states (see 
4.167-174); in Philippos Isokrates still hopes for material benefits to 
accrue to needy Greeks from the campaign (5 120-12 3X hut this alleviation 
of economic and social distress is not perceived as the means of achieving 
homonoia among the Greek states: that must precede any campaign; so, 
although the sufferings of those Greeks who are homeless wander er s, as 
well as their potential danger to social stability, is not omitted in Philippos, 
the topes is not given the same emphasis as it received in Panegyrikos, and 
there is no longer the causal connection between Persian-war and
1See esp. Bobesch, Der Fanhellenische Gedanke, pp .89-94 (a section entitled 
"Keine präzisen Vorschläge!“).
2Cf. Wilcken, “Philipp II u. <J. panhell. Idee", pp.310-311,313 (= Perlman, Philip 
and Athens, pp.200-201,203), and Perlman, "Reinterpretation", pp.310-311 (=Philit> 
and Athens, pp.108-109): Perlman says ("opovoiais actually not more than the 
preservation of peace together with the unimpaired autonomy of Greek states.... In all 
these considerations there is no hint of unification in any form whatsoever, or of any 
other form of Macedonian rule in Greece“). With Perlman's view of the concept of 
homonoia in Isokrates' political discourses cf. also Bringmann, Studien, p.23; cf. also 
E. Barker, CAH, VI, p. 519: "The symmachy of his (Isokrates' ] dream would thus have 
been a military entente of autonomous cities under a generalissimo who might be 
king in his own country, but among his allies was simply a chosen commander.“
consequent promotion of homonoia among the Greeks which is presented in 
Panegyrikos;1 finally, it is to be noted that the propaganda-theme of 
revenge for the desecration of Greece and her temples by the Persians in 
the fifth-century, which was used by Philip in summoning the Greeks in 
33? to announce his campaign against Asia,2 *receives no more than a 
passing mention in Philippqs. 3
For Jaeger Isokrates constructs “a Panhellenic morality on the 
consciousness of racial unity, and by that new moral system he is 
endeavouring to set limits to the egotistic power-politics of the separate 
Greek states."4 5 Isokrates may have been prepared to rhapsodize on the 
theme that Athens' leadership in the spreading of Greek culture had 
‘brought it about that the name ‘Hellenes’ suggests no longer a race but an 
intelligence, and that the title 'Hellenes' is applied rather to those who 
share our culture than to those who share a common blood" (4.50). 
Nonetheless, apart from the fact that this statement could be interpreted to 
mean that, not all Greeks could claim to be "Hellenes", there should be no 
misapprehension about the fact that Isokrates regarded the Persians and 
other barbarians as undeserving of being treated in a political sense in the 
same way as the Greeks; nor in this regard were the Makedonians to be 
classified as Greeks in his opinion (see 5.107, 154). Isokrates would have 
endorsed the opinion of Sokrates rather than that of x^ntiphon on the 
question of race and human kinship.
In the opinion of one of the believers in Isokrates' Panhellenism "le 
retablissement de la paix en 346 parut ä r  orateur une occasion favorable 
pour tenter de gagner ä ses plans celui en qui 1' on voyait de ja 1' arbitre de 
la Grece".5 Such a judgment upon Isokrates' view of the situation and of his 
alleged single-mindedness in the pursuit of his ideal neglects not only the
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ißringmann (Studien., p.24) notes the change from Panegyrikos to Philippos 
in the relationship between the goal of homonoia. and that of the Persian-var.
2D.S. 16.89.2: "He [Philip ] spread the yord that he y^anted to make w”ar on the 
Persians in the Greeks' behalf and to punish them for the profanation of the temples".
3¥ilcken wrongly asserts that the subject receives no mention at all in 
Philippgs("Philipp II u. d. panh. Idee”, pp.314-315 1= Perlman, Philip and Athens. 
pp204-205 D; for a bibliography of those vho had suggested Philippos as the source of 
this panhellenic, but especially Athenian, appeal see ¥ ilcken  (ibid., p.314, n .l).
4Jaeger, Paideia, III, p.79.
5Mathieu, Les Idees, p.155.
somewhat reserved attitude to Philip which is displayed in the work, but it 
also ignores the explicit concern expressed as the motivating influence, that 
the very fragility of the Peace requires further consideration to be given in 
order that it may be made truly secure. One may also wonder whether the 
previous address which Isokrates had been composing to Philip on the 
subject of Amphipolis, but which had been rendered unnecessary by the 
Peace, had intended to address the twin goals which appear in Philippes; 
no answer is possible to this question, but it does not seem inevitable that 
the discussion of who should hold Amphipolis should have been used 
merely as the excuse to discourse upon the questions of homonoia among 
the Greeks and a war against Persia. Certainly there is no suggestion made 
in Philippes to support such an intention; an adequate motive for 
composing a new appeal to Philip is provided, without any need to 
understand that the author's overriding purpose was to pursue long- 
cherished Panhellenic ambitions.
The last issue on which the believers in a Panhellenist Isokrates have 
failed to convince is their assertion that Philippes provided the Makedonian 
king with a blue-print which was ultimately to be translated into practice 
with the establishment in 33? of the League of Corinth. This belief, which 
evolved from a paper by Rudolf von Scala,1 won support in varying 
degrees,2 *but was shown to be without foundation by Wilcken's careful 
examination of the evidence.3 More circumspect attempts have been made 
to perceive a relationship between Philippos and the arrangements which 
Philip made with the Greeks after Chaironeia,4 but precise connections 
cannot be demonstrated, and after Chaironeia Philip had his own reasons 
for wanting a war in Asia and needed no Isokratean plan to show him how 
to handle his relationships with the Greeks. The real effect of Philippos. if 
any effect is to be perceived at all, must be looked for closer to the time 
when the work was published.
310
1R. v. Scala, Isokrates und die Geschichtsschreibung, Verhandlungen der 41. 
Versammlung deutscher Philologen und Schulmänner in München vom 20 bis 23 Mai 
1891 (Leipzig 1892), pp.102-121 ( the vork is cited by Beloch [GG, III2.l.p.325, n.l ]but 
has not been available to me).
2See esp. Beloch, GG, III2. 1. p.j2j, n.l & Münscher, RE IX, col. 2214; cf. also 
Kessler, Isok. u. d. t>anh. Idee, pp .73-80.
^Yilcken, "Philipp II u. d. panh. Idee“, pp. 310-314 (= Perlman, Philip and 
Athens, pp .200-204).
4See esp. Dobesch, Der Panhellenische Gedanke, pp.213-226.
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Whatever the Athenians may have thought about the proposals in 
Philippos upon its publication must have been somewhat changed by the 
obviously unexpected turn of events resulting from Philip's speedy 
termination of the Sacred War. Doubts and fears flooded back, but, for the 
moment, at least, it was too late - even Demosthenes had to admit that in 
his speech On the Peace. Any recovery of trust and hope for the 
relationship between Athens and Philip would have to come from the king: 
the initiative was firmly his.
Philip gave away nothing of his thoughts concerning Persia until after 
Chaironeia (see above, pp. 265*0. At most, there is a hint of his possible 
interest in Asia when he becomes involved in some kind of negotiations 
with the rebellious Persian vassal Hermeias of Atarneus; Hermeias, for his 
pains, was arrested, taken to Susa and executed. Demosthenes knew of the 
arrest, but not the final outcome, when he delivered his Fourth Philippic 
about mid-341; but he could be no more specific about Philip's 
involvement than to claim that Hermeias was an accomplice in "all the 
things which Philip is making ready against the Great King” (4.32). When in 
340 Philip himself sent a letter of protest to Athens, the opportunity was 
available to raise the question of plans for Asia, but it was not taken: Philip 
protested that now Athens was actually appealing to Persia to declare war 
on him, whereas a little earlier (probably in 343) Athens had passed a 
decree which called upon Philip and all the other Greeks to act together 
against Persia (this at a time when Persia was seeking Greek mercenary 
assistance to recover Egypt and Phoinikia) ([Dem] 12.6). Either Philip still 
had not formulated any plans for A ziz or he was anxious not to arouse the 
anxieties and hence the preparations of the Persians.
Philip's behaviour in Greece is more revealing. At the congress at 
Delphi which followed the conclusion of the Sacred War, Philip was granted 
the Amphiktyonic votes which had been held by the Phokians. These, 
when combined with his control of the Thessalian votes, gave him virtual 
control over the Amphiktyonic Council. Although the history of the Council 
and its very structure had shown it to be a largely ineffective body in 
Greek politics, Philip may have hoped that it would provide him with a 
means for controlling, or at least interfering in, Greek affairs. Yet in 346 
the opportunity for further activity in Greece was resisted: it is true that 
Sparta was expelled from the Council, along with the Phokians; but the 
hand of Philip is to be seen in the comparatively moderate treatment which 
was meted out to the Phokians: Thebes was not permitted to gain 
significantly at Phokian expense, nor was further action taken against the
Spartans; finally, Athens had done enough by her pointed refusal to co­
operate in affairs after Philip had passed Thermopylai to justify Philip’s 
anger and to have provided the excuse for a Sacred War against her had 
the Amphiktyons so decided: but the opportunity was overlooked. 
Athenian anger and fear seems also to have abated: in 345, in his 
prosecution of Timarchos, Aischines was able to speak favourably of Philip 
(Aischin. 1.166-169),1 almost nothing is heard of those hostile to Philip 
until later in 344 and early in 343. Philip had more pressing business 
closer to home, and the Athenians seem to have been prepared to let 
sleeping dogs lie.
The situation flared up again in 344, when Spartan activity in the 
Peloponnese caused Messene and Argos to appeal to Philip for assistance . 
Athens responded by sending an embassy, which included Demosthenes, to 
the Peloponnese in order to seek openly to obstruct Philip's influence. 
Philip’s response both here and elsewhere in Greece at this time is 
uncertain: it has been argued that Demosthenes lied in his allegations that 
Philip had transgressed the Peace in these years down to 342.2 That is too 
strong a judgement to apply to all cases, but Demosthenes was possibly 
making much of little.3
Instead, Philip returns to a policy of diplomacy with Athens. In 343 
a Makedonian embassy, led by Python of Byzantion, arrived at Athens and 
offered to revise the Peace. The Athenians debated the matter and 
resolved to send an embassy, to be led by the intransigent anti- 
Makedonian Hegesippos; they made two proposals: the one was that “all 
the Greeks who are not parties to the peace should remain free and 
independent, and that if they are attacked, the signatories should unite to
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*Cf. Cavk’TCll, Philip, of Macedon. p.120.
2See Ca’vkvell, "Demosthenes’ Policy. II”, pp 200-205 (= Perlman, Philip and 
Athens, pp. 165-170); also Philip of Macedon. pp.126-127.
3Cf. Griffith, HM, II, pp. 474-484. Demosthenes claimed (in 344) that Philip v/as 
dispatching mercenaries and aid to Messene and Argos (6.15); Griffith (p.482) accepts 
the claim, but confesses that the actual assistance provided may not have been great: 
the suggestion that Philip himself would follow with an army was perhaps sufficient 
to discourage Sparta; certainly matters in the Peloponnese seem for a time thereafter 
to have become more settled: in 343 the Spartans sent their king Archidamos with an 
army to Crete and then to southern Italy (DS. 16.62.4-63-1), while the Argives felt 
sufficiently assured to dispatch 3,000 troops to meet the call of Artaxerxes Ochos, who 
was preparing to invade Egypt (D5.16.44.1-2); these actions must indicate that no 
further intervention by Philip in Peloponnesian affairs was deemed likely or 
necessary at this time.
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defend them“ ([Dem ] 7.30) - a Common Peace no less, which Philip 
certainly accepted, and may even have proposed.1 The initiative foundered 
because the Athenians made a second demand which Philip could never 
have accepted, the old claim that each side should have what belonged to 
them ([Dem.] 7.16, 26): that is, they attempted to re-open the hoary 
question of Amphipolis.
However, it was the acceptance, in 343, by Philip of a Common Peace 
that is of interest to our discussion. There was, I suggest, a significant 
change in Philip's policy towards the Greeks after the settlement of the 
Sacred War. Opportunities for physical intervention were available in the 
months and years which followed, but they were, by and large, not taken; 
the Amphiktyonic Council was not used in any attempt to arrange Greek 
affairs after Philip withdrew his forces in 346, and when matters looked 
like becoming unstable again in the Peloponnese and Athens showed signs 
of drawing apart from her Macedonian ally, Philip finally made known his 
willingness to conclude a Common Peace, an agreement which he had not 
been prepared to countenance in the spring of 346. It may have been too 
early to consider seriously an attack on Persia, but perhaps it was worth 
putting Isokrates' proposal for a reconciliation of the Greeks to the test!
When Isokrates composed his address to Philip the king's intentions 
towards the Greeks must have seemed anything but certain. However, 
Philip was not the only actor in the drama whose intentions beyond the 
immediate future seemed uncertain. The x^thenians had just acknowledged 
that they had lost the war with Philip in the north. Their acceptance of the 
king's offer of peace had only corne about after they had realized that they 
could not muster support among the other Greeks for resistance to the 
Makedonian and after the Phokians had rebuffed their offer to stand 
alongside them in defence of Thermopylae Even then, the optimists among 
the Athenians had sought to adjust the terms of the peace and to reinvoke 
Athenian claims to Amphipolis, until Philip's ambassadors disabused them 
of such illusions: it had been a peace made on Philip's terms, not Athens'. 
Philokrates, x^ischines and other x^thenian leaders recognized that peace, 
not war, was now to x^thens' advantage; Demosthenes, despite his later 
efforts to dissociate himself from the Peace, also acknowledged at the time
this last point see Griffith, HM, II, p. 490; cf. Cavkwell, Philip of Macedon. 
p.124 & CQ n.s. 13 (1963), p.132 (= Perlman, Philip and Athens, p.158); also Ellis, Philip 
II and Macedonian Imperialism, p,14!>.
that peace was in the immediate interest of Athens.1 It was not a peace to 
cause celebration among the Athenians, and Isokrates recognizes this at the 
start of his discourse (5.0-9). Thus, the problem which Isokrates set out to 
solve after the Athenians had accepted the Peace of Philokrates was not 
how to impress, flatter or ingratiate himself with Philip; the problem was 
how to continue the policy which x^thens had begun by agreeing to peace 
and alliance with Philip, by attempting to bring concord more widely into 
the Greek world; otherwise, it would only be a matter of time before 
Athens would find herself embroiled in another of the unresolved issues of 
the time (e.g. in the Peloponnese, where Sparta, Athens’ ally, refused to 
acknowledge an independent Messenia; or with Thebes, over the border - 
town of Oropos; or in the still-undecided Sacred War, wThere Athens was 
now in the embarrassing, though not unprecedented, position of being 
allied with rival parties in the dispute; or even, if Demosthenes and others 
should win greater support and should assess the time as ripe, with 
Makedonia again).
The two fundamental proposals put forward in Philippos can be seen 
as related in two different ways: the achievement of homonoia among the 
Greeks could be regarded as the necessary requirement to enable Philip to 
attack Persia, or this homonoia could be considered as the principal end or 
goal, with the plan to attack Persia as the carrot’ by which Philip would be 
convinced of the value of encouraging the reconciliation of the Greeks, 
while also offering a means for the king to convince the Greeks of his good 
intentions towards them. The first viewpoint entails the understanding 
that Philippos was written principally with a view to promoting Philip’s 
interests; the latter viewpoint sees the work as designed to resolve a Greek 
problem, and appealing to Philip as the agent by which a solution could be 
effected, and effected in a manner which would relieve the Greeks of 
further threat from Philip himself. This chapter has argued that there is 
little in either Philippos itself or in what is known of Philip's intentions 
towards Asia to commend the former viewpoint, but that the latter 
viewpoint accords with the evidence of the work itself and is 
comprehensible in the contemporary historical situation. Indeed, it seems 
difficult to comprehend the nonagenarian rhetor wishing to ingratiate 
himself with this dangerous monarch, and risking the accusation of being a 
traitor to his own state, when he is already acutely conscious of being 
misunderstood, as he perceives it, by his fellow-Athenians, a criticism
^ ee  Pickard-Cambridge, Demosthenes, pp 235,243-244.
against which he was again to protest in his final composition, in which he 
defends his loyalty to Athens.1
The timing of the composition of Philippos is significant. Isokrates 
had not ventured to make such a proposal to Philip at any time during the 
decade in which he had been at war with Athens. It is not easy to see that 
either Philip's power and potential capacity to act as leader of a campaign 
against Persia had suddenly been enhanced; for he had not yet settled the 
Sacred War and established a position within the Greek world south of 
Thessaly. Nor is it demonstrable that the state of affairs among the Greek 
states was any more precarious early in 346 than it had been for some 
time. What had changed? What had made Isokrates believe that now was 
an auspicious moment to return to the themes on which he had spoken 
more than 30 years before in Panegyrikos? An immediate and explicit 
answer is given by Isokrates himself, when he says that he approves of the 
Peace, but fears lest it should prove to be only a temporary respite. That, 
however, does not account for the course of action which he proposes. For 
the reconciliation of the Greeks and an expedition by Philip against the 
barbarians of Asia goes well beyond a proposal designed to ensure the 
stability of the peace between Athens and Philip. What had become 
obvious in spring 346 which had not been apparent before was that Philip 
was intending that year to pass Thermopylai and to involve himself in the 
affairs of the Greek states within Greece itself; furthermore, it was also 
now clear that the Greeks were divided in their attitude to such 
intervention, and there was no chance that Philip could be kept out of 
Greece by a common resistance: too many states saw the chance to use 
Philip as a means to pursue their own ends at the expense of their 
neighbours. Given Philip's intentions and the state of affairs among the 
Greeks, it is apparent that the timing of Isokrates' proposals to the king suit 
the immediate interests of Athens and the other Greeks, not Philip.
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1 In Panathenaikos: the work was begun in 342 (see 12.17; cf.12.3), but. due to 
illness, was not completed until 339 (12.267-270): one wonders whether the attack of 
Speusippos was in any way instrumental in urging Isokrates to undertake the work, 
although there is no hint of any allegations of disloyalty having arisen out of 
Philipt-os, and the criticisms to which he professes to respond seem more to do with 
his philpsophia and his teaching (see 12.16-25). Demosthenes' silence on Isokrates' 
proposals may appear to indicate that the rhetor's political work had no impact in the 
world of alTairs; however, they do seem to have drawn a taunt from another ardent 
anti-Makedonian at Athens. Hegesipp>os: when Python, a former pupil of Isokrates. 
visited Athens in 342 as leader of an embassy from Philip, Hegesippos says maliciously 
that Python's diplomatic gestures were governed “by his schoolmasters here in 
Athens, who did not imagine that anyone would propose to annul the decree of 
Philocrates. which lost us Amphipolis.“ ([Dem.]7.23)
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Philippos is not advising the king what he wanted to hear, nor does it 
accept the course of action which he appears to be following.1 It is a skilful 
and serious, perhaps almost desperate, attempt to cause Philip to 
reconsider his policy towards Greece: it sets out from what Philip 
presumably regarded with some satisfaction as a diplomatic victory over 
Athens and aims by judicious, but not excessive, flattery to divert the king 
away from Greece to a campaign where prospects for a victory and for the 
victor were enticing; it offers the king a careful assessment of the state of 
affairs among the Greek states at the time, which is not flattering to the 
Greeks but which takes every opportunity and uses every argument to 
show that the rewards of intervention for the king will be slirn and possibly 
hazardous, and it seeks to present Philip with a different ra y  of looking at 
a resolution of the situation in Greece which will still result in an outcome 
which would dispel any concern on the part of Makedon about the Greek 
states. If Philip succeeds in Asia, then there may be pickings too for the 
Greeks, and should he fail, then reward still for the Greeks, in the reduction, 
perhaps even the demise, of an untypically capable and outward-looking 
Makedonian ruler. Isokrates was neither panhellenist nor Philippizer; he 
perceived, as did others at Athens, that here was no ordinary enemy to 
Greece, nor necessarily a guileless ally for Athens; he did not regard it as 
enough to feel satisfied for the time being with the Peace, nor was he 
foolish enough to believe that Philip could be stopped, now or later, by 
Athens by forceful means; what he proposed stood outside the policies 
otherwise known at Athens at the time, but it hinted at a policy (of 
Common Peace) which had received some support, at least among the 
Greeks. Should Isokrates be criticized more than Demosthenes, a practising 
politician, who had no competent plan for stopping Philip?2 The work was 
sent to Philip and received: that much is clear from the testimony of the 
Letter of Speusippos to the king .3 In the light of Philip's policy and actions 
with respect to the Greeks over the next couple of years it would be rash,
*Cf. Jaeger (Demosthenes. p.25G), who believes that Philip somehow made 
Isokrates an instrument of his ideas, or at least made use of Isokrates' ideas for his 
own purposes; Jaeger denies that Philip was ever an instrument of Isokrates' ideas.
20n the impracticality of Demosthenes' policy, before and after the Peace of 
Philokrates, see esp. G.L. Cawkwell, "The Defence of Olynthus“, CQ ns.  12 (1962), 122- 
140 (= Perlman, Philip and Athens, pp. 47-66) and "Demosthenes' Policy. II“, pp. 206- 
209 (= Perlman, Philip and Athens, pp.171-174).
3Speusippos' Letter is clearly based upon the premise that Philip has received 
and heard Isokrates' Philippos.
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even perverse, to assume that Isokrates' discourse was received with 
amusement or scorn. Yet the two subsequent brief Letters to Philip (Epp. 2 
& 3) indicate that Isokrates did not consider that his advice was being 
heeded. However, one thing is sure: whatever consideration Philip may 
have given to Asia before 346, he cannot be said not to have even thought 
of the possibility from that time onward; the publication of Philippos must 
have achieved that much, if nothing else.1 On the other hand, when in 337 a 
"panhellenic" war against Persia was announced by the Makedonian king, 
his relationship with the Greek states had progressed beyond the need for 
kid-glove treatment or diplomatic niceties.
If Isokrates is to be accused of a lack of reality or of an inability to 
appreciate the true circumstances, then it lies not in the proposals 
concerning Philip and the Greeks so much as in his failure to comprehend 
the vital concerns of military security which remained to be resolved by 
Philip on his own borders, before he could contemplate crossing to Asia in 
safety.2 It was to Illyria, Epiros and the north-west, and to Thrace that 
Philip was to direct his military attentions in the years which followed. 
Isokrates would not be the only Athenian who could be charged with too 
little knowledge and understanding of political and military imperatives in 
northern Greece. However, he knew as well as others, and better than 
some, the true situation which confronted the Greeks themselves in spring 
346. His proposals were arguably more truly diplomatic than the approach 
of the headstrong, self-righteous patriots such as Demosthenes and 
Hegesippos 3
^ickard-Cambridge (Demosthenes, p291) believes that Philippos planted the 
idea of an expedition in Philip's mind.
2This is revealed esp. in Ep_2.'3-4,9-12.
3for criticism of official Athenian diplomacy in general see Sir David Hunt, 
"Lessons in Diplomacy from Classical Antiquity", Proc. of the Classical Association 79 
(1982), 7-19: of Demosthenes he pungently remarks (p.7) "If a diplomat of today, on 
analysing the line he Tras taking, ’vere to find that it vas identical vith one taken by 
Demosthenes, to adduce the best-attested example of classical practice, he w uld kno’v 
that he v^ as in danger of making a fool of himself."
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Conclusion
The foregoing analysis of the six discourses in which Isokrates 
recorded his observations of, and comments upon, situations both within 
his own city-state of Athens and between Athens and other major states or 
powers in the contemporary Greek world has sought to show that an 
appreciation of the history of the fourth century, and in particular its 
political history, will be undeniably and unjustifiably restricted, if the 
evidence which is provided by this intelligent and perceptive contemporary 
and close observer is ignored. These discourses are neither deliberate 
historical accounts nor the documentary record of one who was actively 
involved in shaping the course of history at that period; nor again are they 
vehicles for a sustained and coherent political theory. They certainly do 
not offer either the analytical account and reflective judgement of a 
Thucydides or even the more straightforward and limited reporting and 
commentary of a Xenophon; nor are they exactly on a par with the 'raw' 
historical material or the Assembly or law-court speeches or an Aiscnines 
or a Demosthenes.1 However, as historical evidence they are to be located 
much more closely with those 'real' political speeches which survive from 
this period than with a strictly historical account or analysis. Their very 
form proclaims this fact, and it is not unreasonable to apply many of the 
same standards to them as evidence as one wTould apply to a 'genuine' 
political oration, although some extra caution needs to be acknowledged, 
since, as far as can be ascertained, unlike the speeches of the politicians, 
these 'discourses' of Isokrates were not at any stage delivered before a 
general public audience. Nonetheless, their author professed them to be 
intended to provide sincere advice upon current issues. Those issues are 
essentially political, although inevitably matters relevant to social, 
economic and military history are also touched upon in the course of the 
works.
Public orators in fourth century Athens did not have to pay 
scrupulous obedience to accurately recalling the details of history, even of 
quite recent history; there were many conventional rhetorical gambits,
1 It is, however, to t>e remembered that even these speeches of practising 
politicians of that time vere quite possibly 'polished* after delivery in preparation for 
their further circulation in w itten  form (see e g. Dover, Greek Popular Morality, p.9).
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which made no pretence of being fair to one's opponents); and such 
speeches did not profess to present a balanced and unbiased perspective of 
a situation. In imitating the form of such public addresses, and in teaching 
young men the art of making such speeches, Isokrates should not be 
regarded as operating outside the conventions which pertained in 
contemporary public oratory. On the other hand public credibility and 
plausibility, together with the orator's own self-credibility, can surely be 
relied upon to have imposed limits to the freedom with which an orator's 
imagination could be permitted to range. For example, a Demosthenes who 
did not himself believe in Philip as a serious threat makes an unconvincing 
picture of a speaker of the First Philippic, although that is not to assume 
that Demosthenes' portrait of Philip was widely shared by the Athenians at 
that time; it certainly did not possess sufficient influence to persuade those 
politicians who exerted greater influence at Athens at the time to alter 
their policy with regard to Philip and to the situation in the north. On the 
other hand, the famous description of Athenian policy with regard to Philip 
as like that of a barbarian boxer who has no defensive technique, but 
simply places his hands to protect where he has just been struck, thereby 
laying himself open to fresh blows elsewhere (Dem. 4.40-41), must have 
been a credibly recognizable description of Athens’ recent policy; for it to 
have been merely an insulting falsehood, would surely have been a 
pointless, indeed politically damaging, exercise on Demosthenes' part.
There is, however, a caveat which must be expressed in making 
comparison between these discourses of Isokrates and the published 
speeches of the Athenian platform-orators: whatever degree of editing the 
public orators exercised in publishing their orations, we know that their 
audience at the time of initial delivery was as varied as the composition of 
an Athenian Assembly or law-court. We know rather less, however, about 
the range of the audience which was exposed to the views elaborated by 
Isokrates in these works; it is conceivable that they were circulated within 
a relatively narrow circle of readers, but it is also possible that the 
discourses, and the observations and advice contained in them, received a 
rather wider distribution and acquaintance through public recitation and 
by word-of-mouth. They do not read as works destined only for a very 
limited audience: a particular group is not identified to which the works 
would appeal, and at the end of Panegyrikos and On the Peace Isokrates 
urges others to take up his themes, indicating that he wishes his message to 
receive wide distribution. On the whole, then, we need not overplay the
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likely restriction of his audience as a factor which would limit the 
arguments in favour of historical credibility and deliberative plausibility.
Examination of the discourses reveals in each case a work which can, 
and should, be understood as deriving from, and belonging to, the 
immediate historical context in which the work is set. None of the six 
discourses requires a belief that the work was composed at a time 
significantly later than the occasion which is ascribed by the setting.
Indeed, although scholarly discussion has surrounded the precise time of 
the historical setting of a number of these works, in more recent times only 
Harding's attempt to date the composition of Archidamos to a time about a 
decade later than its purported setting has seen a clear division being made 
between the fictional date of the work and its compositional date; in 
Harding's view such an interval is not an issue, since he considers these 
works to be no more than rhetorical exemplars. Yet, such a view would not 
exclude the possibility of any, or all, these discourses having been 
composed long after their contemporary significance had faded. It is worth 
noting that, although Harding's viewT of these works is shared by several 
other more recent scholars (notably Baynes and Kennedy), there has not 
been a general attempt to divorce the compositional dates of the works 
from their fictional dates. Even the tradition which dates from antiquity 
concerning the prodigious time taken for composition of Panegyrikos has 
not encouraged similar argument regarding the later discourses.
The thesis which holds these six Isokratean works to be simply, or 
even primarily, rhetorical tours-de-force composed by the master 
rhetorician as examples for his students has been shown to be an 
unnecessary and improbable interpretation. It is improbable, prima facie. 
that Isokrates waited until the twilight years of his career as a teacher of 
rhetoric to generate most of the deliberative speeches which entered the 
corpus of his writings; furthermore, it is unnecessary to pursue a thesis 
which is flatly contradicted by the author's own statements regarding the 
purpose of these works. Certainly the observations, arguments, political 
commentary and advice contained in the works themselves do not lend 
themselves to such a thesis.
It has been a major part of this thesis to demonstrate that Isokrates, 
although shunning the personal limelight of an active political career, was 
by no means politically ignorant or naive, nor was he the ancient Athenian 
equivalent of an ivory-towered academic, out of touch with political reality. 
I have argued that on each occasion when he elected to publish his 
thoughts and advice on a current political situation he did so in a manner
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which revealed his understanding and alertness to the political exigencies, 
sensitivities and subtleties involved. By the end of the 360s he was aware 
of a growing Athenian confidence with regard to foreign relations, and of 
his fellow-Athenians' desire to regain their international prestige, which 
had been unceremoniously and peremptorarily cut short by the King's 
Peace; his advice in Panegyrikos offered a means to that end, while taking 
cognizance of the political reality of Sparta's current international position 
and power, supported by the Great King; the solution advocated cleverly 
appealed to Spartan pride and prestige and offered promise of support, but 
also took advantage of the chinks which had appeared in Sparta's 
leadership to make subtle threat should Sparta continue to pursue her 
arrogant and aggressive policy towards the other Greek states; the specific 
sequence called for by Isokrates' plan indicates Isokrates' awareness of the 
hard reality which inhibited Athenian ambitions at that time. Panegyrikos 
also provides supportive evidence of there being a variety of views within 
Sparta as to the state's foreign policy and it is suggestive of a sensitivity 
among Spartans on this issue at the time. By 374 the Athenians had 
achieved their aim, although not in the way which Isokrates had 
anticipated; in a relatively short time the major threat, from the Spartans, 
which had drawn other Greeks together in the Second Athenian 
Confederacy, had receded, and in Plataikos Isokrates drew the Athenians' 
attention to the importance of the principles of leadership upon which a 
long-standing hegemony would need to be based, this at a time when 
expediency seemed to be dominant in the decisions of Athenian foreign 
policy; however, the speech is not a crude attack upon the Thebans. 
Plataikos provides valuable evidence for the progressive swing in Athenian 
policy vis-a-vis the Spartans and the Thebans which occurred in the course 
of the 370s. x^rchidamos is the most difficult of the deliberative speeches 
to understand in its purpose, but modern attempts to dismiss it as no more 
than a rhetorical exercise do not pay close enough attention to what is said 
in the work. Again, the simplistic attempt to portray it as a eulogy of 
Sparta was shown to be inadequate. In Archidamos Isokrates sought to 
clarify in Greek minds the absolute intransigence of Spartan opinion toward 
the independent state of Messenia and of the consequent futility of 
contemporary efforts to secure a Common Peace among the Greek states. 
The speech suggests a more complex political scene a t Sparta than can be 
gleaned from the account of Xenophon. Another decade onward he viewed 
with jaundiced eye what he perceived to be the temporary respite gained 
by Athens to end her war with some of her allies; in On the Peace he
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addressed the desire of the Athenians to occupy a position of political 
leadership among the Greeks, arguing, as he had done in Plataikos. and 
observing that such leadership must be based upon respect, not upon 
naked power and expediency; this concept of political leadership, he 
postulated, was incompatible with that which was espoused by those who 
hankered after a renascent imperialism, and who, he feared, would quickly 
come to the fore again once the immediate set-backs of the Social War had 
been assuaged. A position of leadership among the Greek states which was 
based upon justice and generally virtuous behaviour could not be sustained 
by a strong moral position in foreign affairs alone; it must be associated 
with an equally strong righteousness within the city-state of Athens. It 
was with this in mind that soon after On the Peace Isokrates addressed the 
issue of the internal health of the body-politic at Athens, and in 
Areopagitikos called for a revival of earlier values and public standards, to 
be led and supported by the Areopagos Council. Like On the Peace 
Areopagitikos should be read, not as a counsel of despair, but as the advice 
of a concerned Athenian patriot who had some positive advice to impart; 
both these works build up a picture of a political mood at Athens towards 
the end of, and immediately after, the Social War which is somewhat 
different from the mood of depression and despair pictured by many 
modern historians. Finally, m 346 the Makedonian threat to the central 
and southern Greeks loomed as an imminent reality. If the Athenians and 
other Greeks were not to become satellites of this new and extraordinarily 
successful Makedonian ruler, then drastic action was needed. The options, 
however, were limited, and the Peace of Philokrates, like the peace which 
had ended the Social War, was again considered by Isokrates as an 
expedient, and temporary, rather than honourable solution; but if Philip 
was not to be defeated or repulsed by force, then a diplomatic solution was 
needed to provide an acceptable alternative to a forceful and direct 
Makedonian intervention throughout Greece, and an attractive alternative 
ambition was called for to engage the king's attention. This Isokrates 
proposed directly to Philip in his lengthy discourse Philippos. in the form of 
a peaceful political reconciliation among the Greeks, to be sponsored, but 
not presided over, by Philip, and in a glorious, and profitable, campaign 
against the barbarians of Asia, to be led by Philip himself.
On each occasion Isokrates can be shown to have had a sound grasp 
of the political situation, and many of his arguments in support of his 
advice demonstrate his understanding of contemporary circumstances and 
of the factors which might prove influential if his advice were to be heeded
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for example, one might point to his awareness of the pressures which can 
be otherwise confirmed as existing for the Spartans, even after their 
successful seizure of real power within Greece as a consequence of the 
King's Peace in 357. Again, one might note the subtlety of his seemingly 
inept proposal for a reconciliation in 346 of the Greek states to be led by 
Sparta, Thebes, Athens and Argos, together with his capacity to employ 
arguments which would seem likely to have appealed to Philip's personal 
ambitions and political modus operandi.
Lack of immediate political involvement on his own part should not 
lead to the criticism, or the misunderstanding, of Isokrates' views in these 
discourses as those of a political ideologist. Interpretation of these writings 
as the propaganda of a panhellenist or of a political conservatist provide 
broad labels which mask the precise and detailed response which is 
presented to each individual situation which he addressed, and cannot 
consistently be sustained. The proposal to reconcile the Greek states and to 
direct a campaign of conquest against the Persians in Asia forms the key- 
therne of both his first and his last political discourses, but there can be no 
doubting the quite separate purposes and manner in which the plans are to 
be executed: in both Panegyrikos and Philippos the plans are appropriately 
tailored to address and to meet the situations which they are intended to 
resolve; it does Isokrates a grave injustice to treat these two works as little 
more than two attempts by one devoted to a panhellenic vision to achieve 
the same end. Study of the six political discourses does not reveal 
Isokrates to be a political idealist who spent his life searching for the state 
or great leader who could implement his panhellenic plans and goals. 
Political goals could be reinvoked, but they were not reintroduced without 
careful regard for their appropriateness to the current political 
circumstances, and then they were presented as an appropriate solution to 
those circumstances. The goals, in other words, were tailored to suit the 
particular circumstances: the 'solution' was not mindlessly applied.
Isokrates' attitude to a number of political issues could, and did, 
change. A good example is his attitude towards the relationship of the 
Greeks to the Persian king. The King's Peace was portrayed in Panegyrikos 
as a hateful settlement, enforced to their shame upon the Greeks, but we do 
not find the same hostile attitude to the Great King in the changed 
circumstances to which Plataikos and On the Peace belong. When those 
works were composed the attitude of the Athenians towards the Great King 
was, of political necessity, different from what it had been in 360, and 
furthermore the situations in this regard were themselves different in 373
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and 355/4. To have preached an attitude of hostility toward the Persians 
at either of these times would have been politically inappropriate, and in 
these two works Isokrates gives every sign that he was fully aware of what 
was politically relevant at the times involved. In such matters 
consistency', presumably representing the author's own viev/, would be 
quite out of place for a work which aims to provide a commentary and 
advice which were relevant to a current political situation.
There is a degree of consistency throughout these works. However, it 
is not to be found so much in the themes as in the attitudes which lie 
behind the themes and the advice. These works show, I would submit, not 
that Isokrates was moved by some notion of panhellenism, but that, quite 
the contrary, there is a strongly conservative spirit and view which 
motivated Isokrates' advice: this takes the form of a consistent belief in 
the traditional concept of the city-state as the appropriate form of political 
structure for the Greek world. Even more conservative, and distinctly 
parochial, was his view that the Athenians should hold a prominent role 
either as a leading state among the Greek states, or even as the leading 
state. This belief can be traced from Panegyrikos through to Areopagitikos. 
and it is not inconsistent with the interpretation which has been proposed 
for the last of these discourses, Fhilippos, for which it has been argued that 
the major aim of the advice was to preserve the independence of the Greek 
city-states. This view is also supported by the intensely pro-Athenian 
stance of his very last work Panathenaikos. However, his support for his 
own state and for its proper position as hegemon among the Greeks was not 
simply jmgoist, not that of those Athenians who would have revived 
Athenian imperialism. His Panegy ikos should not be read as a crudely 
simplistic advocacy of Athenian sea-powTer: it represents a more subtle 
addressing of the power-balance among the Greek states, and in particular, 
of that involving Athens and Sparta. Then, from Plataikos onward, 
Isokrates showed a persistent favour toward the concept of a Common 
Peace among the Greek states, preferably without any compromise caused 
by the involvement or association of the Great King or of any other non- 
Greek (including Philip). It is here that idealism is to be recognized in 
Isokrates' political view, and advice apropos of contemporary city-state 
politics. For it is quite clear that his concept of political leadership is based 
upon firm ethical belief in the principles of justice and virtuous conduct.
This study has argued that Isokrates did not reveal himself in these 
political commentaries as an abstract thinker, out of touch with political 
reality. It has also made clear that there is insufficient evidence for a view
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that Isokrates was using these publications to promote the political policies 
and views of other Athenians who can be identified as practising 
politicians. It cannot be convincingly demonstrated that Isokrates was 
espousing the cause of Kallistratos in Plataikos or Archidamos. or that of 
Euboulos in On the Peace and Areopagitikos, or that of a moderate - 
conservative faction in the latter work, or that of a pro-Makedonian group 
in Philippos. The conclusion from this study is that Isokrates showed 
himself to be more an independent observer and commentator of his times 
than the spokesman or adherent of any particular political cause or of any 
particular policies. This is not to claim that Isokrates* views were 
altogether original, but only that his personal detachment from an active 
political career would seem to be similarly reflected in his political 
commentaries. In some aspects, however, there does appear to be a certain 
idiosyncracy about Isokrates* observations and advice, at least insofar as 
these do not tally with other surviving viewpoints. His exploitation of the 
combined therne of reconciliation of the Greek states and of a campaign 
against the Persians was on both occasions a distinctly idiosyncratic 
approach to two quite different sets of politically critical circumstances.
The advice in both Plataikos and Archidamos seems to go against the 
prevalent political expediency and majority mood. His plea for a 
permanent state of peace in On the Peace certainly professed to be contrary 
to prevailing popular mood at Athens, while in Areopagitikos his 
enthusiasm for a revival of the active exercise of authority by the 
Areopagos Council appears to be quite against the course of the historical 
role of that political institution during the previous century.
Isokrates* advice may have been somewhat idiosyncratic, but it 
should not be regarded as ill-informed or irrelevant. Study of other 
evidence pertaining to the circumstances with which these discourses were 
concerned reveals that, the pictures which are drawn should not be 
regarded as illusory and representative only of a commentator who failed 
to perceive accurately or to comprehend adequately the political and social 
circumstances in which he lived. His portrayal of current political and 
social circumstances, his identification of contemporary ailments and issues, 
and his advice regarding these can be seen to be a reasonable appreciation 
and to offer conceivable solutions. That his advice did not have the 
precisely identifiable influence which some apologists have attempted to 
find, in such alleged outcomes as the foundation of the Second Athenian 
Confederacy or the League of Corinth, should not detract from the evidence 
which indicates that some of his advice had a less precise, but nonetheless
32&
real effect. In particular, his arguments in 355/4 against the continuation 
of Athenian imperialist ambition, and his recommendation in 354 for the 
resuscitation of the public influence of the Areopagos Council appear to 
presage real political changes at Athens, and even his advice in Philippos. 
especially that in favour of a Common Peace, may have had some influence 
upon Philip. Certainly, as has been noticed, Philip, after having received 
that work, must now, if not before, have at least taken thought of the 
advantages and possibility of a campaign in Asia against the Persians. His 
'solutions’ for the problems which he addresses in these works must be 
treated as at least intelligent attempts to address those issues, and 
sometimes his advice is possessed of a subtlety which seems to go beyond 
the answers and policies of the practising political leaders of the time.
Historians of the fourth century have treated Isokrates in a manner 
which might almost be described as cavalier, at some times ignoring or 
disdaining these political discourses, at other times referring to them as 
products of a man who did not really understand his own times or who is 
claimed to represent sometimes a reactionary viewpoint or at other times 
to be acting as the mouthpiece for the prominent political figures at Athens; 
or, more often, individual points are selected from within the works as 
evidence for general facts or observations about the fourth century. This 
study has indicated that historians of the fourth century neglect the 
evidence of these works at the peril of failing to achieve a complete picture 
of the available evidence for the circumstances with which they deal. 
Although we cannot be sure either how far Isokrates' observations and 
commentaries reflect the views of others at Athens or in the wider Greek 
world, nor can we know how widely the works were familiar either within 
his own society or again across a wider Greek audience, there is no reason 
to suppose that he did not represent the views of other thoughtful and 
observant contemporaries. Sometimes he claims to provide a view or 
advice which is not that which was commonly to be found; to some extent 
that may be a rhetorical commonplace, but, for example, it would be 
prudent, given the portrayal of the political climate at Athens in un the 
Peace and Areopagitikos, not to assume too hastily that the defeat for 
Athens in the Social VvTar had signalled the eclipse of those at Athens who 
wished to regenerate an imperialist policy. More often, it can be seen that 
his observations, especially of his fellow-Athenians, are indicative of and 
consistent with at least one strand of the contemporary mood, and 
sometimes his works appear as prefatory to the hard evidence which 
confirms that mood: thus, for example, his intimation in Panegvrikos that
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the Athenians were, by the end of the 3$Os, rapidly recovering their 
confidence - shattered a second time by the enforcement of the King s 
Peace - and that, many Athenians were seeking a way in which to regain a 
position of hegemony, is consistent with other straws of evidence for the 
time; the mood and wish finally manifested themselves in the form of the 
Second Athenian Confederacy. A similar appreciation of a contemporary 
mood or train of thought can be discerned in his anticipation of a policy 
which was to become associated in practical terms with the politician 
Euboulos by the later 350s, and by his foreshadowing of the noticeably 
more active political involvement of the Areopagos Council in the latter half 
of the fourth century.
Perikles asserted in his Funeral Oration that a man who took no 
interest in politics was not a man to be complimented for keeping himself 
free of political meddling, but was to be condemned for his uselessness (see 
Thuc. 2.40.2). Isokrates did not engage himself in a life of active political 
leadership, but a significant part of his purpose in providing a rhetorical 
education for his students;, and in composing these political commentaries 
was to make a contribution to the political life of his state. In the opening 
of Philippes Isokrates has one who criticizes him for having the temerity to 
offer advice to Philip say. "Do you not, then, think that the man who has 
achieved such great things will pronounce the sender of this discourse a 
great simpleton, and will consider that he was utterly deluded both as to 
the power of his words and his own insight" (5 2 1). It is the conclusion of 
this study that we should join, not those who would support such a view of 
this and of the other political discourses by Isokrates, but. that we should 
count ourselves among those who, upon reading Philippos (and his other 
political commentaries), "were ashamed of their former presumption and 
repented of all they had said, acknowledging that they had never been so 
mistaken about anything in all their lives" (5 23)
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